USC Annenberg

USC University of Southern California

IJoC International Journal of Communication



Table of Contents

Articles

Shifting Demographics: Understanding How Ethnically Diverse Networks Influence Latinos' Political Uses of Social Media and Offline Political Engagement
Andrea M. Quenette, Alcides Velasquez
ABSTRACT PDF 21 pgs.

Mo "Meta" Blues: How Popular Culture Can Act as Metajournalistic Discourse
Patrick Ferrucci
ABSTRACT PDF 18 pgs.

Between Violence and Exclusion: Cinematic Representation of Gender Politics in Antarmahal and Water
Imran Mazid
ABSTRACT PDF 19 pgs.

Media Censures: The Hutchins Commission on the Press, the New York Intellectuals on Mass Culture
Stephen Bates
ABSTRACT PDF 18 pgs.

Immigrants' Church Participation and Community Integration: The Mediating Role of the Local Storytelling Network
Minhee Son
ABSTRACT PDF 23 pgs.

The Whole World Is Watching: Comparing European and United States News Coverage of the U.S. 2008 and 2016 Elections
Peter Van Aelst, Rens Vliegenthart, Amber E. Boydstun
ABSTRACT PDF 23 pgs.

Audience, Media, and Cultural Factors as Predictors of Multiscreen Use: A Comparative study of the Netherlands and the United States
Claire M. Segijn, Anastasia Kononova
ABSTRACT PDF 23 pgs.

A Racial Reckoning of a Progressive Ideology in Public Discourse
Sue Robinson
ABSTRACT PDF 19 pgs.

Routine Adjustments: How Journalists Framed the Charleston Shootings
William P. Cassidy, Betty H. La France, Sam Babin
ABSTRACT PDF 21 pgs.

Business Strategies of Korean TV Players in the Age of Over-The-Top (OTT) Video Service
Eun-A Park
ABSTRACT PDF 22 pgs.

Imbalances in On-Demand Documentary Offerings. The Case of a Small Media Market: Belgium
Catalina Iordache, Eline Livémont
ABSTRACT PDF 26 pgs.

It's Only a Game, Let's Leave Politics Out of It: Mega-Sporting Events, Broadcasting Rights, and Network News Bias
Catie Snow Bailard, Mark Major
ABSTRACT PDF 22 pgs.

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4839–4859 1932–8036/20180005

Shifting Demographics: Understanding How Ethnically Diverse Networks Influence Latinos' Political Uses of Social Media and Offline Political Engagement

ANDREA M. QUENETTE
Indiana University East, USA

ALCIDES VELASQUEZ
University of Kansas, USA

Although prior work has demonstrated a link between online political engagement and offline participation, less is known about which mechanisms might influence online political opinion expression. This study examined specific constructs that might lead to increased social media engagement among Latinos—a demographic group with high social media adoption, but lower levels of political participation. Results from this study, using data from the 2016 presidential election, suggest that acculturation processes can explain the likelihood of online political engagement, willingness to share opinions, and offline political participation. Findings indicate that for Latinos, the ethnic heterogeneity of one's social media network and perceptions of commonality between one's own ethnic group and other ethnic and racial groups drive willingness to share opinions, online political engagement, and, indirectly, offline political participatory behaviors. Results are contextualized in relation to the ways Latinos uniquely integrate with U.S. political culture through online engagement.

Keywords: acculturation, social media political expression, political participation, social networks, quantitative, survey

The increase in the Latino population in the United States has elicited speculation regarding its potential impact on the makeup of the U.S. political landscape. Population growth among this ethnic group has surpassed all others: In the year 2000, Latinos represented 12.5% of the entire U.S. population, and by 2014, they represented 17.3% of people in the United States (Stepler & Brown, 2016). Moreover, since the year 2000, the percentage of U.S.-born Latinos has exceeded that of those who have immigrated. Between 2010 and 2014, approximately only 1 in 4 Latinos were new immigrants (Stepler & Brown, 2016). However, Latinos' political and civic engagement, including voter turnout, has consistently lagged behind that of other races and ethnic groups, such as Whites and African Americans (DeSipio, 2006). We use the term *Latino* to refer to an ethnic group that comprises heterogeneous subgroups.

Andrea M. Quenette: aquenett@iu.edu
Alcides Velasquez: alcides.velasquez@gmail.com
Date submitted: 2018–02–27

Copyright © 2018 (Andrea M. Quenette and Alcides Velasquez). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

Acculturation is one theoretical construct that has been proposed to explain the political behaviors of ethnic minorities in the United States. In this study, we define acculturation as a dual and long-term process of cultural and psychological change that takes place when two cultural groups and their members come into contact (Berry, 2001; Gordon, 2010). At the individual level, this contact implies changes in the behavioral repertoire of a person, and at the group level, it implies changes in both or either of the cultures that come into contact.

The long-term process of acculturation has been documented as enduring across generations, as families and social groups pass on their cultural thumbprint to the following generations (Miller, 2010; Valentine, 2001). Previous studies have operationally defined it in terms of English language dominance and as number of years in the country (e.g., Rumbaut, 1994; Santoro & Segura, 2011; Stokes-Brown, 2012), and they have shown how, as immigrant ethnic minorities spend more time in the United States and learn English, they become better integrated into the country and gain social mobility (Rumbaut, 2008).

In this study, we look at acculturation not only in terms of language dominance and time in the United States, but also using two additional components: social media social network ethnic diversity, and perceived commonality with other races and ethnicities. This novel focus ensures the incorporation of the key distinction between the structural and identification dimensions of the acculturation process (Gordon, 2010) discussed by Sam and Berry (2010) regarding cultural learning and social identity processes. This distinction is discussed in further detail in the following section.

Furthermore, English language media use has long been regarded as an important contributing factor in the acculturation process (Subervi-Velez, 1986). However, social media platforms have increasingly become the most important way people find news, learn about political issues, and encounter and share information and political views. Moreover, they also provide a place for individuals to discuss relevant issues, and interact and maintain their personal relationships; social media affords the combination of mass and interpersonal communication (Carr & Hayes, 2015).

A recent Pew report found that around 73% of Latinos are Facebook users, 38% use Instagram, and 20% use Twitter (Smith & Anderson, 2018). Because Latinos are among the most avid users of social media in the United States, this study set out to examine how acculturation processes contribute to Latinos' engagement in emerging modes of political participation (i.e., social media political expression) and in more traditional forms of political engagement. We argue that as individuals from Latino heritage who are users of social media applications become more socially integrated and identify more closely with mainstream American culture and society, their online and offline political engagement will shift. We believe that they will be less willing to self-censor their political opinions, more likely to engage in expressive political behaviors online, and participate in the political process in more traditional ways.

This study expands our knowledge of social media and offline political behaviors by combining acculturation theory and spiral of silence concepts. Specifically, this study examines a mechanism through which social media social network ethnic diversity and Latinos' perceived group commonality with Whites and African Americans lead to an increase in social media political expression and traditional forms of political participation through the mediating role of willingness to self-censor (WTSC). In short, this study examines

whether acculturation through social media, together with an increased sense of commonality with social groups other than the Latino pan-ethnic identity, negatively influences individuals' WTSC and positively impacts social media political expression, ultimately creating a greater path for traditional political participation.

Acculturation

There are individual differences in the way people go about the acculturation process. Berry (2005) has uncovered four different acculturation strategies. These strategies are derived from the distinction between the personal preferences, attitudes, and behaviors related to maintenance of the original culture and how to connect with and participate in the larger society together with other ethno-cultural groups in the host country. In this study, we focus exclusively on the relative preference of being part of the larger society and having contact with other ethno-cultural groups. Berry (2005) identified these strategies as assimilation and integration. The difference between these two strategies is the relative desire to maintain one's culture and heritage together with the host culture.

The process of acculturation involves social, cultural, and psychological changes (Berry, 2001; Gordon, 2010; Sam & Berry, 2010). The psychological changes refer to observations at the individual level of the different transformations that might take place as part of culture contact situations. These changes influence an individual's affective, behavioral, and/or cognitive functions and perceptions (Sam & Berry, 2010). The study of these different facets of the individual has been traditionally linked with theoretical approaches such as a stress and coping framework, a cultural learning perspective, and a social identification theory approach, respectively.

Social media platforms have become a space for new patterns of sociality and a place where individuals construct and perform their various self-identities as they interact with a variety of audiences (Papacharissi, 2010). We argue that the cultural learning process of acculturation can manifest on social media in the form of the ethnic composition of individuals' social media social network. Although previous studies have operationally defined acculturation in terms of the ethnic/racial diversity of coworkers and friends who constitute individuals' social networks under acculturation processes (e.g., Tucker & Santiago, 2013), this operational definition still describes a meaningful portion of the social contact that Latino social media users currently have with others.

Additionally, acculturation can also be conceived in terms of perceived commonality with other races and ethnicities as part of the social identity component of the acculturation process. We believe this is the case because social identification with other social groups present in the host culture can be considered a manifestation of a positive orientation toward that host culture, and also because it represents the identification subprocesses of acculturation (Gordon, 2010).

In sum, on one hand, this study focuses on the behavioral aspects of acculturation processes; it assumes that interethnic contact through social media entails a shift in individuals' communication styles and values (Gordon, 2010; Sam & Berry, 2010) and is representative of the structural subprocess of acculturation. On the other hand, the study assumes a gradual cognitive transformation reflected in the

perceptions of commonality of Latinos with regard to other ethnicities and races, which is part of the identification subprocess (Gordon, 2010). Therefore, we assume that different levels of acculturation will be reflected in Latinos' perceived degree of commonality with other groups and in the degree to which their social media social networks reflect interethnic group contact. We use this operational definition in addition to the traditional operationalization of acculturation based on time in the country and English language dominance because we believe that our operational definition captures other aspects of the level of acculturation of Latino social media users given the current makeup of this population (Stepler & Brown, 2016) and the cultural and social importance of social media.

Latinos' Acculturation and Political Participation

The vast majority of studies examining the relationship between acculturation and political participation have defined this concept in terms of time spent in the United States (Lien, 1994), generation status (Santoro & Segura, 2011), or English language proficiency (Stokes-Brown, 2012). Currently, nearly half of Latinos in the United States who are able to vote are second- or third-generation Latinos born from immigrant parents or from Mexicans who crossed the border (Cisneros, 2014, p. 9). This means that they speak English fluently because they have gone to school and operated socially using this language. However, traditional cultural values, customs, and social connections might still be present despite their having been born in the United States or speaking English. In other words, those previous definitions might not be reflective of the acculturation levels present for the new makeup of the Latino population in the United States. Therefore, we complement them with our proposed conceptual approach.

A research strand already exists that has examined the relationship between acculturation and Latinos' political behaviors and attitudes that can be linked to cultural learning and social identification approaches. Research on Latinos' political participation examining acculturation from a cultural learning perspective has defined acculturation regarding social integration. In this case, acculturation has been observed in terms of the diversity of Latinos' social networks. Tucker and Santiago (2013) found that acculturation, measured as heterogeneity of friendship and coworker networks, was positively and significantly related to civic engagement. In another study, Albarracin and Valeva (2011) examined how the degree to which Latinos were connected to other members of society influenced their participation in different political activities. Findings suggest that individuals with social networks extending beyond their own ethnic group were more likely to contact a public official and work for or contribute to a political candidate.

Research using social identification theory to approach the acculturation process and its relationship with political activity has focused on the different roles that Latinos' pan-ethnic identification and/or identification with other social groups or with the American society as a whole plays in their political activities. Findings in this area suggest that group identity and group consciousness influence their political behaviors such as voting and voting registration. For example, one who primarily identifies as American is more likely to register to vote, to vote (Valdez, 2011), and to engage in civic activities (Tucker & Santiago, 2013). Similarly, Latinos' perceptions of linked fate with Anglos in their community were associated positively with contacting public officials (Albarracin & Valeva, 2011). These findings resonate with previous research showing that youth identifying mainly as Latino/Hispanic are less assimilated than those who adopt

an American identity (Portes & MacLeod, 1996), and older generations of ethnic minorities adopt an American self-identity more than an ethnic or national-origin identity (Rumbaut, 1994).

In sum, research points at a relationship between acculturation—defined under a cultural learning and social identity approach—and different forms of political engagement. These findings suggest that as people increase their social contact with individuals from other races and ethnicities, they learn and adopt the prevalent social norms, including forms of political engagement. Likewise, as Latinos integrate, a sense of belonging, commonality, and identification with the mainstream culture and with other groups becomes more prevalent. These perceptions of commonality and identity lead to higher levels of participation as a sense of a shared future becomes more salient.

Social media platforms have become a new route through which people can become politically active. On these types of online platforms, people can share and discuss their political views, political information, and news. Based on this evidence, we hypothesize that, similar to other forms of political participation, as individuals acculturate, they will tend to use social media as a means for greater political expression.

H1: Social network ethnic heterogeneity will be positively related to social media political expression.

H2: Perceptions of group commonality will be positively related to social media political expression.

Acculturation and Willingness to Self-Censor

Spiral of silence theory conceptualizes public opinion as a social control device. Because people have a natural fear of becoming socially isolated, they tend to silence their opinions when they believe their opinions go against the opinion climate at any particular moment (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Therefore, spiral of silence processes apply to specific opinions in specific contexts because opinion climate regarding a particular issue might vary by moments in the situational and social setting. In other words, self-censorship from this perspective is conceptualized as a situation-based construct.

However, others argue individual differences exist that obstruct or wane self-censorship processes and that part of these differences might be due to traits that people bring to different opinion expression contexts (Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan, 2005; Matthes et al., 2012). Hayes et al. (2005) argued that, despite their perceived opinion climate, some individuals are more willing to express their opinion and that people have a tendency to self-censor that is relatively constant. Contrary to a situationist conceptualization of self-censorship, this definition assumes a dispositional or trait-based conceptualization of self-censorship. Such conceptualization assumes a personologist view, which implies that this disposition is stable across situations and is not likely to change depending on the issue or the social or political context. Following this line of thought, Hayes et al. (2005) argued that WTSC can be conceptualized as a characteristic of a person that will "enhance the likelihood that the person will refrain from speaking his or her opinion around a dissenting audience across situations" (Hayes et al., 2005, p. 304). This definition assumes that people have dispositions that are relatively stable and that lead people to act consistently in certain ways across different situations.

In this study, although we assume that personality traits can be considered relatively stable, research also suggests that different dimensions of personality change across the life-span (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008) and that these changes can be related to major life events, shifts in life paths and social roles, and changes in norms (Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011; Roberts & Mroczek, 2008; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011). We argue that shifts in the composition of Latinos' social media networks and the way in which they think of themselves and how they self-identify have the potential to impact individuals' WTSC. These changes in WTSC are consistent with the plasticity principle of personality development (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008), which states that personality can be eventually influenced by the external environment.

In this sense, although we adopt Hayes and colleagues' (2005) WTSC construct in this study, we argue that even assuming a personologist perspective, WTSC as a personality trait might be prone to change. Personality development researchers believed for years that although personality changes over time, by age 30, it is mostly defined and does not suffer any major transformations. However, more recent evidence suggests this might not be the case (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). Roberts and Mroczek (2008) argued that personality traits continue to change in adulthood and, in some situations, into old age, suggesting that personality is not "set like plaster at any point in the life course" (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008, p. 33). Such changes can be due to modeling others' behavior, receiving feedback from others regarding how we should change, reflecting on changes in our own behavior that make us perceive ourselves differently, and expectations of roles we assume (Roberts et al., 2008; Specht et al., 2011). Personality changes, in sum, can be influenced by life events, normative changes, and social roles (Specht et al., 2011).

Therefore, one's general disposition to silence an opinion in circumstances of an adverse opinion climate can suffer changes over time. This dispositional variation can be in part due to environmental influences and to changes in how we think of ourselves and how we identify. In the case of Latinos, as the process of acculturation progresses toward higher adaptation to American culture, higher levels of social identification with other social groups and more social contact through social media with people from other ethnic and racial groups are likely. These forces together can likely cause their WTSC to decrease.

We argue that this may be the case for different reasons. The legacy of the political systems of Latin American countries, characterized by weaker democratic institutions and political practices ("EIU Democracy Index 2016," n.d.), creates a political culture more permeated by self-censorship practices (Shen & Liang, 2015). Those who have not integrated into the American culture may still be influenced by the political culture of their home country and thus transmit this influence to second-generation Latinos through family political socialization processes (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009). Second, Latino culture has been characterized as having a high degree of familism (Germán, Gonzales, & Dumka, 2009; Kuhlberg, Peña, & Zayas, 2010). Findings by Austin and Nelson (1993) suggest that in the process of political socialization, family communication practices and cultural background, in the form of ethnic and racial makeup, play a role in individuals' political socialization. It might be that the micro-social environment characterized by familism dimensions—such as familial support, familial interconnectedness, familial honor, and, especially, subjugation of self for family (Steidel & Contreras, 2003)—influences the political socialization process.

However, as previous research has documented, various aspects of familism wane to some degree as Latinos become more acculturated (Sabogal, Marín, Otero-Sabogal, Marín, & Perez-Stable, 1987; Steidel & Contreras, 2003). Therefore, as people from Latino backgrounds become more acculturated and increase their social contact with individuals from other cultural backgrounds, it is likely that they start to model political behaviors that more closely resemble those of the American political culture broadly. Moreover, evidence suggests that the orientation toward the American culture increases over time for young Latinos, and Latino culture orientation decreases (Perez & Padilla, 2000), while less inter-ethnic social contact might hamper the acculturation process (Waters & Jiménez, 2005).

In sum, we argue that as Latinos integrate and assimilate into the U.S. culture, their levels of WTSC will tend to decrease because of the social contact involved with these acculturation strategies and because of self-perception changes. The accommodation to the new culture includes such aspects as not only learning a new language but also adopting forms of interaction that are characteristic of the other group (Sam & Berry, 2010). This acculturation process implies changes in communication styles (Albert & Ah Ha, 2004) and perceptions of communication competence (Johnson, Lindsey, & Zakahi, 2001) that entail lower levels of WTSC; previous evidence suggests that communication culture predispositions influence willingness to express opinions (Ho, Chen, & Sim, 2013). Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis:

H3: Social media network ethnic heterogeneity will be negatively related to willingness to self-censor.

Perceptions of group commonality should also influence WTSC negatively. As the acculturation process brings about identification with the dominant culture of the host country, individuals of Latino origin are then likely to perceive commonalities with people from other racial and ethnic backgrounds. Not only will they adopt and accommodate to the communication norms and styles of that culture, as suggested by the cultural learning approach to acculturation, but they will also perceive themselves as part of, and behave in ways that reflect identification with, the broader American culture. The cognitive process of identification with the American culture and society should also bring about changes in self-perceptions regarding their WTSC. We hypothesize that:

H4: Perceptions of group commonality will be negatively related to willingness to self-censor.

Willingness to Self-Censor and Political Participation

Different types of political participation can be construed as a form of opinion expression given that many of these types of political actions are public and, explicitly or implicitly, imply the public expression of a political opinion (Hayes, Scheufele, & Huge, 2006). Consequently, Hayes et al. (2006) found that those who are more willing to self-censor their political opinions also tend to engage less in political activities as compared with those lower in WTSC.

The same pattern has been found in the online context. Kwon, Moon, and Stefanone (2015) examined social network sites' political opinion expression and its relationship with social network characteristics and WTSC. Findings in this study suggest that WTSC negatively influences political posting

on social media. Congruent with this evidence, we hypothesize that WTSC should be negatively related to social media political expression and to political participation.

Theorized as expression effects (Shah, 2016; Shah et al., 2017), social media political expression has also been found to increase levels of political engagement. Research findings have consistently illustrated how different forms of political expression through social media increase individuals' traditional political engagement (Cho, Ahmed, Keum, Choi, & Lee, 2016; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009). Based on these findings, we hypothesize that social media political expression should be positively related to political participation:

H5: Social media political expression will be positively related to offline political participation.

As one's WTSC influences his or her political expression in social media platforms and online political expression drives offline political engagement as well, we similarly expect there to be an effect of WTSC on offline political participation, dependent on one's level of online political engagement. Specifically, we predict that those less willing to censor their opinions in online spaces are also more likely to express political opinions offline, leading to engagement in politics offline:

H6: WTSC will indirectly affect offline political participation through social media political expression.

Finally, the individual changes involved in the process of acculturation are likely to have a spreading influence in how an individual perceives, engages in, and enacts his or her civic roles. Specifically, when one believes that other racial or ethnic groups share certain aspects with one's own ethnicity, this likely indirectly influences other outcomes, as does the actual makeup of one's social media network. With changes in WTSC that are due to perceptions of group commonality, individuals are also likely to use social media for political expression. Therefore:

H7: Social media network ethnic heterogeneity will indirectly affect social media political expression through willingness to self-censor.

H8: Perceptions of group commonality will indirectly affect social media political expression through willingness to self-censor.

Similarly, we also hypothesize that the observed relationship between acculturation and offline political participation is mediated by WTSC:

H9: Social media ethnic heterogeneity will indirectly affect offline political participation through willingness to self-censor.

H10: Perceptions of group commonality will indirectly affect offline political participation through willingness to self-censor.

The model used to test these hypotheses is shown in Figure 1.



H6: WTSC → SM Expression → Political Participation: -0.80 [-1.17, -0.54]
H7: Network ethnic heterogeneity → WTSC → SM Expression 0.07 [0.02, 0.13]
H8: Group commonality → WTSC → SM Expression: 0.19 [0.09, 0.32]
H9: Network ethnic heterogeneity → WTSC → Political Participation: 0.02 [-0.14, 0.16]
H10: Group commonality → WTSC → Political participation: 0.30 [0.12, 0.61]

Figure 1. Results of the hypothesized model: Links between acculturation, network composition and online and offline engagement.

Methods

Participants and Procedures

Data collected for this study were a part of a much larger project, although only the relevant data and procedures will be discussed here. Using a participant panel purchased from SSI (n = 219), data were solicited from those participants self-identifying as Latino. Participants were younger than the U.S. average (M = 34 years) and predominantly female (67% female). The sample was also more likely to identify as Democrat than the general U.S. population (72% Democrat).

Participants completed an online survey hosted through Qualtrics, although only those who indicated that they had either Facebook or Twitter accounts (or both) were included in the study. Participants completing the study were rewarded for their participation by SSI, using its specific reward structure. No information was available from SSI regarding the nature of the reward, although typically such offers are nominal in value. There was also no information available relevant to possible response rates because it was unclear how many had been solicited to participate in the study initially. Data were collected during the period October 26–28, 2016.

Measures

Social network ethnic homogeneity. Participants were instructed, "Describe your social media (Facebook, Twitter) contacts." Choices were: mostly Latino, mostly White, mixed Latino and White, mostly Black, mixed Latino and Black, or a mix of all the above. Responses on these items were then recoded on a scale from 1 to 4, so that more diverse networks were given a larger value (M = 2.13, SD = 1.12).

Willingness to self-censor. This 10-item scale (Hayes et al., 2005) assessed the degree to which participants censor themselves in various communication situations. Participants evaluated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each item on a 5-point Likert scale (M = 2.94, SD = 0.91, α = 0.87).

Socioeconomic commonality. Participants were asked, "Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment, or income, how much do Latinos have in common with other racial groups in the United States today?" Respondents evaluated the commonality between their own ethnic group and African Americans and Whites (M = 2.86, SD = 0.72, interitem correlation = 0.34).

Social media political expression. To assess how participants express politics online, a nine-item scale adapted from Velasquez and Rojas (2017) was used. Participants were asked about their political expression behaviors on Facebook and Twitter ("express views on current issues," "share news stories with your contacts," "express your views on the presidential election," "post or shared photos, videos, memes, or gifs created by you that relate to current events or politics," "click, like, or share political information"); their informational behavior ("read news articles posted by your contacts," "receive messages or information from a politician or political party," "read the opinions of your contacts about political issues"); and their attempts to mobilize others ("mobilize your contacts about social or political causes"; M = 3.23, SD = 1.21, α= 0.95).

Offline political participation. Offline political participation was assessed using a 12-item measure. Participants indicated whether they had engaged in any of the 12 behaviors within the previous 12 months: attending a political rally, attending a public meeting of their city, participating in local municipal council, signing a petition, working for a political party or movement, writing a letter to the editor, calling in to a live radio show to express an opinion, donating money or objects to a political party or movement, donating money or objects to a group that does social or environmental work, attending a social or political protest, protesting by blocking a street, or ceasing to buy a product or service because of disagreement with the politics of the company that provides it (M = 3.01, SD = 3.39).

Control variables. A set of five control variables was used in all analyses. These included political interest (M = 7.76, SD = 2.95); education (M = 3.75, SD = 1.50); income (M = 4.70, SD = 2.89); political party identification (72% Democrat); and gender (67% female). Two traditional measures of acculturation were also included as controls. The first of these included the number of years each participant had lived in the United States (M = 30.12, SD = 12.82). The second was an index of two variables, partly based on previous research (Shoemaker, Reese, & Danielson, 1985), asking participants, "[in which language you] get your news and information from the media" and use Facebook and/or Twitter (73% primarily English language use).

Analytic Strategy. A structural equation model was used to simultaneously estimate the relationships between the variables and examine the predicted direct and indirect effects of network and acculturation variables on social media and offline political engagement. Data were analyzed using 1,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples in Mplus. Model fit was sufficient based on several fit indices ($\chi 2$ = 3.83, p = 0.05, RMSEA = 0.11, CFI = 0.99, SRMR = 0.01). The tested model is shown in Figure 1. For each of the findings reported, the unstandardized beta and 95% confidence intervals are included.

Alternative models were also tested and found to have less significant fit compared with the model used to test the hypotheses described here. Information about the alternative tested models is available on request.

Results

To begin, the predictors of social media political expression were examined to evaluate the extent to which the makeup of one's social network and perceptions of group commonality influence social media political expression. The model suggests that social network ethnic heterogeneity did not significantly predict social media political expression (b = 0.01; [-0.10, 0.11]). Perceptions of group socioeconomic commonality did not significantly predict social media political expression either (b = 0.08; [-0.11, 0.26]). Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported.

Next, social media network ethnic heterogeneity and perceptions of socioeconomic group commonality were examined as predictors of one's WTSC. Results indicated that both were significant predictors. Those who had more ethnically and racially diverse social networks were less willing to censor themselves online, whereas more homogenous social networks were linked to greater self-censorship (b = -0.12, [-0.23, -0.03]). H3 was supported.

WTSC was significantly negatively predicted by socioeconomic group commonality perceptions—those who believed they shared with other races and ethnicities their socioeconomic conditions were also less willing to censor themselves (b = -0.34; [-0.51, -0.19]). These findings supported H4.

H5 tested the relationship between social media political expression and offline political participation. The model indicated that those who reported engaging in more political expression behaviors on social media were also significantly more likely to report that they engaged in a variety of offline political behaviors (b = 1.45; [1.06, 1.87]). H5 was supported.

The next hypothesis examined the indirect effect of WTSC on offline political participation through social media political expression. The model indicated that this effect was significant (b = -0.80; [-1.17, -0.54]). Individuals' willingness to censor their opinions indirectly affected their offline political participation as a function of their online political engagement through social media—supporting H6.

To examine the impact of acculturation on social media political expression, a series of indirect effects were examined. Notably, both social network ethnic heterogeneity and perceptions of socioeconomic group commonality were indirectly related to social media political expression through WTSC. Those with

more diverse networks (b = 0.07; [0.02, 0.13]) and those who believed they shared the same socioeconomic conditions and possibilities with Whites and African Americans (b = 0.19; [0.09, 0.32]) were more likely to engage in political expression online as a function of their willingness to share opinions. These findings provide support for both H7 and H8.

However, the influence of acculturation on offline political participation was mixed. Although network heterogeneity was not indirectly related to participation through WTSC (b = 0.02; [-0.14, 0.16]), perceptions of socioeconomic group commonality were (b = 0.30; [0.12, 0.61]). Those with stronger beliefs that ethnic and racial groups share socioeconomic prosperity were more likely to participate in politics as a function of their WTSC. However, the same was not true for those with varying amounts of heterogeneity in their social network. H10 was supported, whereas H9 was not.

Discussion

This study connects acculturation processes with variations in political predispositions and reported behaviors that are ultimately related to increases in Latinos' political participation. Social media platforms have turned into a space of sociality where individuals not only share and are exposed to information and opinions, but also generate norms of interaction (Thorson, 2014; Vraga, Thorson, Kligler-Vilenchik, & Gee, 2015), and political practices and cultures (Bennett, 2012; Shao & Wang, 2017). We argued that the emergence of these norms, practices, and cultures contributes to Latinos' reported political behaviors on social media and offline.

Cultural learning and social identification processes influence political communication predispositions such as individuals' WTSC, ultimately leading to political expression on social media and more traditional forms of political participation. Being part of a more ethnically diverse network on social media might offer opportunities to enact Latinos' political selves to an audience more akin to the dominant American culture. Independent of individual differences in WTSC, it might be the case that American political culture is less prone to individual self-censorship in relation to the features embedded in Latino culture. This may explain the relationship between social media social network ethnic composition and WTSC.

Although WTSC is conceptualized as an individual political predisposition, we offer evidence suggesting that it is influenced by the social environment. From a cultural learning approach to acculturation, individuals will adapt their communication styles and accommodate to their environment with the goal of integrating and assimilating into the new culture. Social media is a space where such learning processes take place. For those Latinos who belong to more ethnically diverse social networks on social media, their opportunities for learning about the political communication practices embedded within American culture are broader and might also include behaviors that are not common in their countries of origin or in their family unit, given the greater degree of familism (Germán et al., 2009; Kuhlberg et al., 2010) and power distance in Latin American countries and of low context in the United States (Albert & Ah Ha, 2004).

Therefore, these results contribute to a broader research agenda on political socialization between generations of immigrants and the role that social media social contact plays during such socialization processes. Moreover, previous studies have found that social media users are influenced by previous

behaviors of other users and conform to others' behaviors (Velasquez, 2012). In our findings, this relationship is expressed by the mediating role of WTSC in the relationship between ethnic network composition and social media political expression.

Our findings also provide evidence for social-identification processes taking place during acculturation and how those influence political predispositions and communication. Findings in previous studies show how Latinos who have a positive orientation toward American culture seek ways to identify as Americans to feel accepted in other social groups and increase their sense of belonging (Bedolla, 2003). Our findings suggest that this social identification with American culture, at least regarding socioeconomic commonality, also influences Latinos' WTSC and their social media political expression and participation. These findings are consistent with prior evidence suggesting that Latinos who perceive discrimination against themselves tend to become more politically alienated (Schildkraut, 2005).

When Latinos increased their perceived group commonality levels with other ethnic and racial groups, they were less willing to self-censor their political opinions and reported higher levels of social media political expression activities. It might be that Latinos who think of themselves as belonging to the American society enact that identification through the adoption of political and social practices that characterize and are consistent with the behaviors of others beyond their ethnic group. This notion is consistent with previous findings (Menjívar & Lakhani, 2016) illustrating how, through life changes, including adoption of behaviors and self-concepts, Latinos seek to integrate into American society. The adoption of behaviors and values and the identification with members of other ethnic and racial groups denote their perceived permeability of group boundaries and desire for social mobility in the United States (Abrams & Hogg, 2010).

Acculturation literature suggests that as people assimilate and become more integrated into the host culture, they tend to engage more in participatory political behaviors (Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Lien, 1994). Our findings contribute to theories of acculturation and political participation by providing evidence of possible mechanisms that explain such a relationship, underscoring the importance of communication factors in the process. These data suggest that assimilation and integration are associated with WTSC, a political communication predisposition that explains participatory political behaviors (Hayes et al., 2006). Moreover, in this theoretical model, the mechanism through which assimilation and integration influence political participation is explained not only through variations in WTSC levels but also through political expression on social media.

As social media has become one of the preferred ways in which people in the United States get their news (Shearer & Gottfried, 2017), and given its interpersonal communication affordances, these platforms provide spaces where the debate about issues of public importance takes place. Given that they offer a one-stop shop for intake of political news, and the opportunity to talk about politics and current events with others, it is not surprising to find that social media platforms positively influence political participation. While several other studies have shown that social media political expression and news use positively influence political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014; Rojas & Puig-i-Abril, 2009), this study situates such relationship in the context of Latinos and the differences in their routes to acculturation.

Latino identity and its relationship with political attitudes and behaviors (see Stokes-Brown, 2012, for a discussion and review of this research) have been of interest to researchers. However, this study took an alternative route to that of identity politics, situating this issue in relation to Latinos' level of integration and assimilation into American society, and the role that political communication predispositions and behaviors play in such process.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study brings an understanding of the interconnected relationships between political predispositions and individual differences, exposure, and engagement in the marketplace of political information, and opinion sharing in social media platforms and offline political engagement. As such, several opportunities for future research could further clarify these relationships and improve on the design and execution of this particular study.

The findings in this study are based on the untested assumption that Latinos lean toward higher levels of WTSC compared with the mainstream American culture. This assumption is problematic not only because there is no existing direct evidence to support this claim, but also because it assumes that this disposition will be present among a group whose monolithic identity can be contested. Latinos, as an ethnic group, consist of heterogeneous subgroups. Latinos in the United States are immigrants from a wide variety of countries; they may be part of a second or third generation of immigrants or even of descended from Mexicans who became Americans after the Mexican-American war. Such diverse roots make any claims and assumptions about a unique Latino identity problematic.

However, although the idea of a pan-ethnic Latino identity may not necessarily be associated with political prescriptions such as WTSC, the experience as a Latino within the social and cultural order of the United States might be. It might be the case that the experience as an ethnic minority translates into perceptions of minority opinion, especially for issues salient to that ethnic group, which would make members of that minority more likely to silence their opinions to avoid social exclusion (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Further studies should focus on providing evidence about whether Latinos in the United States are more prone to WTSC, or whether minority experiences—such as discrimination or minority opinion perceptions—play any role in WTSC predispositions.

Part of the relationship we found between WTSC and political expression on social media might be explained in part by the difference between opinion engagement strategies and opinion avoidance strategies (Ho et al., 2013). Future research should examine the extent to which either of these strategies influences the model presented here. Second, while socioeconomic perceptions are likely influential and potentially represent a particularly robust form of social identification (Sanchez, 2006; Sanchez & Vargas, 2016), future work should explore other types of perceptions about connections between one's own racial or ethnic identity and other groups. Additionally, this study took into account only those acculturation processes relative to integration with the host culture without considering the role that maintenance of the original culture might play in political predispositions and behaviors, both on social media and offline.

Finally, because of issues involved in collecting an oversample of Latino participants for the study, there were several biases in the sample that future work could seek to eliminate. Our sample was predominantly female and Democrat and was slightly younger than the U.S. population. Although we were able to control for the influence of these variables, the impact of these characteristics on the data remains an open question. Previous work has suggested that candidate preference is related to political participation (Scheufele & Eveland, 2001); we suggest that those interested in studying Latinos as a subgroup of the population seek to collect data from a sample representative of the demographic characteristics of this population segment.

Conclusions

As the Latino population continues to grow rapidly, and as Latinos carry on with their individual acculturation paths into U.S. society, their use of social media provides an opportunity to observe and mirror the communication habits of the broader U.S. culture—specifically the types of communicative behaviors exhibited relative to politics. This study has shown that social media use is a reflection of this acculturation process but also demonstrates that using social media for political expression can facilitate offline political engagement as well. Potentially, then, leveraging social media engagement can be a meaningful way to motivate offline political participation among a population demographic that lags behind other racial and ethnic groups regarding political engagement.

As low levels of political participation in the United States continue to concern political scholars, finding avenues to boost participation among a growing population segment that holds significant influence over the electoral process can provide a glimmer of hope in a political landscape that can appear dreary at best.

References

Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. (2010). Social identity and self-categorization. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination* (pp. 179–193). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Albarracin, J., & Valeva, A. (2011). Political participation and social capital among Mexicans and Mexican Americans in central Illinois. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, *33*(4), 507–523. https://doi.org/10.1177/0739986311422868

Albert, R. D., & Ah Ha, I. (2004). Latino/Anglo-American differences in attributions to situations involving touch and silence. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *28*(3–4), 253–280. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2004.06.003

Austin, E. W., & Nelson, C. L. (1993). Influences of ethnicity, family communication, and media on adolescents' socialization to U.S. politics. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *37*, 419–436.

Bedolla, L. G. (2003). The identity paradox: Latino language, politics, and selective dissociation. *Latino Studies*, *1*(2), 264–283. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.lst.8600038

Bennett, W. L. (2012). The personalization of politics: Political identity, social media, and changing patterns of participation. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *644*(1), 20–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716212451428

Berry, J. W. (2001). A psychology of immigration. *Journal of Social Issues*, *57*(3), 615–631. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00231

Berry, J. W. (2005). Acculturation: Living successfully in two cultures. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *29*(6), 697–712. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.07.013

Carr, C. T., & Hayes, R. A. (2015). Social media: Defining, developing, and divining. *Atlantic Journal of Communication*, *23*(1), 46–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/15456870.2015.972282

Cho, J., Ahmed, S., Keum, H., Choi, Y. J., & Lee, J. H. (2016). Influencing myself: Self-reinforcement through online political expression. *Communication Research*, 93650216644020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650216644020

Cisneros, D. J. D. (2014). *The border crossed us: Rhetorics of borders, citizenship, and Latina/o identity*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

DeSipio, L. (2006). Latino civic and political participation. In M. Tienda & F. Mitchell (Eds.), Hispanics and the future of America. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. National Research Council Panel on Hispanics in the United States. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK19906/

EIU Democracy Index 2016. (n.d.). Economist Intelligence Unit. Retrieved from https://infographics.economist.com/2017/DemocracyIndex/

Fieldhouse, E., & Cutts, D. (2008). Diversity, density, and turnout: The effect of neighbourhood ethno-religious composition on voter turnout in Britain. *Political Geography*, *27*(5), 530–548. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.04.002

Germán, M., Gonzales, N. A., & Dumka, L. (2009). Familism values as a protective factor for Mexican-origin adolescents exposed to deviant peers. *The Journal of Early Adolescence*, *29*(1), 16–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0272431608324475

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Molyneux, L., & Zheng, P. (2014). Social media, political expression, and political participation: Panel analysis of lagged and concurrent relationships. *Journal of Communication*, *64*(4), 612–634. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12103

Gordon, M. M. (2010). *Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Hayes, A. F., Glynn, C. J., & Shanahan, J. (2005). Willingness to self-censor: A construct and measurement tool for public opinion research. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *17*(3), 298–323. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh073

Hayes, A. F., Scheufele, D. A., & Huge, M. E. (2006). Nonparticipation as self-censorship: Publicly observable political activity in a polarized opinion climate. *Political Behavior*, *28*(3), 259–283. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-006-9008-3

Ho, S. S., Chen, V. H.-H., & Sim, C. C. (2013). The spiral of silence: Examining how cultural predispositions, news attention, and opinion congruency relate to opinion expression. *Asian Journal of Communication*, *23*(2), 113–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2012.725178

Jennings, M. K., Stoker, L., & Bowers, J. (2009). Politics across generations: Family transmission reexamined. *The Journal of Politics*, *71*(3), 782–799. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090719

Johnson, P., Lindsey, A. E., & Zakahi, W. R. (2001). Anglo American, Hispanic American, Chilean, Mexican and Spanish perceptions of competent communication in initial interaction. *Communication Research Reports*, *18*(1), 36–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/08824090109384780

Kuhlberg, J. A., Peña, J. B., & Zayas, L. H. (2010). Familism, parent-adolescent conflict, self-esteem, internalizing behaviors and suicide attempts among adolescent Latinas. *Child Psychiatry & Human Development*, *41*(4), 425–440. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10578-010-0179-0

Kwon, K. H., Moon, S.-I., & Stefanone, M. A. (2015). Unspeaking on Facebook? Testing network effects on self-censorship of political expressions in social network sites. *Quality & Quantity*, *49*(4), 1417–1435. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0078-8

Lien, P. (1994). Ethnicity and political participation: A comparison between Asian and Mexican Americans. *Political Behavior*, *16*(2), 237–264. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498879

Lüdtke, O., Roberts, B. W., Trautwein, U., & Nagy, G. (2011). A random walk down university avenue: Life paths, life events, and personality trait change at the transition to university life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(3), 620–637. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023743

Matthes, J., Hayes, A. F., Rojas, H., Shen, F., Min, S.-J., & Dylko, I. B. (2012). Exemplifying a dispositional approach to cross-cultural spiral of silence research: Fear of social isolation and the inclination to self-censor. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *24*(3), 287–305. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/eds015

Menjívar, C., & Lakhani, S. M. (2016). Transformative effects of immigration law: Immigrants' personal and social metamorphoses through regularization. *American Journal of Sociology*, *121*(6), 1818–1855. https://doi.org/10.1086/685103

Miller, M. J. (2010). Testing a bilinear domain-specific model of acculturation and enculturation across generational status. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *57*(2), 179–186. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019089

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1974). The spiral of silence: A theory of public opinion. *Journal of Communication*, *24*(2), 43–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1974.tb00367.x

Papacharissi, Z. (2011). A networked self. In Z. Papacharaissi (Ed.), *A networked self: Identity, community, and culture on social network sites* (pp. 304–318). New York: Routledge.

Perez, W., & Padilla, A. M. (2000). Cultural orientation across three generations of Hispanic adolescent. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, *22*(3), 390–398. https://doi.org/10.1177/0739986300223008

Portes, A., & MacLeod, D. (1996). What shall I call myself? Hispanic identity formation in the second generation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *19*(3), 523–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1996.9993923

Roberts, B. W., & Mroczek, D. (2008). Personality trait change in adulthood. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *17*(1), 31–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00543.x

Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E., & Viechtbauer, W. (2006). Patterns of mean-level change in personality traits across the life course: A meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. *Psychological Bulletin*, *132*(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.1.1

Roberts, B. W., Wood, D., & Caspi, A. (2008). The development in personality traits in adulthood. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), *Handbook of personality: Theory and research* (3rd ed., pp. 375–398). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Rojas, H., & Puig-i-Abril, E. (2009). Mobilizers mobilized: Information, expression, mobilization, and participation in the digital age. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *14*(4), 902–927.

Rumbaut, R. (1994). The crucible within: Ethnic identity, self-esteem, and segmented assimilation among children of immigrants. *The International Migration Review*, *28*(4), 748–794. https://doi.org/10.2307/2547157

Rumbaut, R. (2008). The coming of the second generation: Immigration and ethnic mobility in Southern California. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *620*(1), 196–236. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271620832295

Sabogal, F., Marín, G., Otero-Sabogal, R., Marín, B. V., & Perez-Stable, E. J. (1987). Hispanic familism and acculturation: What changes and what doesn't? *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, *9*(4), 397–412. https://doi.org/10.1177/07399863870094003

Sam, D. L., & Berry, J. W. (2010). Acculturation: When individuals and groups of different cultural backgrounds meet. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *5*(4), 472–481.

Sanchez, G. R. (2006). The role of group consciousness in political participation among Latinos in the United States. *American Politics Research, 34*(4), 427–450. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X05284417

Sanchez, G. R., & Vargas, E. D. (2016). Taking a closer look at group identity the link between theory and measurement of group consciousness and linked fate. *Political Research Quarterly*, *69*(1), 160–174. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915624571

Santoro, W. A., & Segura, G. M. (2011). Generational status and Mexican American political participation: The benefits and limitations of assimilation. *Political Research Quarterly*, *64*(1), 172–184. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912909346738

Scheufele, D. A., & Eveland, Jr., W. P. (2001). Perceptions of "public opinion" and "public" opinion expression. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *13*(1), 25–44.

Schildkraut, D. J. (2005). The rise and fall of political engagement among Latinos: The role of identity and perceptions of discrimination. *Political Behavior*, *27*(3), 285–312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-005-4803-9

Shah, D. V. (2016). Conversation is the soul of democracy: Expression effects, communication mediation, and digital media. *Communication and the Public*, *1*(1), 12–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057047316628310

Shah, D. V., McLeod, D. M., Rojas, H., Cho, J., Wagner, M. W., & Friedland, L. A. (2017). Revising the communication mediation model for a new political communication ecology. *Human Communication Research*, *43*(4). https://doi.org/10.1111/hcre.12115

Shao, P., & Wang, Y. (2017). How does social media change Chinese political culture? The formation of the fragmentized public sphere. *Telematics and Informatics*, *34*(3), 694–704. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2016.05.018

Shearer, E., & Gottfried, J. (2017, September 7). *News use across social media platforms 2017*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/

Shen, F., & Liang, H. (2015). Cultural difference, social values, or political systems? Predicting willingness to engage in online political discussion in 75 societies. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *27*(1), 111–124. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edu012

Shoemaker, P. J., Reese, S. D., & Danielson, W. A. (1985). Spanish-language print media use as an indicator of acculturation, Spanish-language print media use as an indicator of acculturation. *Journalism Quarterly*, *62*(4), 734–762. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769908506200404

Smith, A., & Anderson, M. (2018, March 1). *Social media use in 2018: Appendix A: Detailed table*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-2018-appendix-a-detailed-table/

Specht, J., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2011). Stability and change of personality across the life course: The impact of age and major life events on mean-level and rank-order stability of the Big Five. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(4), 862–882. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024950

Steidel, A. G. L., & Contreras, J. M. (2003). A new familism scale for use with Latino populations. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, *25*(3), 312–330. https://doi.org/10.1177/0739986303256912

Stepler, R., & Brown, A. (2016, April 19). *Statistical portrait of Hispanics in the United States*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-key-charts/

Stokes-Brown, A. K. (2012). *The politics of race in Latino communities: Walking the color line*. London, UK: Routledge.

Subervi-Velez, F. A. (1986). The mass media and ethnic assimilation and pluralism: A review and research proposal with special focus on Hispanics. *Communication Research*, *13*(1), 71–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/009365028601300105

Thorson, K. (2014). Facing an uncertain reception: Young citizens and political interaction on Facebook. *Information, Communication & Society*, *17*(2), 203–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2013.862563

Tucker, C. M., & Santiago, A. M. (2013). The role of acculturation in the civic engagement of Latino immigrants. *Advances in Social Work*, *14*(1), 178–205.

Valdez, Z. (2011). Political participation among Latinos in the United States: The effect of group identity and consciousness. *Social Science Quarterly*, *92*(2), 466–482. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00778.x

Valentine, S. (2001). Self-esteem, cultural identity, and generation status as determinants of Hispanic acculturation. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, *23*(4), 459–468. https://doi.org/10.1177/0739986301234007

Velasquez, A. (2012). Social media and online political discussion: The effect of cues and informational cascades on participation in online political communities. *New Media & Society*, *14*(8), 1286–1303. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444812445877

Velasquez, A., & Rojas, H. (2017). Political expression on social media: The role of communication competence and expected outcomes. *Social Media + Society*, *3*(1), 2056305117696521. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117696521

Vraga, E. K., Thorson, K., Kligler-Vilenchik, N., & Gee, E. (2015). How individual sensitivities to disagreement shape youth political expression on Facebook. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *45*, 281–289. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.12.025

Waters, M. C., & Jiménez, T. R. (2005). Assessing immigrant assimilation: New empirical and theoretical challenges. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *31*(1), 105–125. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100026

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4821–4838 1932–8036/20180005

Mo "Meta" Blues: How Popular Culture Can Act as Metajournalistic Discourse

PATRICK FERRUCCI[1]
University of Colorado–Boulder, USA

Prior research into metajournalism argues that this type of discourse holds significant influence on how the journalism industry is socially constructed. Studies of how journalism is depicted in popular culture make the same claim. This study, through a textual analysis of television dramas *The Wire* and *House of Cards*, bridges these two bodies of literature and argues that journalism studies scholars should not limit their definition of metajournalistic discourse to journalists commenting on or criticizing the industry and to audience members commenting on or criticizing actual journalism. The results of the study are then interpreted through the lens of the theory of metajournalistic discourse.

Keywords: metajournalistic discourse, popular culture, boundaries of journalism, journalism studies, news production

Metajournalistic discourse provides scholars with a conduit to understanding not only how journalists view themselves, but also how society views the journalism industry (e.g., Carlson, 2016; Carlson & Usher, 2016; Craft & Thomas, 2016; De Maeyer & Holton, 2016). Nominally defined as journalism about journalism, metajournalistic discourses are "public expressions evaluating news texts, the practices that produce them, or the conditions of their reception" (Carlson, 2016, p. 350). This type of discourse can take the form of reporters covering their own industry, ombudsmen commenting on journalism, or trade magazines reporting on the industry. Because the foundational ideas that undergird journalism remain socially constructed, understanding how the industry is depicted to society helps us understand how those foundational ideas are then negotiated (De Maeyer & Holton, 2016; Ferrucci & Taylor, 2018).

According to a study published in 2016 by the Pew Research Center, only about 20% of people trust journalism "a lot," a number that has decreased steadily over the last two decades (Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel, & Shearer, 2016). Perhaps not coincidentally, foundational technological changes to the media industry and society allow for far more outlets for publication, and far more places for journalists and citizens alike to publish criticisms, or metajournalistic discourse, about the industry (Vos, Craft, & Ashley, 2012). Therefore, journalists

Patrick Ferrucci: patrick.ferrucci@colorado.edu
Date submitted: 2017–12–08

[1] I would like to thank "Reviewer B" for the time and effort put into greatly improving this article. I would also like to thank Chad Painter (University of Dayton) and Matt Carlson (University of Minnesota).

Copyright © 2018 (Patrick Ferrucci). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

themselves have significantly less control over the discourse that helps shape the understanding of the journalism industry.

Carlson (2016) published a theoretical model for studying and understanding metajournalistic discourse with the underlying idea that this type of scholarship is vitally important because understanding how actors describe the industry "is inseparable from ways of understanding journalism" (p. 2); however, the theory proposed by Carlson categorizes the creators of metajournalistic in a binary manner: as journalists or people commenting directly on actual journalism. Yet, discourse on journalism can come in the form of more than simply audience comments on stories, media-criticism blogs, or the like. Fundamentally, categorizing an actor producing metajournalism as either a journalist or, essentially, an audience member restricts the manner in which society is introduced to commentary on the profession. For example, what about the entertainment industry skewering journalism through popular culture depictions (Ehrlich, 2006)? David Simon, a former longtime journalist, created the television drama *The Wire*, which features a fifth season depicting the journalism industry. This depiction received both critical acclaim and plaudits from critics and journalists, but also some backlash from the same groups for its "realistic" depiction of the industry, warts and all (Gordon, 2008; Kois & Sternbergh, 2008). Regardless of how journalists and critics reacted, however, the season received significant attention in mainstream press as journalists, in their own words, sought to explain to the public the journalism depicted on the show (Steiner, Guo, McCaffrey, & Hills, 2013).

This study argues for explicitly recognizing popular culture as a form of metajournalistic discourse with the same intrinsic authority of the examples Carlson (2016) provides in his theoretical framework. While metajournalism can affect society's view of journalism, Ehrlich and Saltzman (2015) argue that depictions of the industry in popular culture have the same effect, potentially stronger. Therefore, there is a natural intersection of these two types of discourse concerning the industry. This study examines the metajournalistic discourses in the television series *The Wire* and *House of Cards*, two dramas that spend considerable screen time commenting about the state of journalism in the United States. By doing so, this article builds on the conceptualization of metajournalistic discourse (Carlson, 2016), but it more importantly examines journalism industry commonalities depicted in both dramas. Essentially, metajournalism serves as a form of media criticism (Carlson, 2016), and the type of content studied here—fictional depictions of the journalism industry—also have a similar impact as metajournalistic discourse. More specifically, although we can learn a lot about how actors within and surrounding journalism think about the industry through consuming traditional metajournalistic discourse, an empirical study of this sort can provide insight into the manner in which other types of journalistic critics view the industry. For example, because the traditional definition of metajournalistic discourse limits itself to content surrounding journalism's real-life happenings, it does not capture the content of fictional depictions, especially ones primarily aimed at critiquing the real industry. A study like this one provides insight on how outside actors view and critique the industry through works of popular culture.

Literature Review

Depictions of Journalism in Popular Culture

Only four years after the first motion picture with sound arrived in American movie theaters, moviegoers in 1931 encountered *The Front Page*, a comedy predominantly about journalists, an adaptation

so successful it earned numerous Academy Award nominations (Ehrlich, 2006). Only a mere decade after, the film widely considered the greatest American picture of all time, *Citizen Kane*, arrived in theaters. Through both *The Front Page* and *Citizen Kane*, among other films, even early movie fans could start to see popular culture's fascination with journalism. Many films released from the 1930s through the 2010s concern the inner workings of the journalism industry, providing the audience a glimpse into how the industry operates (Ehrlich & Saltzman, 2015).

But depictions of journalism in popular culture do not limit themselves to just film, as television, over the years, became another viable medium where audiences could get a clearer understanding of journalism (McNair, 2014). Both sitcoms such as *Lou Grant* or *Sports Night* or dramas such as *The Newsroom* and *The Wire* have used the world of journalism as a catalyst for entertainment. And both film and television writers have not relegated themselves to just fiction. For example, in recent years, 2015's *Spotlight*, about the *Boston Globe*'s uncovering of systematic child sex abuse at the hands of the Catholic Church in Boston, won the Academy Award for best picture, and 2017's *The Post* about the publishing of the Pentagon Papers was nominated for best picture at the Academy Awards. Or, potentially the most famous depiction of journalism remains *All the President's Men*, the 1976 drama concerning Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein's quest to uncover the truth surrounding the Watergate scandal; the film made such an impact that it significantly affected, in a positive manner, the public's opinion of journalism (Schudson, 1992). Decades of scholarly studies concerning how popular culture depicts journalists illustrate a clear heroes-and-villains dichotomy (McNair, 2010). And these fictional depictions affect how society views the news industry (Brennen, 2000; Good, 2007). In fact, "journalists have been ubiquitous characters in popular culture, and those characters are likely to shape people's impressions of the news media at least as much if not more than the actual press does" (Ehrlich & Saltzman, 2015, p. 1).

As fiction writers often compose about what they know, it is not surprising that the screenwriters of *The Front Page*, Ben Hecht and Charles MacArthur, both spent time working as newspaper reporters (Ehrlich, 2006). In fact, many depictions of journalism in popular culture have come from the minds of former journalists (Good, 2007). In the last decade, two of the most prominent depictions of journalism have originated as television dramas: HBO's *The Wire* and Netflix's *House of Cards* both received significant attention for their representations of journalists trying to produce news while also navigating all the shifting fortunes of the industry (McNair, 2014).

Popular culture often exerts a codependent influence on society as it is influenced by contemporary society and influences society (Mastro, 2003). Because popular culture often serves as a mirror for a particular time period, it often depicts what is happening in the world, a slightly skewed version of that, or often provides critical commentary on those happenings (Levine, 1992). But, as previously noted, popular culture also impacts how society views the world around itself as most members of society actually experience very little of what happens in the world and rely on all forms of media for understanding (Ehrlich & Saltzman, 2015). This dual-pronged relationship can be seen in how scholars study popular culture depictions.

Dow (1990) argues that although the television comedy *The Mary Tyler Moore Show* often received plaudits for its, at the time, progressive depiction of a single woman navigating corporate life, a more in-

depth reading of the program reveals that beneath the overt feminist messages, it still communicates a message focused on a hegemonic view of womanhood. Essentially, although the show did depict what was a progressive woman for the 1970s, its underlying message was that a happy and successful woman must still submit to patriarchal standards. Dow argues that such depictions kept American women from truly embracing independence. To Dow, popular culture represented a type of content that creators and society could use to negotiate definitions of feminism. In another instance, van Zoonen (2007) illustrates a connection between the viewing of popular culture depicting politics and how people present themselves politically. Essentially, the audience for fictional political television often comments on content as a manner to comment on the real-life institution of politics. In a theoretical essay, van Zoonen (2000) explicitly argues that popular culture depictions of politics are a form of political communication. In this article, I do the same. Like the term *political communication* at the time, metajournalistic discourse currently means a very specific form of content, one that does not include fictional popular culture depictions of the industry. Similarly, and more germane to this research, Peters (2015) studied how viewers commented on *The Newsroom*, a fictional HBO drama concerning cable news. He argues that the audience used the show as a mechanism for not only commenting on characters and the fictional network ACN, but also on the journalism industry as a whole.

Essentially, scholars of popular culture, both from a cultural studies and media effects paradigm, have found that depictions impact how society views the world. More specifically, as both cultural studies scholars such as Ehrlich and Saltzman (2015) argue with depictions of journalists and social pyschologists such as Riddle (2010) found with depictions of law enforcement, or van Zoonen (2007) notes with the instutution of politics, the more often popular culture depicts an institution in a similar manner, the more strongly society will see it in that light. Scholars such as Peters (2015), Klein (2011), Dalhgren and Sparks (1992), and numerous others contend that popular culure depictions allow viewers an opportunity for sensemaking; this type of content is often created as a means for audiences to better think through societal issues and understand a depicted industry or institution.This is a phenemomon that Gray (2006) labels "intertextuality," which he fundamentally describes as the manner in which popular culture allows audiences a chance to reflect on media institutions and, thus, impacts how they think about said institutions. Therefore, the theoretical model Carlson (2016) proposes concerning metajournalistic discourse does include various manners that would influence the journalism industry, and popular culture depictions of the industry would also have a similar impact.

Metajournalism and the Theory of Metajournalistic Discourse

Often, metajournalism allows an audience a view into how journalists themselves see their work; this typically comes in the form of explanation concerning "what journalists say about their capacity to do what they ought to do" (Craft & Thomas, 2016, p. 1). The reason to study metajournalism lies in how this type of discourse illustrates how the very definition of journalism is socially constructed "through both the exercise of institutionalized news practices and through explicit interpretive processes justifying or challenging these practices and their practitioners" (Carlson, 2016, p. 350). As implied by De Maeyer and Holton (2016), metajournalism is not simply public utterances about journalism communicated by journalists. People from outside the industry also produce metajournalism through actions such as commenting, rating, and reposting (Goode, 2009), and furthermore through media-centric blogs or user-generated material (Vos et al., 2012). In fact, as noted by Carlson (2016), "it is through metajournalistic

discourse that the meanings of journalism are formed and transformed by actors inside and outside of journalism" (p. 350).

Carlson's (2016) theory essentially merges numerous threads of research from the relatively recent past. In journalism studies, we often examine discourse surrounding the industry and posit what it could mean about both how the industry views itself and also how the public sees the industry (Carlson, Robinson, Lewis, & Berkowitz, 2018). This conceptualization of metajournalistic discourse not only includes studies explicitly labeled "metajournalistic discourse," but also incorporates Zelizer's (1993) idea of "interpretive communities." Therefore, when Carlson discusses metajournalistic discourse, he is including discourse studies concerning how journalists themselves, through published material, define key terms (e.g., Ferrucci & Taylor, 2018; Vos & Craft, 2017; Vos & Singer, 2016); how journalists defend and rebuild the journalistic paradigm through explicit commentary (e.g., Berkowitz, 2000; Hindman & Thomas, 2013; Vos & Moore, 2018); how journalists negotiate the appropriate practices inherent in the industry through discourse detailing the intricacies of the reporting and editing processes (e.g., Vos & Finneman, 2017); or how journalists themselves discuss their inherent roles and responsibilities (e.g., Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017). But, again, not all metajournalistic discourse comes from journalists themselves; Carlson's theory allows for it to include, for example, audience comments on articles (e.g., Goode, 2009), blogs that provide media analysis (e.g., Vos et al., 2012), and how the audience might share stories on social media (e.g., De Maeyer & Holton, 2016).

But, the bulk of this type of discourse often comes in the form of media criticism (Carlson, 2016). Journalists and nonjournalists together negotiate definitions, but scholars have frequently examined metajournalistic discourse as a means of understanding how those within the industry perform paradigm repair (Ruggiero, 2004). Paradigm repair is the process by which journalists, through metajournalistic discourse, try to repair the cultural and normative boundaries of the industry, or how to provide the audience with a framework for understanding how journalists should or should not act (Carlson, 2012; Reese, 1990). Journalists also produce this type of discourse to question the legitimacy of online news, thus making sure traditional journalists protect the boundary between them and their digital counterparts (Ruggiero, 2004). In short, when journalists produce material about their own industry, it is often to label practices as legitimate or not (Craft, Vos, & Wolfgang, 2016), or as a way of defining the industry internally (Waisbord, 2013). Therefore, metajournalistic discourse produced for television could have the same effect as these "actors" label practices or emerging trends as legitimate or not.

It remains important to study metajournalistic discourse for numerous reasons, but primarily because it can "help bridge the gap between empirical and normative work" (Craft & Thomas, 2016, p. 4). Carlson (2016) argues that researchers should, however, "take seriously divisions among journalists and the blurring of boundaries between journalists and nonjournalists" (p. 357) who produce this discourse.

Carlson (2016), in his theory, breaks down three main components of metajournalistic discourse: sites/audiences, topics, and actors. The site/audiences component concerns where the discourse occurs. The site and the audience cannot be separated, however, because the site often determines how it reaches audiences and thus how the audience perceives the message. The second component concerns the topics that spur metajournalistic discourse. Any analysis of metajournalistic discourse must examine the topic of

said discourse because it is important to understand: For example, reactive metajournalistic discourse is about a particular subject (e.g., a journalistic scandal), whereas generative metajournalistic discourse is more general discourse about the industry (Carlson, 2016). Finally, the third component of metajournalistic discourse is the actor, which refers to the people producing the discourse, and these can be either journalists or nonjournalists. Most of the current research concerning this type of discourse looks at messages produced by journalists (e.g., Carlson, 2016; Craft & Thomas, 2016; Ferrucci & Taylor, 2018; Vos & Craft, 2017; Vos & Finneman, 2017).

Thus, the theory of metajournalistic discourse essentially argues that when examining this type of content, the researcher must focus on the actors creating it, the site in which it is published, how audiences receive it, and finally, the topic that catalyzes it into being. It can be argued that both *The Wire* and *House of Cards* are forms of metajournalism as both dramas find actors (television creators) reaching audiences through a site (television) and providing generative discourse (about the current state of the industry).

Method

To understand the metajournalistic discourse produced by the makers of *The Wire* and *House of Cards*, I conducted a textual analysis. Both text and video of the 10 episodes of Season 5 of *The Wire* and the 13 episodes of Season 1 of *House of Cards* were analyzed, providing the unit of analysis for this study. The episodes of *The Wire* originally aired on HBO between January 6 and March 8, 2008; the *House of Cards* episodes were made available all at once, via Netflix, on February 1, 2013. For this study, to uncover all meanings and critiques of the journalism industry, I focused on a narrative analysis of the text, the most suitable manner for deducing meaning in television studies (Miller, 2010).

Textual analysis is "a means of trying to learn something about people by examining what they . . . produce" (Berger, 1998, p. 23). Because meaning is socially constructed, if researchers hope to understand how receivers construct said meaning, they must analyze all context of a text and deduce possible interpretations (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). Through identifying "the ideological tenor of the content," the researcher can extrapolate all possible meanings and interpretations of the viewer, which is how meaning is constructed (Miller, 2010). When conducting a textual analysis, the researcher can choose one of two theoretical paradigms: a grounded theory approach or one using a theoretical framework (Berger, 1998). In this study, I analyzed both dramas through the theory of metajournalistic discourse introduced by Carlson (2016).

Called the most realistic depiction of a newsroom of all time, *The Wire* was created by former *Baltimore Sun* journalist David Simon (Lowry, 2007). From 1982 to 1995, Simon worked on the city desk, primarily covering the police beat, for the *Sun*. His work in this capacity became the basis for *The Wire*, a critically acclaimed drama that aired on HBO from 2002 to 2008. Although often called a crime drama, *The Wire* depicted the failings of American institutions (Williams, 2014). Each of the show's five seasons dealt with how a different institution unsuccessfully served the American public. For the fifth and final season, Simon and his team of writers turned their eyes toward journalism. Using a fictionalized version of the *Baltimore Sun* as their focus, the writers "created a newsroom that would ultimately face many of the challenges described and studied by numerous scholars" (Ferrucci & Painter, 2013). Because professional journalists have long called the drama's fifth season the most realistic depiction of the industry in the history of popular culture (e.g., Lowry, 2007),

numerous journalism studies scholars have examined the show. Some have studied how the fictional journalists produce news, focusing on their extensive and negative utilization of pseudoevents (Ferrucci & Painter, 2013), or how reporters cover failing institutions ethically (Painter, 2017). Others have examined the show using sociological inquiry, studying how one character and fictional coverage of said character experiment with narrative to make social commentary (Penfold-Mounce, Beer, & Burrows, 2011), or how realistic the newsroom appears (Ferrucci & Painter, 2018). Others looked to the show to get a complete overview of how each institution, including journalism, is presented (Bzdak, Crosby, & Vannatta, 2013).

Streaming-content provider Netflix released the first season of its Emmy Award-winning television series *House of Cards* on February 1, 2013. The show is adapted from a British version that aired on the BBC in 1990, which was based on a series of novels written by a British politician. Although the Netflix version primarily explores the inner workings of Washington politics, it focuses extensively on the journalists covering politics, especially in its first season (Ferrucci & Painter, 2017). Creator Beau Willimon has been criticized by mainstream media for his negative depiction of the press (Rosenberg, 2013), but Willimon argued that he tried to be as realistic as possible (Shaw, 2013). The 39-year-old television writer spent time during his career working as a journalist and around journalists. He worked at the Columbia University newspaper for four years before moving onto magazine work; he then transitioned into a role as a press officer for various politicians (Moos, 2013; Rothman, 2014). In the media, Willimon said he wanted to create a journalistic character that "wants access and influence, not necessarily the truth"; this is something he thinks is prevalent in the industry (Zakarin, 2013, para. 6). Journalists have noted how Willimon strongly criticizes today's journalism in *House of Cards*, and the creator/writer of the show admitted that is one of the main points of the first season: to understand how journalism is failing (Gould, 2013; Zakarin, 2013). Due to Willimon's depiction of the journalism industry and *House of Cards*' high profile, scholars have also examined the show to understand how it depicts the industry. McNair (2014) argues that the program continues television's pattern of depicting journalists as either heroes or villains. Moos (2013) and Ferrucci and Painter (2017) focus on the differences in how the show depicts legacy versus new media.

For this study, I viewed each season of both programs three times over a three-month period. Before the beginning of the three-month period, I had already viewed each season at least twice. During the first stage of the analysis, or the viewings, I took notes on how the shows depict journalists and the industry of journalism. For the second stage, I again viewed each season, this time looking for themes or patterns. Finally, for the third viewing, I jotted down notes and observances relating to the themes and patterns. These notes were then analyzed. This process closely follows the three-step qualitative data analysis method of Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw (1995). Miller (2010) surmises that "television has become an alembic for understanding society" (p. 145), and Craft and Thomas (2016) and Carlson (2016) argue that, through textual analysis of metajournalistic discourse, we can begin to understand how the meanings of journalism are socially constructed by society. This present study combines these elements and examines television and metajournalistic discourse as a manner to better understand meanings around journalism.

Findings

Four consistent themes implicit in both dramas emerged. Throughout the fifth season of *The Wire* and the first season of *House of Cards*, the dramas, when depicting journalism, present four clear themes through

metajournalistic discourse of the industry: fear of lost expertise, a decreasing ethical foundation, financial considerations impacting journalism considerations, and technology's negative effect on news.

Fear of Lost Expertise

Both *House of Cards* and *The Wire* spend a significant amount of screen time implicitly arguing that because of budget cuts and a significant number of veteran journalists fleeing the industry for various reasons, most organizations rely too heavily on younger reporters. Both programs comprehensively critique younger reporters' lack of knowledge of industry norms while, at the same time, extolling the positives of veteran journalists. In *House of Cards*, this criticizing discourse becomes evident early. When we first meet Zoe Barnes (Kate Mara), a main character and early-20s reporter recently hired by *The Washington Herald* (a fictional *Washington Post*), she is asking her editor, Lucas Goodwin (Sebastian Arcelus), for a first-person blog that would extol, at best, dubious ethics:

> **ZOE**: I'll go underground, back rooms, the urinals. I'll win over staff members on The Hill. They need a place to vent.
> **LUCAS**: A gossip column.
> **ZOE**: No, we lift the veil, what's really going on.
> **LUCAS**: This is *The Washington Herald*, Zoe, not *TMZ*.
> **ZOE**: Do you know how many people watch *TMZ*?
> **LUCAS**: I couldn't care less.

This back-and-forth immediately lets viewers know that Zoe is attempting to negatively affect not only the quality of journalism at the *Herald*, but also focus on gossip. It takes her more experienced editor, Lucas, to say no to the project. In *The Wire*, viewers see something very similar. In a fictional version of *The Baltimore Sun*, Simon and his team of writers introduce veteran editor Gus Haynes (Clark Johnson). One of the first scenes featuring Haynes shows him going from desk to desk advising and mentoring younger reporters. When he reads a story written by reporter Alma Gutierrez (Michelle Paress), he tells her to correct something. He walks away and the camera focuses on Alma checking Gus's correction, saying, "He's right." The clear implication is that she did not know something and a veteran did.

Both dramas also implicitly criticize young reporters for being too focused on themselves. On *The Wire*, viewers meet Scott Templeton (Tom McCarthy), a young reporter depicted breaking all journalistic rules as a means of gaining publicity for his own benefit. Barnes, on *House of Cards*, is consistently depicted as caring far more about personal accolades and recognition than actually covering real news. Younger reporters, also, do not have the institutional knowledge to do their jobs proficiently. On *The Wire*, younger reporters are shown not knowing enough about a story's topic to effectively report on it. In an exemplary scene, Haynes assigns Templeton a story about a police colonel receiving a promotion. Haynes asks Templeton whether he knows anything about the officer, and the reporter says he does not. The recently laid-off veteran reporter Roger Twigg (Bruce Kirkpatrick) sits nearby and immediately rattles off a 40-second biography about the officer that includes numerous details. The implication is clear: As news organizations go younger, they lose people with the institutional knowledge that will actually undercover "the real story," as Haynes call it. With Barnes, when she starts to do what is depicted as good journalism, it only occurs

after consistently asking veterans such as Lucas and Janine Skorsky (Constance Zimmer) for advice. In one scene on *The Wire*, after the newspaper misses out on a big story concerning the police, Haynes explicitly expounds on this when he says, after being asked by an editor why they missed the story, "A veteran in the cop shop is how we get a story like this, but fuck if we didn't buy ours out."

Throughout, both dramas depict an industry consistently losing a veteran presence. If the industry relies on younger journalists, the result will be, at best, inferior quality news because of inexperience and naiveté, and, at worst, news produced by publicity-seeking young reporters who do not prioritize truth and accuracy.

Decreasing Ethical Foundation

Journalism ethics, or a lack thereof, play a major role in both series. *The Wire* does not bring up faulty ethics immediately, but *House of Cards* does. A major source of plot throughout the first season concerns the relationship between Barnes and Congressman Frank Underwood (Kevin Spacey). Barnes finds out that Underwood lasciviously looked at her at an event and uses a photo of the incident to blackmail him into allowing her into his house late in the evening. When visiting, Barnes wears provocative clothing. "It's a cheap ploy," Underwood calls her attire. She responds by calling it "cheap but effective." This encounter leads to Underwood, at first, becoming an off-the-record source. The two knowingly pursue inaccurate stories. In one scene, Underwood gives Barnes a scoop:

ZOE: Is that true?
FRANK: It will be after you write it.
ZOE: (Looks at Frank, knowing she'd be publishing untruths).
FRANK: This is where we get to create.

In a different scene, the two even discuss ethics explicitly, with Zoe saying, "Wait, we're in a very gray area ethically, legally, which I'm OK with." In other instances, Barnes researches and finds important information, but does not report on it when Underwood tells her not to publish. But this source–reporter relationship with Underwood is far more ethically challenged as the season goes on. By the fourth episode, Frank and Zoe begin a sexual relationship.

In *The Wire*, more ethical breaches occur. A significant amount of the plot revolves around reporter Templeton fabricating stories. At first, his lies start small, with manufactured quotes. By the end of the season, however, Templeton wins a Pulitzer for a completely fabricated series. Throughout his unethical reporting, editor Haynes implicitly and explicitly discusses his concerns that Templeton is not ethical. At first, Haynes believes Templeton is lazy and imprecise, but soon starts to believe the reporter is fabricating complete stories. Haynes does some research and soon finds the truth. When he tells his superiors, they choose to do nothing, further exacerbating the unethical culture in the *Sun* newsroom. Near the end of the season, Haynes and Gutierrez discuss the situation, thereby elucidating a concise view on why there is a lapse of ethics in journalism:

ALMA: Did he make it all up?

> **GUS**: Some, not all.
> **ALMA**: Why?
> **GUS**: Look around you. The pond is shrinking. The fish are nervous. Get some profile. Win a prize. Maybe find a bigger pond somewhere. [The editor, the managing editor], Templeton, they snatch a Pulitzer or two and they are up and gone from this place. For them, this is what it's all about. Me, I'm too fucking simpleminded for that. I just wanted to see something new every day. Write a story.

The implication from Simon and his team is very clear: Some people at the *Sun* do not care a bit about ethics and the normative goals of journalism; they are just out for themselves. But there are some good journalists still there. The writers' implication is even more negative, however, because, by the end of the season, Haynes receives a significant demotion for accurately accusing Templeton of fabricating stories. So not only, according to the show, are newsrooms lacking for ethics, but someone displaying proper journalism ethics runs of the risk of punishment because those ethics potentially run counter to other goals.

Financial Considerations Impacting Journalism Considerations

One of the main critiques both dramas make about the journalism industry concerns how newsrooms are now focusing strongly on financial success to the detriment of other goals, including solid journalism. For example, when *Washington Herald* editor-in-chief Tom Hammerschmidt (Boris McGiver) wants to fire Zoe Barnes for what he deems unethical and disrespectful behavior, he cannot get publisher/owner Margaret Tilden (Kathleen Chalfant) to let him. Their conversation illustrates how Tilden thinks Barnes is good for the paper's bottom line:

> **TILDEN**: The paper is operating at a loss. We need people like Zoe.
> **TOM**: I'm very aware of how much we're hurting, Margaret. Staff reductions, dip in circulation, each of those faces of every subscriber we lose, they keep me up at night. Now I won't argue the business side of things. It's neither my place nor my area of expertise. But know this, Zoe Barnes, Twitter, blogs, enriched media, they're all surface. They're fads.

By this point in season, viewers already see Tom as the voice of reason, the good journalist. The viewers know Zoe is an ethical deviant. So, when the publisher does not fire Zoe and, in fact, fires Tom, it is clear to the viewers this is an economically driven choice, not one made for journalistic betterment. When Zoe does leave the *Herald* for an online site called *Slugline*, the viewers see this drive for finances more clearly. At one point, Zoe's editor chastises her for sending a story to editors before publishing. The editor notes that it is most important, more important than accuracy, to beat the competition.

On *The Wire*, numerous scenes involve the *Sun* missing stories and publishing something incomplete because of the financial decisions of the paper's parent company. It is explicitly discussed numerous times how the fictional version of the Tribune Company prioritizes finances over journalistic excellence. Editorial decisions, for example, get made because of financial decisions. In one scene, reporter

Gutierrez is upset that her story about a triple murder ran in a spot of low prominence. She asks Haynes about it:

> **GUS**: Your story deserved better.
> **ALMA**: Three people murdered in a house and it gets 12 inches below the fold. Explain that to me.
> **GUS**: There's no explaining it. Advertising is down. We got a smaller news hole. We're not managing it well. We messed up. That's all.

Although that might seem to the viewer that the paper just made an honest mistake, when Gus leaves the scene, the drama lets the audience know the real reason: Fellow reporter Mike Fletcher (Brandon Young) immediately says to Alma, "Wrong zip code. Their dead doesn't count. If they were White, murdered in [a rich suburb], you'd have had 30 inches off the front." The implication is clear: The newspaper made an economic decision because not many readers live in the poor neighborhood where the murders occurred.

Finally, in one scene, after feeling disillusioned because many of his colleagues have been laid off and the newspaper continues to focus its resources on what he considers less important stories and substandard reporters, Gus asks out loud to all in the newsroom, "How come there are cuts in the newsroom when the company is still profitable?" Haynes is voicing an implicit criticism focused on the idea that the corporation makes choices not based on quality but simply on economics.

Technology's Negative Effect on News

In *House of Cards* and *The Wire*, the creators and writers systematically criticize current newsrooms' embrace of technology as the future of the industry, while also proselytizing about how an overreliance on all things digital negatively affects news quality, a traditional goal. In fact, one of the first depictions of journalism on *House of Cards* very clearly makes this opinion known when Zoe tells Lucas that she would like a blog. When he says no, she says, "That's why newspapers are dying." His response is, "Then we'll die with dignity." Clearly, the implication here is twofold: Blogs remain devoid of dignity and, more important, technology allows for negative changes in the industry. And the drama makes clear, even during that initial episode, that Lucas is a good journalist, whereas Zoe is an ethically challenged below-average one, implying to the audience that her view is one more characteristic of something negative for the journalism industry. The scene, although not directly about technology, subtly introduces the season-long message about technology. It allows for shifts in traditional journalistic practices that have clearly negative effects. In a different early scene, fellow reporter Janine, who viewers have been told is very good at her job, calls Zoe a "Twitter twat," again a reminder that technology negatively impacts journalism. In fact, *House of Cards* continually brings up technology and associated practices made possible through technology only as things negatively impacting journalism. In one scene, editor Tom Hammerschmidt calls extensively using technology in news "a fad." Whenever technology does become a talking point, it is invariably a vehicle to commit bad acts of journalism.

This depiction of how the industry uses and relies on technology is no different on *The Wire.* Early on, tremendously unethical reporter Templeton gets associated with technology, as a reporter willing to

embrace it. He is the only one during the whole season, and given that he is depicted so negatively, technology is also negative. During a scene when editor James Whiting (Sam Freed) delivers a speech announcing the closing of the *Sun*'s bureaus, he blames an influx of technology for this decidedly negative news. So, in this case, unlike with Barnes or Templeton and technology being negatively associated with violating foundational journalistic norms, here technology is blamed for harming the industry as a whole.

Discussion

This study argues that both *House of Cards* and *The Wire* feature generative metajournalistic discourse that consistently addresses four main foci concerning the journalism industry: a fear of lost expertise, a decreasing ethical foundation, how financial considerations are negatively impacting journalism, and technology's negative effect on the industry. In prior studies, "metajournalistic discourse has exclusively focused on journalists as the primary definers of journalism" (Carlson, 2016, p. 356). More specifically, Carlson (2016) labels metajournalism as evaluations of "news texts" (p. 350). The theory marks creators of this discourse as actors, but these actors are discussed in a binary fashion, as either journalists or, essentially, audience members commenting, in some manner, on these news texts (Carlson, 2016). But this differentiation remains too simplistic. Therefore, one contribution from this study to the scholarship surrounding metajournalistic discourse revolves around how fictional depictions should be considered metajournalistic discourse. This may seem obvious based on the vast body of literature concerning depictions of journalism in popular culture, but Carlson's conceptualization of metajournalistic discourse leaves out fictional depictions.

Beyond this study's argument for a reconceptualization of metajournalistic discourse, it is also important to examine how the depictions examined in seasons of *The Wire* and *House of Cards* add to our understanding of industry criticisms. Both Ehrlich and Saltzman (2015) and McNair (2010, 2014) note that depictions of popular culture in journalism often focus on individual journalists. But there is an important difference in what happens in both Season 5 of *The Wire* and Season 1 of *House of Cards*. In both cases, the creators and writers depict a morally decaying industry as opposed to a single or handful of bad actors; this is a key shift from arguing that the industry itself polices itself against these bad actors to labeling the entire industry as degenerating and moving away from traditional normative behavior. On *The Wire*, some good journalists attempt to do good work at the fictional *Baltimore Sun*, but in the end, they either lose their job, are demoted, or get stuck in unrewarding positions. On the other hand, unethical reporter Templeton wins a Pulitzer and is feted by his unethical superiors who would rather print falsities for adulation than do normative journalism. The character of Zoe Barnes on *House of Cards* is shown to be a completely unethical and immoral journalist who not only gets continously promoted and earns better jobs, more fame, and more access, but also even helps get her editor fired when he questions her practices. These depictions are not simply one or two journalists as "villains," but rather an industry hospitable and, in fact, applauding unethical behaviors.

This slight but important difference could help explain society's increasingly negative view of journalism. Prior studies examining the depiction of journalists in popular culture explain that even when journalists are depicted villainously, they are often faced with severe consequences and, often, stopped by other virtuous journalists (Ehrlich & Saltzman, 2015). In effect, unethical behavior is not rewarded and not represented as an industry-wide problem. That is not the case in *The Wire* or *House of Cards*: The in-depth, relative for fictional teleivsion, examination of the journalism industry depicted in both dramas spotlights numerous issues

currently facing the actual journalism industry (Painter, 2017; Rosenberg, 2013). This, it stands to reason, then, would have a similar effect as the one Schudson (1992) found and thus influences the industy in a variety of ways.

Furthermore, the themes uncovered in this study illustrate an industry without much hope for revitalization. In an article for *The Nation*, Maharidge (2016) depicts the real-life journalism industry as a place unwelcoming for industry veterans and that experience is tantamount to job insecurity. Both *The Wire* and *House of Cards* delve into this very concept, taking something happening in the industry and robustly critiquing it. In both series, veteran journalists are often overruled, undervalued, and, in some cases, demoted or outright fired. Both dramas' depiction of this shift toward younger, less experienced journalists might be over the top and hyperbolic (e.g., young journalists being murdered by sources after making ethical lapses or editors simply not caring about truth but rather young reporters winning awards), but the commentary is no less timely. These fictional programs are clearly shining a light on a current problem in journalism (Maharidge, 2016). Moreover, Goode (2009) and Hanitzsch and Vos (2017) detail how technology and, more implicitly, economics are changing the very nature of newswork, primarily not for the better. Both dramas, once again, provide a blueprint for how this could eventually manifest itself in the actual journalism industry. Succinctly, although one could argue that both *The Wire* and *House of Cards* are magniloquent or overwrought in their depictions of the industry, it is important to recognize that all of the general issues presented in the dramas, as analyzed in this study, are current problems facing the industry that have also been found by researchers.

Whereas popular culture often praises and criticizes the journalism industry in a variety of ways that are not always consistent (Ehrlich, 2006), both *House of Cards* and *The Wire* depict an industry becoming more dependent on young, unprincipled journalists taking up the profession for less than admirable reasons and, because of disruptors such as technology, having the ability to break free from the industry's traditional normative values. In effect, these depictions can potentially help us understand why the public owns such a negative view of journalism (Mitchell et al., 2016).

In effect, popular culture depictions could be considered both types of "topics" of metajournalism, both reactive and about a specific issue in the industry (think of films such as *Shattered Glass* or *Spotlight*) or generative about the industry as a whole (films such as *Network* or *The Paper* or television programs such as the ones in this study). As argued by Ehrlich (2006), Brennen (2000), and numerous other scholars, popular culture also impacts perceptions of the industry. This study contends that popular culture should be explicitly added to the conceptualization of metajournalistic discourse in future studies. Therefore, when Carlson (2016) argues that metajournalism comes from both journalists and nonjournalists, included in that category of "nonjournalists" should be popular culture creators working in fictional media.

References

Berger, A. A. (1998). *Media research techniques* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Berkowitz, D. (2000). Doing double duty: Paradigm repair and the Princess Diana what-a-story. *Journalism, 1*(2), 125–143.

Brennen, B. (2000). Fictional journalists: Newswork in American novels. In H. Hardt (Ed.), *In the company of media: Cultural constructions of communication, 1920s–1930s* (pp. 101–115). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Bzdak, D., Crosby, J., & Vannatta, S. (Eds.). (2013). The Wire *and philosophy*. Chicago, IL: Open Court.

Carlson, M. (2012). "Where once stood titans": Second-order paradigm repair and the vanishing U.S. newspaper. *Journalism*, *13*(3), 267–283.

Carlson, M. (2016). Metajournalistic discourse and the meanings of journalism: Definitional control, boundary work, and legitimation. *Communication Theory, 26*(4), 349–368.

Carlson, M., Robinson, S., Lewis, S. C., & Berkowitz, D. A. (2018). Journalism studies and its core commitments: The making of a communication field. *Journal of Communication*, *68*(1), 6–25.

Carlson, M., & Usher, N. (2016). News startups as agents of innovation: For-profit digital news startup manifestos as metajournalistic discourse. *Digital Journalism*, *4*(5), 563–581.

Coffey, A., & Atkinson, P. (1996). *Making sense of qualitative data: Complementary research strategies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Craft, S. L., & Thomas, R. J. (2016, June). *Metajournalism and media ethics*. Paper presented at the International Communication Association annual conference, Fukuoka, Japan.

Craft, S. L., Vos, T. P., & Wolfgang, J. D. (2016). Reader comments as press criticism: Implications for the journalistic field. *Journalism, 17*(6), 677–693.

Dahlgren, P., & Sparks, C. (1992). *Journalism and popular culture*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.

De Maeyer, J., & Holton, A. E. (2016). Why linking matters: A metajournalistic discourse analysis. *Journalism, 17*(6), 776–794.

Dow, B. J. (1990). Hegemony, feminist criticism and *The Mary Tyler Moore Show*. *Critical Studies in Media Communication, 7*(3), 261–274.

Ehrlich, M. C. (2006). *Journalism in the movies*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Ehrlich, M. C., & Saltzman, J. (2015). *Heroes and scoundrels*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Emerson, R., Fretz, R., & Shaw, L. (1995). *Writing ethnographic fieldnotes*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Ferrucci, P., & Painter, C. (2013). Pseudo newsgathering: Analyzing journalists' use of pseudo-events on *The Wire*. *The Image of the Journalist in Popular Culture Journal, 5*(Fall 2013–Spring 2014), 135–169.

Ferrucci, P., & Painter, C. (2017). Print versus digital: How medium matters on *House of Cards*. *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, *41*(2), 124–139.

Ferrucci, P., & Painter, C. (2018). On *The Wire*: An analysis of "the most accurate presentation" of a newsroom ever. *The Journal of Popular Television*, *6*(1), 3–8.

Ferrucci, P., & Taylor, R. (2018). Access, deconstructed: Metajournalistic discourse and photojournalism's shift away from geophysical access. *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, *42*(2), 121–137.

Good, H. (Ed.). (2007). *Journalism ethics goes to the movies*. Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Goode, L. (2009). Social news, citizen journalism and democracy. *New Media & Society, 11*(8), 1287–1305.

Gordon, D. (2008, February 20). David Simon on the end of *The Wire*. *Newsweek*. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/david-simon-end-wire-93337

Gould, E. (2013). *House of Cards* shows the unfortunate future of journalism. *TV Worth Watching*. Retrieved from http://www.tvworthwatching.com/post/House-of-Cards-Shows-the-Unfortunate-Future-of-Journalism-and-Office-Space.aspx

Gray, J. (2006). *Watching with the Simpsons: Television, parody, and intertextuality*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Hanitzsch, T., & Vos, T. P. (2017). Journalistic roles and the struggle over institutional identity: The discursive constitution of journalism. *Communication Theory, 27*(2), 115–135.

Hindman, E. B., & Thomas, R. J. (2013). Journalism's ''crazy old aunt'' Helen Thomas and paradigm repair. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 90*(2), 267–286.

Klein, B. (2011). Entertaining ideas: Social issues in entertainment television. *Media, Culture & Society, 33*(6), 905–921.

Kois, D., & Sternbergh, A. (2008). Debating the legacy of "The Wire": Did Season Five tarnish the show that invented the Dickensian aspect ratio? Retrieved from http://www.vulture.com/2008/03/debating_the_end_of_the_wire_t.html

Levine, L. W. (1992). The folklore of industrial society: Popular culture and its audiences. *The American Historical Review, 97*(5), 1369–1399.

Lowry, B. (2007). "The Wire" gets the newsroom right. *Variety*. Retrieved from https://variety.com/2007/voices/columns/the-wire-gets-the-newsroom-right-1117978111/

Maharidge, D. (2016). What happens to journalists when no one wants to print their words anymore? *The Nation*. Retrieved from http://www.thenation.com/article/these-journalists-dedicated-their-lives-to-telling-other-peoples-stories/

Mastro, D. E. (2003). A social identity approach to understanding the impact of television messages. *Communication Monographs, 70*(2), 98–113.

McNair, B. (2010). *Journalists in film: Heroes and villains*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

McNair, B. (2014). From cinema to TV: Still the same old stories about journalism. *Journalism Practice, 8*(2), 242–244.

Miller, T. (2010). *Television studies: The basics*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Mitchell, A., Gottfried, J., Barthel, M., & Shearer, E. (2016). Trust and accuracy. Retrieved from http://www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/trust-and-accuracy/

Moos, J. (2013). In "House of Cards," Slugline is the new Politico. Retrieved from http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/202921/how-realistic-are-the-journalism-issues-depicted-in-house-of-cards/

Painter, C. (2017). All in the game: Communitarianism and *The Wire*. *Journalism Studies*, *18*(1), 11–27.

Penfold-Mounce, R., Beer, D., & Burrows, R. (2011). *The Wire* as social science-fiction? *Sociology, 45*(1), 152–167.

Peters, C. (2015). Evaluating journalism through popular culture: HBO's *The Newsroom* and public reflections on the state of the news media. *Media, Culture & Society, 37*(4), 602–619.

Reese, S. D. (1990). The news paradigm and the ideology of objectivity: A socialist at *The Wall Street Journal*. *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, *7*(4), 390–409.

Riddle, K. (2010). Always on my mind: Exploring how frequent, recent, and vivid television portrayals are used in the formation of social reality judgments. *Media Psychology, 13*(2), 155–179.

Rosenberg, A. (2013). *House of Cards* thinks all female political reporters are mean sluts. *Slate*. Retrieved from http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/02/06/house_of_cards_on_female_political_reporters_you_re_all_mean_sluts.html

Rothman, L. (2014, February 13). *House of Cards* creator Beau Willimon talks Season 2 and his surprising influences. *TIME*. Retrieved from http://entertainment.time.com/2014/02/13/house-of-cards-season-2-beau-willimon/

Ruggiero, T. E. (2004). Paradigm repair and changing journalistic perceptions of the Internet as an objective news source. *Convergence*, *10*(4), 92–106.

Schudson, M. (1992). *Watergate in American memory: How we remember, forget, and reconstruct the past*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Shaw, L. (2013). "House of Cards" boss Beau Willimon doesn't "give a s— whether anyone likes my characters." Retrieved from http://www.thewrap.com/emmys-house-cards-showrunner-willimon-f-likeability-99161/

Steiner, L., Guo, J., McCaffrey, R., & Hills, P. (2013). *The Wire* and repair of the journalistic paradigm. *Journalism, 14*(6), 703–720.

van Zoonen, L. (2000). Popular culture as political communication: An introduction. *Javnost—The Public, 7*(2), 5–17.

van Zoonen, L. (2007). Audience reactions to Hollywood politics. *Media, Culture & Society, 29*(4), 531–547.

Vos, T. P., & Craft, S. (2017). The discursive construction of journalistic transparency. *Journalism Studies, 18*(12), 1505–1522.

Vos, T. P., Craft, S., & Ashley, S. (2012). New media, old criticism: Bloggers' press criticism and the journalistic field. *Journalism, 13*(7), 850–868.

Vos, T. P., & Finneman, T. (2017). The early historical construction of journalism's gatekeeping role. *Journalism, 18*(3), 265–280.

Vos, T. P., & Moore, J. (2018). Building the journalistic paradigm: Beyond paradigm repair. *Journalism*. Advance online publication. doi:1464884918767586

Vos, T. P., & Singer, J. B. (2016). Media discourse about entrepreneurial journalism: Implications for journalistic capital. *Journalism Practice, 10*(2), 143–159.

Waisbord, S. (2013). *Reinventing professionalism: Journalism and news in global perspective*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Williams, L. (2014). *On* The Wire. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Zakarin, J. (2013, February 15). "House of Cards"' Beau Willimon on showing bad journalist behavior: "That's sort of the point." *The Hollywood Reporter*. Retrieved from http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/house-cards-journalism-beau-willimon-421661

Zelizer, B. (1993). Journalists as interpretive communities. *Critical Studies in Media Communication, 10*(3), 219–237.

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4802–4820 1932–8036/20180005

Between Violence and Exclusion: Cinematic Representation of Gender Politics in Antarmahal and Water

IMRAN MAZID
Eastern New Mexico University, USA

This article explores representation of gender politics in two films—*Antarmahal* and *Water*—to illuminate the synergy of patriarchy and religion that creates a structure of cultural violence against women. A sense of feminist consciousness pitted against dogmatic social practices drives the narratives of these films. This study employs Julia Kristeva's idea of semanalysis as an analytic framework to consider the signification process as dynamic because it is driven by an interplay of bodily drives and pulsions (genotext) and symbolic structures (phenotext). The cinematic texts under analysis address two aspects of gender relations in Indian Hindu society: conjugality and widowhood. Conjugality is marked by men's sexual gratification and an obsession for an heir, and widowhood effaces women's sexual and social existence. Three themes emerged from the textual analysis: women's desire, patriarchy and power relations, and vulnerability. The film texts reveal a constant struggle between patriarchal subjugation and women's agency. Hindu patriarchy creates unequal power relations that exacerbate the vulnerability of women. However, women often resist such misogynistic practices by circumventing the norms of patriarchy.

Keywords: chora, gender politics, genotext, Julia Kristeva, phenotext, semanalysis, semiotic, symbolic

The pervasive cultural force of Indian cinema shapes social imagery of gender relations and reproduces patriarchal social norms and values. Women in Indian cinema are portrayed mainly in two ways. First, they are shown as self-sacrificing mythological ideals like Sita and Savitri. Second, women are portrayed in a hypersexual manner to feed male fantasy and erotic desires (Agarwal, 2014; Dasgupta, 1996; Dasgupta & Hegde 1988; Nandkumar, 2011; Manohar & Kline, 2014; Sarkar, 2012). Contemporary women-centric cinematic productions aspire to distance themselves from the typical cultural construct of women and to interrogate gender politics perpetuated by the dominant patriarchy. However, we have limited knowledge about women-centric cinema that delves into the realms of conjugality and widowhood to unmask the dogmatic social practices that exclude women's voices. This study fills that gap by interrogating the cinematic texts of *Antarmahal* (2005) and *Water* (2005) that represent women's agency and desire. The directors of *Antarmahal* (Rituparno Ghosh) and *Water* (Deepa Mehta) blend feminist consciousness with an artistic sensibility to produce

Imran Mazid: imranmazid09@gmail.com
Date submitted: 2017–11–02

Copyright © 2018 (Imran Mazid). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

cultural texts that challenge dominant Hindu patriarchy and transgress the cultural imagery of womanhood.

Rituparno Ghosh, a talented and versatile Indian film director, constantly challenged the boundaries of gender identity and gender performativity, and delicately sketched the intricacies of human relationships. He considered himself a womanist, not a feminist, filmmaker as it is difficult to think completely outside of patriarchal practices and value system (Mazumder, 2017). His cinema subtly portrays the desires of women and always contests gender hierarchy. In the same vein, Indo-Canadian film director Deepa Mehta, through her film *Water,* depicts the marginalization of women and problematizes the dominating patriarchal value system in India. The film was nominated for an Academy Award for Foreign Language Film. Deepa Mehta is well-known for her Elements trilogy: *Fire*, *Earth*, and *Water*.

Several contemporary women-centric Hindi films deal with the reality of women's lives; however, scholars argue that the representation of women in such films is highly problematic and reflects patriarchal expectations (Rad, 2016; Sarkar, 2012). *Antarmahal* and *Water* critically examine the role of patriarchy and misogyny in social practices that perpetuate cultural violence against women. These films portray women's desire, sexual agency, and subversion in ways that challenge the synergy of patriarchy and religion. *Antarmahal* and *Water* represent exemplary films that rearticulate how the infusion of artistic sensibility and social criticism can promote gender equality in celluloid.

Rationale for the Study

The study examines women-centric films that articulate lived experiences of women in a patriarchal society governed by strict religious values. The rationale for the study is two-fold. First, though Indian women are now playing significant roles in the political, social, and economic development of India (Seema, 2013), cinema narratives are often hesitant to portray their shifting roles in society. Such misogynistic practices perpetuate cultural violence (Galtung, 1990) against women and create tensions in achieving gender equality. However, Indian cinema like *Antarmahal* and *Water* reimagines agentic representation of women, question dominant patriarchal values, and critically examine women's desire and sexuality. Such rearticulation of gender roles creates new cultural spaces for subversive gender roles and renegotiates cultural imagery and expectations regarding gender relations in society. Therefore, such cinematic texts demand scholarly attention.

Second, the reception of *Antarmahal* and *Water* is intriguing for critical cultural scholars because it signals social transgression. Production was suspended on *Water* after the film set was ransacked by Hindu nationalists who identified the film as an anti-Hindu cultural production. The incident delayed production for four years, and Deepa Mehta had to move the set location from India to Sri Lanka (Bumiller, 2006). Similarly, conservative audiences accused Rituparno Ghosh of presenting pornography because they considered *Antarmahal* a depiction of crude sexuality. Conservative audiences mistook the artistic sensibility and the critical rendition of Bengali conjugal life in *Antarmahal* (Rediff, 2005). Such reception indicates the transgressive nature of *Antarmahal* and *Water*, which invites intellectual investigation.

Literature Review

The synergy of patriarchy and religion perpetuates cultural violence against Hindu women. Galtung (1990) defines cultural violence as "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)—that can be used to justify and legitimate direct or structural violence" (p. 291). The ideology of patriarchy and Hindu religious practices legitimize violence against women by shaping moral norms and clouding reality (Galtung, 1990). Such practices render violence against women acceptable to society. Akinyemi (2018) argued that the experience of colonization, patriarchy, and social practices create a sphere of cultural violence against African women. Oyedemi (2016) illustrated how the notion of feminine beauty encapsulates the ethnic and social politics of gender that is directly linked to cultural violence. Standish (2014) revealed the connection between cultural violence, honor killings, and dowry murder. Indian cinema, the symbolic and cultural domains, often works as an ideological vehicle that reproduces the Hindu patriarchal norms to legitimize the marginalization of women in society.

Indian Hindi films, popularly known as Bollywood, are heavily influenced by the Hindu religious belief systems that project women as *Sati*, the mythical self-sacrificing and virtuous women who bear pain and suffering to protect the honor of husbands or fathers. Agarwal (2014) argued that women's roles in Indian cinema mainly center on being the Other of men. Women are housewives, mothers, and objects of male interest in love and erotic attraction, the source of men's sexual gratification and the magnet of the male gaze. Thomas (2005) analyzed the representation of women in Hindi cinema during the late colonial period. She drew a parallel between Indian warrior women of the *virangana* tradition and their portrayal by the actress Nadia, a White woman who played lead roles in Hindi cinema. Gopal (2011) examined how the Bengali film *Chokher Bali,* an adaptation of Tagore's novel, infuses artistic sensibility with Bollywood production techniques to produce new *bhadralok* (gentlemen) cinema that appeals to the global Indian audience.

Scholars have argued that Indian cinema, as a vehicle of male domination, often perpetuates violence and harassment as a control mechanism of women (Dasgupta, 1996; Dasgupta & Hegde 1988; Manohar & Kline, 2014). These studies illuminate how such sexual assault narratives depict women as responsible for the very assault against them. Gopalan's (1997) analysis of rape-revenge narratives of Hindi cinema highlighted how the portrayal of avenging women, whose actions echo the male action genre, often end up reintegrating into law and order of the society.

Indian cinema started to embrace women's shifting role in society and experimented with how women were shown in films. Such representation highlights women's agency and independence; however, the women face severe consequences for exercising that freedom. Rad (2016) examined two Indian films, *Daman* and *Mrityudand*, to understand women's representation and agency, which she argued is highly problematic. Directors, male and female alike, produce a women's gender identity that strongly reflects patriarchal expectations. Sarkar (2012) reported that female directors of Hindi parallel cinema focus on social injustice, with women engaged in subversive role-playing. Male directors of middle cinema, on the other hand, rarely criticize patriarchy, and women are pitied rather than celebrated as social transgressors. Dasgupta (1996) revealed that Hindi cinema presents women in sexual and romantic ways. Very few

cinematic portrayals depict women's agency. Such exercises of women's autonomy and transgression are often engulfed by the dominant patriarchal societal norms (Dasgupta, 1996). Indian cinema hesitates to provide substantial commentary on gender hierarchy in social practices. Scholars have a very limited understanding of Indian cinema, or, more specifically, of women-centric cinema that astutely blends social and religious criticism with an artistic sensibility to represent gender politics and challenge dominant patriarchy.

This study fills that gap by examining two women-centric films that nurture strong feminist consciousness to locate women's desire and sexual agency and to tackle the dehumanizing social practice that perpetuates cultural violence against women.

Research Method

This study sets out to illuminate gender politics in textual structures and, to do so, turns to the work of Julia Kristeva, employing Kristeva's semanalysis to locate textual politics articulated in *Antarmahal* and *Water*. Semanalysis deals with the interplay of bodily drives and symbolic structure and is here compared with Derrida's (1991) framework of deconstruction and Merleau-Ponty's (1970) ideas of body and language. In articulating the idea of deconstruction, Derrida (1991) employed the concept of "différance" in the context of the human psyche. He considered the link between the pleasure principle and the reality principle as only différance as a detour (Derrida, 1991). However, the nonlinguistic elements of language—more specifically, embodiment as a locus of meaning production—were not conceptualized adequately in Derrida's articulation of language and meaning. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (2013) recognized the potentials of the body in the signifying process but failed to shed light on how bodily drives or desires make their presence known in language. Kristeva's semanalysis provides the needed analytic scaffold on which to examine the interconnection of bodily drives and symbols in the meaning-making process.

The method segment is divided into two sections. In the first, I elucidate Kristeva's ideas related to semanalysis: the signifying process and the textual performance. The signifying process comprises three core elements: the semiotic, the symbolic, and *chora*. Kristeva (2002) recognized two modalities of textual performance: genotext and phenotext. The second section provides phenomenological textual analytical procedures: description, reduction, and interpretation (Chang, 1987; Lanigan, 1988; Ricoeur, 1975). The theoretical insights of semanalysis are here studied against a phenomenological textual analytic framework. Kristeva's semanalysis builds a connection between a semiotic explication of texts and a phenomenological or existential dimension of sign production (Smith, 1990). Such association reflects on rhetorical modalities that require examination of semiotic, social-cultural codes, the chain of intertextuality, and self-conscious reflection of the signification process (Smith, 1990).

Semiotic Analytic Framework: Kristeva and Semanalysis

Kristeva (1986) considered the signifying process to be a combination of two elements: the semiotic and the symbolic. She used Lacan's concepts of the "imaginary" and the "symbolic" innovatively. Especially, she employed the distinction between these ideas to identify the difference between the semiotic and the symbolic (Moi, 1986). Kristeva (1986) posited that the continual interaction and, more specifically, the

disruption or tension between the semiotic and the symbolic ensure the signifying process. The semiotic and the symbolic "are inseparable within the signifying process that constitutes language, and the dialectic between them determines the type of discourse (narrative, metalanguage, theory, poetry, etc.) involved" (Kristeva, 1986, p. 92). The semiotic belongs to the prelinguistic realm and organizes the drives in language. Kristeva (1993) considered semiotic as "translinguistic" or "nonlinguistic" (pp. 32–33). The semiotic refers to "distinctive mark, trace, index, precursory sign, proof, engraved or written sign, imprint, trace, figuration" (p. 93). It is an essential component of language characterized by rhythms and tones; however, it does not "represent or signify something" (Oliver, 2002, p. xiv). Kristeva identified drives as ambiguous; at the same time, she referred to them as assimilating and destructive. Moreover, through rhythms and tones, drives are discharged in language.

Kristeva incorporated Plato's concept of *chora* to articulate her position on the semiotic. The semiotic *chora* relates to the "emotions, sensations, and other marks and traces of psychical and material experience" (Rickert, 2007, pp. 260–261). Because it is beyond any regulatory process, the *chora* comprises the presymbolic drives repressed in the symbolic realm. It emerges in the symbolic "as contradictions, meaninglessness, disruption, silences and absences" (Moi, 1986, p. 13). It resembles the infant's babbling in its drive to acquire language but has no definite meaning in the symbolic realm.

The symbolic is the realm of language and relates to the structure of language that dictates the operation of symbols. Oliver (2002) posited that "the symbolic is the element of signification that sets up the structures by which symbols operate. The symbolic is the structure or grammar that governs the ways in which symbols can refer" (p. xiv). In sum, the symbolic is the formal structure of language that we use to communicate. The dialectic between the semiotic and the symbolic drives the signifying process. Oliver (2002) argued that without the symbolic—the rules governing and structuring linguistic elements—we have only an endless flow of pulsions or the prelinguistic drives manifested in meaningless sounds or babble. In the same vein, the semiotic provides motivation to communicate, and its absence marks a void in the signifying process. The continual tension between the semiotic and the symbolic makes the signifying process dynamic.

The signifying process determines the textual representation of reality. The "genotext" and "phenotext" are the two modalities of language that ensure the functioning of text. The genotext is not the linguistic structure, but rather a generative process that relates to the semiotic drives. Its presence can be found in the repetition of phonemes or rhymes and through melodic devices. It articulates the ephemeral and nonsignifying structure. Kristeva (1986) identified phenotext as a structure that follows the rules of communication, irreducible in the semiotic process, and "presupposes a subject of enunciation and an addressee" (p. 121).

The significance of Kristeva's semanalysis is twofold. First, her linguistic conceptualization situates the speaking body in a signifying process (Oliver, 2002). It also manifests that every signification bears the mark of bodily drives. Second, she formulated the notion of the speaking subject as subject-in-process/on trial (Oliver, 2002). Drawing on Kristeva's theory of semanalysis and informed by the works of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, this study examines the cinematic texts of two films: *Antarmahal* and *Water*. *Antarmahal*

delineates the Bengali upper-class conjugal relations at the end of the 19th century. Deepa Mehta's film *Water* explores the life of widows in Indian society.

The core feature that binds these two films is women's desire and sexual agency. These films interrogate the Hindu patriarchal social structure that exploits and suppresses female sexuality and desire. They articulate women's bodies as sites of patriarchal domination and points of resistance by projecting women's sexual agency. Therefore, the focus of this study is the dominance of Hindu patriarchy in Indian society that mostly influences gender relations. However, people of different religions—Muslim, Sikh, Christian, Buddhist, and others—live side by side in India. Guided by the intersectionality literature (Collins, 1999a, 1999b; Crenshaw, 1991; Hooks, 1989), this study refrains from generalizing the results in the context of the diverse orientations of religious patriarchies in India.

Schematic for Data Analysis

Description of cinematic texts is the first layer of analysis. It highlights the manifest content of cinematic texts, the way they construct and present different characters, and it identifies the social realm and the use of language. The purpose of such layering is to "keep external presupposition 'outside' the brackets from influencing our description" (Lanigan, 1988, p. 10). In the first layer, the researcher articulates how the cinematic texts represent the lived experiences of the protagonists. The description stage reveals three emerging themes: women's desire, patriarchy and power relations, and vulnerability.

Reduction, the next layer, delves into "the object of consciousness—the thing, person, emotion, and so forth, that constitutes the experience we have" (Lanigan, 1988, p. 10). The researcher employs an imaginative free variation technique to locate the cognitive, affective, and conative meaning of the texts (Chang, 1987; Langdridge, 2007; Lanigan, 1988; Ricoeur, 1975). This technique compares and contrasts different textual elements by "systematically imagining each aspect present or absent within the lived experience" (Orbe, 1998). Different contextual elements and themes are compared, and the analysis then proceeds to "reduce the description to those parts that are essential for the existence of the consciousness of experience" (Lanigan, 1988, p. 10). Such analytical layering examines the contextual elements of women's desire, patriarchy and power relations, and vulnerability. The Hindu patriarchy creates unequal power relations that dictate women to be submissive to social norms that render women vulnerable. However, women often challenge patriarchal norms and exercise their agency to unsettle power relations. After reflecting on the themes and contextual elements of texts, I reduced the themes into a structure–agency relationship that focuses on the constant tension between the Hindu patriarchy and women's agency.

Interpretation, the third layer of analysis, unifies the relationship of description and reduction to examine the conscious experience of the speech act through the use of symbols and signs (Lanigan, 1988). Interpretation focuses on the sociocultural meaning of our lived experiences. Such semiotic examination of *Antarmahal* and *Water* reveals the broader spectrum of the cultural politics of gender in Indian Hindu society. More important, interpretation forges connections between cultural violence, women's desire and agency, and Hindu patriarchy.

Textual Analysis

The textual analysis section is divided into two segments. The first delves into the description, reduction, and interpretation of the cinematic text of *Antarmahal*. The study locates the presence of phenotext and genotext while sketching the contours of description and reduction. The interpretation situates textual analysis in the social spectrum of gender politics in India. The second segment follows a similar procedure to analyze the cinematic text of *Water.*

Description (Antarmahal)

Phenotext

The word *antarmahal* refers to the private space of a house where women carry out their daily routine household activities. The film *Antarmahal* depicts women in that inner space because social norms strictly limit their presence outside. Though women always wish to visit outside their houses, such a desire is rarely fulfilled. *Antarmahal* portrays women as trapped in the inner chamber of a house, and that entrapment resonates with the title of the movie. The film astutely depicts the intricacies of the relationship between four characters: Bhubaneswar Chowdhury (zamindar or squire), Mahamaya (the elder wife), Jashomati (the younger wife), and Brajo (the young sculptor). The narrative revolves around Bhubaneswar's desire for a son and his desperate attempts to outshine his rival Nadubabu (a neighboring landlord, or squire).

The film also depicts the Hindu religious festival *Durga Puja*. The beginning of the film is marked by fast drum beats and high-pitched musical instruments. The colorful religious rituals and statue of the deity *Durga* create a festive mode. The voice-over of an Englishman recalls the date of July 5, 1878, as if he was recollecting an event from his journal. His voice-over also manifests his fantasy toward the wives of the Bhubaneswar. With a derisive tone, he says the Hindu zamindars tried to outshine each other, and last year, the neighboring zamindar, Nadubabu, outshone his patron Bhubaneswar. After that defeat in showmanship, Bhubaneswar is seeking to outshine Nadubabu. To belittle his rival and to demonstrate his loyalty to the British Empire, Bhubaneswar plans to make an effigy of the goddess *Durga* but with Queen Victoria's face. He fires his regular sculptor and hires a young one to materialize his plan.

The film audience hears the rhythmic squeaking of a four-poster bed, revealing Bhubaneswar on top of Jashomati, the younger wife, having sexual intercourse. Jashomati lies passively on the bed, obviously in pain, and trying to avoid eye contact with Bhubaneswar, who is forcing himself into her. Promiscuous Bhubaneswar reveals his nature to Jashomati when she questions him about the fragrance she smells on him. The zamindar laughs and replies, "You go out with one fragrance, and return with the other; then only I will be considered as the man of the Borobari" (Ghosh, 2005). Later in the scene, Mahamaya, the elder wife, hears Jashomati screaming in pain and tells her maid, "What a poor thing. She wants to become the mother of a son. Then she has to tolerate this much pain" (Ghosh, 2005). In a desperate attempt to conceive an heir, Bhubaneswar summons a priest who claims that if Bhubaneswar's wife hears religious chants while having intercourse, she will bear a son. Jashomati repeatedly refuses such an outrageous proposition. She becomes traumatized when Bhubaneswar forces her to have intercourse with him in front of a priest. She attempts suicide after such a disgraceful incident, but Mahamaya rescues her before she can succeed.

Genotext

As noted earlier, the genotext belongs to the presymbolic realm, which generates heterogeneity of meaning. The genotext is anterior to the sign, to signification, while at the same time discharged through the phenotext. In cinematic texts, we can locate the existence of genotext by examining the tones, rhythms, silences, whispers, breaks, recurrences, sudden clashes, and discontinuities in the film (Smith, 1989, 1990). Genotext manifests itself most prominently in *Antarmahal* through the combination of musicality and visual composition. Critically examining the phenotext, especially the musicality and visual composition, one can extrapolate the drives, pulsions, and desires. An analysis of genotext reveals three prominent themes: women's desire, patriarchy and power relations, and vulnerability.

The relationships among Jashomati, Mahamaya, and Brajo reveal women's desire for romantic relationships outside the confined settings of marriage. The cinematic production of Jashomati's first encounter with the young sculptor Brajo flaunts the musicality of text. Brightness or dimness, musical score, background noise, and rhythm of the scene tease the audience about the presence of genotext. A subtle and close examination can unravel the collision of phenotext and genotext in the cinematic text. Such an eruption of genotext is revealed when Jashomati accidentally runs into Brajo. Poignant background music, her longing for the outside, sounds of raindrops, a tamed bird, darkness outside, and Jashomati's innocence and beauty create an emotionally piercing encounter between the two. In another scene, genotext is revealed when Jashomati escapes from her husband and bumps into Brajo, who is building the new *Durga* in the Thakur Ghar, a special place within a house for worship. The playful presence of light and darkness, coupled with the tense background music, sets the tone of the scene.

The text of *Antarmahal* often represents the encounters of Jashomati and Brajo with an artistic sensibility. Jashomati is sitting in front of a flickering fire lamp and trying to dry her wet body part with the edge of her sari. Her face is glowing, and her ravishing beauty shines a light on the whole place. The lyrical background music signals imminent danger of which Jashomati is unaware until that moment. She hears a noise and tries to locate the source. The sound becomes louder when she looks at the corner of the room, then screams in fear. She desperately moves outside and bumps into Brajo. The young sculptor holds her body for several seconds, and they look at each other. She suddenly moves away from him, and the background music resonates with stormy weather. The encounters between Jashomati and Brajo are filled with tension, narrative discontinuities, emotional upheavals, vulnerability, and desolation. Mahamaya's desire for the sculptor is manifested through her peeping looks.

Mahamaya is in a drenched sari when she visits the Thakur Ghar to meet Brajo, and she keeps her shoulders uncovered. Her stunning beauty could mesmerize anyone. The jewelry, vermilion, and the soothing tone of visual composition render the particular scene as a scintillating moment for an emotional encounter. She smiles and gazes at Brajo, and her eyes are full of longing. The background music resembles Sanai, a popular music genre, which expresses emotional longing and upsurge. In short, the sensibility, tones, rhythm, and silence of the cinematic text bear the mark of the presymbolic realm, which had a constant tension with the symbolic function of text. Such struggle makes the signification process dynamic.

Genotext illuminates the power relations in a patriarchal social setting where women's lives are controlled entirely by the males. In *Antarmahal*, women are completely helpless, and their existence depends on the mercy of the men. Women have no freedom to live their lives as they wish. The musicality of *Antarmahal* reveals the unequal power relations between men and women. For example, the poetic revelation of Jashomati's powerless existence is revealed when she attempts to ask the sculptor to send a palki (a sedan chair) so she can go to a fair. The background music, darkness, rain, sudden movement of a bird, and a glimpse of light illuminate the poignancy of reality in Jashomati's life. Religion and patriarchy work side by side to render women powerless. Bhubaneswar beats Jashomati to force her to have intercourse with him in front of a priest. The Hindu priest remains utterly indifferent to such an act of violence. Priests also use religious texts as a pretext to have intercourse with the elder wife of Bhubaneswar. They do not feel any moral qualms about proposing such vicious conditions for performing a religious ritual.

The text of *Antarmahal* reveals the direct and indirect violence that exacerbate women's vulnerability in Hindu social practices. Violence is not limited just to physical assaults but also extends to cultural norms that impose stricter restrictions on those who are vulnerable. The lives of Jashomati and Mahamaya exist within the confines of the inner chamber of the house. They cannot visit outside without their husband's permission. Jashomati's simplest desire to buy clay dolls is not fulfilled because her husband is reluctant to approve such a wish. The well-being of Jashomati and Mahamaya is threatened if they fail to satisfy the needs of their husband. Bhubaneswar even asks Mahamaya to satisfy the outrageous demands of the Hindu priests, and he beats Jashomati to force her into submission. Such practices illuminate the vulnerability of women in patriarchal societies.

Reduction

Phenotext

The film text conjures up the repressive structure of conjugality in Hindu marital relationships. In the economies of conjugality, women are a sexual commodity and rarely find any pleasure or happiness in the relationship. Women in the Borobari, the house of the zamindar, are entirely helpless because their lives depend on the mercy of their husband, Bhubaneswar, who values them solely for sexual pleasure and procreation. On several occasions, he forces himself on his young wife without acknowledging her refusal to engage in sexual intercourse. The elder wife falls out of his grace when she fails to give him a son. He rarely visits her chamber and completely ignores her existence.

There is no romantic relationship, caring, or any sense of partnership between Bhubaneswar and his wives. He keeps a mistress for sexual gratification but wants his wives to be devoted to him to ensure that any children his wives bear are his. Though he has sexual relationships with three women, he fails to sire any offspring. Hindu patriarchy fails to recognize the inability or infertility of the zamindar, but blames his wives for being barren. The wives bear the social stigma.

Hindu priests see opportunity when they learn that the zamindar plans to replace the face of the deity *Durga* with that of Queen Victoria. The village Brahmins threaten Bhubaneswar for having such a plan, and he desperately asks them for a solution to his desire to satisfy the British Empire. The Brahmins mention

the performance of Ashvamedha Yagya, a *Vedic* tradition, as a solution. Ashvamedha Yagya, a bizarre royal ritual performed to display the power of the king, dictates that the queen must copulate with the horse selected for the Yagya (Jamison, 1996; Knipe, 2015). Though the Brahmins argue that the performance of such a ritual may not be possible in the 19th century, the priests can consider the Ashvamedha Yagya completed if the elder wife of the zamindar can sexually satisfy the Brahmins. Such a proposition illuminates the abusive religious practices in Hindu society. On another occasion, a priest advised Bhubaneswar to conduct sexual intercourse in front of a chanting priest. Such vicious roles of the priests unravel the seditious religious practices against women. Bhubaneswar is so desperate that he asks his elder wife to satisfy the priests sexually so he can attain the title of Rai Bahadur, a recognition from the British Empire. Thus, Hindu religion and conjugal structure subjugated women and relegated their lives to the realm of nonexistence.

Antarmahal playfully sketches the niceties of human relationships. The text eloquently reveals the intricate relationship between Mahamaya and Jashomati. Each wife is vying for affection and attention from their husband, but the relationship creates jealousy as well as an emotional bond between them. Mahamaya often taunts Jashomati for having the attention of their spouse, yet is infuriated when she notices Jashomati's desire for Brajo, the young sculptor. However, when their husband repeatedly abuses Jahomoti, Mahamaya provides emotional support for her. The elder wife even encourages Jashomati to have a secret relationship with Brajo to beget a child:

> How long does it take? The husband does not remain in the house in the evening; ask Tarini [maidservant] to bring him through the back door. It will not take much time. Everything will be done in a while. Our husband will not even know. (Ghosh, 2005)

In a nutshell, the relationship between the two wives resonates the tapestry of human relationships—from envy to comfort, from grudge to love, from resentment to solace, and from bitterness to warmth.

Genotext

After reflecting on the three themes discussed in the description stage, I reduce them to a structure–agency relationship. The Hindu patriarchy is identified as one structure, and the women's desire to resist such structure represents their agency. The film text reveals a constant struggle between patriarchal subjugation and women's agency. Hindu patriarchy creates unequal power relations that exacerbate the vulnerability of women. However, women often resist such misogynistic practices by circumventing the norms of patriarchy. Therefore, the themes—women's desire, patriarchy and power relations, and vulnerability—are reduced to a structure–agency relationship to highlight the tension between the Hindu patriarchal structure and women's agency.

The repressive structure of Hindu patriarchy manufactures a sexist discourse that imposes stricter practices to control women's bodies. Women have no control over their lives because patriarchy has reduced the conjugal relationship to a "procreation-only" engagement. Men can easily toss women out if they fail to beget a son. Women also face violence and exclusion for not following the gender norms. Patriarchy and religion work together to create a structure of violence that subjugates women's existence and uses religious norms to justify such actions.

However, women often resist such repressive structure by exercising their agency. They use their sexuality to control men and seek solace outside their marriage. Mahamaya attempts to tease the priest while he is chanting verses from the *Veda*, positioning herself in front of him. A flickering lamp is the only light in the room. As the priest continues his chanting, she gently removes her shawl to ignite a passion for derailing his concentration. She gradually uncovers the left side of her upper body, and the priest gets distracted. A burning desire for Mahamaya disrupts his chanting, and he starts to make lapses, pauses, and even discontinues his chanting. He starts fumbling when Mahamaya reveals her bare leg.

When the priest stops chanting for several seconds, Mahamaya gazes at him with a playful look that ultimately shakes him. Whenever he looks at her, his chanting becomes erratic. In her final move, Mahamaya completely uncovers her upper body, and the priest is beyond his limit. He starts fumbling, recites one line twice, and even stops his recitation. He is in a vortex of burning desire. This particular moment in *Antarmahal* depicts the presence of genotext in a poetic vignette. Furthermore, encounters between Jashomati and Brajo reflect the ingenious presence of genotext. Their encounters are often marked by a stolen gaze, a mix of light and darkness, background music, sudden disruptions, hesitations, desire, a sense of danger, tensions, and an unarticulated attraction. Such depictions signal a forbidden relationship and prepare the audience for the upcoming danger.

Interpretation

The text of *Antarmahal* represents a structure of cultural violence (Galtung, 1990) against women sustained through patriarchy and Hindu religious practices. Cultural violence against women manifests through a repressive conjugal structure that relentlessly subjugates them through patriarchal norms and religious values. Both Mahamaya and Jashomati are trapped in an oppressive relationship in which their lives depend on the mercy of their husband. Jashomati's simple desires—going to a fair and having clay dolls—are never fulfilled because Bhubaneswar, her husband, does not care about her wishes. She is unable to restrain her husband when he forces himself on her. She commits suicide because her sense of vulnerability and lack of recourse leave her with no choice but death. The interpretative framework (Butler, 2009) of Hindu patriarchy—the cultural repertoire that shapes and frames affective responses—feels no moral outrage for Jashomati's death. Such a framework renders women as nonbeings whose experiences are of no consequence. Similarly, Hindu priests invoke religious rituals to normalize violence against women, as when the priest advises Bhubaneswar to have intercourse while listening to religious chants. This completely disregards any sense of respect for women and allows patriarchal subjugation.

However, violence cannot completely suppress women's voices; instead, it opens up new possibilities for resistance. The text of *Antarmahal* portrays resistance by revealing women's sexual agency and desire. The playful presence of Mahamaya represents how women's bodies are the sites of patriarchal violence as well as points of transgression. Mahamaya flaunts her body in front of the priest to unsettle the psychological tension of patriarchal control and male fantasy. Ghosh (2005) depicts Mahamaya in such sensuality to project women's agency that questions patriarchal violence and reveals the masks of religious hypocrisy. The text of *Antarmahal* deftly articulates women's desires in

Jashomati's romantic interest in Brajo. *Antarmahal* creates a stunning contrast between Jashomati's encounters with Bhubaneswar and her sudden meetings with Brajo. The encounters with Bhubaneswar are marred by violence, whereas the meetings with Brajo are marked by sexual tensions. Such portrayal of women's agency and desire indicates the difficulty of articulating women's subjectivity in patriarchal social contexts.

Description (Water)

Phenotext

Deepa Mehta's film *Water* delineates the plight of widows in colonial India, especially in Hindu society. The film starts with three verses from the *Manu*, the sacred Hindu religious text that prescribes a rigorous life for widows, signaling to the audience the probable theme of the movie. The narrative revolves mainly around five characters: Chuyia, a 7-year-old child widow; Kalyani, a young widow; Shakuntala, a middle-aged widow; Madhumati, the manager of an ashram; and Narayan, a young nationalist man who loves Kalyani.

The film presents Chuyia's wish to go back to her home. Her father had married her to an elderly person when she was 6 or 7 years old. When her husband died, her father sent her to an ashram, a Hindu monastery in Baranas. A child, Chuyia does not understand the religious niceties related to widowhood—such as shaving the head, wearing only white saris (unlike married women who wear colorful saris because they have husbands who make their lives colorful), eating only vegetables without onions or any spices, financial hardship like begging, and, ultimately, rendering themselves as undesirable. Chuyia regularly expresses her desire to go back home.

On her first day at the ashram, Chuyia meets Kalyani, a young widow in her small room, which has a balcony. Unlike other widows, who keep their hair short, Kalyani wears her hair long. She has a puppy as her companion. Because Chuyia is eager to go back home, Kalyani tells her to chant the name of God 108 times a day, and God will listen to her prayers. Shakuntala, a middle-aged widow, loves Chuyia like a daughter and takes care of her, sheltering her from the rage of Madhumati, the ashram manager who controls the in-house activities. Madhumati sends young widows like Kalyani out as prostitutes to generate funds for the ashram. He even prostitutes Chuyia to a rich patron. Madhumati is connected to Gulabi, a pimp and hermaphrodite who takes Kalyani to the houses of wealthy patrons.

The film also portrays a romantic relationship between Kalyani and Narayan, an educated nationalist from a wealthy family. He is a liberal-minded young man who questions the hypocrisy of society regarding widows. He has fallen in love with Kalyani and wants to marry her, but his parents object. He is determined and takes the initiative to propose to her. Kalyani declines his proposal when she learns about his father, and she eventually commits suicide. Kalyani's reluctance to marry Narayan implies that his father had an illicit relationship with her. In a nutshell, the film presents the plight of Hindu widows' lives in a subtle way.

Genotext

The cinematic construction of emotional excess in *Water* makes the signification process dynamic as it flaunts the presence of genotext in teasing sensibilities. Three themes emerged from the textual analysis: women's desire, patriarchy and power relations, and vulnerability. The encounter between Kalyani and Narayan in front of her balcony projects the musicality of text. Kalyani and Chuyia are working together to squeeze water from a dress. The water drains from the balcony onto the street and lands on Narayan. The audience can easily feel Kalyani's unspoken desire. It is not enunciated in the text, but the musicality of the scene makes it obvious. The sudden encounter between Kalyani and Narayan leads to a conversation, and the background music creates an aura of longing as the two young people feel a spark of love. The melodious song presents the ecstasy of love with an artistic nicety, presenting their love in a melodramatic way.

In traditional Hindu society, widows are pushed to the margins, where their lives depend entirely on the mercy of the patriarchal system. They live in ashrams with no financial recourse, and they are considered half-dead. Chuyia's arrival at the ashram reveals how patriarchy systematically renders women powerless. Chuyia is crying when she enters the ashram. Madhumati draws her close and explains that half of the widows' existence dies with the death of their husbands, and therefore, they need to live a life devoid of any grace. Madhumati strongly suggests that Chuyia embrace the ashram as her new home. Chuyia tells Madhumati that since she is half-alive, she can feel pain and immediately bites Madhumati's feet. Then she runs away, and other widows run after her to restrain her.

The gender hierarchy in Hindu society exacerbates the vulnerability of women, especially widows. Their vulnerability stems from social norms that consider widows as socially undesirable and a threat to joy and ecstasy of other lives. The text delineates this poignant reality in contrasting images. When Shakuntala goes to the river to fetch water, there is a ritualistic ceremony of marriage. The bride and others are in colorful attire. The music adds a soothing harmony. In contrast, Shakuntala drapes herself in a white sari that has no color. The priest conducting the ritual is enraged to see a widow near the ceremony. His stern voice orders Shakuntala to keep away from the ceremony: "Watch it. Do not let your shadow touch the bride" (Mehta, 2005). In short, the text explores the pain of widows with great skill. The cinematic projection of the plight of a widow's life forces the audience to contemplate the vulnerability of widows in Hindu society.

Reduction

Phenotext

Water depicts the cruel practices of Hindu society related to the sanctions of widows—sanctions that ensure that the lives of widows lack color, passion, exuberance, happiness, and sociality. The widows in the movie have internalized such religious doctrines. Most of them are illiterate, and religion is their only guiding force. The striking element of the text is that widows live within strict religious sanctions and render themselves as undesirable. Their heads are bald, their attire colorless, and their skin wrinkled. They have no jewelry, ornaments, or makeup to bring a softening look to their faces. Therefore, the Hindu widows in the ashram lack any feminine grace. Their dilapidated house echoes their dreary condition. Like their white saris, they have no color in their daily lives. Religious fasting is part of their lives; they are given only small portions of food. They represent a direct contrast to a married woman. Moreover, widows are economically vulnerable. Without begging, they do not have access to any income and live in a condition of penury.

The text of *Water* delineates the constant tension between social control and women's desire and agency. Women's agency and desire manifest in *Water* through the portrayal of Kalyani and Shakuntala. Kalyani transgresses the boundary of social control and falls in love with Narayan. Her desire for a regular life with him reflects how social control often fails to restrain our emotions and forbidden desires. When Madhumati learns that Kalyani plans to marry Narayan, she locks Kalyani in her room. Shakuntala goes against the will of the other widows to help Kalyani plan to marry Narayan. Shakuntala also carries the injured Chuyia to the train station to give her to Gandhi, the national leader in Indian independence, to rescue this child widow from future violence caused by the social conditions that forced her to live within the ashram.

Genotext

The themes of textual analysis—women's desire, patriarchy and power relations, and vulnerability—are reduced to a structure–agency relationship in the reduction stage. The structure of the Hindu patriarchy takes away any joy from the lives of widows. The rituals that mark widowhood—breaking of bangles, wearing borderless white saris, the taking away of ornaments, and shaving the head—remove all grace from a widow's life and relegate her to the existence of a nonbeing. Such practices create a sense of loss in the psyche of the widows that keeps coming back and generates melancholia about their past lived experiences. Like Chuyia, many widows in the ashram lost their husbands when they were 6 or 7 years old. Their melancholic souls keep roaming around the emotional excess that marked their marriage ceremonies—exuberance, celebration, ecstasy, festivity, musicality, food, aroma, dress, and color—creating a sensual uproar for the widows, and, eventually, cultivating a sense of longing for the past. This melancholic urge for the past, as a symptomatic presence of the genotext, discharges through their desire for a graceful life that disrupts the flow of cinematic narratives and drives our attention to such melancholic moments. The sparkle of life touches the souls of the widows in the ashram only when they celebrate Jonmastomi, a religious festival.

Widows often exercise their agency by circumventing the religious sanction against them. They use the Hindu religious festival of Jonmastomi to take back the joy of their lives that had been shackled by religious restrictions. A celebration of Jonmastomi signals disruption, musicality, and emotional excess in the lives of widows and is the only colorful event in the ashram. Chuyia as the center of the festival is dressed like the God *Krishna*, and her face is colorfully painted. She looks cute and full of life. The celebration—performance of ritual, music, laughter, and dance—brings bliss to that sad place. The widows in the ashram chase each other and shower everyone with colored powder. Such festivity brings life back into the ashram. The Jonmastomi celebration is filled with such effervescence that it sprinkles joy, delight, and cheerfulness in the lives of the widows in the ashram.

Interpretation

The text of *Water* reveals how the synergy of religion and patriarchy controls women's bodies by imposing stern sanctions on widows. Such practices reflect cultural violence that renders women helpless. Religion demands that widows refrain from sexual urges, and to ensure such restraint, religion imposes financial hardship on them. Hindu widows have no social or financial capital to survive and so have to beg

for their livelihood. Wealthy patrons take advantage of the dreary conditions of widows and provide financial support in exchange for sexual favors. These patrons have no moral qualms about assaulting 6- or 7-year-old females. Such patriarchal practices illuminate the duplicity in social practices. Religion and patriarchy are in collusion to control women's bodies.

However, social control often creates space for resistance that eventually unsettles dominant practices. Widows like Chuyia, Kalyani, and Shakuntala question the beliefs and practices related to widowhood. For example, Chuyia is a rebel from the beginning, and her innocence and vulnerability create a space where audiences can witness the cruelty in religious practices. Kalyani transgresses social expectations by acting on her desire to establish a romantic relationship with Narayan. Her romantic relationship with him challenges the social construct that renders widows as half-dead and illuminates the presence of women's desire. Shakuntala feels a tension between moral conscience and faith in religion; however, she overcomes the burden of faith in realizing women's place in the world. She goes against the norms by supporting both Kalyani and Chuyia to have better lives in the future. Such subversive actions signal a shift in social practices related to Hindu widows.

Discussion

The textual analysis reveals how the synergy of patriarchy and religion reinforces cultural violence against women by legitimizing the repressive structure of conjugality and widowhood. The Hindu patriarchy creates unequal power relations that marginalize women's lived experiences and exacerbate the vulnerability of women. More important, the textual analysis highlights women's vulnerability because religion and patriarchy are in cahoots to create cultural violence against women. Though Gultang's conceptualization of cultural violence assists the understanding of the cultural norms and social processes of violence, it falls short in articulating resistance and agency that challenge violence. Salazar and Casto (2008) argued that women need to move from being the victims of cultural violence to being survivors in order to resist sexist discourse. Such interrogation of cultural violence ushers in a new way to understand the interconnection of power, resistance, and gender equality.

Though Salazar and Casto (2008) provide a new starting point to understand resistance in the context of cultural violence, scholars need to interrogate how mediated practices rearticulate gender relations and dominance. Media play a crucial role in reimaging gender identity and power relations by unsettling the dominant meaning-making process. *Antarmahal* and *Water* highlight women's agency and resistance that question and challenge patriarchal deceits and religious dogma. By depicting agency and resistance of women, *Antarmahal* and *Water* reimagine gender roles and contest the typical representation of women as Sita and Savitri in popular Bollywood movies. Such mediated representation of women's agency reveals how feminist consciousness promotes gender equality in celluloid.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to locate gender politics in women-centered films in India. It employs Kristeva's semanalysis to understand how the interplay of genotext and phenotext reveals women's desire and sexual agency. Semanalysis provides a vantage point from which to examine social transgressions by

women that question dominant practices of both religion and patriarchy. Furthermore, this study highlights how the synergy of patriarchy and religion perpetuates cultural violence against women. A textual analysis of *Antarmahal* and *Water* illuminates the duplicity of religion and patriarchy and highlights how women's bodies are the sites of social control and points of resistance. However, textual analysis limits the generalizability of the findings to a larger sample of women-centric films in India. Future research needs to investigate how Bollywood cinema embraces the changing roles of women in society and incorporates women's sexual agency.

This study contributed to gender studies, feminist media scholarship, and Asian cinema studies by highlighting how the portrayal of women's desire and sexual agency challenges the synergy of patriarchy and religion that perpetuates cultural violence against women. Furthermore, this study reveals the significance of critical cultural commentary in cinema that creates spaces for social transgression to question patriarchal norms, values, and social practices. Indian cinema influences cultural imagery about gender roles in society. This study highlights how the texts of *Antarmahal* and *Water* challenge the stereotypical representation of women and renegotiates social expectations on gender relations in society. The research reveals how critical and artistic representation of women's lives can unmask dogmatic social practices and open up new avenues for mediated representation of women.

References

Agarwal, R. (2014, June). *Shifting roles of women: Through the lens of Bollywood*. Paper presented at the 10th International Academic Conference, Vienna, Austria.

Akinyemi, L. S. (2018). Cultural violence and gender injustice in Africa: The necessity for enlightened self-interest. In F. Gursozlu (Ed.), *Peace, culture, and violence*, (pp. 183–197). : The Netherlands: Brill and Rodopi.

Bumiller, E. (2006, May 3). Film ignites the wrath of Hindu fundamentalists. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/movies/03wate.html

Butler, J. (2009). *Frames of war: When is life grievable?* New York, NY: Verso Books.

Chang, B. G. (1987). World and/or sign: Toward a semiotic phenomenology of the modern life-world. *Human Studies, 10*(3), 311–331.

Collins, H. P. (1999a). *Black feminist thought*. New York, NY: Routledge

Collins, H. P. (1999b). Moving beyond gender: Intersectionality and scientific knowledge. In M. F. Ferree (Ed.), *Revisioning gender* (pp. 261–284). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color. *Stanford Law Review, 43*(6), 1241–1299.

Dasgupta, S. D. (1996). Feminist consciousness in women-centered Hindi films. *The Journal of Popular Culture, 30*(1), 173–189.

Dasgupta, S. D., & Hegde, R. S. (1988). The eternal receptacle: A study of mistreatment of women in Hindi films. In R. Ghadially (Ed.), *Women in Indian society: A reader* (pp. 209–216). New York, NY: SAGE Publications.

Derrida, J. (1991). Différance. In P. Kamuf (Ed.), *A Derrida reader: Between the lines* (pp. 59–79). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, *27*(3), 291–305.

Ghosh, R. (Director). (2005). *Antarmahal* [Motion picture on DVD]. India: A B Corporation Limited, Puja Films.

Gopal, S. (2011). *Conjugations: Marriage and form in new Bollywood cinema*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Gopalan, L. (1997). Avenging women in Indian cinema. *Screen, 38*(1), 42–59.

Hooks, B. (1989). *Talking back: Thinking feminist, thinking Black*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Jamison, S. W. (1996). *Sacrificed wife/sacrificer's wife: Women, ritual, and hospitality in ancient India*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Knipe, D. M. (2015). *Vedic voices: Intimate narratives of a living Andhra tradition.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Kristeva, J. (1986). Revolution in poetic language. In T. Moi (Ed.), *The Kristeva reader* (pp. 89–136). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Kristeva, J. (1993). *New maladies of the soul*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Kristeva, J. (2002). *The portable Kristeva* (updated ed., K. Oliver, Ed.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Langdridge, D. (2007). *Phenomenological psychology: Theory, research and method.* New York, NY: Pearson Education.

Lanigan, R. L. (1988). *Phenomenology of communication: Merleau-Ponty's thematics in communicology and semiology*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.

Manohar, U., & Kline, S. L. (2014). Sexual assault portrayals in Hindi cinema. *Sex Roles, 71*(5–8), 233–245.

Mazumder, R. (2017). Being Rituparno Ghosh: An artist and a young radical. *The Quint*. Retrieved from https://www.thequint.com/entertainment/celebrities/rituparno-ghosh-a-portrait-of-the-artist-as-a-young-radical

Mehta, D. (Director). (2005). *Water* [Motion picture]. Canada: 20th Century Fox Studio.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). *Phenomenology of perception.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1970). *Phenomenology of perception*. New York, NY: The Humanities Press.

Moi, T. (Ed.). (1986). *The Kristeva reader*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Nandkumar, S. (2011). *The stereotypical portrayal of women in commercial Indian cinema* (Unpublished M.A. thesis). University of Houston, Houston, TX.

Oliver, K. (2002). *The portable Kristeva*. New York. NY: Columbia University Press.

Orbe, M. P. (1998). *Constructing co-cultural theory: An explication of culture, power, and communication*. New York, NY: SAGE Publications.

Oyedemi, T. (2016). Beauty as violence: "Beautiful" hair and the cultural violence of identity erasure. *Social Identities, 22*(5), 537–553.

Rad, M. T. (2016). Women and their portrayal in Indian cinema. *International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies, 2*(4), 1318–1334.

Rediff. (2005). People said I created pornography. *Rediff.com*. Retrieved from http://www.rediff.com/movies/report/ghosh/20051122.htm

Rickert, T. (2007). Toward the Chora: Kristeva, Derrida, and Ulmer on emplaced invention. *Philosophy and Rhetoric, 40*(3), 251–273.

Ricoeur, P. (1975). Phenomenology and the social sciences. *The Annals of Phenomenological Psychology*, *2,* 145–159.

Salazar, C. F., & Casto, C. (2008). Moving from victim to survivor of cultural violence: A conceptual model. *The Journal of Humanistic Counseling, 47*(1), 82–98.

Sarkar, S. (2012). *An analysis of Hindi women-centric films in India*. Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1265. https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/1265

Seema, S. (2013). Historical analysis of women development in India. *International Journal of Scientific Engineering and Research, 1*(3), 111–116.

Smith, A. R. (1989). Seeing through a mask's confession. *Text and Performance Quarterly, 2*, 135–152.

Smith, A. R. (1990). Mishima's Seppuku speech: A critical-cultural analysis. *Text and Performance Quarterly, 10*, 1–19.

Standish, K. (2014). Understanding cultural violence and gender: Honour killings; dowry murder; the *zina* ordinance and blood-feuds. *Journal of Gender Studies, 23*(2), 111–124.

Thomas, R. (2005). Not quite (pearl) white: Fearless Nadia, queen of the stunts. In R. Kaur & A. Sinha (Eds.), *Bollywood: Popular Indian cinema through a transnational lens* (pp. 35–69). New Delhi, India: SAGE Publications.

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4784–4801 1932–8036/20180005

Media Censures: The Hutchins Commission on the Press, the New York Intellectuals on Mass Culture

STEPHEN BATES
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA

Around the middle of the 20th century, two groups of American intellectuals turned their attention to the mass media. The scholars on the Commission on Freedom of the Press, chaired by University of Chicago president Robert Maynard Hutchins, assessed the American news media. Dwight Macdonald and his fellow New York intellectuals assessed the American entertainment media and other forms of mass culture. On the whole, both groups were appalled. Hutchins et al. and Macdonald et al. inhabited different worlds—the intellectual establishment and the intellectual antiestablishment—yet the two groups developed parallel critiques. Comparing them reveals important aspects of the role of midcentury intellectuals, particularly their attitudes toward mass media and mass society, officialdom and power. It also raises provocative questions about the forces that shape research agendas.

Keywords: media criticism, culture criticism, media responsibility, intellectuals

In the 1940s, American intellectuals from a wide range of positions focused their attention on the mass media. Under the leadership of University of Chicago president Robert Maynard Hutchins, a group of scholars known as the Commission on Freedom of the Press evaluated the news media, while Dwight Macdonald and some other New York intellectuals, as they were later dubbed, evaluated the American entertainment media. On the whole, both groups were appalled.

Hutchins et al. and Macdonald et al. inhabited different worlds—the intellectual establishment and the intellectual antiestablishment—yet the two groups developed parallel critiques of the mass media. The critiques rest on the same approach to research, the same misreading of history, and the same misunderstanding of media effects. Although each group's commentary is the subject of a substantial literature, the two have almost never been considered together. Tracing the similarities and differences sheds new light on the two groups of intellectuals and their attitudes about mass media, and it raises provocative questions about the forces that shape research agendas.

This article examines the critiques and their authors. The Hutchins Commission's critique is represented principally by its report, *A Free and Responsible Press* (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947), supplemented by its unpublished memos, background papers, drafts, and deliberations, with a

Stephen Bates: stephen.bates@unlv.edu
Date submitted: 2017–10–01

Copyright © 2018 (Stephen Bates). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

focus on the commission's discussion of public affairs journalism. The New York circle's critique is represented principally by articles published between 1941 and 1960 by Dwight Macdonald, supplemented by works of Clement Greenberg, Irving Howe, and a few others.

Admittedly, Macdonald is an imperfect representative of his group. In their mass-culture critiques, he and other New York intellectuals overlapped in some arguments but not others, and at some times but not others. Macdonald was sui generis. Leon Trotsky supposedly called him a "Macdonaldist" (Epstein, 2001, p. 27), and Howe remarked on his "table-hopping mind" (Rodden, 2017, p. 49). But Macdonald produced the best-known critique of mass culture, and some New York intellectuals shared his concerns.

Two preliminary points should be made. First, although some scholars (e.g., Gans, 1999) view the news media as a component of mass culture, this article treats the two as distinct, just as the two circles of critics generally did. Second, some New York intellectuals did defend mass culture, at least tepidly (e.g., Hook, 1952). This article concentrates on those who criticized it, particularly Macdonald.

Literature Review

More than three decades ago, Hilton Kramer (1986) observed that "there appears to be no end" (p. 1) to the outpouring of books and articles on the New York intellectuals. The outpouring continues, with books published in the last decade on the New York intellectuals as Jews (Goffman & Morris, 2009), as commentators on the Cuban revolution (Rojas, 2015), and as targets of FBI surveillance (Rodden, 2017). Major works on the group include books by Ernest Goldstein and Bernard Rosenberg (1982), Alexander Bloom (1986), Terry A. Cooney (1986), Alan M. Wald (1987), Joseph Dorman (2000), and David Laskin (2000). Works on Dwight Macdonald include a biography (Wreszin, 1994), a collection of his letters (Wreszin, 2001), a collection of interviews with him (Wreszin, 2003), a study of his writings in his journal *politics* (Sumner, 1996), and a study of his writings on culture (Lewandowski, 2013). Another important work, whose ambit extends beyond the New York group, is a study of radical intellectuals and popular culture by Paul R. Gorman (1996). In addition, Robert Vanderlan (2010) provides insights into the role of public intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly two who worked for Henry Luce's *Fortune*: Dwight Macdonald and future Commission on Freedom of the Press member Archibald MacLeish.

The Commission on Freedom of the Press is the subject of a smaller literature. Major works relying on original sources include monographs by Margaret A. Blanchard (1977) and Stephen Bates (1995); articles by Stephen Bates (2009), Jerilyn S. McIntyre (1979, 1987), Roger Simpson (1995), and Jane S. McConnell (1997); part of a book by Victor Pickard (2015); a book chapter by Brett Gary (2005); and theses or dissertations by Paul M. Fackler (1982), Susan Dell Gonders Golike (1995), and Frederick Blevens (1995).

Studies of the New York circle of culture critics seldom overlap with studies of the Hutchins assemblage of press critics. Two exceptions are an article by Blevens (1994) and the book chapter by Gary (2005). Blevens considers the Commission on Freedom of the Press in the context of another Hutchins project, the selection and publication of the Great Books of the Western World. He links

Hutchins's efforts to popularize the high culture of the Great Books with his efforts to upgrade the low culture of journalism, and he takes note of Macdonald's attack on the Great Books project. Gary links the mass-culture critique to fears of propaganda-mesmerized masses, and he notes that the Commission on Freedom of the Press in general viewed the public more positively, as discriminating and competent citizens who were ill-served by corporate media.

The Two Groups

Background

The Commission on Freedom of the Press, often called the Hutchins Commission, grew out of discussions between Time, Inc., editor in chief Henry R. Luce and his friend Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago. Luce offered to fund a study of freedom of the press, and Hutchins agreed to oversee it (Hutchins, 1947). The two men selected a dozen Americans, mostly academics, as members, plus four foreign advisers (McConnell, 1997; McIntyre, 1987). The most active members, in addition to Hutchins, included Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, philosopher William Ernest Hocking, First Amendment scholar Zechariah Chafee Jr., and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. In addition to its general report, the commission published special studies by Hocking (1947), Chafee (1947), and members of the research staff (Inglis, 1947; White, 1947; White & Leigh, 1946). Published in 1947, the general report, *A Free and Responsible Press*, declares that the news media "have not provided a service adequate to the needs of the society" (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, p. 1) and that they "must be accountable . . . for meeting the public need" (p. 18). On the whole, the book met with a chilly reception from American journalists, including Luce; but in the years that followed, it entered the canon of media studies as the foundation of the social responsibility theory of journalism (Blanchard, 1977; Rantanen, 2017).

The New York intellectuals were a circle of writers coalesced around small, cerebral magazines, notably *Partisan Review*. Irving Howe conferred the title "New York intellectuals" in 1968; previously they had been called simply "the *Partisan Review* crowd" (Jumonville, 2007, p. 2). Clement Greenberg published the first of the group's critiques of mass culture, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," in *Horizon* in 1940, and Irving Howe published "Notes on Mass Culture" in *politics* in 1948. The most visible mass-culture critic was Dwight Macdonald, who published "A Theory of 'Popular Culture'" in *politics* in 1944 and then revised the argument in "A Theory of Mass Culture," published in *Diogenes* in 1953, and the two-part "Masscult and Midcult," published in *Partisan Review* in 1960.

The Groups Compared

The two groups share several attributes. First, members of both wrote about a wide range of topics beyond their formal training. Macdonald (1960b) in fact maintained that only "generalists whose ideas are broad and non-professional" can qualify as intellectuals (p. 617). Second, the members of both groups were writers, and some were also editors. Hutchins chaired the editorial committee of the cultural magazine *Measure* (Regnery, 1979), and commission member George Shuster was the former managing editor of *Commonweal* (Van Allen, 1995). The New York intellectuals frequently invented or reinvented

magazines, including *Partisan Review*, *politics*, *Dissent*, *Commentary*, *Public Interest*, and *Encounter*. "When intellectuals can do nothing else, they start a magazine," remarked Howe (1979, p. xiv). Third, although the New York intellectuals focused on culture and the commission on journalism, members of both groups crossed over. Macdonald frequently wrote critically about journalism, especially Time, Inc., where he had worked (e.g., 1937a, 1937b, 1937c, 1938, 1945, 1950, 1957b), and Hutchins played a lead role in selecting classic works for the Great Books of the Western World (Beam, 2008). Fourth, with two exceptions in the case of the Hutchins Commission (Blanchard, 1977), members of both groups kept apart from big business. They thereby stayed true to what Howe (1954) called "the whole idea of the intellectual vocation—the idea of a life dedicated to values that cannot possibly be realized by a commercial civilization" (p. 11). Finally, one Hutchins Commission member was also one of the New York intellectuals, though not a prominent commentator on mass culture: Reinhold Niebuhr.

Though substantial, the features shared by the two groups are outweighed by the differences. To begin with, the Commission on Freedom of the Press was a collaborative undertaking. The 13 commission members unanimously signed *A Free and Responsible Press*, which, as Hutchins noted in the foreword, demanded compromises on tone and phrasing. The result is a sermon that is stern and staid in tone. By contrast, the New York intellectuals' articles on mass culture are distinctly individual productions. In particular, Macdonald's "Masscult and Midcult" is an antic performance, aglow with glee as well as gloom, hardly the sort of thing a committee might produce.

Indeed, the New York intellectuals seem to have been temperamentally disinclined to compromise. They aspired to avoid "the accredited institutions of society" (Howe, 1954, p. 13), and some managed to subsist "in decent poverty from moderately serious literary journalism" (p. 14). Macdonald scraped by as a writer and editor, aided by a modest trust fund and, in the late 1940s, by an unanticipated inheritance of his wife's (Wreszin, 1994). Most members of the Hutchins Commission, by contrast, worked in elite universities.

Perhaps in part because many of them operated outside formal institutions, the New York intellectuals were less prominent than the commission members in the 1930s and 1940s. Macdonald and other members of the New York circle rarely addressed audiences beyond their small magazines (Howe, 1968), though Macdonald did write for *Fortune* in its early years. (Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, he wrote for *The New Yorker* and *Esquire*.) By contrast, Hutchins twice appeared on the cover of *TIME*, and he and other commission members contributed articles to mass-market magazines such as *Life* (a favorite target of Macdonald's attacks on mass culture).

The groups differed in other respects, too. In art, many New York intellectuals favored the avant-garde, whereas Hutchins's Great Books tastes were mainstream. In politics, Macdonald (1972) at one point embraced Trotskyism, though he later called himself "a conservative anarchist" (p. 2). By contrast, most Hutchins Commission members were New Deal liberals when they collaborated on *A Free and Responsible Press*, though some had held radical views earlier, according to Blevens (1995).

Perhaps the most substantial difference between the two groups is their stance toward politics and power. The New York intellectuals stood apart from officialdom as a matter of principle, believing,

according to Howe (1954), that intellectuals "who attach themselves to the seats of power . . . surrender their freedom of expression without gaining any significance as political figures" (p. 13). Most members of the Hutchins Commission, by contrast, had worked in government as advisers or appointees (McIntyre, 1987). Archibald MacLeish served as Librarian of Congress and as the Roosevelt administration spokesman on military preparedness (Donaldson, 1992). John Dickinson ran the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department (Dickinson, 1940). Hutchins accepted a Roosevelt administration job only to have the offer evaporate; he also aspired to be nominated to the Supreme Court (Ashmore, 1989). Whereas Bloom (1986) calls the New York intellectuals "the perfect outsiders" (p. 153), Gary (2005) terms the members of the Hutchins Commission "bookish men of action" (p. 83).

The disagreement over the role of the intellectual came to a head after MacLeish published *The Irresponsibles* in 1940. In the brief tract, MacLeish (1940) characterized fascism as "a revolt against the common culture of the West" (p. 14), and he called on writers and scholars to oppose it with "the weapons of ideas and words" (p. 16). In this time of global crisis, he said, they must abandon their "antiseptic air of objectivity" (p. 34) and their single-minded pursuit of "truth of feeling" (p. 31).

The critic Van Wyck Brooks praised *The Irresponsibles* and said that it might "turn the tide in American literature" (Donaldson, 1992, p. 335). Thereafter, in two speeches and then a book, he distinguished between primary writers and secondary (or "coterie") writers (Nelson, 1981). According to Brooks (1941), primary writers, such as Dostoyevsky and Dickens, address timeless themes and universal feelings in works intended for the masses, whereas secondary writers, such as Joyce and Proust, obsess over form and phrasing in works intended mainly for other secondary writers. Brooks said, quoting Nietzsche, that "literature is not important unless it is a 'stimulus to life'" (p. 200).

In a *Partisan Review* essay titled "Kulturbolschewismus Is Here," Macdonald (1941) charged that Brooks and MacLeish were trying to impose an "official approach to art" (pp. 450–451) that verged on totalitarianism. Treating MacLeish and Brooks together was "a shrewd debater's tactic" on Macdonald's part, writes Vanderlan (2010, p. 131). MacLeish's focus was political. Though he urged writers to join the struggle against fascism, he did not contend that the apolitical writers were producing bad art; in fact, he said that "the time we live in has produced more first-rate writers than any but the very greatest ages" (MacLeish, 1940, p. 27). Brooks, by contrast, advanced a broad aesthetic argument that mentioned fascism only in passing.

Macdonald, ironically, was vulnerable to his own "Kulturbolschewismus" criticism. When Edmund Wilson maintained a public silence on the Brooks theory of literature, Macdonald accused him of shirking "the responsibility of writers on *our* side of the fence to stick their necks out now, to speak out publicly against this sort of thing" (Wreszin, 2001, p. 106). In rallying opposition to MacLeish and Brooks for telling writers what to say, thus, Macdonald himself told a writer what to say.

Comparing the Critiques

Targets and Goals

Both the Hutchins Commission and the New York circle sought not just to spotlight bad media products but also to explain the historical, social, and economic forces responsible for them. The Hutchins Commission focused on news media and their impact on self-government, whereas Macdonald and other New York intellectuals focused on the arts in general and, more particularly, entertainment media and their impact on culture.

Although the categories overlap—journalism can have artistry, and the arts can affect politics—two distinctions are important. First, news articles report on actual people and events, and they are judged in large part by their accuracy. The arts are measured by other standards. Second, whereas journalism tends to be ephemeral, telling truths about the moment, the arts at their best tell truths that transcend the moment. In the famous phrase of Ezra Pound (1934), "Literature is news that STAYS news" (p. 29).

Research

In formulating their critiques of the media, both the Commission on Freedom of the Press and Macdonald eschewed extensive research, particularly quantitative research on media content. "The Commission did not conduct elaborate 'research,'" Hutchins (1947, p. v) wrote, prompting one reviewer to remark that Hutchins seemed to regard *research* as a neologism (Liebling, 1947). Macdonald (1957b) similarly embedded the term "social sciences" in quotation marks (p. 120). He maintained that cultural criticism "can never be 'statistically verified,' being a matter of sensibility" (Macdonald, 1957a, p. 81).

Both groups were criticized for neglecting research. "No matter how wise the men are," Frank Luther Mott (1947, p. 441) wrote in a review of *A Free and Responsible Press*, "if they do not have original, first-hand knowledge of the subject, they cannot report reliably on a complicated, extensive, and vitally important system." Edward Shils (1957, 1958, 1960) similarly faulted Macdonald and other critics of mass culture for citing no evidence for their assertions.

Historical Narrative

The two groups constructed overlapping historical narratives, with a golden age shattered by the forces of mass society—historical narratives that scholars deem inaccurate.

For the Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947), the golden age existed around the time of the framing of the First Amendment, an era of "easy individual access to the market place of ideas" (p. 15). During this period, "anybody with anything to say had comparatively little difficulty in getting it published," because "presses were cheap; the journeyman printer could become a publisher and editor by borrowing the few dollars he needed" (p. 14). But by the early 20th century, only the wealthy could afford the facilities to publish major newspapers, so ownership fell into fewer hands. In addition, "the economic

logic of private enterprise force[d] most units of the mass communications industry to seek an ever larger audience" (p. 52), which prevented in-depth analysis and dissenting viewpoints from reaching the public.

For the New York intellectuals, the golden age began in the 17th century and deteriorated in the 18th and 19th centuries (Macdonald, 1960a). It featured two tiers: the folk culture of the masses and the high culture of the aristocracy. Appreciating high culture required education that the masses lacked, but they took pleasure in folk culture, "an autochthonous product shaped by the people to fit their own needs" (Macdonald, 1960a, p. 214). Then came mass society, with its cluster of social and political disruptions. Industrialization and improved transportation drew people to the cities. Literacy rates increased. In factories, the lives of workers became less arduous but more tedious; inexpensive and formulaic mass culture served to distract them from their "disturbing reduction to semi-robot status" (Howe, 1948, p. 120). As with newspapers, the machinery to manufacture mass culture required a large investment; for the sake of profit, companies maximized the size of the audience (Greenberg, 1940).

According to scholars, both of the golden age narratives are flawed. As for the Hutchins Commission, historians have found that Americans of around 1790 did not have ready access to printing presses; the dominant mass communication media of the era were too expensive for the masses (Roucek & Huszar, 1950). Mott (1947) faulted the commission for a "blind spot" in its "reliance on the mythical 'golden age of journalism'" (p. 443). According to Gorman (1996), Macdonald posited a simplified and romanticized view of folk societies, which originated with the anthropologist Robert Redfield—coincidentally, a member of the Hutchins Commission—but which later was debunked.

The Indictments

The two groups faulted media offerings on parallel grounds. First, both groups complained about the absence of individualized sensibility. Notwithstanding the institutional prose of the committee-written *A Free and Responsible Press*, MacLeish lamented the "sameness and lack of variety" of wire-service articles (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1946, p. 101). For Macdonald (1960a), mass culture is "a standard product, like Kleenex" (p. 206), "fabricated" (Macdonald, 1953, p. 2) by "efficiency experts and audience-reaction analysts" (p. 17). In this regard, he viewed mass culture as the product of quantitative research, and he rejected quantitative research as a tool for criticizing it; for him, criticism of culture, like culture itself, ought to reflect a distinctive sensibility rather than data-driven sterility. He wrote of "the Academic-Cautious approach," with its "statistical tables and other instruments of pedantic torture" (Wreszin, 2001, p. 277).

Second, both groups rejected the notion that newness signifies importance. Although it might seem difficult to take the *new* out of *news*, the commission tried. One criterion of news, it said, is recentness—"something that has happened within the last few hours" (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, pp. 54–55)—which, according to the commission, has the effect of omitting important information. As for works of culture, Howe (1968) and Macdonald (1960a) maintained that novelty does not signify quality. New York intellectual Hannah Arendt, whose theory of mass society influenced Macdonald's critique of mass culture (Gorman, 1996), maintained that "the only nonsocial and authentic

criterion for works of culture is, of course, their relative permanence and even their ultimate immortality" (Arendt, 1960, p. 280).

Third, some members of both groups looked down on media products that could be appreciated without effort. In 1930, Hutchins lamented that the press seemed reluctant to "call forth intellectual effort from the reader" ("Hutchins Suggests Endowed Press," 1930). Clement Greenberg (1940) said that Norman Rockwell "pre-digests art for the spectator and spares him effort," whereas one must "train for the enjoyment of Picasso" (p. 267). According to Macdonald (1944), "the bad is more easily enjoyed than the good" (p. 21).

Fourth, both groups cited Gresham's Law, according to which low-quality materials drive out high-quality ones (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1945; Macdonald, 1953). They argued that the mass products, news and culture alike, reduce the availability of high-quality products.

Finally, both groups hinted that they themselves were victims of the mass media. In an editorial, *Partisan Review* said that mass culture "weakens the position of the artist and the intellectual profoundly by separating him from his natural audience" ("Our country and our culture: Editorial statement," 1952, p. 285). *A Free and Responsible Press* says that "color and 'hate' words" (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, p. 26) in news coverage can feed the audience's prejudices against minority groups. One of the hate words listed may reflect the experience of MacLeish and others in the government: "bureaucratic."

Macdonald's indictment does differ from the Hutchins Commission's in two interrelated fashions. First, whereas the commission talked broadly of the elements of good journalism, Macdonald categorized particular cultural works as good or bad—as he put it, "this is kosher and this is not" (Wreszin, 2001, p. 305). Second, he separated the bad group into two subcategories: mass culture, which he called Masscult, and middlebrow culture, which he called Midcult (Macdonald, 1960a, 1960b). He particularly loathed Midcult, a category in which he included MacLeish's play *J.B.* The Hutchins Commission had no counterpart to Midcult.

The Dangers

Both groups warned that current trends, unless reversed, would lead to cataclysm—hyperbole that probably stemmed from a flawed understanding of media effects.

The Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947) said that "the world seems to be on the brink of suicide" (p. 99), and an irresponsible press could bring about "universal catastrophe" (p. 4) and even the end "of democracy and perhaps of civilization" (p. 106). Macdonald (1957a) linked mass culture to "such malign political growths as Hitler's demagogy" (p. 75) and predicted that "if the US doesn't or cannot change its mass culture . . . it will lose the war against USSR" (Macdonald, 2001, p. 203). Both groups analogized the media's impact on individuals to illness and debilitation: "an actual degenerative process" (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1944, p. 38), "a cancerous growth" (Macdonald, 1953, p. 2).

The Macdonald plaint overlaps with the work he had excoriated in 1941: MacLeish's *The Irresponsibles*. Both Macdonald and MacLeish maintained that bad art endangers the world. But three distinctions are important. First, MacLeish held a government position when he published *The Irresponsibles*. Macdonald and other critics believed that the Librarian of Congress was behaving like a czar of culture. Second, whereas MacLeish principally criticized writers, Macdonald focused on the corporate machinery that produces mass culture. Finally, MacLeish stressed the immediate peril posed by fascism, whereas the defeat of the United States seemed to be an afterthought for Macdonald, mentioned only in passing.

The alarmism of both critiques reflects the now-discredited hypodermic model of communication. Gorman (1996) writes that Macdonald treated the masses as "highly susceptible to manipulation and exploitation" (p. 184). Such commentary has faded from prominence, according to Gorman, as communication researchers have found that the media are not so potent. Blanchard (1998), Pickard (2008), and Blevens (1995) assert that the Hutchins Commission critique of the news media also rests on the hypodermic model, though Gary (2005) argues that the commission rejected the era's dominant "propaganda anxiety."

Solutions

A Free and Responsible Press features a chapter titled "What Can Be Done" (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, pp. 79–106), and the penultimate section of "Masscult and Midcult" opens with the question "What is to be done?" (Macdonald, 1960b, p. 625). But the proffered solutions differ.

The Hutchins Commission sought not just to identify problems but to solve them, and it was confident that it had found the solutions. The report states that if its recommendations are implemented, the press "will be brought much closer" (Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947, p. 102) to providing what society needs. The recommendations themselves are modest: mainly mechanisms for incentivizing social responsibility among publishers, along with a call for the creation of "a new and independent agency to appraise and report annually upon the performance of the press" (p. 100). The agency would seek to improve not just the press but also the public, by "educat[ing] the people as to the aspirations which they ought to have for the press" (pp. 100–101).

Macdonald's answer to "What is to be done?" changed with time, and he never framed it with the confidence of the Hutchins Commission. In 1944, he rejected the view of "reactionary prophets like Otega [*sic*] y Gasset" that "the only road to sanity is to rebuild the old class walls and bring the masses once more under aristocratic control" (Macdonald, 1944, p. 23). Instead, he predicted that the mass-culture problem might be solved by the arrival of a "new *human* culture, in Trotsky's phrase, which for the first time in history has a chance of superseding the class cultures of the present and past" (Macdonald, 1944, p. 23). By 1953, he was less hopeful. "Far from Mass Culture getting better," he wrote, "we will be lucky if it doesn't get worse" (Macdonald, 1953, p. 17). In 1958, he said he had abandoned his original "quasi-Marxist conclusion" in favor of "one that inclines to the position of T. S. Eliot and Ortega y Gasset" (Macdonald, 1958, p. 356). Two years later, he sketched "a compromise between the conservative and

liberal proposals which I think is worth considering" (Macdonald, 1960b, p. 629): an expansion of high-culture nonprofit or commercial institutions that serve niche audiences.

The Hutchins Commission was optimistic; Macdonald was pessimistic. The commission expressed "a refreshing optimism about the possibilities for improvement—not just of journalism but of humankind, too" (Tucher, 2000, p. 57), whereas Macdonald outlined a problem from which "there seemed neither relief nor escape" (Howe, 1968, p. 35). Perhaps the distinction helps explain the endurance of the former in the study of journalism and the decline of the latter in the study of popular culture. *A Free and Responsible Press*, though certainly the subject of criticism (e.g., Merrill, 1974; Udick, 1993), "is now regarded as one of the most important documents in the history of American media" (Dennis & DeFleur, 2010, p. 387). By contrast, Macdonald's work has been demoted in the field of popular culture studies. According to Gorman (1996), "while Macdonald remains the American writer most commonly cited in popular culture analyses, he is most often invoked as an example of 'what went wrong' with mass culture criticism" (p. 191).

Contextualizing the Critiques

Democracy, the Marketplace, and Cultural Elitism

One challenge facing both the Commission on Freedom of the Press and the New York intellectuals was reconciling their faith in the American public with their disapproval of the public's media choices. Media executives maintained that whatever the public wanted, a corporation would supply it. If one corporation refused, others would rush in. By claiming to be giving the public what it wanted, the executives could deflect criticism. They could argue that critics of the mass media are actually critics of the masses (Stanton, 1960).

The critics of mass culture and those of news media came up with varying responses. At times, they sought to shift the blame back to the corporations. Both Macdonald (1953, 1960a) and the Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947) argued that media corporations do respond to the public appetite, but it is an appetite distorted by the corporations' limited offerings and potent advertising. At one point, Macdonald (1953), but not the Hutchins Commission, further contended that the media products are "imposed from above" as "an instrument of political domination" (pp. 2–3). Ultimately, Macdonald (1960b) concluded that supply and demand in mass culture reinforce each other; "which came first . . . is a question as academic as it is unanswerable" (p. 627).

There is no escaping the elitist nature of the two critiques, as has been widely noted by scholars writing about the Hutchins Commission (e.g., Blanchard, 1998; Bollinger, 2000) and those writing about New York intellectuals (e.g., Gorman, 1996; Kristol, 1979). The picture can be viewed from many angles. One can see the critics of mass culture and those of the news media as intellectual snobs, a self-appointed aristocracy, and antidemocratic elitists concerning media products, though often with a dedication to democracy and equality in the political realm. Or one can see them as pursuing one of the goals of criticism set forth by T. S. Eliot (1932): "the correction of taste" (p. 13). Or one can see them as educators. For his book *Freedom of the Press: A Framework of Principle*,

William Ernest Hocking (1947) invited other commission members to add footnotes of commentary. In one passage, Hocking wrote: "It would hardly do to make free speech free and listening compulsory, though that might be the speaker's dream!" Robert Hutchins responded in a footnote: "This is doubtless why men become professors" (p. 162).

Behind and Beyond the Critiques

Funders can redirect research in a field, as William J. Buxton (1994), Brett Gary (1996), David E. Morrison (2008), and Jefferson Pooley (2011) all show. The Commission on Freedom of the Press existed solely because Henry Luce came up with the idea, persuaded Hutchins that it was feasible, and provided the money. Luce's biographer calls him an "intellectual omnivore" (Brinkley, 2010, p. 416) who believed that "putting smart and eminent people together (he was drawn especially to what he called 'philosophers and thinkers') was always a good way to solve a problem" (p. 415).

For his part, Macdonald needed no outsider either to suggest a study of mass culture or to pay for it. He could follow his interests, not the interests of funders. He made his own opportunities. Perhaps, though, not money but politics drove Macdonald to examine mass culture, at a time when prospects for socialism in the United States were dwindling. He published his first article on mass culture in 1940. He continued writing principally about politics through the 1940s, according to Christopher Lasch (1965), and thereafter wrote mostly about culture. Howe (1968), while noting the risk of reductionism, suggested that mass-culture criticism "replace[d] the criticism of bourgeois society" (p. 36) for some New York intellectuals. He added: "If you couldn't stir the proletariat to action, you could denounce Madison Avenue in comfort" (p. 36).

Conclusion

In the middle of the 20th century, two groups criticized the media choices made by their fellow citizens. The Commission on Freedom of the Press, chaired by Robert M. Hutchins, deplored the news media. The New York intellectuals, particularly Dwight Macdonald, deplored mass culture. Despite differences between the two groups and between the critiques they advanced, the Hutchins Commission and the mass-culture critics overlapped in many respects, including their misconceptions.

Henry Luce's intellectual curiosity provided the impetus behind the Commission on Freedom of the Press. Without Luce, the commission's critique of the news media vanishes. As for Macdonald—and this is more speculative—perhaps the decline of 1930s radicalism prompted him to turn away from politics and focus instead on culture in general and mass culture in particular. The demise of the Left may be the indispensable condition precedent for the Macdonald critique of mass culture, just as the interest of Luce was a precondition for the Commission on Freedom of the Press.

Neither *A Free and Responsible Press* nor the Macdonald critique is the product of the common funding model of today, in which researchers develop proposals and seek support from funding agencies. From a higher level of generality, though, the commission's and Macdonald's critiques raise two provocative questions about opportunity structures, financial and otherwise. First,

what projects, along the lines of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, are being done principally because of the interest of paymasters? In his study of Ford Foundation priorities, Pooley (2011) writes that funders of communications research shifted their priorities after 2000 "from psychological warfare to social justice" (p. 212). In journalism, similarly, an editor's priorities can become a writer's priorities, as Macdonald knew from his years working for Luce at *Fortune*. Second, what projects, along the lines of Macdonald's mass-culture work, are being done principally because scholars and writers, dismayed by the direction of politics, have abandoned earlier, politically engaged agendas? (The opposite, of course, may happen, too: dismay over politics may fuel engagement and research.) To pose the questions differently, under what circumstances does the attraction of money spawn research, and under what circumstances does the repulsion of politics spawn research? Even if they are ultimately unanswerable, as Macdonald said of the supply-versus-demand question in mass culture, these questions merit consideration. As the examples of Hutchins et al. and Macdonald et al. illustrate, factors outside the control of researchers and writers—not only funding ecology but also political ecology—can determine the direction of their work.

References

Arendt, H. (1960). Society and culture. *Daedalus*, *89*(2), 278–287.

Ashmore, H. S. (1989). *Unseasonable truths: The life of Robert Maynard Hutchins*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Bates, S. (1995). *Realigning journalism with democracy: The Hutchins Commission, its times, and ours*. Washington, DC: Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies.

Bates, S. (2009). Public intellectuals as media critics. *Society*, *46*, 124–128.

Beam, A. (2008). *A great idea at the time: The rise, fall, and curious afterlife of the Great Books*. New York, NY: PublicAffairs.

Blanchard, M. A. (1977). The Hutchins Commission, the press and the responsibility concept. *Journalism Monographs*, *49*.

Blanchard, M. A. (1998). Reclaiming freedom of the press: A Hutchins Commission dream or nightmare? *Communications Law and Policy*, *3*, 371–387.

Blevens, F. (1994, August). *The rise and fall of a middle brow: Robert M. Hutchins's Victorian influence on high culture and low journalism*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Atlanta, GA. Retrieved from http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED376533.pdf

Blevens, F. (1995). *Gentility and quiet aggression: A cultural history of the Commission on Freedom of the Press* (PhD dissertation). University of Missouri, Columbia.

Bloom, A. (1986). *Prodigal sons: The New York intellectuals and their world*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Bollinger, L. C. (2000). The Hutchins Commission, half a century on—III. In R. Giles & R. W. Snyder (Eds.), *What's fair? The problem of equity in journalism* (pp. 67–70). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Brinkley, A. (2010). *The publisher: Henry Luce and his American century*. New York, NY: Knopf.

Brooks, V. W. (1941). *Opinions of Oliver Allston*. New York, NY: E. P. Dutton.

Buxton, W. J. (1994). The political economy of communications research. In R. E. Babe (Ed.), *Information and communication in economics* (pp. 147–174). Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic.

Chafee, Z., Jr. (1947). *Government and mass communications*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Commission on Freedom of the Press. (1944, September 13). *Doc. 20a*. Commission on Freedom of the Press Papers (box 1, folder 2). Columbia University, New York, NY.

Commission on Freedom of the Press. (1945, February 17). *Doc. 34*. Commission on Freedom of the Press Records (box 3, folder 1). University of Washington, Seattle, WA.

Commission on Freedom of the Press. (1946, September 15–17). *Doc. 119*. Commission on Freedom of the Press Records (box 8, folder 12). University of Washington, Seattle, WA.

Commission on Freedom of the Press. (1947). *A free and responsible press: A general report on mass communication*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Cooney, T. A. (1986). *The rise of the New York intellectuals:* Partisan Review *and its circle*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Dennis, E. E., & DeFleur, M. L. (2010). *Understanding media in the digital age: Connections for communication, society, and culture*. New York, NY: Allyn & Bacon.

Dickinson, J. (1940). Legal change and the rule of law. *Dickinson Law Review*, *44*(3), 149–161.

Donaldson, S. (1992). *Archibald MacLeish: An American life*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Dorman, J. (2000). *Arguing the world: The New York intellectuals in their own words*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Eliot, T. S. (1932). The function of criticism. In T. S. Eliot (Ed.), *Selected essays, 1917–1932* (pp. 12–22). New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace.

Epstein, J. (2001). Dwight Macdonald: Sunburned by ideas. *New Criterion*, *20*, 25–33.

Fackler, P. M. (1982). *The Hutchins Commissioners and the crisis in democratic theory, 1930–1947* (PhD dissertation). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Gans, H. J. (1999). *Popular culture and high culture: An analysis and evaluation of taste*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Gary, B. (1996). Communication research, the Rockefeller Foundation, and mobilization for the war on words, 1938–1944. *Journal of Communication*, *46*(3), 124–148.

Gary, B. (2005). The search for a competent public: The Hutchins Commission and post–World War II democratic possibilities. In J. Romance & N. Riemer (Eds.), *Democracy and excellence: Concord or conflict?* (pp. 75–90). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Goffman, E., & Morris, D. (Eds.). (2009). *The New York public intellectuals and beyond: Exploring liberal humanism, Jewish identity, and the American protest tradition*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.

Goldstein, E., & Rosenberg, B. (1982). *Creators and disturbers: Reminiscences by Jewish intellectuals of New York*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Golike, S. D. G. (1995). *A grounded theory comparative analysis of the Hutchins Plan philosophy of education and the Hutchins Commission philosophy of the press* (PhD dissertation). Oklahoma State University, Oklahoma City.

Gorman, P. R. (1996). *Left intellectuals and popular culture in twentieth-century America*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Greenberg, C. (1940, April). Avant-garde and kitsch. *Horizon*, 255–273.

Hocking, W. E. (1947). *Freedom of the press: A framework of principle*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hook, S. (1952). Our country and our culture. *Partisan Review*, *19*, 569–574.

Howe, I. (1948, Spring). Notes on mass culture. *politics*, 120–123.

Howe, I. (1954). This age of conformity. *Partisan Review*, *21*(1), 7–33.

Howe, I. (1968). The New York intellectuals: A chronicle and a critique. *Commentary*, *46*(4), 29–51.

Howe, I. (1979). Introduction. In I. Howe (Ed.), *Twenty-five years of dissent: An American tradition*. New York, NY: Methuen.

Hutchins, R. M. (1947). Foreword. In Commission on Freedom of the Press (Ed.), *A free and responsible press* (pp. v–ix). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hutchins suggests endowed press. (1930, April 26). *Editor and Publisher*, 33.

Inglis, R. A. (1947). *Freedom of the movies: A report on self-regulation from the Commission on Freedom of the Press*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Jumonville, N. (Ed.). (2007). *The New York intellectuals reader*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Kramer, H. (1986, June). Writing the history of the New York intellectuals. *New Criterion*, *4*, 1–7.

Kristol, I. (1979, October). The adversary culture of intellectuals. *Encounter*, 5–9.

Lasch, C. (1965). *The new radicalism in America, 1889–1963: The intellectual as a social type*. New York, NY: Norton.

Laskin, D. (2000). *Partisans: Marriage, politics, and betrayal among the New York intellectuals*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Lewandowski, T. (2013). *Dwight Macdonald on culture: The happy warrior of the mind, reconsidered*. New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Liebling, A. J. (1947, April 12). Some reflections on the American press. *Nation*, 427.

Macdonald, D. (1937a, May 1). *Time* and Henry Luce. *Nation*, 500–503.

Macdonald, D. (1937b, May 8). *Fortune* magazine. *Nation*, 527–530.

Macdonald, D. (1937c, May 22). *Time, Fortune, Life*. *Nation*, 583–586.

Macdonald, D. (1938, April). *Time's* fifteenth. *Partisan Review*, 60–62.

Macdonald, D. (1941). Kulturbolschewismus is here. *Partisan Review*, *8*(6), 442–451.

Macdonald, D. (1944, February). A theory of "popular culture." *politics*, 20–23.

Macdonald, D. (1945, October). Memo to Mr. Luce. *politics*, 309–311.

Macdonald, D. (1950, February 14). The Times—One man's poison. *Reporter*, 10–13.

Macdonald, D. (1953). A theory of mass culture. *Diogenes*, *1*(3), 1–17.

Macdonald, D. (1957a, June). A corrupt bigness. *Encounter*, 75–82.

Macdonald, D. (1957b). The triumph of the fact: An American tragedy. *Anchor Review*, *2*, 113–144.

Macdonald, D. (1958). Correspondence. *Sewanee Review*, *66*(2), 354–356.

Macdonald, D. (1960a, Spring). Masscult and midcult (I). *Partisan Review*, *27*(2), 203–233.

Macdonald, D. (1960b, Fall). Masscult and midcult (II). *Partisan Review*, *27*(4), 589–631.

Macdonald, D. (1972, October 1). An invaluable biography for some future biographer. *New York Times Book Review*, 1–2, 16.

MacLeish, A. (1940). *The irresponsibles: A declaration*. New York, NY: Duell, Sloan & Pearce.

McConnell, J. S. (1997). Choosing a team for democracy: Henry R. Luce and the Commission on Freedom of the Press. *American Journalism*, *14*(2), 148–163.

McIntyre, J. S. (1979). The Hutchins Commission's search for a moral framework. *Journalism History*, *6*(2), 54–57, 63.

McIntyre, J. S. (1987). Repositioning a landmark: The Hutchins Commission and freedom of the press. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, *4*, 136–160.

Merrill, J. C. (1974). *The imperative of freedom: A philosophy of journalistic autonomy*. New York, NY: Hastings House.

Morrison, D. E. (2008). Opportunity structures and the creation of knowledge: Paul Lazarsfeld and the politics of research. In D. W. Park & J. Pooley (Eds.), *The history of media and communication research* (pp. 179–203). New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Mott, F. L. (1947). Review of *A free and responsible press*. *Political Science Quarterly*, *62*(3), 441–443.

Nelson, R. (1981). *Van Wyck Brooks: A writer's life*. New York, NY: Dutton.

Our country and our culture: Editorial statement. (1952). *Partisan Review*, *19*. 282–286.

Pickard, V. (2008). *Media democracy deferred: The postwar settlement for U.S. communications, 1945–1949* (PhD dissertation). University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Pickard, V. (2015). *America's battle for media democracy: The triumph of corporate libertarianism and the future of media reform*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Pooley, J. (2011). From psychological welfare to social justice: Shifts in foundation support for communication research. In S. C. Jansen, J. Pooley, & L. Taub-Pervizpour (Eds.), *Media and social justice* (pp. 211–240). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pound, E. (1934). *ABC of reading*. London, UK: Faber & Faber.

Rantanen, T. (2017). A "crisscrossing" historical analysis of *Four Theories of the Press*. *International Journal of Communication*, *11*, 3454–3475.

Regnery, H. (1979). *Memoirs of a dissident publisher*. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Rodden, J. (2017). *Of G-men and eggheads: The FBI and the New York intellectuals*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Rojas, R. (2015). *Fighting over Fidel: The New York intellectuals and the Cuban revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Roucek, J. S., & Huszar, G. B. D. (1950). *Introduction to political science*. New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell.

Shils, E. (1957). Daydreams and nightmares: Reflections on the criticism of mass culture. *Sewanee Review*, *56*(5), 587–608.

Shils, E. (1958). Mr. Shils replies. *Daedalus*, *66*(2), 356–359.

Shils, E. (1960). Mass society and its culture. *Daedalus*, *89*(2), 288–314.

Simpson, R. (1995). "Our single remedy for all ills": The history of the idea of a national press council. *American Journalism*, *12*(4), 477–495.

Stanton, F. (1960). Parallel paths. *Daedalus*, *89*(2), 347–353.

Sumner, G. D. (1996). *Dwight Macdonald and the* politics *circle*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Tucher, A. (2000). The Hutchins Commission half a century on (II). In R. Giles & R. W. Snyder (Eds.), *What's fair? The problem of equity in journalism* (pp. 53–60). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Udick, R. (1993). The Hutchins paradox: Objectivity versus diversity. *Mass Comm Review*, *20*(3–4), 148–157.

Van Allen, R. (1995). *Commonweal* and the Catholic intellectual life. *U.S. Catholic Historian*, *13*(2), 71–86.

Vanderlan, R. (2010). *Intellectuals incorporated: Politics, art, and ideas inside Henry Luce's media empire*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Wald, A. M. (1987). *The New York intellectuals: The rise and decline of the anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

White, L. (1947). *The American radio: Report from the Commission on Freedom of the Press*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

White, L., & Leigh, R. D. (1946). *Peoples speaking to peoples: A report on international mass communication from the Commission on Freedom of the Press*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Wreszin, M. (1994). *A rebel in defense of tradition: The life and politics of Dwight Macdonald*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Wreszin, M. (2001). *A moral temper: The letters of Dwight Macdonald*. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee.

Wreszin, M. (2003). *Interviews with Dwight Macdonald*. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi.

International Journal of Communication12(2018), 4761–4783 1932–8036/20180005

Immigrants' Church Participation and Community Integration: The Mediating Role of the Local Storytelling Network

MINHEE SON
University of Southern California, USA

This article investigates the implications of church participation for immigrants' commitment to their broader community. Utilizing communication infrastructure theory, this study introduces a communication lens for exploring the civic potential of immigrant churches in diverse urban communities. Supplementing the theory with social capital concepts of bonding and bridging, and observations made in the civic engagement literature on spillover effects, this study examines how immigrants' church participation shapes their neighborhood belonging and integration into the local storytelling network. Self-administered surveys conducted in 2015 with members of a large Korean immigrant church in Los Angeles inform the research findings. Regression analyses indicate that church-based social ties and civic participation promote members' integration into their local communities. Furthermore, findings support a communication mediation model in which the local storytelling network mediates the relationship between church participation and community integration.

Keywords: communication infrastructure theory, social capital, civic engagement, Korean immigrants, church participation, community integration

Since the 1970s, there has been a dramatic upswing of Latinos and Asians in the U.S. population (Census Reporter, 2012; Pastor, 2013). National and regional data point to the general trend of new immigrant groups changing the demographic landscape of residential communities across the United States (Lou, Lee, Guardado, & Myers, 2012; Ramakrishnan & Baldassare, 2004). Communication scholars have reported on the diverse experiences of immigrants as they settle in and adjust to the host society (e.g., Croucher, 2011; Katz, 2010; Y. Y. Kim, 2001; Ros, Gonza, Mara, & Sow, 2007). Empirical studies have taken on the task of identifying strategies for improving the lives of ethnic communities that face linguistic, cultural, or social challenges on a daily basis (e.g., Christmas & Barker, 2014; Oommen, 2014; Seo, 2011; Seo & Moon, 2013). However, challenges remain as new immigrant groups often find themselves caught in the middle—seeking survival and comfort with coethnics while navigating unfamiliar places, dealing with life uncertainties, and cohabiting urban space with strangers.

This study uses communication infrastructure theory (CIT; Ball-Rokeach, Kim, & Matei, 2001; Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006a) to examine the relationships between church participation and community

Minhee Son:minheeson@gmail.com
Date submitted: 2016–12–05

Copyright © 2018 (Minhee Son). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

integration among first-generation Korean immigrants attending a large Korean church in Los Angeles, California. Supplementing CIT with social capital concepts of bonding and bridging (Putnam, 2009) and observations made in the civic engagement literature on spillover effects (Beyerlein, Trinitapoli, & Adler, 2011; Handy & Greenspan, 2009; Schwadel, 2002), this study identifies individual-level church-based factors that contribute to Korean immigrants' integration into their respective local residential communities. In addition to the main effects of church-based factors on community integration outcomes, I explore the role of communication in mediating the effects of church factors on community integration. The implications of the findings are discussed in relation to the civic role of immigrant churches in multiethnic urban communities and how communication research can continue to guide scholars and practitioners seeking to understand pathways to immigrant integration. Self-administered surveys provide the data for analysis.

Why Korean Immigrants?

Ethnic Koreans in Los Angeles County make up the third largest Asian group after ethnic Chinese and Filipino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Despite overall high levels of education and economic success, reports indicate that Korean immigrants face barriers to accessing mainstream public services and resources, and have low rates of health insurance, homeownership, and language proficiency (Asian Americans Advancing Justice, 2013). Studies also point to Korean immigrants' disengagement from civic and political life (Choi, Lim, & Mitchell, 2008; Ramakrishnan & Ahmad, 2014) and low levels of neighborhood attachment and belonging (Lin, Song, & Ball-Rokeach, 2010).

In contrast, Korean immigrants' rate of church attendance is particularly high. Reporting on data from the Pew Research Center, Connor (2014) highlights Christianity as a dominant majority religion among Korean Americans. Nearly three-quarters (71%) of Korean Americans living in the United States identify themselves as Christian (61% Protestant and 10% Catholic), while 6% identify as Buddhist and 23% identify as unaffiliated. In South Korea, less than a third (29%) identify themselves as Christian, 23% as Buddhist, 46% as unaffiliated, and 2% as other religion. These numbers make a compelling statement about the central role of religion (and, in particular, the Christian church) in the everyday lives of Korean immigrants in the United States, and in the Korean immigrant community at large.

Min (1992) reports on the distinct social functions of Korean immigrant churches in the United States. Compared with the churches of earlier European immigrants, Korean immigrant churches focus more on counseling and educational services, and the immigrants' most pressing issues tend to center on family and noneconomic problems (rather than economic problems such as obtaining housing and jobs). Others have observed the general trend of Korean immigrant churches in the United States—in particular, second-generation Korean Americans—making more deliberate efforts to reach out beyond the ethnic enclave (S. Kim, 2010). Going beyond community-level trends and efforts made by the church leadership, the impact of church participation on the everyday social and communicative practices of immigrants is unexplored territory. This lack of understanding may be due to several factors, including the difficulty of recruiting and developing rapport with non-English-speaking participants; the difficulty of navigating the complex organizational structure of megachurches; and the diversity of churches in terms of size (small vs. large numbers of regular attendees), characteristics of the congregation (e.g., homogeneous vs. heterogeneous socioeconomic

backgrounds), organizational structure (e.g., hierarchical vs. flat), and different religious traditions they adhere to (e.g., Protestant vs. Catholic).

If the church plays such a central role in the everyday lives of Korean immigrants, are there particular types of activities at church that promote integration into their local residential communities? Does the church provide opportunities for developing the social support and competencies needed for its congregation to become members of a broader community? Are there individuals who reap the benefits of such opportunities more than others? These are the questions that need to be addressed.

Communication Infrastructure Theory Approach to Community Integration

Communication infrastructure theory provides an ecological model for understanding how recent immigrants become integrated into their local communities (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001). Ecological approaches, in general, sensitize us to a wider net of civic possibilities across multiple social, organizational, and institutional contexts. CIT points to locally based *storytelling agents* that increase the likelihood that diverse community members will participate in the making of an "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991) and take collective action to address community problems. There are three storytelling agents in CIT that act as community resources for residents, and generate a flow of neighborhood stories and local knowledge for residents to access on a daily basis. The three storytelling agents of CIT are (1) residents who talk with neighbors, family, and friends (microlevel); (2) nonprofit organizations in the community that serve the residents (mesolevel); and (3) local media that target a specific geographic area or ethnic group (mesolevel). Together, the three storytelling agents make up a *storytelling network* that is unique to each geographically bound local community. The capacity for generating and sharing stories among the three agents is shaped by various contextual factors within that community (e.g., transportation, ethnic diversity, and public spaces).

This study measures Korean immigrants' degrees of community integration by their integrated connectedness to the storytelling network (ICSN) and levels of neighborhood belonging. Different indicators of integration have been offered by immigration scholars and policy makers. Common indicators include social cohesion, civic participation, economic well-being, and health (OECD & European Union, 2015; Pastor, Ortiz, Carter, Scoggins, & Perez, 2012). In general, the goal of these indicators is to capture the degree to which immigrants' everyday needs are met and their chances of maintaining a positive life trajectory in the host society. The current study uses two types of indicators from CIT. The first is a communicative indicator, measured by immigrants' connections to the local storytelling network. The second indicator is neighborhood belonging and captures immigrants' levels of social integration.

A community's storytelling network in CIT consists of storytelling agents—residents, local media, and community organizations—that generate and share stories about the community. When individuals are integrated into the local storytelling network, they become involved in "a generic process of constructing and reconstructing discourse about community identity, issues, and action strategies" (Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006a, p. 177). This is important for community integration because individuals who participate in local storytelling are more likely to position themselves as a residential member of the neighborhood. When enough residents are connected to the storytelling network, they are more likely to share a common idea about the

kind of neighborhood they live in without having to directly experience every aspect of community life or interact with every other resident.

One of the earliest conceptualizations of CIT focuses on ICSN as a pathway to neighborhood belonging and civic engagement (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001). More recent studies conducted in different neighborhood contexts have found that individuals' ICSN and levels of neighborhood belonging are positively correlated (e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006a; Liu et al., 2017). CIT defines neighborhood belonging as "an attachment to a residential area that is evidenced in everyday exchange behaviors" (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001, p. 393). Neighborhood belonging is important for collective efficacy, participation in civic action, and intergroup relations (Broad, Gonzalez, & Ball-Rokeach, 2014; Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006a). The relationship between ICSN and neighborhood belonging among church-attending Korean immigrants has yet to be explored.

In addition to CIT, this study draws on the concepts of bonding and bridging from the social capital literature and observations made in the civic engagement literature on spillover effects (Schwadel, 2002). The goal is to identify individual-level church-based factors that contribute to Korean immigrants' communicative (ICSN) and social (neighborhood belonging) integration into their respective local communities.

Social Capital and the Role of the Church

Faith-based associations shape social capital and civic life in the United States (Bellah, 1985; Putnam, Campbell, & Garrett, 2010; Stepick, Rey, & Mahler, 2009). In general, church-based social ties are shown to contribute to individuals' health (McDougle, Handy, Konrath, & Walk, 2013), civic engagement (Lewis, MacGregor, & Putnam, 2013), and volunteerism (C. Lim & MacGregor, 2012; Merino, 2013). Ties developed with other church members can be seen as an important form of bonding social capital (Aldrich, 2012; Putnam, 2009) via their shared membership in and identification with the goals of the church (Leonard & Bellamy, 2015). Research shows that congregation-based friendship networks are an indication of the degree to which an individual is socially and civically integrated into the congregation (McClure, 2014; Rhodes, 2012; Stroope, 2012).

For immigrants in a multiethnic neighborhood, the church is a place where ties are forged with coethnic others who share the culture and language of their home country. Megachurches are often equipped with facilities such as large meeting rooms, cafes, picnic areas, basketball courts, playgrounds, and on-site parking, which facilitate informal interactions among church members and the development of social ties. Coethnic ties have been shown to be a powerful resource during times of crises (Airriess, Li, Leong, Chen, & Keith, 2008) and to provide protective effects on health outcomes (Beaudoin, 2009). In particular, having close ties may buffer the stress of investing time and energy into forging social relationships outside the church. Having weak ties, where members are introduced to friends of friends or an acquaintance of friends, may result in a gradual expansion of immigrants' social network rooted in the local host community, with the church serving as a central hub. Thus, church-based friendship networks may increase individuals' social support and local knowledge, which in turn facilitate their communicative and social integration into the local community.

H1: *Individuals' church-based social ties will have a positive effect on their connections to the local storytelling network.*

H2: *Individuals' church-based social ties will have a positive effect on their sense of neighborhood belonging.*

Spillover Effects of Civic Participation

Faith-based groups and religious organizations generally have an open-door policy and expose individuals to the types of communication and organizational competencies needed to become participants of civil society (Eliasoph, 2011; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The church is an important organizational context where the motivation, competencies, and actual practices related to becoming engaged community members are learned and experienced. Civically oriented behaviors and practices that are context specific and coethnic generally have spillover effects on individuals' commitment to the broader local society (Beyerlein et al., 2011; Handy & Greenspan, 2009; Schwadel, 2002). Studies that examine active forms of participation that go beyond regular worship attendance generally report a positive relationship to outcomes related to civic and political engagement (Driskell, Lyon, & Embry, 2008; Houston & Todd, 2013; Merino, 2013; Robnett & Bany, 2011). This study also captures the more active forms of participation to examine the effects on individuals' connections to the local storytelling network, and positive attitudes and behaviors towards neighbors. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H3: *Individuals' church-based civic participation will have a positive effect on their connections to the local storytelling network.*

H4: *Individuals' church-based civic participation will have a positive effect on their sense of neighborhood belonging.*



Figure 1. Hypothesized model linking church participation and community integration.

Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized church-based individual-level factors that contribute to Korean immigrants' communicative (ICSN) and social (neighborhood belonging) integration into their respective local communities.

The Mediating Role of Communication

This section describes a communication mediation model in which Korean immigrants' ICSN mediates the effects of church participation on neighborhood belonging. In addition to the four hypotheses about the effects of church-based factors on community integration, two research questions explore the relationships among the individual church-based factors and the two community integration variables ICSN and neighborhood belonging. In addition to the main effects of church-based factors on neighborhood belonging (H2 and H4), I speculate that some of the effects may be mediated in part by ICSN. In other words, when Korean immigrants form social ties at church, they become more embedded in their local storytelling networks, which leads to an increased sense of neighborhood belonging. Likewise, when Korean immigrants take part in civic activities at church, they become more embedded in the local storytelling network, which also leads to an increased sense of neighborhood belonging.

Social ties may lead to integration into the broader society when a ripple effect over time affords members opportunities to share knowledge of community resources and at times directly assist other members in connecting to those resources. This may involve, for example, church members taking other members to their own volunteer group or sports club, pointing out a local news website they find useful, or referring them to professionals and service providers in the area.

Church civic participation may lead to integration into the broader society when the types of activities available at church motivate individuals to expand their interpersonal networks, expose them to a wider range of news sources, and help them become comfortable working with organizational staff and professionals. The function of the church may be to bring in parts of the local storytelling network for members to access in culturally sensitive ways—for example, legal or health-related workshops led by community organizations in Korean. Or it may be that the church directs people to parts of their own local storytelling resources—via development of organizational and communication competencies that members can apply in neighborhood contexts outside the church. The research questions are the following:

RQ1: Does ICSN mediate the relationship between church social ties and neighborhood belonging?

RQ2: Does ICSN mediate the relationship between church civic participation and neighborhood belonging?

Method

Study Location

The study site, Eternal Church,[1] is located in Central Los Angeles, in a zip code with a population of a little over 18,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Two-thirds (66%) of the residents are Latino, 12% are White, 15% are Asian, 6% are Black, and 1% are other. Eternal Church exemplifies a "megachurch" as defined by the Hartford Institute for Religion Research in terms of its congregation size, level of activity and services provided throughout the week, emphasis on fellowship among members, and various types of organizational activities outside worship service. Eternal Church is a church with an open-door policy and a low threshold for membership. During my informal interviews with key informants, it became clear that the church was known to many in the Korean immigrant community as a church attended by people of all socioeconomic backgrounds. Eternal Church is divided into parish groups. Each group is homogeneous in terms of age and residential location, and each group has its own set of organized activities outside regular worship service. For the purpose of this study, I examined 10 parish groups whose members reside in Los Angeles.

Survey Administration

Data for this study come from 270 surveys administered in May–June 2015 to first-generation Korean immigrants attending Eternal Church. The surveys were administered in Korean because the participants were more comfortable reading and speaking in their native language, and they attended Korean worship services. Individual survey packets were created and provided to church staff members, who then distributed the survey packets to members of the 10 parish groups. Each packet included one paper survey, a pen, and an Institutional Review Board information sheet. To keep the survey administration process consistent across the parish groups, the church staff members were provided with a recruitment script, which they read before passing out the surveys. The survey was introduced as a Korean immigrant community participation survey. The script also mentioned that participants must be 18 years old or older to participate, they must currently attend or work at Eternal Church, and participation in the survey is voluntary. Participants were also informed that their participation in the study would not impact their relationship with the church in any way. The participants completed the surveys in their own time and returned them to church staff in sealed envelopes. Those who completed the survey and provided an address were mailed a $25 gift certificate. Of the 379 surveys distributed, 270 were completed and returned (71% response rate).

Measures

Neighborhood Belonging

The respondents' level of neighborhood belonging is captured with an eight-item "belonging index," which was developed to assess both subjective neighborly feelings and objective neighborly behaviors (see Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001, for details about how the scale was developed). The four items assessing the subjective dimensions of belonging are: "being interested in knowing what your neighbors are like" (16% of

[1] Eternal Church is a pseudonym for the study site.

respondents agreed or strongly agreed), "enjoying meeting and talking with your neighbors" (20.2% agreed or strongly agreed), "ease of becoming friends with your neighbors" (25.3% agreed or strongly agreed), and "exchanging gifts with your neighbors" (11.9% agreed or strongly agreed). Respondents used a 5-point Likert scale to answer each question: 1 = *strongly disagree*; 2 = *disagree*; 3 = *neutral*; 4 = *agree*; and 5 = *strongly agree*.

To assess objective dimensions of belonging, respondents were asked to write the number of neighbors they know to: "keep watch on their house or apartment" (M = 2.47, SD = 1.30), "ask for a ride" (M = 2.91, SD = 1.36), "talk with them about a personal problem" (M = 2.92, SD = 1.42), and "ask for their assistance in making a repair" (M = 2.64, SD = 1.22). To keep the metric consistent with the subjective dimensions, the responses were recoded into values between 1 and 5 where 1 = *0 neighbors*, 2 = *1 neighbor*, 3 = *2 neighbors*, 4 = *3 neighbors*, and 5 = *4 or more neighbors*. The scores for the eight items were added to create a neighborhood belonging composite variable that ranges between 1 and 40. The mean value is 20.79 (SD = 6.57). Cronbach's α test for index scalability is .84. The neighborhood belonging measure has been tested in other studies with large data sets, and the measure has been reported to have high reliability (e.g., Broad et al., 2014; Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006b; Liu et al., 2017).

Integrated Connectedness to the Storytelling Network

ICSN is an operationalized measure for an individual's degree of connection to the local storytelling network and is composed of three variables: intensity of interpersonal neighborhood discussion, local media connectedness, and scope of community organizational membership (see Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006a, for a detailed description of the ICSN measure). The intensity of interpersonal neighborhood discussion was captured by two questions: "How often do you talk about the neighborhood where you live with other Koreans?" (M = 4.42, SD = 2.52) and "How often do you talk about the neighborhood where you live with people of other ethnicities (not Korean)?" (M = 2.91, SD = 2.09). For each question, respondents were asked to circle one number on a 10-point scale where 1 = *never*, and 10 = *all the time*. A synthetic variable assessing the respondent's intensity of interpersonal neighborhood discussion was created by adding the two scores (range 2 to 19, M = 7.33, SD = 3.93).

Local media connectedness was measured by asking respondents about how they get news related to their community. The first question asked: "How often do you get news about the community where you currently live through Korean media?" (M = 2.81, SD = 1.05). The second question was: "How often do you get news about the community where you currently live through English-language media?" (M = 2.18, SD = 0.95). For both questions, respondents used a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = *never* to 5 = *always*. A synthetic variable assessing connectedness to local media was created by adding the two scores (range 2 to 10, M = 4.98, SD = 1.68).

Connection to community organizations was measured by asking whether the respondent or anyone in his or her family participated in the following six groups: sports or recreational (19.5%), cultural or ethnic (7.4%), educational or school related (8.9%), neighborhood specific (12.4%), political (0.8%), and others (7.8%). Each type of group a respondent participated in was assigned a value of 1. A final synthetic variable for scope of connection to community organizations was created by summing the scores for all six categories

(range 0 to 5, *M* = 0.56, *SD* = 0.90). To prevent the effects of negative skew, a dichotomous variable was created so that participation in any one of the six organizations was coded as 1 and participation in none of the six organizations was coded as 0. A little over a third (36.6%) of respondents participate in one or more organizations.

The ICSN score was calculated by summing the three interaction terms between local media connectedness, scope of connections to community organizations, and intensity of interpersonal neighborhood storytelling (Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006b; range 2 to 18.14, *M* = 7.64, *SD* = 3.79).

Church Social Ties

Church-based social ties was measured by the number of close friends the respondent identified at church (McClure, 2015). Following Ellison and George (1994) and Wang and Wellman's (2010) assessment of individuals' friendship network *size* as an indicator of the levels of social connectivity or social resources, respondents were asked: "How many people at church do you consider as your close friend?" (range 0 to 30, *M* = 6.35, *SD* = 5.31).

Church-Based Civic Participation

Respondents' scope of civic participation in church was adapted from CIT's civic participation measures (Y.-C. Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006a). The measure was created by adding the number of community-oriented and leadership activities that individuals have participated in at Eternal Church. The respondents' were asked whether they had done any of the following eight activities: attended a meeting discussing issues related to the church (outside regular parish group meetings); written a letter, sent an e-mail, or talked to the parish leader, pastor, or deacon about a problem at church; posted thoughts or an opinion on the church website; helped organize an event or program at church; volunteered to help with cleaning or washing dishes at church or did volunteer work related to service or worship; volunteered to help in the surrounding community; donated money to a political, social, or charitable cause that was specifically supported by the church or the pastor; participated in missionary work organized by the church. For each item, respondents answered either yes (value = 1) or no (value = 0). The responses for the eight items were summed to create a synthetic variable assessing respondents' scope of civic participation in the church context (range 0 to 8, *M* = 3.69, *SD* = 2.43).

Control Variables

For control purposes, several sociodemographic variables were included. For income, respondents were asked to specify an estimate of their household income for the previous year. The seven response options are 1 (less than $15,000), 2 ($15,000 to less than $20,000), 3 ($20,000 to less than $35,000), 4 ($35,000 to less than $45,000), 5 ($45,000 to less than $60,000), 6 ($60,000 to less than $75,000), 7 ($75,000 to less than $100,000), and 8 ($100,000 or more). For education, respondents were asked to indicate their highest grade or level of school that they have completed. Response options are 1 (eighth grade or less), 2 (some high school), 3 (high school graduate), 4 (some college or technical school), 5 (college graduate), 6 (some graduate study), and 7 (graduate degree). For age, respondents were asked to give the

year of their birth. The year was subtracted from 2015 to obtain their age. Respondents' gender was coded 0 for male and 1 for female.

Results

Hypothesis Testing

Three-step hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to measure how well church social ties and civic participation predict levels of ICSN and neighborhood belonging. First, age, gender, education, and income were entered into the model as control variables. Second, church-based social ties was entered into the model. Last, church participation was entered into the model. The analyses were conducted separately for the two community integration variables ICSN and neighborhood belonging.

Predictors of ICSN

The first multiple regression analysis identifies predictors of ICSN (see Table 1). The first model including only the control variables shows that 4% of the variance in individuals' ICSN is due to control variables, $F(4, 222) = 2.331$, $p < .10$, $R^2 = .040$. In the second model, church friends did not provide a statistically significant addition to the model. In the third model, church civic participation provided a significant addition to the model ($b = .214$, $p < .010$). In the final model, $R^2 = .089$, $F(6, 220) = 3.596$, $p < .010$, holding constant key sociodemographic variables and the number of close friends at church, individuals' scope of church civic participation emerged as a positive predictor of their levels of ICSN.

Table 1. Predictors of Integrated Connectedness to the Storytelling Network.

	Model 1 β	Model 2 β	Model 3 β
Control variables			
Age	.051	.045	.039
Gender (male)	.048	.053	.046
Education	.202**	.204**	.178*
Income	.052	.052	.087
Church factors			
Church social ties		.083	.038
Civic participation			.214**
ΔR^2	.040	.007	.042
R^2	.040	.047	.089**

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Predictors of Neighborhood Belonging

Similar steps were taken for neighborhood belonging, as shown in Table 2. The first model that includes only the control variables shows that less than 6% of the variance in individuals' neighborhood belonging is due to control variables, $F(4, 228) = 3.479$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .058$. Age and

gender were significantly related to neighborhood belonging, whereas education and income were not significant predictors. In the second model, church social ties provided a statistically significant addition to the model, $\Delta F(5, 227) = 4.881$, $p < .000$, $\Delta R^2 = .040$. In the last model, church civic participation provided a significant addition to the model, $\Delta F(6, 226) = 5.308$, $p < .000$, $\Delta R^2 = .026$. Thus, in the final model $R^2 = .124$, both church social ties ($b = .164$) and civic participation ($b = .169$) are significant positive predictors of levels of neighborhood belonging.

Table 2. Predictors of Neighborhood Belonging.

	Model 1 β	Model 2β	Model 3β
Control variables			
Age	.218**	.203*	.200*
Gender (male)	.137*	.150*	.144*
Education	.128	.131	.111
Income	.043	.043	.069
Church factors			
Church social ties		.200**	.164*
Civic participation			.169*
ΔR^2	.058	.040	.026
R^2	.058**	.097***	.124**

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

To summarize, H1 and H2 proposed that church social ties will positively predict ICSN and neighborhood belonging, respectively. Church social ties is a positive predictor of neighborhood belonging but not of ICSN. Thus, only H2 is supported. H3 and H4 proposed that church civic participation will positively predict ICSN and neighborhood belonging. Church civic participation is a positive predictor of both ICSN and neighborhood belonging, supporting both H3 and H4.

Research Question Findings

I used Baron and Kenny's (1986) four-step test for mediation effects to examine RQ1 and RQ2. Figure 2 presents a path diagram for mediation showing the proposed links among the independent, mediator, and outcome variables. A series of ordinary least squares regressions was conducted to establish significant links among the variables.



Figure 2. Path diagram for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Research question 1 asks whether the effects of church social ties (independent variable) on neighborhood belonging (outcome variable) are mediated in part by ICSN (mediator). The four steps to establishing mediation (see Table 3) are as follows:

- Step 1. Church social ties is a significant predictor of neighborhood belonging (b = .143, p = .030; path c in Figure 2).
- Step 2. Church social ties is positively correlated with ICSN (b = .136, p = .046; path a).
- Step 3. ICSN is positively correlated with neighborhood belonging (b = .320, p< .000; path b).
- Step 4. The effect of church social ties on neighborhood belonging decreased from b = .143 to b = .112 in the presence of the mediator, ICSN, while the effect of ICSN on neighborhood belonging remains significant (b = .276, p< .000; path c′).

Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis for Mediation Paths: Social Ties.

	β			
	Path c ST > NB	Path a ST > ICSN	Path b ICSN > NB	Path c′ ST + ICSN > NB
Control variables				
Age	.194*	.027	.208**	.199*
Gender (male)	.164*	.049	.127*	.151*
Education	.131	.200**	.041	.074
Income	.052	.053	.048	.052
Church social ties	.143*	.136*		.112 (p = .084)
ICSN			.320***	.276***
R^2	.067**	.035*	.138***	.167***

Note. ST = church social ties; NB = neighborhood belonging; ICSN = integrated connectedness to storytelling network. * p< .05. ** p< .01. *** p< .001.

The regression analysis indicates that ICSN plays a mediating role in the association between church social ties and neighborhood belonging. Figure 3 presents a path diagram for the partially mediated effects of church social ties on neighborhood belonging.



* p< .05. *** p< .001.

Figure 3. Path diagram for mediated effects of church social ties on neighborhood belonging.

Research question 2 asks whether the effects of civic participation on neighborhood belonging are mediated in part by ICSN. Again, a series of ordinary least squares regression analyses is conducted for the following four steps (see Table 4):

- Step 1. Church participation is a significant predictor of neighborhood belonging (b = .195, p = .003; path c in Figure 2).
- Step 2. Church participation is positively correlated with ICSN (b = .214, p = .001; path a).
- Step 3. ICSN is positively correlated with neighborhood belonging (b = .320, p< .001; path b).
- Step 4. The beta and significance level of church participation decreases when ICSN is added to the model, from b = .195 to b = .121, and p = .057. ICSN remains significant (b = .292, p< .001; path c').

Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis for Mediation Paths: Civic Participation.

	β			
	Path c CP > NB	Path a CP > ICSN	Path b ICSN > NB	Path c' CP + ICSN > NB
Control variables				
Age	.192*	.031	.208**	.200**
Gender (male)	.136*	.056	.127*	.123
Education	.075	.163*	.041	.033
Income	.087	.062	.048	.071
Civic participation	.195**	.214**		.121 (p = .057)
ICSN			.320***	.292***
R^2	.087**	.075**	.138***	.167***

Note. CP = church civic participation; NB = neighborhood belonging; ICSN = integrated connectedness to storytelling network. * p< .05. ** p< .01. *** p< .001.

Evidence supports a partial mediation role of ICSN for church civic participation. In other words, the effects of church civic participation on neighborhood belonging are partially mediated by ICSN. Figure 4 presents a path diagram for the partially mediated effects of church civic participation on neighborhood belonging.



* p< .05. ** p<.01. *** p< .001.

Figure 4. Path diagram for mediated effects of church civic participation on neighborhood belonging.

Discussion

Implications of Making Friends and Taking Action at Church

The number of friends at church was a positive predictor of immigrants' levels of social integration (neighborhood belonging) into their residential neighborhood (H1) but not a significant predictor of communicative integration (ICSN). In other words, the more church friends Korean immigrants of Eternal Church have, the more likely they are to display positive behaviors and attitudes toward their neighbors. The findings of this study indicate a gradual expansion of individuals' social network rooted in the local host community, with the church serving as a central hub of this expanding network.

We can speculate that over time, for some church attendees, their boundaries of "imagined community" (Anderson, 1991) expand to include both the church and their residential neighborhood. The idea of a more inclusive community boundary may be challenging for newcomers, especially if their residential neighborhood and the church are located in different cities, or if they live in an ethnically heterogeneous neighborhood. Nonetheless, in general, finding the right church or social group is a crucial first step to immigrants' understanding of the social structures, communication resources, and key institutions in the host society. Once the initial coethnic-based social needs are met, the church continues to act as a gateway and indirectly connects individuals to the world outside the church walls. For example, the social support and comfort from peer groups and close friends at church may act as a buffer to the stress and anxiety involved in interacting with other ethnicities in immigrants' own neighborhoods by decreasing levels of intercultural communication apprehension (Oommen, 2014).

The positive relationship between church participation and community integration (H3 and H4) further provides evidence of faith-based organizational life contributing to members' growing commitment to their communities. When members assume leadership roles, work collectively to address issues, and invest their own time and money into improving the church community, they develop the types of communication and organizational competencies that are needed to become good citizens of a community. In other words, Korean immigrants of Eternal Church learn how to come together in the church context, and this learning is transferred to their local communities.

Although frequency of attendance is a commonly used proxy for church participation, findings on the effects of frequency of attendance on civic engagement–related outcomes are inconclusive. Studies point out that attendance alone does not fully explain the effects on civic engagement, and may be moderated by type of religious traditions (Guo, Webb, Abzug, & Peck, 2013) or demographic factors such as gender (Sirin & Katsiaficas, 2011). This study went beyond frequency of attendance to examine participation in civic activities at church in addition to church-based friendship ties. Nuanced measures of church participation are important for the study of immigrant groups—such as Korean immigrants in Los Angeles—whose rate of church attendance is quite high. Thus, while it is clear that church participation

plays a key role in the overall well-being of immigrants, continued efforts need to be made to improve tools for capturing the multitude of social and communicative aspects of participation.[2]

Results from testing the hypotheses indicate that context-specific and coethnic forms of participation have spillover effects (Tselios, Noback, van Dijk, & McCann, 2015) into other areas of community life. Although this study focused on church participation, there may be other institutions or contexts where recent immigrants increase their chances of community integration and civic engagement. For some, family networks may be integral, particularly if immigrant children play a crucial role in connecting the parents to the host society (e.g., Katz, 2010, 2014a). For those seeking education or work in the United States, transnational networks or online communities may anchor individuals in other institutions or groups in the host community, which may or may not be related to their church participation. Schools are another possible site of involvement and collective action among immigrant parents (M. Lim, 2014; Terriquez, 2012).

The Mediating Role of Communication

The second part of the analysis examined the role of communication in mediating the effects of church factors on community integration. Flory, Loskota, and Miller's (2011) assessment of the religious ecology of Los Angeles between 1992 and 2010 suggests that, despite the efforts of some faith-based groups to engage in the public life of Los Angeles, many still function within "closed organizational systems" (p. 34). By testing the ICSN mediation model, this study puts "communication dynamics" at the center of church participation, with the goal of identifying practical strategies that can be employed "to effect change at various levels of analysis" (Katz, 2014b, p. 58). Findings from the research questions point to the central role of local communication processes in Korean immigrants' community integration. Korean immigrants' integration into the local storytelling network (ICSN) mediated the effects of church-based friendship ties on neighborhood belonging (RQ1). ICSN also mediated the effects of church-based civic participation on neighborhood belonging (RQ2). To summarize, members of Eternal Church tap into locally specific communication resources through their social ties and civic activities at church, which in turn increase their sense of belonging in their residential neighborhood.

Church-based social ties may be conducive to neighborhood belonging when the more horizontal interactions afforded by close friendship ties can encourage free-flowing exchange of neighborhood stories and connect individuals to parts of their local storytelling network—other residents, local media, and community organizations. Examples of neighborhood stories being exchanged include: where to go for sports and entertainment, cheap and healthy foods, and health services; learning how to fill out a legal form; understanding the local economy; and learning about the different ethnic groups in the area. The one-to-one social ties initiated by in-person activities organized by the church may be sustained over time via other forms of communication such as mobile messaging and phone calls. Through multiple forms of communication, members can organically generate a repertoire of community resources that can be

[2] This study examined church-based social ties and civically oriented activities to capture different degrees of participation in the church context among Korean immigrants. For an in-depth discussion of a more multidimensional measure of church participation and its conceptual underpinnings, see Son (2018).

tapped into to address everyday life needs. In the process of developing and sustaining social ties, church members may take another member to their own volunteer group or sports club outside church, point out a local news website or blog they find useful, or refer the member to professionals and service providers in the area.

Church-based civic activities may be conducive to neighborhood belonging when the church brings community resources inside its boundaries for members to experience in a culturally sensitive way—for example, when the church invites community organizations to hold workshops for members (e.g., related to citizenship application, financial literacy, or health services) or when local police volunteer to help manage traffic in high pedestrian areas near the church. The effects might also be indirect when the civic activities at church help members develop the motivation and skills to engage with parts of their own local storytelling network. A church member might practice civic skills by reaching out to church leaders about issues within the church community. With repeated positive and successful experience communicating with church leaders, the church member may gain the motivation to speak up in other neighborhood contexts—for example reaching out to school staff and teachers if they feel their children's needs are not being met at school.

Urban sprawl and demands for mobility in today's society will continue to pose challenges to community integration. Immigrant church participation is important for understanding the local dynamics of immigrant settlement, integration, and the specific needs and challenges of immigrant groups. The findings of this study suggest it is crucial that community leaders and groups working with new immigrant groups continue to recognize the importance of—and, in some cases, facilitate—coethnic activities and social support systems. Immigrant churches may work directly to integrate individual members into local storytelling networks by facilitating conversations about their own neighborhoods and directing members to diverse local media sources and stories. At the organizational level, churches will also benefit from trust-based relationships with other community organizations and leaders. Positive working relationships with media outlets will help increase the church's visibility in the community and disseminate information about church events and services that are open to the public. Research can also be directed at capturing the constantly changing social and communicative dynamics of church members (e.g., the size of social networks, degrees of belonging, and levels of ICSN) and understanding why some churches are better than others at connecting with other groups in the community.

Study Limitations and Future Directions

There are a few limitations in this study. First, more systematic analyses are needed to draw out aspects of the organizational structure and culture of Eternal Church that are particularly effective in facilitating members' integration into the local community. So far, field observations point to two aspects: (1) both formal and informal activities that revolve around the parish group that each member is assigned to by the church and (2) an overall emphasis on an open-door policy. Such organizational-level features may encourage certain social ties to be forged and collective activities to prevail over others. A comparative case study might examine a Korean church in Los Angeles with more organically formed parishes or subgroups.

Second, the findings of the current study point to a positive relationship between the number of friendship ties and levels of neighborhood belonging. Further research can more closely examine the nature of the ripple effects of church-based social ties on neighborhood belonging. Although the current study identified two types of social ties—church friends and residential neighbors—I have not examined the extent to which church friends and residential neighbors may (or may) not overlap for the participants (i.e. church friends live close by in the participants' neighborhood vs. having distinct and separate church friends and residential neighbors). Understanding the degree to which the individual member feels the church is part of their own neighborhood (either geographically or symbolically) might help disentangle the effects of the different *types* of social ties on community integration. In addition, more in-depth observations may be directed at understanding the different types of church participation, and the difference participation makes when the activity is communication related (e.g., reaching out to a church leader, posting on the church website), organizational (e.g., organizing an event or program, attending a meeting), or monetary (e.g., donating money to causes supported by the church).

Finally, efforts can be directed at exploring sociocultural factors of individuals who show relatively higher levels of church participation—i.e., those who are more engaged than others in church activities and leadership roles. A closer examination of sociocultural factors may reveal whether the church is truly a level playing field for all or whether church participation is experienced differently depending on individual factors such as length of residency, English proficiency, and other family members attending the same church. In addition, future studies can examine the extent to which immigrants' prior experience of civic participation in the home country shapes their likelihood of church participation and community integration in the host community.

References

Airriess, C. A., Li, W., Leong, K. J., Chen, A. C.-C., & Keith, V. M. (2008). Church-based social capital, networks and geographical scale: Katrina evacuation, relocation, and recovery in a New Orleans Vietnamese American community. *Geoforum*, *39*(3), 1333–1346. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.11.003

Aldrich, D. P. (2012). *Building resilience: Social capital in post-disaster recovery.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism.* New York, NY: Verso Books.

Asian Americans Advancing Justice. (2013). *A community of contrasts: Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders in Los Angeles County*. Retrieved from https://advancingjustice-la.org/system/files/CommunityofContrasts_LACounty2013.pdf

Ball-Rokeach, S. J., Kim, Y.-C., & Matei, S. (2001). Storytelling neighborhood: Paths to belonging in diverse urban environments. *Communication Research*, *28*(4), 392–428. doi:10.1177/009365001028004003

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*, 1173–1182.

Beaudoin, C. E. (2009). Bonding and bridging neighborliness: An individual-level study in the context of health. *Social Science and Medicine*, *68*(12), 2129–2136. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.04.015

Bellah, R. N. (1985). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Beyerlein, K., Trinitapoli, J., & Adler, G. (2011). The effect of religious short-term mission trips on youth civic engagement. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *50*(4), 780–795. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5906.2011.01607.x

Broad, G. M., Gonzalez, C., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (2014). Intergroup relations in South Los Angeles: Combining communication infrastructure and contact hypothesis approaches. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *38,* 47–59.

Census Reporter. (2012). Los Angeles, CA. Retrieved from http://censusreporter.org/profiles/16000US0644000-los-angeles

Chen, N.-T.N., Ognyanova, K., Zhao, N., Liu, W., Gerson, D., Ball-Rokeach, S., & Parks, M. (2013). Communication and socio-demographic forces shaping civic engagement patterns in a multiethnic city. In P. Moy (Ed.), *Communication and community* (pp. 207–232). New York, NY: Hampton Press.

Choi, B., Lim, D., & Mitchell, J. (2008, March). *The K factor: Korean-American attitudes toward and impact on U.S.-Korea policy: A report of the CSIS International Security Program.* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws .com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/080801_mitchell_kfactor.pdf

Christmas, C. N., & Barker, G. G. (2014). The immigrant experience: Differences in acculturation, intercultural sensitivity, and cognitive flexibility between the first and second generation of Latino immigrants. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, *7*(3), 238–257. doi:10.1080/17513057.2014.929202

Connor, P. (2014, August 12). *6 facts about South Korea's growing Christian population.* Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/12/6-facts-about-christianity-in-south-korea/

Croucher, S. M. (2011). Social networking and cultural adaptation: A theoretical model. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, *4*(4), 259–264. doi:10.1080/17513057.2011.598046

Driskell, R. L., Lyon, L., & Embry, E. (2008). Civic engagement and religious activities: Examining the influence of religious tradition and participation. *Sociological Spectrum*, *28*(5), 578–601. doi:10.1080/02732170802206229

Eliasoph, N. (2011). *Making volunteers: Civic life after welfare's end*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ellison, C. G., & George, L. K. (1994). Religious involvement, social ties, and social support in a southeastern community. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *33*, 46–61.

Flory, R., Loskota, B., & Miller, D. E. (2011). *Forging a new moral and political agenda: The civic role of religion in Los Angeles, 1992–2010.* Los Angeles, CA: Center for Religion and Civic Culture.

Guo, C., Webb, N. J., Abzug, R., & Peck, L. R. A. (2013). Religious affiliation, religious attendance, and participation in social change organizations. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, *42*(1), 34–58. doi:10.1177/0899764012473385

Handy, F., & Greenspan, I. (2009). Immigrant volunteering: A stepping stone to integration? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, *38*(6), 956–982. doi:10.1177/0899764008324455

Houston, J. D., & Todd, N. R. (2013). Religious congregations and social justice participation: A multilevel examination of social processes and leadership. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *52*(3–4), 273–287. doi:10.1007/s10464-013-9593-3

Katz, V. S. (2010). How children of immigrants use media to connect their families to the community. *Journal of Children and Media*, *4*(3), 298–315.

Katz, V. S. (2014a). Children as brokers of their immigrant families' health-care connections. *Social Problems*, *61*(2), 194–215. doi:10.1525/sp.2014.12026

Katz, V. S. (2014b). Communication dynamics of immigrant integration. In E. L. Cohen (Ed.), *Communication yearbook 38* (pp. 39–68). New York, NY: Routledge.

Kim, S. (2010). *A faith of our own*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Kim, Y.-C., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (2006a). Civic engagement from a communication infrastructure perspective. *Communication Theory*, *16*(2), 173–197.

Kim, Y.-C., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (2006b). Community storytelling network, neighborhood context, and civic engagement: A multilevel approach. *Human Communication Research*, *32*(4), 411–439. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2006.00282.x

Kim, Y. Y. (2001). *Becoming intercultural: An integrative theory of communication and cross-cultural adaptation.* Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Leonard, R., & Bellamy, J. (2015). Dimensions of bonding social capital in Christian congregations across Australia. *Voluntas: International Journal of Volunteer and Nonprofit Organizations*,*26*, 1046–1065. doi:10.1007/s11266-015-9582-2

Lewis, V. A., MacGregor, C. A., & Putnam, R. D. (2013). Religion, networks, and neighborliness: The impact of religious social networks on civic engagement. *Social Science Research*, *42*(2), 331–346. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.09.011

Lim, C., & MacGregor, C. A. (2012). Religion and volunteering in context: Disentangling the contextual effects of religion on voluntary behavior. *American Sociological Review*, *77*(5), 747–779.

Lim, M. (2014). Unpacking parent involvement: Korean American parents' collective networking. *School Community Journal*, *22*(1), 89–109.

Lin, W.-Y., Song, H., & Ball-Rokeach, S. (2010). Localizing the global: Exploring the transnational ties that bind in new immigrant communities. *Journal of Communication*, *60*(2), 205–229.

Liu, W., Son, M., Wenzel, A., An, Z., Zhao, N., Nah, S., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (2017). Bridging mechanisms in multiethnic communities: Place-based communication, neighborhood belonging, and intergroup relations. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*,*11*(1), 58–80. doi:10.1080/17513057.2017.1384506

Lou, L., Lee, H., Guardado, A., & Myers, D. (2012). *Racially balanced cities in Southern California, 1990 to 2010.* Los Angeles, CA: USC Sol Price School of Public Policy.

McClure, J. M. (2014). Religious tradition and involvement in congregational activities that focus on the community. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion*, *10*, Article 8.

McClure, J. M. (2015). The cost of being lost in the crowd: How congregational size and social networks shape attenders' involvement in community organizations. *Review of Religious Research*, *57*(2), 269–286. doi:10.1007/s13644-014-0201-2

McDougle, L., Handy, F., Konrath, S., & Walk, M. (2013). Health outcomes and volunteering: The moderating role of religiosity. *Social Indicators Research*, *117*(2), 337–351. doi:10.1007/s11205-013-0336-5

Merino, S. M. (2013). Religious social networks and volunteering: Examining recruitment via close ties. *Review of Religious Research*, *55*(3), 509–527. doi:10.1007/s13644-013-0113-6

Min, P. G. (1992). The structure and social functions of Korean immigrant churches in the United States. *International Migration Review*, *26*, 1370–1394.

OECD & European Union. (2015, July 2). *Indicators of immigrant integration 2015: Settling in.* Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/9789264234024-en

Oommen, D. (2014). The relationships among perceptions of social support, intercultural communication apprehension (ICA), and conflict management preferences in the context of cultural adaptation. *Journal of Intercultural Communication Research*, *43*(3), 215–237. doi:10.1080/17475759.2014.935797

Pastor, M. (2013). Racial healing, social equity and immigrant integration in the American South: Lessons from community organizing for community philanthropy. In P. J. Kelly (Ed.), *Pathways to racial healing and equity in the American South: A community philanthropy strategy* (pp. 12–31). Little Rock, AR: Clinton School of Public Service, University of Arkansas.

Pastor, M., Ortiz, R., Carter, V., Scoggins, J., & Perez, A. (2012). *California immigrant integration scorecard*. Los Angeles, CA: Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration. Retrieved from https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/731/docs/California_Immigrant_Integration_Scorecard_web.pdf

Putnam, R. D. (2009). Diversity, social capital, and immigrant integration: Introductory remarks. *National Civic Review*, *98*(1), 1–3.

Putnam, R. D., Campbell, D. E., & Garrett, S. R. (2010). *American grace: How religion divides and unites us*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Ramakrishnan, K., & Ahmad, F. Z. (2014, September). *State of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders series: A multifaceted portrait of a growing population.* Washington, DC: Center for American Progress.

Ramakrishnan, S. K., & Baldassare, M. (2004). *The ties that bind: Changing demographics and civic engagement in California.* San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.

Rhodes, J. (2012). The ties that divide: Bonding social capital, religious friendship networks, and political tolerance among Evangelicals. *Sociological Inquiry*, *82*(2), 163–186.

Robnett, B., & Bany, J. A. (2011). Gender, church involvement, and African-American political participation. *Sociological Perspectives*, *54*(4), 689–712. doi:10.1525/sop.2011.54.4.689

Ros, A., Gonza, L. E., Mara, N. A., & Sow, P. (2007). *Migration and information flows: A new lens for the study of contemporary international migration* (Working Paper Series WP07-002). Barcelona, Spain: Internet Interdisciplinary Institute and Universitat Oberta de Cataluyna. Retrieved from http://www.uoc.edu/in3/dt/eng/ros_gonzalez_marin_sow.pdf

Schwadel, P. (2002). Testing the promise of the churches: Income inequality in the opportunity to learn civic skills in Christian congregations. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *41*(3), 565–575.

Seo, M. (2011). Beyond coethnic boundaries: Coethnic residential context, communication, and Asian Americans' political participation. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *23*(3), 338–360. doi:10.1093/ijpor/edr019

Seo, M., & Moon, S.-G. (2013). Ethnic identity, acculturative stress, news uses, and two domains of civic engagement: A case of Korean immigrants in the United States. *Mass Communication and Society*, *16*(2), 245–267.

Sirin, S. R., & Katsiaficas, D. (2011). Religiosity, discrimination, and community engagement gendered pathways of Muslim American emerging adults. *Youth and Society*, *43*(4), 1528–1546. doi:10.1177/0044118X10388218

Son, M. (2018). Examining the links between church and local community engagement: The case of Korean immigrants in Los Angeles. In Y.-C. Kim, M. D. Matsaganis, H. A. Wilkin, & J.-Y. Jung (Eds.), *The communication ecology of 21st century urban communities* (pp. 107–123). New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Stepick, A., Rey, T., & Mahler, S. J. (2009). *Churches and charity in the immigrant city: Religion, immigration, and civic engagement in Miami*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Stroope, S. (2012). Social networks and religion: The role of congregational social embeddedness in religious belief and practice. *Sociology of Religion*, *73*(3), 273–298.

Terriquez, V. (2012). Civic inequalities? Immigrant incorporation and Latina mothers' participation in their children's schools. *Sociological Perspectives*, *55*(4), 663–682. doi:10.1525/sop.2012.55.4.663

Tselios, V., Noback, I., van Dijk, J., & McCann, P. (2015). Integration of immigrants, bridging social capital, ethnicity, and locality. *Journal of Regional Science*, *55*(3), 416–441. doi:10.1111/jors.12160

U.S. Census Bureau. (2010). *American fact finder.* Retrieved from http://factfinder2.census.gov/main.html

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wang, H., & Wellman, B. (2010). Social connectivity in America: Changes in adult friendship network size from 2002 to 2007. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *53*(8), 1148–1169. doi:10.1177/0002764209356247

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4731–4753 1932–8036/20180005

The Whole World Is Watching: Comparing European and United States News Coverage of the U.S. 2008 and 2016 Elections

PETER VAN AELST
University of Antwerp, Belgium

RENS VLIEGENTHART
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

AMBER E. BOYDSTUN
University of California, Davis, USA

United States presidential election campaigns provide a unique opportunity to study how media in different countries cover the same "international" event. Although campaign research is flourishing, it is unclear to what extent U.S. and European media cover campaigns differently. Therefore, this study analyzes how the U.S. press covered both the 2008 and 2016 campaigns in comparison with the press in 6 West European countries. We analyze 2 central characteristics of campaign coverage: (1) the tone or degree of negativity and (2) the substantial nature of the coverage. Our results confirm that substantial issue coverage is low, and a negative view of candidates and the campaign is prevailing. Although there is variation in the coverage within and between the countries under study, structural differences between the press in the U.S. and Europe are almost absent. In line with the idea of media convergence, this suggests that we can no longer distinguish the campaign coverage of U.S. and European newspapers. We argue that shared news values and the specific context of campaigns determine news coverage across the board.

Keywords: election campaigns, comparative research, content analysis

There is broad consensus about the central role of the news media in election campaigns. The mass media are not the only channel through which parties and candidates can reach voters, but they are undoubtedly the most important one. In past decades, the news media have become less dependent on politics and, as a result, rely more on their own logic (Strömbäck, 2008). The growing independent role of the media during campaigns can partly explain the fascination of political communication scholars with

Peter Van Aelst: peter.vanaelst@uantwerpen.be
Rens Vliegenthart: R.Vliegenthart@uva.nl
Amber E. Boydstun: aboydstun@gmail.com
Date submitted: 2018–07–19

Copyright © 2018 (Peter Van Aelst, Rens Vliegenthart, and Amber E. Boydstun). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

media coverage of election campaigns, which has become important research objects in almost all Western democracies (Semetko, 1996). These studies have given us insights into the (sometimes limited) media impact on voters, as well as political agendas and news management tactics, and overall have enhanced our knowledge of how politics is covered in the news (Gulati, Just, & Crigler, 2004). For scholars in many democracies, content analysis of election coverage has become as natural as the election campaign itself.

Yet despite the abundance of research on media coverage of national campaigns, it remains striking how little we know about how campaign media coverage differs between countries. Scholars agree that analyzing the variation between countries is crucial to fully understanding the production of election coverage (Gulati et al., 2004; Holtz-Bacha, 2004; Kaid & Strömbäck, 2008). The problem is not only that the number of comparative studies is limited (see below) but rather that they mostly compare the coverage of different elections in different countries. Is it the nature of the media system, the particular political rules of the election game in question, or simply the (exceptional) campaign context that accounts for different campaign coverage? Even the long tradition of comparative studies on the European elections campaigns can only partly overcome this problem, as there is no common European campaign, but rather several national campaigns. Thus, only the coinciding campaigns of the different member states are studied (de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006).

In this article, we start to fill the gap of examining cross-national media coverage of campaigns by focusing on how journalists in different countries covered a single type of event: U.S. presidential election campaigns. Presidential campaigns in the U.S. have always received international attention, but the 2008 campaign, with the election of Barack Obama, was seen as a historic event that garnered exceptionally high levels of coverage by media outlets all over the world. This global attention is impressive, and in sharp contrast with the limited coverage from U.S. media for elections in other countries (Golan & Wanta, 2003). The 2008 campaign also led to attention from scholars outside the U.S., with studies comparing how different foreign media covered that U.S. campaign (Holtz-Bacha & Zeh, 2011; Strömbäck, Painter, & Fernandes, 2011; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, Van Aelst, & de Vreese, 2010). Because these studies all focus on an identical foreign event, this approach allows for a comparison of different media systems' coverage of the same campaign. These studies have identified some variables that could account for any cross-country variation we might find. The campaign study of Vliegenthart and colleagues (Boomgaarden, Van Aelst, & de Vreese, 2010), for example, showed that the public opinion vis-à-vis the incumbent U.S. president affected the tone of the newspapers' coverage from eight European countries, with challenger Barack Obama receiving more positive coverage in countries where opinion was particularly negative about the Bush presidency. A more global study by Strömbäck and colleagues (2011), examining media from Europe, Asia, and the Middle-East, came to similar findings with more positive coverage of Obama compared with McCain in countries that were disenchanted with the Bush administration. At the same time, the authors did not find an effect of different types of "anti-American" feelings in these countries and concluded that there was a "more or less global perception that Obama's candidacy transcended long-held beliefs in the cultural, social, and systemic biases of American politics" (Strömbäck et al., 2011, p. 290).

In this article, we take a slightly different approach by comparing how the European press and the U.S. press cover two different U.S. election campaigns that received massive global attention. In the literature, there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which the news media in European countries are

following a trend of "Americanization" and whether their news coverage still differs from U.S. news coverage (e.g., Blumler & Gurevitch, 2001). However, because election campaigns in most European (multiparty) countries are still very different from the U.S. context, it is hard to determine whether differences can be attributed to a different style of campaign coverage by journalists, or rather by differences in European versus U.S. electoral system and traditions of political campaigning. For instance, Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2011) find that Swedish media frame their 2006 election more in terms of issues and less as a strategic game compared with U.S. media coverage of the 2008 U.S. presidential election. However, in such a comparison it is practically impossible to determine whether this larger focus on substantial issues in the Swedish press can be attributed to journalistic practice or rather to a stronger focus on issues by the main candidates and parties in each country, and thus differences across election campaigns. Similar questions arise with regard to negativity: Can we blame the U.S. media for their highly negative coverage of U.S. campaigns (e.g., Farnsworth & Lichter, 2007; Patterson, 2000), or is this pattern simply a consequence of the U.S. tradition of negative campaigning by politicians (e.g., Lau & Rovner, 2009)?

Overall, we expect that differences between news coverage of the U.S. elections in Europe and the U.S. will be limited, mainly because of the broader idea of media convergence. We argue that political journalists in both parts of the world are driven by similar professional news values and commercial incentives, which will lead to comparable news coverage (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). However, we are well aware that comparing the U.S. coverage with foreign coverage of the U.S. campaign is not a perfect apples-to-apples comparison. U.S. news media are expected to inform their readers as voters, while the European press do not have this obligation and can take a more outsider approach. This difference in audience might lead to differences in the coverage of the campaign. We will use these contrary expectations when interpreting the findings of our study. The findings are based on an analysis of the coverage of the U.S. election campaigns in 2008 and in 2016 by newspapers in six Western European countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Spain, UK) as well as the U.S. We do not claim these two campaigns are typical for U.S. campaigns in general or allow a comparison over time, but merely use them to test whether specific campaign dynamics drive the coverage. We focus on two central characteristics of news reporting that are commonly researched in election campaign media studies and seen as part of the broader process of the mediatization of politics (e.g., Zeh & Hopmann, 2013). First, we question the substantial nature of the coverage and analyze the extent to which attention to the horse race, and the candidates, was present compared with substantive issue coverage. This examination addresses a classical aspect of campaign coverage, as issue-based coverage influences the degree to which citizens learn about the issues at stake, as opposed to focusing their attention on who is winning or losing the race (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2012). Second, we study the tone (i.e., degree of negativity) of the coverage. This aspect of coverage is important, as it can codetermine how people perceive the candidates and can also influence (dis)trust in politics in general (Van Aelst, 2017). Before explaining our research design in more detail and discussing our results, we give an overview of earlier campaign studies with special attention for the differences and similarities between the findings in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Studying Election Campaigns

The growing scholarly attention for media coverage of campaigns is justified by the importance of elections for democracy (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). During those periods voters decide on who will have

power and who will not. The fact that ever more voters postpone their final decision until the last weeks, or even days, before the election has further increased the importance of the campaign period (McAllister, 2002). The popularity of the campaign period among political communication scholars is surely also related to the predictable nature of the event. Elections are usually scheduled years, in the worst case months, ahead of time, thus guaranteeing extensive media coverage. But perhaps most importantly campaigns are periods where the main actors involved—politicians, media, citizens—are more active than ever. As Holtz-Bacha (2004) puts it, "Campaigns are times of condensed political communication, where its special features are made visible like light through a prism" (p. 468). We can distinguish three main types of campaign research. Although scholars often try to combine all three (e.g., Just et al., 1996), studies focus on (1) the effects of campaigns on voters, (2) the campaign activities of political actors, or (3) the production of election news. This article can be considered as belonging to this last type. Our discussion of earlier studies will focus on the tone and substantial character of media coverage of U.S. elections. Where possible, we will highlight similarities and differences with European studies.

How Substantial Is U.S. Campaign Coverage?

In the literature, there is ongoing discussion on the need for and potential decline of so-called hard political news (see Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2012). In the specific case of U.S. election coverage, the concern is that the news is not enough about issues and public policy. Although there is a broad consensus that substantial issue coverage is necessary for people to act as informed voters, the media's appetite for substantive issues is modest at best. Often, news outlets are argued to be more interested in the horse race (who wins and who loses), strategies that parties use, and (trivial) facts about the candidates. Based on a literature review, Gulati et al. (2004) conclude the following: "Numerous studies have shown that campaign news is overly focused on strategies, tactics, poll results and candidates' prospects for winning rather than on the substantive issues for the campaign" (p. 238). Benoit, Stein, and Hansen (2005) come to a similar conclusion: "Most studies (nine of eleven) found that horse race coverage was the most common topic of newspaper coverage of the presidential campaign" (p. 359). In their own longitudinal study of campaign coverage by *The New York Times*, Benoit and colleagues (2005) come to two important conclusions. First, even in a quality newspaper like *The New York Times*, the overall attention for the horse race and campaign strategy outweighs issue coverage. Coverage of the capacities and characteristics of the main candidates is also slightly more present than discussion of issues and policy. Second, there are no clear trends over time. Based on these data, it is incorrect to think that campaigns were once very substantial, and gradually shifted to the horse race and strategy (see also Aalberg et al., 2012; but see Patterson, 1994). On the contrary, for instance, the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign was one of the most substantial in the postwar history.

The lack of substantive issue coverage is hardly a phenomenon unique to the U.S. media. There is ample proof that in many West European countries as well, horse-race and strategy framing of election news is strongly present in national (e.g., Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2010; Zeh & Hopmann, 2013) and European elections (Schuck, Boomgaarden, & de Vreese, 2013). However, it is not clear to what extent the presence of these characteristics is comparable with the U.S., as the number of comparative studies is limited and the results somewhat contradictory. Strömbäck and Dimitrova (2006, 2011) compared election coverage of recent U.S. and Swedish campaigns, both on TV and newspapers, and consistently find that the

U.S. news media focus less on the issues and have a higher share of "game framed" news. Yet the comparison with Sweden is not representative of all European countries.[1] For instance, Esser and D'Angelo (2006) compared television coverage elections in the U.S. (2000), UK (2001), and Germany (2002) and found (perhaps surprisingly) that U.S. election coverage was no less about issues and policy than in the two European countries. They concluded that "the game-minded character of U.S. news culture may be less distinct than previous studies implied. (p. 59). This conclusion seems to be confirmed by a recent large comparative study of nonelection news coverage in 13 European countries, as well as Israel and the United States. In terms of strategy and game framing, the U.S. turned out not to be an outlier but rather "well-placed in-between the European countries in this study" (Aalberg, de Vreese, & Strömbäck, 2017, p. 47). This finding is in line with a comparative study outside election time that found that U.S. news media did not provide less hard political than news outlets in several European countries (Brekken, Thorbjørnsrud, & Aalberg, 2012).

In sum, there is mixed evidence that U.S. journalists give less substantial coverage of their election campaign compared with their European colleagues. Therefore, we do not formulate a concrete hypothesis, but rather the following research question:

RQ1: To what extent is the coverage of the U.S. election more or less substantial in U.S. newspapers compared with European newspapers?

How Negative Is Campaign Coverage?

The negative nature of U.S. election news, and political news in general, has become a truism. The dominance of negative over positive messages is a recurring finding, with much discussion of the damaging consequences for people's trust in politics (Van Aelst, 2017). The titles of some of these studies leave little doubt about their findings: "Good Intentions Make Bad News: Why Americans Hate Campaign Journalism" (Lichter & Noyes, 1996), "The Nightly News Nightmare: Television's Coverage of U.S. Presidential Elections" (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2007), "Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy" (Fallows, 1996). According to Patterson (1994), the share of negative news coverage in election time has risen from 25% in 1960 to 60% in the beginning of the 1990s.[2] In 2000, he notes that "the real bias of the press today is not a partisan one, but a pronounced tendency to report what is wrong with politics and politicians rather than what is right" (Patterson 2000, p. 14). However, the longitudinal study of Benoit et al. (2005) disputes the idea that a general trend over time exists, finding that the higher degree of negative (57%) versus positive (39%) election news is fairly consistent throughout history, with large variation across elections. In 1972, for example, 85% of election coverage of *The New York Times* was negative, whereas in 1984 it was "only" 38%.

[1] During the 2009 European election, campaign strategy framing was among the lowest in Sweden (Schuck et al., 2013).

[2] Using a slightly different approach, Zaller (1999) finds for the same time period an increase from 5% to 20% negative news.

Traditionally, in European countries, election coverage was found to be less critical and more respectful toward politicians, at least compared with U.S. news. For instance, Hallin and Mancini (1984) noticed that in the beginning of the 1980s, U.S. TV news was much more critical toward political authority compared with Italian TV news, which maintained a more "respectful distance" from its political leaders. Similarly, Semetko and colleagues noticed that British journalists in the 1980s used a more "sacerdotal approach" in their campaign coverage compared with the more skeptical, almost negative view of U.S. journalists (Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 1991). However, because of the lack of comparative and longitudinal studies, it is unclear whether these differences still hold today. There is ample proof that more critical and negative coverage has become more prominent in the European press. For instance, Kepplinger (2000) analyzed political reporting in the German press over 45 years (1951–1995) and found that statements about German political elites have become gradually more negative. Reinemann and Wilke (2007) came to similar findings in their longitudinal analysis of the main candidates for chancellorship in the election coverage of the German press. They showed that after an increase in negativity, between 1949 and 1980, a negative tone toward both incumbent and chancellor has become the norm (see also Magin, 2015). Thus, as in the U.S., there seems to be large variation in the tonality of the coverage caused by campaign-specific events. This finding matches the work of Vliegenthart et al. (2010), who found that in the UK and the Netherlands, campaign coverage is in general more critical than noncampaign coverage, although they also found that the context of each campaign leads to large variation in the degree of negativity in the news.

In sum, it seems that a critical, or negative, tone is a standard part of today's news coverage in European democracies as well as in the U.S. A comparative study of Plasser, Palaver, and Lengauer indicates that the TV coverage of a U.S. election campaign (2004) is hardly more negative in tone than those of Germany (2005), Italy and Austria (2006; cited in Lengauer, Esser, & Berganza, 2012). An exceptional comparative study of a nonelection period shows that U.S. television and newspaper coverage of politics is not more, but less negative than that of news media in 13 European countries (Esser, Engesser, Matthes, & Berganza, 2017). Yet again, given this mixed evidence, we refrain from formulating a clear hypothesis and ask the following question:

RQ2: To what extent is the coverage of the U.S. election more or less negative in U.S. newspapers compared with European newspapers?

Research Design

To empirically address our research questions, we conducted a systematic content analysis of 14 newspapers from seven different countries for both the 2008 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections. When possible, we included one quality and one popular paper per country, although we were somewhat constrained by electronic availability of sources, resulting in the inclusion of only four popular papers. In addition, we also tried to take the political leaning of the newspaper into account. We included one paper situated at the center or the left of the political spectrum and one right (or center) leaning paper, such that for each country we examined two newspapers with at least some ideological distance between them. The newspapers and their classifications are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Selected Newspapers.

Newspaper	Country	Leaning	Popular	*N*
The New York Times	United States	Left	No	186
USA Today	United States	Center	Yes	182
de Volkskrant	Netherlands	Left	No	296
De Telegraaf	Netherlands	Right	Yes	206
The Guardian	United Kingdom	Left	No	232
The Sun	United Kingdom	Right	Yes	204
Le Monde	France	Left	No	181
Le Figaro	France	Right	No	168
De Standaard	Belgium (Flanders)	Center	No	216
Het Laatste Nieuws	Belgium (Flanders)	Right	Yes	162
El Mundo	Spain	Right	No	202
El Pais	Spain	Left	No	216
Die Welt	Germany	Right	No	175
Die Tageszeitung	Germany	Left	No	171

For each newspaper, from all the articles that contained at least one of the two main candidates' names, we randomly selected a minimum of one article per day for the period between August 24 and November 4, 2008, and between July 13 and November 8, 2016.[3] These time periods start with either the Republican or Democratic convention (whichever came first), thus marking the end of the primary elections and the starting point of the general election campaign. During the periods in which the election coverage was substantially higher, namely, the two weeks during which the party conventions took place as well as in the last one-and-a-half week before Election Day, we selected at least two articles per day for each newspaper. A total of 1,377 articles (for 2008) and 1,420 articles (for 2016) were coded. The *N* per outlet is listed in Table 1.

To analyze the substantial nature of the campaign coverage, we used three separate indicators. First, we coded the main substantial issue that was discussed in the article. At least one full sentence needed to be devoted to a specific issue to be coded. If not, no issue code was attributed. Because we are uninterested in what issues were prominent in the campaign, but rather whether the issue content was present, we recoded this variable into the mere presence or absence of a substantial issue. Second, we coded the presence of strategy framing as well as horse-race framing. Strategy framing was operationalized by the presence of politicians' or parties' strategies for winning elections or issue debates. For horse-race framing, we used two indicators: the presence or absence of polling information and the presence or absence of references to parties and candidates in terms of "winners and losers." Third, we coded the degree to which the article discussed the character (e.g., trustworthiness) and/or capacity (e.g., experience) of the candidates. We distinguished between those articles with a main focus on character/capacity aspects of the candidates versus articles that did not mention (or only occasionally mentioned) these characteristics.

[3] Articles that were in fact not about the election or about one of the two candidates were excluded from further analysis. This happened more often in 2016, in particular because several articles referred in one or two sentences to Donald Trump, but were not about the campaign at all.

To analyze the degree of negativity of the coverage, we used two separate indicators. First, we coded the favorability of the two main candidates in each election campaign. If a candidate was mentioned, coders determined if the article was positive or negative from the perspective of that candidate.

Coders at three different universities were trained extensively by the authors of this study.[4] Articles in foreign languages were coded by native speakers or students with very good knowledge of the specific language. To check intercoder reliability for the 2008 data, 28 English-language articles were double coded. We report percentage-wise agreements and standardized lotus scores, a measure that has been considered especially useful for binary decisions (Fretwurst, 2015). Agreement for the relevant variables was as follows: 95% (standardized lotus = .90) for issue presence, 95% for horse-race framing (standardized lotus = .90), 92% for strategy framing (standardized lotus = .83), 90% for character coding (standardized lotus = .81). For the tone variables, the standardized lotus was .54. For the 2016 data, all coders coded the same 10 English-language articles. Here, intercoder reliability was 86% (standardized lotus = .72) for issue presence, 88% for horserace framing (standardized lotus = .75), 85% for strategy framing (standardized lotus = .71), 86% for character coding (standardized lotus = .73), and the standardized lotus for the tone variables was .68.

We compare the presence (issues and frames) and the mean scores (tone) and test for differences between the United States and the European countries, using *t* tests and chi-squared tests. Additionally, we conduct linear and logistic regression analyses to test for alternative explanations. We include country dummy variables, a dummy variable for the election campaign (2008 or 2016), and a dummy variable to capture the difference between quality and popular newspapers.

Results

To what extent are the European newspapers distinct from those in the U.S.? We begin here with an important caveat that each newspaper is a unique entity, making it an oversimplification to generalize about newspapers in any single country or, even more so, to generalize about newspapers in "Europe." Yet our primary goal here is to see whether U.S. newspapers are, in general, significantly different from non-U.S. newspapers (in this case, European newspapers), and so we focus on that line of comparison.

We first look at the substantial nature of the campaign coverage. Figure 1 shows the percentage of articles per newspaper for each campaign that contain at least some substantial issue coverage.

[4] This analysis was done at the University of Antwerp (Belgium), University of Amsterdam (Netherlands), and University of California (Davis, U.S.). A total of 16 (2008) and seven (2016) coders participated.



Figure 1. Percentage of articles with issue coverage.

The figure illustrates a wide variation between the different papers under study. Two observations, however, stand out. First, almost all newspapers present more substantial issue coverage in 2008 compared with 2016. The average scores for all newspapers combined in 2008 was 56%, and this value declined to 44% in 2016, meaning that less than half of the 2016 articles contained some substantial coverage. Second, the U.S. newspapers are positioned squarely between different European newspapers and do not stand out in any way. In both campaigns, *The New York Times* scores slightly above average, while *USA Today* resembles the average of all newspapers. In short, the idea that U.S. newspapers would provide more issue coverage to their readers (who also need to act as voters) finds little support in our data, especially in the case of 2016.

Did the decline of issue coverage from 2008 to 2016 correspond with more strategy and/or horse-race coverage? The answer is simply no: Both strategy and horse-race coverage are lower in 2016 compared with 2008 in most newspapers. Table 2 shows the scores for strategy and horse-race coverage decline in both European and U.S. papers. The U.S. newspapers score in the two campaigns somewhat higher on strategy framing, which can be attributed to *The New York Times*, which is among the top users of this frame. In terms of horse-race coverage, the U.S. papers are again placed among the European papers, with much more variance within European papers than between *The New York Times* and *USA Today*.

Table 2. Issue, Strategy, and Horse-Race Coverage Across Newspapers and Campaigns (2008 and 2016).

	2008			2016		
Newspaper	Issue	Strategy	Horse Race	Issue	Strategy	Horse Race
The New York Times	69.3%	50.5%	34.7%	49.4%	43.5%	29.4%
USA Today	61.8%	43.8%	53.9%	37.6%	26.9%	35.5%
de Volkskrant	45.8%	30.7%	28.3%	53.6%	32.1%	35.7%
De Telegraaf	76.2%	31.7%	26.7%	44.8%	26.7%	43.8%
The Guardian	15.7%	44.6%	47.0%	44.3%	45.0%	39.6%
The Sun	42.2%	32.5%	32.5%	36.4%	15.6%	28.9%
Le Monde	44.1%	43.0%	60.2%	27.3%	21.6%	36.4%
Le Figaro	53.0%	56.6%	50.6%	35.3%	24.7%	32.9%
De Standaard	70.7%	36.6%	25.6%	44.0%	32.8%	34.3%
Het Laatste Nieuws	30.5%	30.5%	36.6%	28.8%	25.0%	36.3%
El Mundo	74.5%	63.3%	49.0%	51.0%	28.8%	38.5%
El Pais	73.9%	64.1%	53.3%	51.6%	31.5%	33.9%
Die Welt	63.9%	24.7%	38.1%	38.5%	32.1%	55.1%
Die Tageszeitung	35.8%	30.9%	34.6%	68.9%	39.3%	42.2%
Total	54.2%	40.9%	39.7%	43.9%	30.7%	37.0%
U.S. versus EU	X^2 = 9.098, p< .01	X^2 = 3.83, *ns*	X^2 = 1.44, *ns*	X^2 = 0.04, *ns*	X^2 = 1.61, *ns*	X^2 = 1.73, *ns*

Note. *N* = 1,377 in 2008 and N = 1,420 in 2016.

The decline of issue coverage did not lead to more strategy or game coverage, but rather to significantly more attention for the character of both candidates. Table 3 shows how in 2008 hardly any articles were mainly devoted to the character of one of two main candidates.

Table 3. Percentage of Articles With a Strong Focus on Character Across Newspapers and Campaigns (2008 and 2016).

	2008		2016	
Newspaper	Character Obama	Character McCain	Character Clinton	Character Trump
The New York Times	4.0%	3.0%	7.1%	18.8%
USA Today	1.1%	1.1%	9.7%	26.9%
de Volkskrant	6.1%	5.2%	13.1%	13.1%
De Telegraaf	1.9%	2.0%	8.6%	17.1%
The Guardian	1.2%	0.0%	6.7%	26.8%
The Sun	1.2%	2.4%	5.8%	10.7%
Le Monde	2.1%	5.4%	3.4%	15.9%
Le Figaro	4.8%	3.6%	5.9%	9.4%
De Standaard	2.4%	1.2%	5.2%	17.2%
Het Laatste Nieuws	0.0%	3.7%	10.0%	15.0%
El Mundo	3.0%	4.1%	4.8%	17.3%
El Pais	5.4%	4.3%	4.8%	18.5%
Die Welt	12.3%	6.2%	14.1%	20.5%
Die Tageszeitung	2.4%	0.0%	11.1%	22.2%
Total	3.8%	3.3%	7.5%	18.1%
U.S. versus EU	$\chi^2 = 0.79$, *ns*	$\chi^2 = 0.94$, *ns*	$\chi^2 = 0.23$, *ns*	$\chi^2 = 3.34$, *ns*

Note. N = 1,377 in 2008 and N = 1,420 in 2016.

In 2016, these types of articles were much more present, in particular in the case of Donald Trump (average of 18%). Again, the amount of focus on the character and leadership of the main candidates in the U.S. newspapers is not significantly different from the European press, although *USA Today* stood out as one of the newspapers most focused on the character of Donald Trump (at 27% of coverage), matched only by *The Guardian*.

Next, we move to the tone of the campaign coverage and the levels of negativity toward the main candidates. Figure 2 shows that the overall perception of the U.S. elections is slightly negative, but (considering that the scale runs from −2 to +2; see the Appendix) not very outspoken. Most striking is the finding that the 2016 campaign was covered in a more negative way (−0.24) than the 2008 campaign (−0.05) (both shown in darker bars in Figure 2). This pattern of the 2016 campaign receiving more negative coverage is true for almost every newspaper in our sample. This difference in tone over time is also reflected in the favorability of the coverage toward the main candidates.



Figure 2. Tone toward campaign in general.

Table 4 shows how the coverage of Barack Obama was much more positive than that of Hillary Clinton eight years later, and, similarly, the coverage of John McCain in 2008 was less negative than that of Donald Trump in 2016. Again, the U.S. newspapers do not stand out in their tone of the campaign in general, nor in their coverage of the main candidates, with the notable (and interesting) exception that in 2008, the tone toward Obama is slightly less positive ($t = -2.70$, $p < .05$) in U.S. newspapers than in European newspapers.

Table 4. Comparison of Tone Coverage Across Newspapers (2008 and 2016).

	2008			2016		
Newspaper	Tone Obama	Tone McCain	Tone campaign	Tone Clinton	Tone Trump	Tone campaign
The New York Times	0.228	−0.327	−0.050	−0.086	−0.843	−0.365
USA Today	0.360	0.022	−0.034	−0.103	−0.516	−0.226
de Volkskrant	0.387	−0.193	−0.009	−0.127	−0.744	−0.202
De Telegraaf	0.594	−0.178	−0.020	0.190	−0.788	−0.308
The Guardian	0.627	−0.458	−0.036	0.014	−0.769	−0.295
The Sun	−0.036	0.000	0.024	−0.036	−1.405	−0.124
Le Monde	0.441	−0.183	−0.011	0.068	−0.726	−0.148
Le Figaro	0.530	−0.108	−0.024	−0.194	−0.924	−0.188
De Standaard	0.476	−0.451	−0.220	−0.093	−0.740	−0.328
Het Laatste Nieuws	0.537	−0.207	−0.049	−0.092	−0.539	−0.250
El Mundo	0.480	−0.143	−0.092	0.072	−0.752	−0.240
El Pais	1.011	−0.761	−0.196	−0.018	−0.958	−0.194
Die Welt	0.443	−0.206	0.000	0.016	−0.545	−0.154
Die Tageszeitung	0.420	−0.432	−0.086	−0.449	−0.942	−0.311
Total	0.458	−0.252	−0.052	−0.048	−0.815	−0.241
U.S. versus EU	$t = 2.70$, $p < .01$	$t = -1.44$, *ns*	$t = -.31$, *ns*	$t = .64$, *ns*	$t = -1.94$, *ns*	$t = 1.15$, *ns*

Note. $N = 1{,}377$ in 2008 and $N = 1{,}420$ in 2016.

To what extent can we explain the difference in coverage between the newspapers under study? Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate the extent to which the presence of a certain content characteristic in an article can be explained by (1) the campaign under study (2008 or 2016), (2) the country in which the newspaper is published, and (3) the type of newspaper (quality or popular newspaper; left-leaning or center/right-leaning paper). We report odds ratios from logistic regressions (Table 5) and unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS regressions (Table 6).

Table 5. Explaining Differences in Issue and Frame Presence (Logistic Regression, Odds Ratio).

	Issue	Strategy	Horse Race	Character Democrat	Character Republican
2016	0.634***	0.620***	0.876	2.285***	6.619***
Country					
Netherlands	0.871	0.554***	0.770	1.417	0.771
Belgium	0.544***	0.666*	0.826	0.629	0.753
Germany	0.738	0.526***	1.246	1.569	0.928
UK	0.597***	0.781	0.953	0.708	0.827
France	0.436***	0.657**	1.414*	0.573	0.607
Spain	1.105	0.985	1.289	0.631	0.804
Quality newspaper	1.560**	1.563***	0.889	1.249	1.130
Left newspaper	0.731**	1.031	1.015	0.759	1.137
Constant	1.442**	0.689**	0.697**	0.033***	0.036***
Pseudo R^2	0.030	0.024	0.008	0.035	0.095

Note. Country reference category is U.S. N = 2,797.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

To start with the campaign period, for all but one of the content characteristics (horse-race framing), the year of the campaign mattered significantly: There was less issue coverage and less strategy framing in the 2016 campaign compared with 2008 (odds ratios smaller than 1), while both the coverage about the candidates and the campaign was more negative in 2016 than in 2008. Rather than there being a trend of increasing negativity in news coverage, we believe this finding reflects the enthusiasm and excitement about Obama and his campaign that existed in 2008 and the outspoken negative feelings about the 2016 candidates and their much-criticized campaigns. We will elaborate on this interpretation in the final part of our study. The character of the two candidates played a much larger role in 2016, with the odds that an article discussing the Republican's character being more than 6 times higher compared with 2008 (and for Democrats, more than 3 times higher).

Table 6. Explaining Differences in Tone (Logistic Regression).

	Tone Democrats		Tone Republicans		Tone campaign	
	B	*SE*	*B*	*SE*	*B*	*SE*
Year						
2016	−0.509***	0.038	−0.547***	0.038	−0.188***	0.022
Country						
Netherlands	0.145*	0.068	−0.048	0.067	0.042	0.039
Belgium	0.126	0.078	−0.143	0.078	−0.052	0.045
Germany	0.042	0.082	−0.142	0.080	0.051	0.046
UK	0.068	0.071	−0.249***	0.070	0.052	0.040
France	0.140	0.081	−0.086	0.080	0.976*	0.046
Spain	0.303***	0.077	−0.253**	0.077	0.017	0.044
Quality newspaper	−0.043	0.064	0.049	0.063	−0.048	0.036
Left newspaper	0.030	0.053	−0.143**	0.052	−0.013	0.030
Constant	0.355***	0.060	−0.098	0.060	−0.041	0.035
Adjusted R^2	0.068		0.084		0.030	

Note. Country reference category is U.S. N = 2,797.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Differences across countries' coverage of both elections exist, but are not very systematic. In line with the descriptive results presented earlier, substantial issue coverage was significantly higher in the U.S. compared with some other countries (Belgium, UK, and France), but did not differ from the coverage in three other countries (Germany, Spain, Netherlands). Strategy framing in the U.S. papers was higher compared with all countries except Belgium and Spain. In terms of horse-race coverage, there are hardly any country differences, with only slightly higher levels of horse-race framing in France. In terms of the attention for the character and leadership of the main candidates, there are simply no significant country differences at all. Also related to the tone of the campaign and candidates, we find little country variation (Table 6). The Dutch and Spanish newspapers were the most positive about the Democratic candidates, while the British newspapers were most negative about the Republicans, scoring 0.25 lower on the −2 to +2 scale than their U.S. counterparts.

Finally, we look at the systematic differences between the types of newspapers, with two main findings. First, the differences between popular and quality newspapers are limited, with only significant differences on two aspects: quality newspapers focus more on issue coverage and on strategy coverage. This finding confirms that issue coverage and strategy coverage are not mutually exclusive. In particular, quality newspapers provide articles that combine coverage that explains the motives and actions behind the campaigns with substantial issue coverage. For all other variables there were no significant differences between popular and quality papers. Second, we also investigated whether the leaning of the paper had an effect on the coverage. Again, we only find significant differences on two variables: left-leaning papers, first, provide slightly less substantial coverage and, second, are more negative about the Republican candidates. The first result is hard to explain, in particular as these papers do not provide more strategy coverage or focus more on the character of the candidates. The second difference is more in line with the idea that a left-leaning outlet is more critical toward a right-leaning political party. Overall, the differences are substantially small, and the models do not explain high levels of variance in the presence of those characteristics at the article level, with (pseudo) R^2 ranging from close to zero to 0.09.

Conclusion

This study focused on two central features of election campaign coverage: their substantial character and tone. We devoted special attention to the differences between the U.S. press and newspapers in six Western European countries in covering a specific type of event, the U.S. election campaigns of 2008 and 2016. Overall, our findings are in line with previous studies in showing that substantial issue coverage is relatively low, and a negative view of the main candidates, and of the campaign in general, is more common than a positive one.

Our key finding is that although there is wide variation between the 14 newspapers and seven countries under study, structural differences between the U.S. press and "the" European press are almost absent. In terms of the substantial nature of the coverage, the U.S. newspapers scored slightly better, normatively speaking, than most European newspapers in 2008, but in 2016 there were no significant differences at all. Also related to the tone of coverage, the U.S. papers do not stand out compared with the European newspapers. On both continents, the overall tone toward the U.S. campaigns is slightly negative. In terms of specific candidates, there were, again, few differences, with only the European press covering

Obama slightly more positively in 2008. This small variation between European newspapers and U.S. newspapers might reflect public opinion in European countries, which is, in general, more in line with a Democratic president (Wike, Stokes, Poushter, & Fetterolfpew, 2017).

In sum, the findings of this study are in line with the idea of global media convergence and with recent comparative studies (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017) showing that traditional U.S. news media such as *USA Today* and *The New York Times* are not outliers but rather well placed in between the European newspapers. Our study shows that by far the biggest predictor of the nature of newspaper coverage of the U.S. elections was not the country or newspaper producing the coverage but, instead, the year of the election; in general, newspaper coverage differed much more from 2008 to 2016 than from one country (or continent) to the next.

Theoretical Explanations and Hypotheses for Future Work

How can this lack of systematic variation between U.S. and European coverage of the U.S. elections be explained? We argue there are two main explanations. The first is the simple but powerful role of news routines and news values, common to American and European news outlets alike, on how to cover political events. Journalists in Western democracies work according to a similar media logic driven by "a trans-national news-value culture" and a shared idea on what is newsworthy (O'Neill & Harcup, 2009; Swanson, 2004, p. 57). Our literature overview of campaign studies suggests that, over time, the coverage of European news media started to resemble that of their U.S. colleagues. The news media became more politically autonomous, and commercial pressures increased. This process has been labeled among others as "globalization," "homogenization," or, more controversially, as "Americanization" (Blumler & Gurevitch, 2001; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Our study, containing only two points in time, does not allow us to confirm a trend over time but can still be seen as evidence of the presence of media convergence. That does not mean that all media reports have become identical, as the strong variation within and between countries illustrates. Rather, our study suggests that we cannot clearly distinguish a U.S. style that is distinct from how media in Western Europe cover a campaign. The absence of a distinct U.S. campaign style might be further strengthened by the intermedia agenda-setting role of the U.S. press, as most foreign correspondents rely heavily on traditional U.S. quality news outlets as sources of inspiration (Willnat & Weaver, 2003). As part of another project, we interviewed eight foreign correspondents from different European countries that covered the U.S. 2016 election.[5] They all indicate that their day starts with reading a newspaper like *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post*, thereby possibly unintentionally, contributing to a common understanding of what is at stake in the campaign. Furthermore, European journalists do not cover the U.S. election campaign from a "domestic" point of view. We find that, on average, only one article in 10 in the European newspapers makes a clear link to the home country (not presented in the results). This finding indicates that the U.S. election campaign is seen as an internationally newsworthy event, thus increasing the chance that the coverage will be similar to that of the home country. In short, we found no evidence to support the idea that U.S. newspapers had stronger incentives than newspapers in Europe to provide substantial information to their readers.

[5] More concretely, we interviewed U.S. correspondents from Belgium (3), The Netherlands (2), UK (1), Germany (1), Sweden (1). See also Boydstun and Van Aelst (2018).

Second, we believe that the similarities in coverage are explained by campaign dynamics. For almost all the indicators used in this study, there was a significant difference between the two campaigns, whereas country variation and newspaper characteristics proved less relevant. In sum, the 2008 coverage was more about (economic) issues and less about character than the 2016 coverage. The 2016 campaign coverage also turned out to be more negative. As scholars, we are often tempted to interpret such findings as a potential trend, or at least as systematic over-time variation. Previous longitudinal studies (e.g., Benoit et al., 2005), however, stress the lack of trends across campaigns, pointing instead to the specific nature of each campaign. The campaign in 2008 was characterized by an unfolding economic crisis and a young African American politician that seemed to inspire young American voters and people across the globe. In 2016, journalists were forced to devote more attention to the atypical figure of Donald Trump, a political outsider whose campaign led to enthusiastic, but also hostile, reactions. It seems that the very specific contexts of the 2008 and 2016 elections, but in very different ways, determined the behavior of journalists across the board. Only the focus on the horse race and opinion polls seem to be a rather stable characteristic of campaign coverage across time and campaign.

Of course, more research on more election campaigns is needed to examine the two mechanisms we have argued are behind our findings: first, that journalists across media systems have basically the same news values in covering an election, whether at home or internationally; and second, that most of the variance in news coverage of an election campaign can be explained by how news values map onto the dynamics of that particular campaign. Future research should test these purported mechanisms more directly than our data allow. Concretely, for example, to test the hypothesis that journalists from different countries abide by the same campaign dynamics, future studies could perform a fine-grained analysis of the timing of stories by different countries' newspapers on different events throughout a debate, using error correction models to test the hypothesis that key events systematically predict the volume, tone, and type of news coverage to the campaign, regardless of country (e.g., Johnson & Socker, 2012). We hope this comparative content study will motivate future work along these lines.

We are well aware that our conclusions should be read with caution and nuance. The variation between U.S. and European media might be more apparent if we were to look also at television news. In particular, networks like CNN and Fox News are often absent in many European countries, where public broadcasters still play a dominant role. We also ignored the many online media platforms that provide alternative and often very partisan news (Vargo & Guo, 2016). Including these new media might have provided a more nuanced conclusion related to the idea of media convergence.

Additionally, our relatively small sample of newspapers and articles might influence the findings for some countries and outlets. For instance, the differences between the countries under study are not always easily interpreted. This might be partly because we only analyzed two newspapers per country. Furthermore, the enormous attention to the U.S. election meant that we could only investigate a part of the coverage, which might influence the findings. It is important to note, however, that the significant differences we found are mostly limited in substantial terms. Despite the limitations of our study, we are convinced that this type of research, examining news coverage of a single event across journalists in different countries, is a promising way to improve our understanding of how political news media work in a comparative perspective.

References

Aalberg, T., de Vreese, C., & Strömbäck, J. (2017). Strategy and game framing. In C. de Vreese, F. Esser, & D. N. Hopmann (Eds.), *Comparing political journalism* (pp. 33–49). London: Routledge.

Aalberg, T., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. H. (2012). The framing of politics as strategy and game: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. *Journalism, 13*(2), 162–178. doi:10.1177/1464884911427799

Benoit, W. L., Stein, K. A., & Hansen, G. J. (2005). *New York Times* coverage of presidential campaigns. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 82*(2), 356–376. doi:10.1177/107769900508200208

Blumler, J., & Gurevitch, M. (2001). Americanization reconsidered: UK–U.S. campaign communication comparisons across time. In L. Bennett & R. Entman (Eds.), *Mediated politics. Communication in the future of democracy* (pp. 380–403). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Boydstun, A. E., & Van Aelst, P. (2018). New rules for an old game? How the 2016 U.S. election caught the press off guard. *Mass Communication and Society*, 1–26. doi:10.1080/15205436.2018.1492727

Brekken, T., Thorbjørnsrud, K., & Aalberg, T. (2012). News substance: The relative importance of soft and de-contextualized news. In T. Aalberg & J. Curran (Eds.), *How media inform democracy: A comparative approach* (pp. 64–78). London, UK: Palgrave.

de Vreese, C. H., Banducci, S. A., Semetko, H. A., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2006). The news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary election campaign in 25 countries. *European Union Politics 7*(4), 477–504. doi:10.1177/1465116506069440

Esser, F., & D'Angelo, P. (2006). Framing the press and publicity process in U.S., British, and German general election campaigns. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 11*(3), 44–66. doi:10.1177/1081180X06289188

Esser, F., Engesser, S., Matthes, J., & Berganza, R. (2017). Negativity. In C. de Vreese, F. Esser, & D. N. Hopmann (Eds.), *Comparing political journalism* (pp. 71–91). London, UK: Routledge.

Fallows, J. M. (1996). *Breaking the news: How the media undermine American democracy*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Farnsworth, S. J., & Lichter, S. R. (2007). *The nightly news nightmare: Television's coverage of U.S. presidential elections, 1988–2004*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

mFretwurst, B. (2015). *Lotus Manual.* Retrieved from www.iakom.ch/Lotus/LotusManualEng.pdf

Golan, G., & Wanta, W. (2003). International elections on U.S. network news. *International Communication Gazette, 65*(1), 25–39. doi:10.1177/0016549203065001135

Gulati, G. J., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. N. (2004). News coverage of political campaigns. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), *Handbook of political communication research* (pp. 237–256). London, UK: Erlbaum.

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (1984). Speaking of the president: Political structure and representational form in U.S. and Italian television news. *Theory and Society, 13*, 829–850. doi:10.1007/BF00209215

Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Americanization, globalization, and secularization. Understanding the convergence of media systems and political communication. In F. Esser & B. Pfetsch (Eds.), *Comparing political communication: theories, cases, and challenges* (pp. 25–44). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Holtz-Bacha, C. (2004). Political communication research Abroad: Europe. In L. L. Kaid (Ed.), *Handbook of political communication research* (pp. 463–477). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Holtz-Bacha, C., & Zeh, R. (2011). In love with Barack Obama: German press coverage of the U.S. presidential elections campaigns 2004 and 2008. In M. S. McKinney & M. C. Banwart (Eds.), *Communication in the 2008 U.S. election: Digital natives elect a president* (pp. 295–312). New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Johnson, T., & Socker, E. (2012). Actions, factions, and interactions: Newsworthy influences on Supreme Court coverage. *Social Science Quarterly, 93*(2), 434–463. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00842.x

Just, M. R., Crigler, A. N., Alger, D. E., Cook, T. E., Kern, M., & West, D. M. (1996). *Crosstalk. Citizen, candidates and the media in a presidential campaign*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Kaid, L. L., & Strömbäck, J. (2008). Election news coverage around the world: A comparative perspective. In J. K. Strömbäck & L. Lee (Ed.), *The handbook of election news coverage around the world* (pp. 421–431). New York, NY: Routledge.

Kepplinger, H. M. (2000). The declining image of the German political elite. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 5*(4), 71–80. doi:10.1177/1081180x00005004005

Lau, R. R., & Rovner, I. B. (2009). Negative campaigning. *Annual Review of Political Science, 12*, 285–306. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071905.101448

Lengauer, G., Esser, F., & Berganza, R. (2012). Negativity in political news: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. *Journalism, 13*(2), 179–202. doi:10.1177/1464884911427800

Lichter, R., & Noyes, R. (1996). *Good intentions make bad news: Why Americans hate campaign journalism.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Magin, M. (2015). Shades of mediatization: Components of media logic in German and Austrian elite newspapers (1949–2009). *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 20*(4), 415–437. doi:10.1177/1940161215595944

McAllister, I. (2002). Calculating or capricious? The new politics of late deciding voters. In D. Farrell & R. Schmitt-Beck (Eds.), *Do political campaigns matter?* (pp. 22–40). London, UK: Routledge.

O'Neill, D., & Harcup, T. (2009). News values and selectivity. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies* (pp. 161–174). New York, NY: Routledge.

Patterson, T. E. (1994). *Out of order*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Patterson, T. E. (2000). *Doing well and doing good: How soft news and critical journalism are shrinking the new audience and weakening democracy—And what news outlets can do about it*. Retrieved from https://shorensteincenter.org/how-soft-news-critical-journalism-are-shrinking-news-audience/

Reinemann, C., Stanyer, J., Scherr, S., & Legnante, G. (2012). Hard and soft news: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. *Journalism, 13*(2), 221–239. doi:10.1177/1464884911427803

Reinemann, C., & Wilke, J. (2007). It's the debates, stupid! How the introduction of televised debates changed the portrayal of chancellor candidates in the German press, 1949–2005. *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 12*(4), 92–111. doi:10.1177/1081180X07307185

Schuck, A. R. T., Boomgaarden, H. G., & de Vreese, C. H. (2013). Cynics all around? The impact of election news on political cynicism in comparative perspective. *Journal of Communication, 63*(2), 287–311. doi:10.1111/jcom.12023

Semetko, H. A. (1996). The media. In E. A. L. LeDuc (Ed.), *Comparing democracies: Elections and voting in global perspective*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Semetko, H. A., Blumler, J. G., Gurevitch, M., & Weaver, D. H. (1991). *The formation of campaign agendas: A comparative analysis of party and media roles in recent American and British elections*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Strömbäck, J. (2008). Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatization of politics. *International Journal of Press Politics, 13*(3), 228–246. doi:10.1177/1940161208319097

Strömbäck, J., & Dimitrova, D. V. (2006). Political and media systems matter: A comparison of election news coverage in Sweden and the United States. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 11*(4), 131–147. doi:10.1177/1081180X06293549

Strömbäck, J., & Dimitrova, D. V. (2011). Mediatization and media interventionism: A comparative analysis of Sweden and the United States. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 16*(1), 30–49. doi:10.1177/1940161210379504

Strömbäck, J., Painter, D. L., & Fernandes, J. (2011). International media's love affair with Barack Obama: Anti-Americanism and the global coverage of the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign. In M. S. McKinney & M. C. Banwart (Eds.), *Communication in the 2008 U.S. election: Digital natives elect a president* (pp. 275–294). New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Strömbäck, J., & Van Aelst, P. (2010). Exploring some antecedents of the media's framing of election news: A comparison of Swedish and Belgian election news. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 15*(1), 41–59. doi:10.1177/1940161209351004

Swanson, D. L. (2004). Transnational trends in political communications. In F. Esser & B. Pfetsch (Eds.), *Comparing political communication: Theories, cases, and challenges* (pp. 45–63). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Swanson, D. L., & Mancini, P. (1996). *Politics, media and modern democracy: An international study of innovations in electoral campaigning and their consequences*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Van Aelst, P. (2017). Media malaise and the decline of legitimacy: Any room for good news? In C. van Ham, J. Thomassen, R. Andeweg, & K. Aarts (Eds.), *Myth and reality of the legitimacy crisis: Explaining trends and cross-national differences in established democracies* (pp. 95–114). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Vargo, C. J., & Guo, L. (2016). Networks, big data, and intermedia agenda setting: An analysis of traditional, partisan, and emerging online U.S. news. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 94*(4), 1031–1055. doi:10.1177/1077699016679976

Vliegenthart, R., Boomgaarden, H. G., & Boumans, J. (2010). Changes in political news coverage: Personalization, conflict and negativity in British and Dutch newspapers. In K. Brants & K. Voltmer (Eds.), *Political communication in postmodern democracy* (pp. 92–110). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vliegenthart, R., Boomgaarden, H. G., Van Aelst, P., & de Vreese, C. H. (2010). Covering the U.S. Presidential election in Western Europe: A cross-national comparison. *Acta Politica, 45*, 444–467. doi:10.1057/ap.2010.2

Wike, R., Stokes, B., Poushter, J., & Fetterolfpew J. (2017). *U.S. Image suffers as publics around world question Trump's leadership*. Retrieved from http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/u-s-image-suffers-as-publics-around-world-question-trumps-leadership/

Willnat, L., & Weaver, D. (2003). Through their eyes. *Journalism, 4*(4), 403–422. doi:10.1177/14648849030044001

Zaller, J. (1999). *A theory of media politics. How the interests of politicians, journalists, and citizens shape the news*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Zeh, R., & Hopmann, D. N. (2013). Indicating mediatization? Two decades of election campaign television coverage. *European Journal of Communication, 28*(3), 225–240. doi:10.1177/0267323113475409

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4708–4730 1932–8036/20180005

Audience, Media, and Cultural Factors as Predictors of Multiscreen Use: A Comparative Study of the Netherlands and the United States

CLAIRE M. SEGIJN
University of Minnesota, USA

ANASTASIA KONONOVA
Michigan State University, USA

Statistics about the prevalence of media multitasking differ in stating that this behavior entails 20%–50% of our media time. An explanation of these differences could be the country of research. Previous cross-country studies have found that media multitasking was most prevalent in the United States and the least prevalent in the Netherlands. The current study seeks explanations of these differences by comparing survey data from the United States (n = 314) and the Netherlands (n = 328) and examining audience, media, and cultural factors as predictors of multiscreening, as a specific form of media multitasking. The results showed that multiscreening was more prevalent in the United States than in the Netherlands. Media factors are the most important predictor of multiscreen use. Audience and cultural factors differed by country and screen combination. This emphasizes the importance of cross-country research and examining predictors of a specific type of media multitasking.

Keywords: multiscreening, cross-country, polychronicity, long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance

Media multitasking, the use of multiple media at the same time, is a pervasive phenomenon. Statistics about the prevalence of media multitasking vary among studies, stating that approximately 20%–50% of our media time consists of media multitasking (e.g., Pilotta, Schultz, Drenik, & Rist, 2004; Segijn, Voorveld, Vandeberg, Pennekamp, & Smit, 2017). Explanations of this difference in prevalence can be found in multiple factors. One of these is the country where such studies have been conducted. Most studies on prevalence of media multitasking have been conducted in the U.S. (e.g., Carrier, Cheever, Rosen, Benitez, & Chang, 2009; Foehr, 2006; Pilotta et al., 2004), reporting relatively high numbers of media multitasking compared with the few studies conducted outside of the U.S. (e.g., Segijn et al., 2017; Voorveld & van der Goot, 2013). Furthermore, cross-country studies have shown that media multitasking is the most prevalent in the U.S. (Kononova, 2013; Kononova & Chiang, 2015; Voorveld, Segijn, Ketelaar, & Smit, 2014) and the

Claire M. Segijn: segijn@umn.edu
Anastasia Kononova: kononova@msu.edu
Date submitted: 2018–04–04

Copyright © 2018 (Claire M. Segijn and Anastasia Kononova). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

least prevalent in the Netherlands (Voorveld et al., 2014). Although previous studies have provided some explanations of this difference, it is still relatively unknown what the predictors of media multitasking across countries are. Because most studies on media multitasking have been conducted in the U.S., it is important to get a better understanding of why the behavior is more prevalent in this country compared with other countries, such as the Netherlands.

To our knowledge, only three studies have looked at predictors of media multitasking across countries (Kononova, 2013; Kononova & Chiang, 2015; Voorveld et al., 2014). Overall, these studies found that media multitasking was most prevalent in the U.S. compared with any of the other countries. Explanations were sought in different predicting factors—namely, audience (e.g., demographics), media (e.g., screen ownership), and cultural (e.g., polychronicity; the preference of doing multiple things at the same time) factors. However, no research has looked at all three types of predictors within the same study. Examining this can provide an interesting theoretical base to predict media multitasking differences across countries. Therefore, the current study will explore the three types of predictors within one study. In addition, this study will focus on one specific form of media multitasking—namely, multiscreening. Multiscreening is the use of multiple screens (e.g., television, smartphone, laptop) at the same time. Previous research has shown that predictors of multiscreening may vary for different screen combinations (Segijn et al., 2017). Thus, more relevant information can be gathered by zooming in on one specific form of media multitasking. Knowledge about the predictors of multiscreening, as a form of media multitasking, is lacking. Only information about audience factors within one country are available for this type of media multitasking, which is remarkable because it is the most prevalent form of media multitasking (Segijn et al., 2017). Therefore, the current study will examine the predictors of this type of media multitasking by comparing audience, media, and cultural factors in the U.S. and the Netherlands.

Literature Review

Multiscreening Across Countries

Three studies have compared the prevalence of self-reported media multitasking behaviors across multiple countries (Kononova, 2013; Kononova & Chiang, 2015; Voorveld et al., 2014). First, Kononova (2013) compared young adults in the U.S., Kuwait, and Russia. She found that media multitasking was most common in the U.S., followed by Kuwait. The high rates of media multitasking in these countries were predicted by structural, macro-level media factors such as advancement of ICT and press freedom index, as well as individual factors such as individual media ownership—that is, possession of electronic devices. Second, Voorveld et al. (2014) compared representative samples from the U.S., United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands. Again, media multitasking was most prevalent in the U.S. Explanations were sought by looking into audience (i.e., demographics) and culture (i.e., polychronicity) factors. Results showed that age was a predictor of multitasking behaviors in all countries. In addition, they showed that the prevalence of screen compositions differed by country. Finally, Kononova and Chiang (2015) compared Internet user samples from different ages in the U.S. and Taiwan to confirm that American respondents were heavier multitaskers. Explanations were sought in media (i.e., media ownership) and cultural (i.e., polychronicity) factors measured as individual-level variables.

Predictors of cross-country differences in media multitasking behaviors have been sought in different factors. The theoretical framework underlying these predictors is the model of Webster, Phalen, and Lichty (2000) and the extended model of Jeong and Fishbein (2007). In the extended model, media multitasking behavior is predicted by audience factors (e.g., age, gender) and media factors (e.g., screen ownership). Jeong and Fishbein's (2007) model has been designed to examine predictors of media multitasking within a country. However, countries might differ not only in terms of individual-level but also with regard to structural-level characteristics. Such macro-level characteristics pertain to the overall situation in a media market and the freedom of information flow (e.g., Kononova, 2013, explored ICT and democratic developments in three national markets) as well as culture (Hofstede, 1980). Although the cross-national studies of media multitasking behaviors reviewed above offered a rather straightforward approach to measuring macro-level media predictors (e.g., press freedom index, ICT development level), culture as a predictor has been explored to a lesser degree due to the complexity of this concept and limitations of its quantitative operational definitions. Voorveld et al. (2014) treated this predictor as a macro-level factor, comparing mono- and polychronic countries in terms of their media multitasking rates. Polychronicity, however, was not measured in that study directly. Instead, they used previous literature to distinguish between Northern European and South European countries as being either monochronic (North) or polychronic (South; Bluedorn, 1998

; Hall, 1959). Kononova and Chiang (2015) focused on psychological representations of polychronicity, treating it as an individual-level factor. This study continues the investigation of cultural factors relevant to time management, perception, and orientation.

This study's theoretical novelty is in looking at three types of predictors (i.e., audience, media, and culture) and measuring various culture-related variables, such as polychronicity, uncertainty avoidance, and short- and long-term orientation as predictors of media multitasking. In addition, previous studies have looked at media multitasking in general, whereas this study deals with one, but the most prevalent, form of this behavior—multiscreening. Thus, this study will compare audience, media, and cultural predictors of multiscreening in the U.S. and the Netherlands. Before looking into the predictors of multiscreening, we first need to test whether the assumption that multiscreening is more prevalent in the U.S. compared with the Netherlands still holds. In line with previous research, we expect that multiscreening is more prevalent in the U.S. compared with the Netherlands:

H1: People in the U.S. multiscreen more than people in the Netherlands.

Audience Factors

According to the extended model of Jeong and Fishbein (2007), audience factors are important predictors of media multitasking. Most studies that have explored the prevalence of media multitasking have looked at audience factors, such as demographics. Age has been found to be a universal predictor of media multitasking across multiple countries (Voorveld et al., 2014). The younger people are, the more they multitask with media. Also, for multiscreening, age appeared to be a significant predictor (Segijn et al., 2017). Although all age groups engaged in multiscreening at least once, it was found that the younger people are, the longer they multiscreen. A plausible explanation for the age difference can be found in adoption rates of media, which are different for different generations (Brasel & Gips, 2011; van der Goot,

Rozendaal, Opree, Ketelaar, & Smit, 2016). Age groups tend to use the medium of their generation. People between 17 and 34 years of age are, for example, more likely to use new media (van der Goot et al., 2016). In addition, new media are easy to combine with other media (Voorveld et al., 2014). Support for this assumption has also been found in another study that showed that the average age of people who combine television with a smartphone is younger compared with the combination of television with a laptop or tablet (Segijn et al., 2017).

H2: Age will negatively predict multiscreening.

Gender is another audience factor that is often taken into account as a predictor of media multitasking. So far, the results have been mixed. Some studies have found that women are more likely to media multitask compared with men (e.g., Duff, Yoon, Wang, & Anghelcev, 2014; Hwang, Kim, & Jeong, 2014; Jeong & Fishbein, 2007), one study has found that men multitask more than women (Segijn et al., 2017), and other studies have found no significant differences between men and women in the amount of media multitasking (e.g., Kononova, 2013; Voorveld et al., 2014). Kononova (2013), however, has shown that the lack of the gender effect is observed in countries such as the U.S. where gender roles are not strictly defined. The gender effect was found in Kuwait and Russia, which are considered to be more traditional countries with a more rigid gender structure. Thus, gender differences in multitasking rates and types can be explained by culture, which study samples represent, as well as the composition of media. For example, Segijn et al. (2017) have found that men multiscreen more than women do, but only with the smartphone–television combination. Thus, it is important to take this audience factor into account when looking at predictors of specific screen compositions across countries. Because positive, negative, and nonsignificant results were found for gender as a predictor, we formulated the following research question:

RQ1: To what extent does gender predict multiscreening?

Media Factors

According to the extended model of Jeong and Fishbein (2007), media factors could also influence media multitasking behavior. Individual-level media factors consist of media ownership or time spent with the medium. Previous research has shown a positive relation between the availability of media and media multitasking behavior. For example, it has been found that people who are in the possession of screens such as a computer, laptop, and television are more likely to media multitask (Foehr, 2006). Other studies, including the ones conducted cross-nationally, have also found that the more media and devices people own, the more they multitask (Jeong & Fishbein, 2007; Kononova, 2013; Kononova & Chiang, 2015). Also, for multiscreening, it was found that the more screens people own, the more they multiscreen (Segijn et al., 2017). Looking at differences between countries, it has been found that countries differ in media-related factors, such as ownership of media devices and amount of time spent on different types of media (Kononova, 2013; Livingstone, d'Haenens, & Hasebrink, 2001). In addition, research has shown that people most likely multitask with media they most frequently use (Voorveld & van der Goot, 2013). Therefore, it is likely to assume that multiscreening behaviors not only will be predicted by media ownership but also differ by country because of differences in media factors.

H3: Screen ownership (a) and time spent using screen devices (b) will positively predict multiscreening.

Cultural Factors

In addition to audience and media-related factors, we include cultural factors as predictors of multiscreening use when comparing data from different countries. In the current study, we examine polychronicity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation as possible cultural factors that are directly related to how people in different cultures perceive and organize time.

Polychronicity

Previous research has examined polychronicity as a cultural factor approached as both a macro-level (Voorveld et al., 2014) and individual-level (Kononova & Chiang, 2015) variable that could explain media multitasking prevalence. On the macro level, the construct of polychronicity is defined as a characteristic of a culture where people have shared values related to time and shared ways to manage it. The studies of media multitasking that treated polychronicity as an individual-level predictor defined polychronicity as "the extent to which people prefer to engage in two or more tasks or events simultaneously" (Kaufman-Scarborough & Lindquist, 1999, p. 288). Monochronic individuals prefer to engage in one activity at a time, whereas polychronic-oriented people have the tendency and the preference of doing multiple things simultaneously (Kaufman-Scarborough & Lindquist, 1999; Poposki & Oswald, 2010). Although, polychronicity and media multitasking are separate constructs, they are conceptually related (König & Waller, 2010). Again, polychronicity is the preference of doing multiple things (these things are not always related to media and technology use), and media multitasking is conceptualized as an actual behavior rather than a preference, in the case of our study, using screens, such as smartphones, computers, and television at the same time. Previous studies have found a relation between polychronicity and media multitasking (Kononova & Chiang, 2015; Voorveld et al., 2014). The more polychronic-oriented people report to be, the greater the extent of media multitasking they engage in (Kononova & Chiang, 2015), especially with new media, such as smartphones (Voorveld et al., 2014).

H4: Polychronicity will positively predict multiscreening.

Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty avoidance reflects the culture's capacity to cope with the unpredictable future and the overall unexpected. People (and societies) who are considered to be highly avoidant of the uncertainty of the future tend to deal with it by creating rigid schedules and following plans. When unexpected events or changes to the schedule occur, they are perceived negatively, as a threat (de Mooij & Hofstede, 2011). Low-avoidant individuals and cultures are less likely to be stressed and anxious about changes in plans and the unpredictability of the future. According to Hofstede Insights (n.d.), the Netherlands (53) scores slightly higher on the dimension of uncertainty avoidance than the U.S. (46). In other words, in the Netherlands people are more avoidant of uncertainty compared with people in the U.S. As the uncertainty avoidance construct somewhat resembles the construct of polychronicity when it comes to the discussion of schedule and changes in plans, where high levels of polychronicity may be associated with low levels of uncertainty avoidance, we hypothesize the following:

H5: Uncertainty avoidance will negatively predict multiscreening.

Long-Term Orientation

This dimension can be best described in terms of a societal or individual perception of the past, present, and future. Short-term societies lean toward being more conservative and traditional, where preserving the existing norms is viewed as a more desirable benefit than intangible outcomes of future progress. On the other hand, long-term orientation is more characteristic of societal or individual pragmatism, where the present is managed and manipulated to achieve a positive change and future outcomes. Rigid norms are secondary in such societies or for such individuals (Hofstede Insights, n.d.; de Mooij & Hofstede, 2011). The Netherlands scores 67 on the long-term orientation dimension, whereas the United Sates scores 26 (Hofstede Insights, n.d.). Thus, in the Netherlands, people tend to be more oriented to the long term compared with people in the United States. We view this dimension as relevant to explore in the context of media multitasking, as media multitasking can be a behavior of choice when the pragmatic, long-term benefits are not primary. When long-term outcomes are the goal, we predict that individuals will be more likely to focus and less likely to attend to additional concurrent media activities.

H6: Long-term orientation will negatively predict multiscreening.

Predictors Across Countries and Screen Compositions

The aim of the study is to examine the predictors of multiscreening by looking at audience, media, and cultural factors. We will include age and gender as audience factors; screen ownership and screen time as media factors; and polychronicity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation as cultural factors. We focus on individual-level factors because we believe it is important to distinguish between individuals within one country (Yoo, Donthu, & Lenartowicz, 2011). Thus, all factors will be measured on an individual level rather than a country level. To examine which of these factors explains multiscreen use most, and to examine if predictors vary across countries and screen compositions, we formulated the following research questions:

RQ2: What factor (individual-level audience, media, and cultural factors) explains the most variance in multiscreen use?

RQ3: To what extent do individual-level audience, media, and cultural predictors of multiscreen use differ by country?

RQ4: To what extent do individual-level audience, media, and cultural predictors of multiscreen use differ by multiscreen composition?

Method

Sample

Two identical surveys were administered online simultaneously in the U.S. and the Netherlands, using the online software Qualtrics. Participants were recruited through the student subject pools of two universities, using convenience sampling strategies. Every participant registered in the subject pool could participate in the study. The surveys were advertised on the online website of the subject pools. The study started with a consent form, followed by questions about cultural dimensions, screen ownership, time spent using screens, and multiscreening. At the end, respondents reported demographic information. Participants received extra credit for participation. In the U.S., the survey generated 474 initial responses, of which 427 were completed. In the Netherlands, a total of 450 responses were generated, of which 406 were completed. The final sample of participants, after the proper cleaning, totaled in 642, with 191 cases being removed. Reasons to remove people were (1) participants took the survey twice or did not provide their identification number, which made it impossible to determine whether it was a unique case (n = 26); (2) outlier for age (n = 1); (3) repeating response patterns (n = 2); (4) failing the attention checks (n = 90); and (5) all cases where English was not identified as the native language in the U.S. sample and all cases where Dutch was not the native language in the Dutch sample, as we aimed at looking at homogenous representations of culture within each sample (n = 72). The final sample consisted of 642 participants (M_{age} = 21.57, SD_{age} = 1.60, 72.6% female), with 314 participants in the U.S. (M_{age} = 21.54, SD_{age} = 1.31, 65% female) and 328 (M_{age} = 21.59, SD_{age} = 1.83, 79.9% female) participants in the Netherlands.

Independent Variables

Country

This variable states whether the participant filled out the survey in the U.S. (−1) or in the Netherlands (1) to distinguish between the two countries.

Audience Factors

We measured age by asking the year the participant was born and calculated their age based on the year. In addition, we asked about gender (1 = women, −1 = men).

Media Factors

First, we measured screen ownership by asking whether participants owned a certain screen (yes/no) and if yes, how many. A sum score was calculated to get the number of screens a participant owns (M = 5.15, SD = 1.14). Second, to measure media use, we asked, "During the last week, how many hours and minutes did you spend . . ." using different screen media. We asked this question for television, smartphone, laptop, desktop computer, tablet computer, and video-game console. Participants had to indicate their media use per screen in hours (M = 48.93, SD = 33.81).

Cultural Factors

First, we measured polychronicity (Poposki & Oswald, 2010) with 15 items (Cronbach's alpha = .89, *M* = 3.66, *SD* = 0.93). Second, we measured uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation with five items each (Yoo et al., 2011). Both uncertainty avoidance (Cronbach's alpha = .89, *M* = 5.15, *SD* = 1.01) as well as long-term orientation (Cronbach's alpha = .80, *M* = 5.20, *SD* = 0.91) appeared to be reliable. All cultural dimensions were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Dependent Variable

An adapted version of the Media Multitasking Index (Ophir, Nass, & Wagner, 2009) was used to measure the amount of multiscreening. Because we were interested in multiscreen use, we only focused on screen media (i.e., Multiscreening Index, MSI). The items included television, smartphone, laptop, desktop computer, tablet computer, and video-game console. Similar to Ophir et al. (2009), we measured the total number of hours and minutes a week each participant spent using each of the screens. Then, participants rated the frequency of using each possible combination of the two screens, where either one screen or another screen use was indicated to be the primary activity. The frequency was measured on ordinal 5-point scales ranging from *never* to *all of the time*. Each frequency anchor was later recorded into numerical format: *never* = 0, *rarely* = .25, *sometimes* = .5, *often* = .75, and *all of the time* = 1. These scores and the total time spent with all five screens were used to calculate the MSI index (see formula in Ophir et al., 2009).

Results

H1: Multiscreening in the U.S., versus the Netherlands

An independent-samples *t* test was conducted with country as the independent variable and MSI as the dependent variable. As expected, the participants in the U.S. were heavier multiscreeners (*M* = 1.90, *SD* = 0.68) compared with the participants in the Netherlands (*M* = 1.52, *SD* = 0.54), $t(639) = 7.90$, $p < .001$. Thus, the first hypothesis is accepted. In addition, we looked at screen ownership across countries (see Table 1). Almost every participant owned a television (U.S., 96.2%; Netherlands, 86%), a smartphone (100% in both samples), and a laptop (U.S., 98.4%; Netherlands, 99.1%). Percentage of screens owned differed significantly per screen between participants in the U.S. and the Netherlands, except for the smartphone, laptop, and tablet. Besides total percentage of screens owned, the number of screens owned by country differed significantly, $t(640) = -6.09$, $p < .001$. The participants of the U.S. owned significantly more screens (*M* = 5.42, *SD* = 1.05) compared with the participants in the Netherlands (*M* = 4.89, *SD* = 1.17). Table 1 shows that this is true for the total number of screens owned and the number per screen type, with the biggest differences between the number of televisions (U.S., *M* = 2.92, *SD* = 2.30; Netherlands, *M* = 1.49, *SD* = 1.17) and the number of game devices (U.S., *M* = 1.29, *SD* = 1.56; Netherlands, *M* = 0.62, *SD* = 0.95).

Table 1. Screen Ownership by Country.

	Total % that owns a screen		Number of screens per person	
	U.S.	NL	U.S.	NL
TV	96.2%[a]	86%[b]	2.92 (2.30)[a]	1.49 (1.17)[b]
Smartphone	100%[a]	100%[a]	1.23 (0.97)[a]	1.07 (0.44)[b]
Laptop	98.4%[a]	99.1%[a]	1.25 (0.80)[a]	1.14 (0.56)[b]
Tablet	41.5%[a]	35.5%[a]	0.55 (0.84)[a]	0.4 (0.60)[b]
Desktop	39.5%[a]	28%[b]	0.59 (1.42)[a]	0.36 (0.72)[b]
Game device	68.3%[a]	41.2%[b]	1.29 (1.56)[a]	0.62 (0.95)[b]
Total	–	–	5.42 (1.05)[a]	4.89 (1.17)[b]

Note. The average number of screens per person per country are presented in the last two columns with standard deviation presented within parentheses. NL = the Netherlands. Different superscripts indicate significant differences across countries. Thus, significantly more people in the U.S. own a television compared to people in the Netherlands (96.2% [a] vs. 86% [b]), but no significantly differences exist between the percentage of people that owns a laptop (U.S. = 98.4%[a] vs. NL = 99.1%[a])

Predicting Variables of Multiscreening

To examine to what extent individual-level audience, media, and cultural factors predict multiscreen use, three hierarchical-regression analyses were conducted, one for each country sample and one with all participants. The dependent variable in all regression models was MSI, and the individual-level audience (Step 1), cultural (Step 2), and media factors (Step 3) were added as the independent variables. Country (U.S. vs. the Netherlands) was also added in the model, with all participants to the first step as a control variable.

The results are presented in Table 2. The models explained 23.8% of the variance in multiscreen use for all participants, 18.7% of the variance in multiscreen use in the U.S., and 21.5% of the variance in multiscreen use in the Netherlands. Overall, the most important predictors of multiscreen use appeared to be the media factors. Both screen ownership (all $b^* = .33$, $p < .001$; U.S. $b^* = .39$, $p < .001$; $b^* = .30$, $p < .001$) and screen use (All $b^* = .19$, $p < .001$; U.S. $b^* = .13$, $p = .013$; $b^* = .30$, $p < .001$) had a significant impact on multiscreen use, with screen ownership being the strongest predictor of multiscreen use. Furthermore, age appeared to be a predictor within the two countries. However, the results were in the opposite direction. In the U.S., the older the participants are, the more likely they are to multiscreen ($b^* = .14$, $p = .013$), whereas in the Netherlands, the younger the participants are, the more likely they are to multiscreen ($b^* = -.11$, $p = .030$). The individual-level cultural factors did not have a significant impact on multiscreen use.

Table 2. Hierarchical Regression MS Index.

Predictor	All Participants			U.S.			The Netherlands		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Step 1—Demographics									
Country	−0.30***	−0.29***	−0.26***			–			–
Age	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	0.09	0.10	0.14*	−0.07	0.08	−0.11*
Gender	−0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	0.04	0.03	0.06
Step 2—Cultural dimensions									
Polychronicity		0.03	0.03		0.03	0.05		0.04	0.03
Uncertainty avoidance		−0.01	−0.03		−0.08	−0.08		0.06	0.00
Long−term orientation		0.06	0.05		0.07	0.05		0.07	0.07
Step 3—Media factors									
Screen ownership			0.33***			0.39***			0.30***
Screen use in hours			0.19***			0.13*			0.30***
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.24	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.01	0.02	0.22
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.09	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.20
F for change in *R*	20.71	0.72	60.59	1.51	0.68	31.94	1.30	1.11	40.24

Note. The table presents standardized regression coefficients (beta). Variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostics showed no multicollinearity issues (VIFs < 1.34). *p < 05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Predicting Variables per Multiscreen Composition

To examine predictors of multiscreen use for different multiscreen compositions, we looked at multiscreening with television, smartphone, and laptop. The other multiscreen compositions (i.e., tablet, desktop computer, and video console) were not prevalent enough to conduct reliable analyses. The amount of multiscreening with a certain screen served as the dependent variable. Models for all participants and for the two samples by country were examined. The same independent variables were entered as for the models in Table 2. Screen use in hours is now the screen that is examined instead of general screen use. In addition, the number of devices of the examined screen are included as a media factor.

Multiscreening With Television

The results for multiscreening with television are presented in Table 3a. The models explained 24.9% of the variance in multiscreen use with television for all participants, 19.4% of the variance in multiscreen use with television in the U.S., and 21.8% of the variance in multiscreen use with television in the Netherlands. Overall, media factors appeared to be the most important predictors of multiscreening with television. Total number of screens has the highest impact on multiscreen use with television (all $b^* = .30$, $p < .001$; U.S. $b^* = .33$, $p < .001$; Netherlands $b^* = .36$, $p < .001$). The higher the total number of screens someone owns, the more they will multiscreen with the television. In addition, total television use in hours had a significant impact on multiscreening with television for all participants ($b^* = .17$, $p < .001$) and in the Netherlands ($b^* = .26$, $p < .001$), but not in the U.S. However, total number of televisions owned affected multiscreening with television in the U.S. ($b^* = .12$, $p = .045$) and not in the other two samples.

In addition to the media factors, some audience factors predicted multiscreen use with television. In the U.S., older participants were more likely to multiscreen with television ($b^* = 15$, $p = .12$), and in the Netherlands, female participants multiscreened more with television ($b^* = .13$, $p = .012$). Finally, the cultural factor polychronicity affected multiscreening with television in the Netherlands ($b^* = .10$, $p = .047$). Higher participant scores on the scale of polychronicity in the Netherlands (i.e., the more polychrome this person is) were correlated with greater levels of multiscreening with television.

Table 3a. Hierarchical Regressions for Multiscreening With Television.

Predictor	All Participants			U.S.			The Netherlands		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Step 1—Demographics									
Country	−0.30***	−0.31***	−0.23***						
Age	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.15*	0.01	0.01	0.04
Gender	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.04	−0.03	0.09	0.09	0.13*
Step 2—Cultural dimensions									
Polychronicity		0.06	0.07		0.03	0.06		0.11	0.10*
Uncertainty avoidance		−0.02	−0.03		−0.07	−0.08		0.02	−0.00
Long-term orientation		0.00	0.00		0.02	0.01		0.01	0.02
Step 3—Media factors									
TV use in hours			0.17***			0.10			0.26***
Number of televisions			0.07			0.12*			−0.09
Total number of screens			0.30***			0.33***			0.36***
R^2	0.09	0.10	0.25	0.02	0.02	0.19	0.01	0.02	0.22
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.09	0.24	0.01	0.01	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.20
F for change in *R*	21.69	0.95	42.76	2.49	0.65	21.66	1.22	1.15	27.27

Note. The table presents standardized regression coefficients (beta). Variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostics showed no multicollinearity issues (VIFs < 1.69). *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Multiscreening With Smartphone

The results for multiscreening with smartphone are presented in Table 3b. The models explained 21.6% of the variance in multiscreen use with smartphone for all participants, 19.2% of the variance in multiscreen use with smartphone in the U.S., and 20.2% of the variance in multiscreen use with smartphone in the Netherlands. Overall, media factors appeared to be the most important predictors of multiscreening with smartphone. Total number of screens had the highest impact on multiscreening with smartphone (all $b^* = .32$, $p < .001$; U.S. $b^* = .37$, $p < .001$; Netherlands $b^* = .29$, $p < .001$). The higher the total number of screens someone owned, the more they reported they used a smartphone while using other screens. Similar to multiscreening with television, total smartphone use in hours had a significant impact for all participants ($b^* = .14$, $p < .001$) and in the Netherlands ($b^* = .28$, $p < .001$), but not in the U.S. Total number of smartphones owned had a significant impact for all participants ($b^* = .10$, $p = .004$) and in the U.S. ($b^* = .11$, $p = .045$), but not in the Netherlands. Of the other variables, only the audience factor gender ($b^* = -.09$, $p = .020$) and cultural factor long-term orientation ($b^* = .09$, $p = .036$) were related to multiscreening with smartphone for all participants. Men are more likely to multiscreen with smartphone than women are, and people who score higher on the scale for long-term orientation are more likely to multiscreen with smartphone.

Table 3b. Hierarchical Regressions for Multiscreening With Smartphone.

Predictor	All Participants			U.S.			The Netherlands		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Step 1—Demographics									
Country	−0.23***	−0.20***	−0.13**						
Age	−0.01	0.02	−0.00	0.06	0.06	0.10	−0.06	−0.07	−0.08
Gender	−0.08	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.07	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.08	−0.08
Step 2—Cultural dimensions									
Polychronicity		0.04	0.04		0.01	0.03		0.08	0.06
Uncertainty avoidance		0.01	0.01		−0.05	−0.05		0.06	0.03
Long-term orientation		0.10*	0.09*		0.12	0.11		0.09	0.09
Step 3—Media factors									
Smartphone use in hours			0.14***			0.07			0.28***
Number of smartphones			0.10**			0.11*			0.06
Total number of screens			0.32***			0.37***			0.29***
R^2	0.06	0.07	0.22	0.01	0.02	0.19	0.01	0.02	0.20
Adjusted R^2	0.06	0.06	0.21	0.01	0.01	0.17	0.00	0.01	0.18
F for change in *R*	14.31	2.13	38.55	2.00	1.12	21.15	1.04	1.74	24.02

Note. The table presents standardized regression coefficients (beta). Variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostics showed no multicollinearity issues (VIFs < 1.35). *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Multiscreening With Laptop

The results for multiscreening with laptop are presented in Table 3c. The models explained 18.7% of the variance in multiscreen use with laptop for all participants, 13.3% of the variance in multiscreen use with laptop in the U.S., and 13.4% of the variance in multiscreen use with laptop in the Netherlands. Again, media factors appeared to be the most important predictors of multiscreening with laptop. As with the previous two screens, total number of screens owned had the highest impact on multiscreening with laptop (all $b^* = .26$, $p < .001$; U.S. $b^* = .28$, $p < .001$; Netherlands $b^* = .30$, $p < .001$). The more total number of screens someone owns, the more he or she will multiscreen with laptop. In addition, total laptop use in hours had a significant impact on multiscreening with laptop for all participants ($b^* = .09$, $p = .013$) and in the Netherlands ($b^* = .18$, $p = .001$), but not in the U.S. This was similar to the multiscreening with television and multiscreening with smartphone.

In addition to media factors, some of the audience factors predicted multiscreen use with laptop. In the U.S., older participants were more likely to multiscreen with laptop ($b^* = 14$, $p = .19$), and in the Netherlands, female participants multiscreened more with laptop ($b^* = .13$, $p = .014$). Finally, in the U.S., the cultural factors polychronicity ($b^* = .13$, $p = .020$) and uncertainty avoidance ($b^* = -.16$, $p = .008$) also affected multiscreening with laptop. The higher someone scores on the scale of polychronicity or the less someone avoids uncertainty situations, the more likely this person will multiscreen with a laptop.

Table 3c. Hierarchical Regressions for Multiscreening With Laptop.

Predictor	All Participants			U.S.			The Netherlands		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Step 1									
Country	−0.33***	−0.33***	−0.30***						
Age	−0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.14*	0.02	0.01	0.02
Gender	−0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.10	−0.13***
Step 2									
Polychronicity		0.07	0.07		0.11*	0.13*		0.04	0.03
Uncertainty avoidance		−0.05	−0.06		−0.17*	−0.16**		0.07	0.04
Long-term orientation		0.05	0.04		0.07	0.07		0.04	0.05
Step 3									
Laptop use in hours			0.09**			0.01			0.18***
Number of laptops			0.06			0.07			0.01
Total number of screens			0.26***			0.28***			0.30***
R^2	0.01	0.11	0.19	0.01	0.05	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.13
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.01	0.18	0.00	0.03	0.11	0.01	0.01	0.11
F for change in *R*	24.48	1.74	19.87	1.18	4.03	10.37	1.79	0.98	13.99

Note. The table presents standardized regression coefficients (beta). Variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostics showed no multicollinearity issues (VIFs < 1.35). *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

Discussion

The aim of the current study was to examine the predictors of multiscreening by looking at audience, media, and cultural factors and by comparing data from the U.S. with the Netherlands. This was necessary for at least three reasons. First, previous research had found that media multitasking was most prevalent in the U.S. and the least prevalent in the Netherlands. However, limited explanations of these differences were provided. Second, previous research into predictors of media multitasking have looked at audience, media, and cultural factors as predictors of this behavior. However, they never compared these three types of factors within the same cross-country study. Third, previous research found mixed results on the predictors of media multitasking. Differences in results might be explained by the use of the different media combinations. Therefore, the current study focuses on the most prevalent form of media multitasking, namely, multiscreening (Segijn et al., 2017). This study compared multiscreening prevalence between the U.S. and the Netherlands and looked at predictors of multiscreen use.

First, we confirmed that participants in the U.S. multiscreen more than participants in the Netherlands. That differences between countries exists is important when comparing statistics about the prevalence of multiscreening that is derived from different countries—for example, when comparing Nielsen data from the U.S. with the Dutch numbers from Voorveld and van der Goot (2014). These results emphasize the importance of cross-country research. The difference found between the U.S. and the Netherlands is in line with previous research that found that media multitasking was most prevalent in the U.S. and least prevalent in the Netherlands (Voorveld et al., 2014). In addition to prevalence, this study showed differences in screen ownership. Both screen saturation and total number of screens owned differed significantly between the two countries. Participants from the U.S. owned more screens compared with Dutch participants. Future research should therefore ask whether people own a screen and also the number of screens per screen type.

Second, we looked at predictors of multiscreening by comparing audience, media, and cultural factors. Overall, media factors appeared to be the best predictors of multiscreen use for both countries. People who own more screens and consequently spend more time with these screens will also be more likely to multiscreen. Media-related factors are also the most important predictors when looking at multiscreening with television, smartphone, or tablet. Interestingly, the total number of hours spent with a specific screen is only a predictor in the Netherlands, whereas the number of specific screens owned is only a predictor in the U.S. An explanation could be that participants in the U.S. own multiple devices of the same screen (e.g., they own multiple televisions), whereas in the Netherlands, this is less common (see Table 1). In both countries, total screen ownership had the biggest impact on multiscreen use. This was also the only predictor that had a significant impact on multiscreen use across all samples and every multiscreen combination. Because media factors are consistent predictors across countries, it will be interesting for future research to examine whether affordances of media drive multiscreening use. In other words, future research should be devoted to examining what screen-device properties facilitate multiscreening behavior. For example, a television viewer might check additional information about a TV show on her tablet screen. Thus, in this example, a tablet affords the user to multiscreen while watching TV.

Third, some of the audience factors also had an impact on multiscreen use. Age appeared to be a predictor of total multiscreen use. Older participants were more likely to multiscreen in the U.S., and younger participants were more likely to multiscreen in the Netherlands. A possible explanation of this opposite result can be found in the media predictors. In the U.S., the number of screens owned is a better predictor of multiscreen use than the hours spent with a screen, whereas in the Netherlands, it is the other way around. It is likely that the older people get, the more access they have to more screens, but younger people have more time to spend with media. In addition to age, gender had an impact on multiscreen use with the smartphone in the total sample. Contrary to the results of multiscreening with television and laptop, these results showed that men multiscreen more with smartphone than do women. This is in line with previous research in multiscreening with smartphone (Segijn et al., 2017). Furthermore, gender appeared to be a predictor for specific multiscreening combinations. Women multiscreen more with television and laptop. However, these results were only observed for participants in the Netherlands. In the U.S., gender did not affect multiscreen use, which provides support for the argument that a lack of a gender effect could be observed in countries where gender roles are not strictly defined (Kononova, 2013).

Finally, we examined individual-level cultural factors as predictors of multiscreen use. Results differed by multiscreen combinations and per sample. Polychronicity appeared to be a predictor of multiscreening with television in the Netherlands and multiscreening with laptop in the U.S. As expected, the more people prefer to do multiple things at the same time, the more they engage in multiscreening. Uncertainty avoidance appeared to be a significant predictor of multiscreening with laptop in the U.S. Consistent with our predictions, American participants who reported they did not cope well with an unexpected future were less likely to multiscreen. This goes back to our argument that individuals who try to reduce uncertainty are more likely to follow a schedule and do one thing at a time. Finally, long-term orientation appeared to be a significant predictor of multiscreening with smartphone in the overall sample. The results showed that people who score higher on organizing activities to maximize future goals also score higher on multiscreening with smartphone. This is contrary to the expectation that long-term-oriented people would multiscreen less. One explanation of this finding could be that long-term-oriented individuals are more likely to break the existing norms of current media use for future efficiency. In this case, multiscreening with smartphone could be seen as a way to increase efficiency. Short-term-oriented individuals, on the contrary, are less likely to adopt the new media-use behavior.

Contrary to expectations, age was not a significant predictor of multiscreen use for all screen compositions. Previous studies have been consistent in finding age as a predictor of a form of media multitasking (e.g., Carrier et al., 2009; Voorveld et al., 2014; Voorveld & van der Goot, 2013). An explanation could be that the current study made use of a student sample, and variations in age were small. Having a student sample can be seen as a limitation of the study because the results could not be generalized to the whole population of the U.S. and the Netherlands and are limited to the two universities. Although the samples do not represent the general population of both countries, students are frequent multitaskers (Calderwood, Ackerman, & Conklin, 2014; Carrier et al., 2009). Therefore, they provide a good baseline understanding of multiscreening across countries and the predictors that drive this behavior. Students are also young adults, some of whom will soon join the workforce and carry their media-use habits with them, changing the etiquettes of working and leisure. Having said that, the results of the study must be carefully interpreted. Future research is necessary to replicate the findings in a general sample.

A second limitation might be the predictors included in the study. Although this study examined audience, media, and cultural factors as predictors of multiscreening, it did not grasp the whole scope of these predictors. According to the extended model of Jeong and Fishbein (2007), audience factors consist of both demographic and psychological factors, such as sensation seeking. Also, media factors consist of both individual-level media factors (e.g., screen ownership) as structural-level media factors (e.g., media market). In this study, we focused on demographic and the individual-level media factors. Not including psychological audience factors and structural-level media factors can be seen as a limitation. For example, it would have been interesting to know more about the living status of the participants, which could influence media ownership (Foehr, 2006). Also, country continued to be a significant predictor in every regression model, even after adding all other variables. This is an indication that other country-level factors contribute to multiscreening that have not been measured in this study. Despite these limitations, this study is the first to combine audience, media, and cultural factors. Future research is necessary to test the other factors as predictors of multiscreening, especially on the country level.

Finally, we have to be careful in drawing causal conclusions based on correlational survey data. For example, it might be possible that heavier multiscreeners own more screens or spend more time with media because they are multiscreening. It is also important to note that the three cultural factors were measured as self-reported individual-level variables. For instance, respondents who reported a greater degree of multiscreening could also report a greater degree of polychronicity. Future research should consider more precise and less subjective measures of culture and multiscreen use to establish a causal relationship with media and screen multitasking variables.

The results of this study have at least three important implications for theory. First, it extends the model of Jeong and Fishbein (2007) by including cultural factors as a possible predictor of media multitasking use. In their model, Jeong and Fishbein focused on audience and media-related factors only. The model was designed to examine predictors of media multitasking within one country. Our study showed that cultural dimensions could also be predictors of a form of media multitasking prevalence. Cultural factors are also important to take into account when examining predictors within one country because these cultural factors could also differ per individual (Yoo et al., 2011). Our study showed that within a country, differences on these cultural dimensions could influence multiscreening use.

Second, the current study added two new cultural predictors that have not been examined before in the context of multiscreening or media multitasking, namely, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. Studies looking at cultural factors in the context of media multitasking have mostly focused on polychronicity (Kononova & Chiang, 2015; Voorveld et al., 2014). This study showed that uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation are also related to specific types of multiscreening behavior. An interesting theoretical implication of exploring the three factors together is to determine if these factors affect media multitasking behaviors in a similar way. The three cultural characteristics have one similarity: all revolve around people's perception of time from more rigid and linear, to more flexible and spiral. It is intriguing that despite this similarity, the cultural variable predicted multiscreening behaviors differently. This should be further investigated. In addition, future research could look at other time-related predictors, such as time orientation (Settle, Alreck, & Glasheen, 1978; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).

Finally, this study found that predictors of multiscreen use could differ by country and per screen composition. This stresses the importance of differentiating between these two factors in future research. Not every multiscreen or media multitasking situation is the same. Different combinations of media can have different predictors and may also have different effects. Additionally, these predictors might differ by country. Countries differ in terms of their media systems, and this could also have an impact on how media are used and how often media are used. More cross-country research is necessary to further develop theory building on the relation between media systems and media use.

In addition to theoretical implications, this study also has important practical implications. Multiscreening and other media multitasking behaviors receive attention from advertisers, schools, and the government. These organizations worry about the detrimental effect that multiscreening has on information processing. Previous studies showed that multiscreening has a negative effect on cognitive outcomes, such as memory and comprehension (e.g., Segijn, Voorveld, & Smit, 2016; Van Cauwenberge, Schaap, & van Roy, 2014). Therefore, it is important to understand what drives this behavior to get a better understanding of this media-use habit, especially because some factors (i.e., media factors) can be more controlled by external parties than others (i.e., audience and cultural factors). The strategy to influence this behavior may depend on the factors that drive the behavior. Additionally, improving the knowledge about predictors of multiscreening is valuable information for media planners. This research provides insights into who is engaging in multiscreening and what drives their behavior. This information could improve the effectiveness of messages and reduce risk when trying to find the target audience. Furthermore, with the trend of globalization, it is important not only to examine the predictors within a country but also to expand research across borders. Understanding predictors of multiscreening behavior and how they differ across countries will help media practitioners improve audience segmentation in an international campaign.

In sum, this study is a first step in examining predictors of multiscreening use across countries. It was confirmed that multiscreening was most prevalent in the U.S. The main universal predictor of the behavior seems to be media-related factors. Specifically, the total number of screens owned was the biggest predictor of multiscreen use for all screen compositions and across countries. Audience factors and cultural factors are also predictors of the behavior, but only for some screen compositions and in some countries.

References

Bluedorn, A. C. (1998). An interview with anthropologist Edward T. Hall. *Journal of Management Inquiry, 7*(2), 109–115. doi:10.1177/105649269872003

Brasel, S. A., & Gips, J. (2011). Media multitasking behavior: Concurrent television and computer usage. *CyberPsychology, Behavior & Social Networking, 14*(9), 527–534. doi:10.1089/cyber.2010.0350

Calderwood, C., Ackerman, P. L., & Conklin, E. M. (2014). What else do college students "do" while studying? An investigation of multitasking. *Computers & Education, 75*, 19–29. doi:10.1016/j.compedu.2014.02.004

Carrier, L. M., Cheever, N. A., Rosen, L. D., Benitez, S., & Chang, J. (2009). Multitasking across generations: Multitasking choices and difficulty ratings in three generations of Americans. *Computers in Human Behavior, 25*(2), 483–489. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2008.10.012

de Mooij, M., & Hofstede, G. (2011). Cross-cultural consumer behavior: A review of research findings. *Journal of International Consumer Marketing*, *23*(3/4), 181–192.

Duff, B. R. L., Yoon, G., Wang, Z., & Anghelcev, G. (2014). Doing it all: An exploratory study of predictors of media multitasking. *Journal of Interactive Advertising, 14*(1), 11–23. doi:10.1080/15252019.2014.884480

Foehr, U. G. (2006). *Media multitasking among American youth: Prevalence, predictors and pairings*. Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.

Hall, E. T. (1959). *The silent language*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Hofstede, G. (1980). Motivation, leadership, and organization: Do American theories apply abroad? *Organizational Dynamics*, *9*(1), 42–63.

Hofstede Insights. (n.d.). *Country comparison: Netherlands vs. United States*. Retrieved from https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/the-netherlands,the-usa/

Hwang, Y., Kim, H., & Jeong, S. (2014). Why do media users multitask? Motives for general, medium-specific, and content-specific types of multitasking. *Computers in Human Behavior, 36*, 542–548. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2014.04.040

Jeong, S., & Fishbein, M. (2007). Predictors of multitasking with media: Media factors and audience factors. *Media Psychology, 10*(3), 364–384. doi:10.1080/15213260701532948

Kaufman-Scarborough, C., & Lindquist, J. D. (1999). Time management and polychronicity: Comparisons, contrasts, and insights for the workplace. *Journal of Managerial Psychology, 14*(3), 288–312. doi:10.1108/02683949910263819

König, C. J., & Waller, M. J. (2010). Time for reflection: A critical examination of polychronicity. *Human Performance, 23*(2), 173–190. doi:10.1080/08959281003621703

Kononova, A. (2013). Multitasking across borders: A cross-national study of media multitasking behaviors, its antecedents, and outcomes. *International Journal of Communication, 7*, 1688–1710.

Kononova, A., & Chiang, Y. (2015). Why do we multitask with media? Predictors of media multitasking among Internet users in the United States and Taiwan. *Computers in Human Behavior, 50*, 31–41. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2015.03.052

Livingstone, S., d'Haenens, L., & Hasebrink, U. (2001). Childhood in Europe: Contexts for comparison. In S. M. Livingstone & M. Bovill (Eds.), *Children and their changing media environment: A European comparative study* (pp. 3–30). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ophir, E., Nass, C., & Wagner, A. D. (2009). Cognitive control in media multitaskers. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106*(37), 15583–15587.

Pilotta, J. J., Schultz, D. E., Drenik, G., & Rist, P. (2004). Simultaneous media usage: A critical consumer orientation to media planning. *Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 3*(3), 285–292. doi:10.1002/cb.141

Poposki, E. M., & Oswald, F. L (2010). The Multitasking Preference Inventory: Toward an improved measure of individual differences in polychronicity. *Human Performance, 23*(3), 247–264. doi:10.1080/08959285.2010.487843

Segijn, C. M., Voorveld, H. A. M., & Smit, E. G. (2016). The underlying mechanisms of multiscreening effects. *Journal of Advertising, 45*(4), 391–402. doi:10.1080/00913367.2016.1172386

Segijn, C. M., Voorveld, H. A. M., Vandeberg, L., Pennekamp, S. F., & Smit, E. G. (2017). Insight into everyday media use with multiple screens. *International Journal of Advertising, 36*(5), 779–797. doi:10.1080/02650487.2017.1348042

Settle, R. B., Alreck, P. L., & Glasheen, J. W. (1978). Individual time orientation and consumer life style. In H. K. Hunt (Ed.), *Advances in consumer research* (pp. 315–319). Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Consumer Research.

Van Cauwenberge, A., Schaap, G., & van Roy, R. (2014). TV no longer commands our full attention: Effects of second-screen viewing and task relevance on cognitive load and learning from news. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *38*, 100–109.

van der Goot, M., Rozendaal, E., Opree, S. J., Ketelaar, P. E., & Smit, E. G. (2016). Media generations and their advertising attitudes and avoidance: A six-country comparison. *International Journal of Advertising, 37*(2), 289–308. doi:10.1080/02650487.2016.1240469

Voorveld, H. A. M., Segijn, C. M., Ketelaar, P., & Smit, E., G. (2014). Investigating the prevalence and predictors of media multitasking across countries. *International Journal of Communication, 8*, 2755–2777.

Voorveld, H. A. M., & van der Goot, M. (2013). Age differences in media multitasking: A diary study. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 57*(3), 392–408. doi:10.1080/08838151.2013.816709

Webster, J., Phalen, P., & Lichty, L. (2000). *Ratings analysis* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Yoo, B., Donthu, N., & Lenartowicz, T. (2011). Measuring Hofstede's five dimensions of cultural values at the individual level: Development and validation of CVSCALE. *Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 23*, 193–210.

Zimbardo, P. G., & Boyd, J. N. (1999). Putting time in perspective: A valid, reliable individual-differences metric. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(6), 1271–1288.

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4689–4707 1932–8036/20180005

A Racial Reckoning of a Progressive Ideology in Public Discourse

SUE ROBINSON[1]
University of Wisconsin–Madison, USA

Applying racial formation theory, this research argues that when the political progressive ideology becomes the status quo, it loses its focus on "reform" and "progress" toward equity. Critical discourse analysis of media texts reveals how the ideology evolved into a "racial project" perpetuating institutional racism. When a moment of racial reckoning is presented to challenge the hegemonic politics in this case study, politicians, journalists, and engaged citizens employ discursive strategies to uncover privileges, call out (dis)trusting relationships, and reclaim the dominant narrative around what reform and progress look like. This work demonstrates how political communication unfolds when a progressively maintained infrastructure is revealed to be a system of oppression and where digital platforms allow for a substantial challenge.

Keywords: race, digital technologies, discourse, political communication, progressive, media, trust

Reform of institutions and an interrogation of power abuse, social inequities, and political fraud serve as bedrock for the politically "progressive" ideology, still practiced more than a century after its formal birth (Aldridge, 2007; Schafer, 2001). Since the 1890s, progressives have championed improvements to public schools, government safety nets, labor laws, and the environment based on advancements (aiming for "progress") in thought and practice. Race in particular has long been a topic of discussion in politically progressive circles, although some have criticized the stance for being racist because of its insistence on reform of existing institutions rather than revolution (Schafer, 2001; Snyder, 2015). Central to the practice of progressivism, a vibrant public sphere demands interrogation of failings, an articulation of identification always in flux, and a constant dialogue around how progress might be made through trusting relationships (Boggs, 2001; Goodnight, 1982; Habermas, 1989).

This work explores political communication in public discursive spaces such as journalism and social media within a setting dominated by progressive ideology. This exploration arose from deep inquiry into

Sue Robinson: robinson4@wisc.edu
Date submitted: 2018–03–31

[1] I appreciate the support and feedback from Robert Asen and Jordan Foley of the University of Wisconsin–Madison and the editors and anonymous reviewers.

Copyright © 2018 (Sue Robinson). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

how places that identify as progressive—politically, historically, culturally, administratively—talk about race in public. The case of Madison, Wisconsin, and Dane County was chosen because of long-standing progressive roots, proud civil rights histories, and present-day mottos of "comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable." In addition, the city had a moment at which change could come about—a racial reckoning confronting city leaders and its hyperengaged citizens. The year was 2013 and a report called "A Race to Equity" revealed the county to be the worst in the country in its racial achievement disparities across all metrics from unemployment to high school graduation rates. The Wisconsin Council on Children and Families unveiled the report at the YWCA Racial Justice Summit and sent copies to all of the local policymakers and news outlets.

This midsized city in the Midwest was used to talking—a lot—about race, but generally in more episodic events such as budget decisions and new proposals. But now this report, widely dispersed, had aggregated all of that talk into real data points that collectively showed a significant fissure in the way Madison saw itself. The report indicated noxious systems of oppression, and I was eager to see how the report might be characterized in public discourse: Would Madison live up to its stated commitment to reform when faced with the irrefutable facts of its progressive-maintained-but-broken structures? Would that dialogue be productive? Would digital social platforms help or hinder that discourse be more or less progressive? This research uses as its theoretical framework a racial lens in lieu of a political one to answer these questions. Racial formation theory argues that race remains a central organizing influence over political ideology (Omi & Winant, 2014, p. 3). An analytical framework of a critical discourse analysis guided the research.

Building on my recent book (Robinson, 2018) about how power and privilege play out in progressive communities, this work seeks to understand so-called antiracist projects at the meso level. The way that this community conversation unfolded demonstrated how civic dialogue adheres to an inevitable racial formation that characterizes progressive politics in the digital age in liberal places that have long civil rights histories in the United States and where progressiveness had become the status quo. Central to the argument here are the varying dimensions of trust and distrust that played out: not only the idea that reporters assumed a high-level of trust for foundational institutions like school systems, but also that citizens of color adopted a narrative of distrust for these same institutions. This work adds to the literature on political communication by demonstrating how racial formation is revealed in the exercising of (dis)trusting relationships as well as expressions of privilege, and the reclaiming and repairing of public narratives within the information exchange. In addition, it offers a detailed example of the kind of "White fragility"—that is, the defensive way in which White people react when confronted with their innate racism—that Robin DiAngelo explained in her 2018 book. As such, this article offers White journalists, policymakers, and other community leaders an understanding of why they feel the way they do when trying to legislate racial disparities and an appreciation of the inherent flaws in the structures they champion.

The Case: A Progressive Enclave

Madison, Wisconsin,[2] claims itself the birthplace of the Progressive Party, launched back in the early 1900s (Buenker, 1998; Thelen, 1972). Dane County has voted reliably liberal; in 2016, Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton got 72% of the vote. The midwestern city of 250,000 people retained a formally organized party dedicated to the political ideology—Progressive Dane, which still campaigned for candidates. I consider *progressivism* to mean an ideology that purports the "reform of" institutions and policy toward an advancement in civilization through the address of inequities, fraud, or other problematic situations. Its early roots associated the ideology as a "movement" meant to make policies around transportation, environment, education, labor laws, and social security more egalitarian for those citizens without power (Filene, 1970), but it has always been a hotly contested idea and differentiated practice with many nuances (Fortune, 2007; Freeden, 2014). At its heart, progressivism has been about "radical *progress*" via public institutions (Muller, 2001, p. 60).

In Madison, I argue that this progressive political stance had become a core identity for citizens in such a way that other ideologies suffered nearly complete obfuscation in public talk. Furthermore, this construct worked at all discursive levels of the society—macro systems, meso-level institutions and organizations, and micro individual actions. For example, at the meso level, historically progressive institutions such as Progressive Dane and the Madison Teachers Inc. union influenced both policy and citywide elections; one education reporter around the time of this study analyzed the past school board elections and found that the union-endorsed candidate won 70% of the time (DeFour, 2012).

Progressivism was even a strong thread through the news media ecology of the city. One 100-year-old company named *The Capital Times* even touted its connections to William Evjue who founded the paper to serve as a progressive option for constituents of Senator Robert "Fighting Bob" La Follette during the early 1900s. *The Progressive Magazine* still ran its national offices in downtown Madison. Other parts of the ecology included more mainstream outlets such as the statewide newspapers the *Wisconsin State Journal* and the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, the online Channel 3000, the left-leaning *Madison Magazine,* a handful of ethnic media such as the *Madison Times* and *Capital City Hues,* and a proliferation of blogs (most of which—but not all—were liberal and run by local politicians and activists) and public social media groups such as "Stop the Charter School Bill" on Facebook.[3]

If we apply a racial lens to all of this, we note that very few Black or Brown journalists contributed to public discourse,[4] very few policymakers were Black or Brown, and the elections, although often inclusive

[2] This project entailed four other case studies (Evanston, Illinois; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Cambridge, Massachusetts) to see how the findings transferred to other progressively oriented communities; the findings of only one case are detailed so that I could dive deep into the data.

[3] It needs to be stated that all of these publications had experienced significant cutbacks over the last 15 years, with some newsrooms down as much as 60% from more prosperous times.

[4] This number is probably zero as I could not find a single mainstream piece written by a Black or Brown journalist in Madison during the time of study on racial achievement disparities. However, no formal records are kept of this at the city or even county level.

of Black or Brown candidates, generally ended up with White winners. In 2012 and then again in 2016, Madison had the opportunity to elect two different persons of color school board candidates who promised reform of the system. Both candidates lost to White people with deep connections to the progressive-entrenched power infrastructure. It should be noted that Dane County's population comprised about 85% White people, with only about 5% African Americans in stark contrast to the majority–minority situation of the local schools (U.S. Census, 2010). This constant rejection for people of color in the city nurtured generations-old distrust for the place's institutions, including government and media.

Progressiveness and Whiteness

Despite all best intentions around being truly "progressive," this hegemonic identity that informed this city for more than 100 years performed in fundamentally racist ways as mediated through public discourse. This statement, although it would be met with alarm and denial by many White progressives in the city, rings true for most ethnic-studies scholars studying progressive politics (see Aldridge, 2007; DiAngelo, 2018; Schafer, 2001; Snyder, 2015; or anything by W. E. B. Du Bois). In racial formation theory, we understand that all politics are racial (Omi & Winant, 2014). This means that "we make our racial identities both individually and collectively, but not under conditions of our own choosing" (Omi & Winant, 2014, p. 138). One must consider the state in conjunction with the civil society and all the social interactions that help entrench hegemony. Race is "an element of social structure, rather than as an irregularity within it" (Omi & Winant, 2014, p. 112).

Ongoing and episodic "racial projects" both systemic and/or individual in nature are methods that racially orient citizens. Some of these "projects" over time have included explicit ones such as voter identification laws, housing discrimination, or standardized testing. More latent projects also proliferate; for example, education–policy critiques show how teachers embed their instruction routines with norms organized around race yet advocating color-blind practices (Du Bois, 1997; Gillborn, 2005). These teachers practice what is referred to as "Whiteness."

Whiteness has a whole body of scholarship explaining it; researchers suggest that Whiteness "reveals the ways in which Whites benefit from a variety of institutional and social arrangements that often appear (to Whites) to have nothing to do with race" (Bush, 2004, p. 15). Zeus Leonardo (2002) defines Whiteness as a social concept that can be characterized by "an unwillingness to name the contours of racism," "the avoidance of identifying with a racial experience or group," and "the minimization of racist legacy" (p. 32; see also Gillborn, 2005). In essence, Whiteness "functions as part of a broader dynamic grid created through intersections of race, gender, class, and sexuality. The way these identities work in concert gives them their true social meaning" (Lipsitz, 2013, p. 97). Lipsitz (2013) gives an example of how this played out in politics in the 1980s in the United States with President Ronald Reagan when he blamed the civil rights, gay rights, women's rights, and other social movements for the feeling of deficit among middle-America White men. According to this literature, politics in the United States cannot help but be guided by an ideology of Whiteness delineated by a racialized duality, oscillating between egalitarianism and color-blindness as well as privilege and normalized oppression (Winant, 2004, p. 5; but see also Du Bois, 1997; Lipsitz, 2013; Powell, 2012). Winant (2004) noted how political movements such as the Far Right resisted challenges to White supremacy and Neoliberals and the New Abolitionists set out to rearticulate Whiteness

into a more egalitarian society. However, when called out for its racism, Whiteness prevents White people, who become defensive to the point of anger and inaction, from changing (DiAngelo, 2018).

Journalists have been complicit in perpetuating Whiteness throughout time, from rampant stereotyping to constant reinforcement of White status quos and authority structures (Reid-Brinkley, 2012). As a result, scholars have examined how little marginalized people have trusted the news media (Brants, 2013). News media, essential to a thriving democracy, strive for the trust required for authority to tell the days' stories through a codified set of norms such as objectivity, transparency, and accountability (Cook, 2005; Tuchman, 1972, 1980). When trust is absent, the legitimacy of necessary political information becomes questioned, knowledge suffers, and systems based on collaboration like democracy destabilize and can no longer function (Hardin, 2006; Misztal, 1996).

Ostensibly, the progressive ideology has always been about pushing the envelope on Whiteness and the racial formation of institutions by calling for reform in order to shore up democratic structures. However, something nefarious happens when a reform movement becomes the political status quo over time. In Madison,[5] progressive policymakers had been in charge for a century. Yet, their schools at the time of this research still enacted racial conditions that prevented Black and Brown students from opportunities to thrive as White students did. These disparities in Madison, as outlined in the "Race to Equity" report (Nelson & Winn, 2013), meant that half of Black kids graduated from high school on time, compared with 85% of White kids, with huge gaps showing in everything from third-grade testing to differences in the college-ready ACT exams (70% of Black students in high school were not even taking the ACT exam). Instead of heading to college, Black teens were six times more likely to be arrested than their White counterparts. Yet, when Black and Brown leaders called for change, little real reform was enacted.

It is my argument in this article that progressivism became so entrenched in this city that it served as a long-standing racial project of Whiteness whose articulation ebbed and flowed in the public discursive response (within journalism, blogs, social media) over time. Journalism and digital interactive spaces provided a key stage to witness how the dominant actors of the progressivism as "racial project" navigated the counterforces of an "antiracial project" that was the "Race to Equity" report. Within production spaces, we see articulations of trust as it ebbed and flowed, revealing power dynamics at work. Furthermore, the ideology becomes both challenged and repaired within the public discourse through revelations of privilege, the enacting of both trusting and distrusting relationships, and reclamations of narratives.

Race as Part of Political Ideology Via Public Discourse

One of the ways in which racial formation becomes an innate structure in any community is through a variety of public discursive practices (Urban, 2000; van Dijk, 1991, 1993) such as journalism, speeches, civic meetings, blogs, and social media. To answer my research questions, I collected all the public mediated texts around the "Race to Equity" baseline report from October 2013 until December

[5] As well as in all of the four other cities we looked at. In fact, in Chapel Hill, a liberal enclave surrounded by a red state, city officials we interviewed could not remember the last time voters had elected a Republican to municipal office.

2016. In this article, I investigate this discourse at three different levels of talk: the primary source of the report itself, the mainstream journalism about it (e.g., the newspapers, the weekly *Isthmus*, *Madison Magazine*, Channel 3000), and finally the citizen-produced coverage in news forums, in blogs, and on public Facebook posts such as those by school officials, community leaders, and local activists. Using the keywords *race to equity* in Google, Lexis Nexis, and all of the news organizations' websites, I found a voluminous body of material: 129 articles and Facebook posts from journalists and more than 1,600 blog posts, Facebook updates (revealed by looking at the public pages of community activists, leaders, and politicians, as well as through Facebook searches) and comments from citizens within the posts, as well as on blogs and news websites. I supplemented these data with in-depth interviews with 48 key communicative players, including one of the report's authors, journalists, bloggers, frequent commenters, and community leaders involved in the conversation. I asked about their roles in the information exchange around politics and race, thoughts on both racial and political dialogues in the city, description of Madison's identity, and level of trust for journalists, activists, and public institutions, as well as their attitudes toward social media political content.[6]

I drew specifically from Teun A. van Dijk's (1995, 2006) work around discourse analysis as ideological. For van Dijk (2006), "ideologies" can be defined "as foundational beliefs that underlie the shared social representations of specific kinds of social groups. These representations are in turn the basis of discourse and other social practices" (pp. 120–121). Both cognitive and social in their form and formation, ideologies are foundational, represent interdisciplinary perspectives, and make up in-group attitudinal differentials and out-group cohesion. Finally, they are gradually acquired and, thus, generally stable but not static. For van Dijk (1995), ideologies are best understood through critical discourse analysis, which pays attention not only to syntax and sentence complexity, but also to lexicon, any assumptions of knowledge, use of euphemisms, metaphors, particular historical references, and absences (of source, of perspective). Most important in an ideologically informed critical discourse analysis are the links one sees between the texts and superstructure (i.e., the framing of the topic in such a way that a particular ideology is privileged as a fundamental world view). This approach offered the advantage of understanding what, how, and who manifested in the discourse from an ideological standpoint. Obviously, an understanding of progressivism as an ideology informed the analysis, but I sought primarily to replace that political understanding with the racial dynamics of that ideology.

Soon into this analysis, during the first of three rounds of critical discourse analysis coding, I noted that the racial aspect of the progressive ideology as it had evolved in this city was manifesting in several schematics: (1) as assertions of privilege, (2) as articulations of (dis)trusting relationships at the micro–meso–macro levels of this community's information flow, and (3) as reclamation narratives, which are the counterstories that get told to contradict other more formal or "official" versions. Following a deep dive into this tripartite of racial formation, I discuss the implications of how this public discourse played out in new engagement tools such as social media platforms during a time of what could be ideological challenge, if not upheaval.

[6] The four other case studies included an additional 2,479 pieces of content from these cities' public discourse around race and interviews with an additional 49 people.

A Moment of Racial Reckoning?

Policymakers, teachers, administrators, activists, and others had worked on the city's racial disparities for generations with task forces, reports, and programs. But the opportunity debts continued to grow and, with them, more Black people unemployed, on welfare, and in jail. Mainstream news covered each new proposal or report, but rarely engaged in an interrogation of systemic failures. The "Race to Equity" report by the Wisconsin Council on Children and Families in October 2013 asked the city, its policymakers, community leaders, and citizens—especially White people—to have that racial evaluation:

> Sooner rather than later, this nexus between risk factors and race has to be severed. The status quo is toxic for the future of the African American population and, by extension, for other communities of color in Dane County. But it is also poisonous for the county as a whole. Failure to alter the current imbalances in opportunity, well-being, and outcomes will ultimately corrode Madison and Dane County's reputation for an enlightened and progressive commitment to social justice. It will discourage some families of color from coming or remaining here. And, perhaps most importantly, the continued marginalization of communities of color will undermine the region's cultural vitality, economic competitiveness, and overall quality of life in a world that increasingly values and demands racial and ethnic diversity and inclusion. (Nelson & Winn, 2013, p. 15)

The report weighed in at 82 pages and included dozens of statistics and data points showing the disparities between White people and African Americans in Dane County. It touched on demographics, income and unemployment, incarceration, K–12 education, health and health care, insurance, mortality, welfare and social programs such as the foster care system, geographic segregation, public transportation, birth rates, and housing. It implied that Madison was in crisis, as a community, and that it would need to fundamentally transform the schools, prison systems, and other structures:

> In short,
>
> *success in this challenge will demand real change, but unless we make some significant and strategic employment-related reforms* [emphasis added], there is little likelihood we are going to *make real progress* [emphasis added] in narrowing our significant income disparities or in reducing the intergenerational disadvantages that poor parents too often, despite their best efforts, pass down to their children. (Nelson & Winn, 2013, pp. 16–17)

Note here the use of the words *change*, *reform*, and *progress*, which are all rhetorical keyword devices for the progressive political ideology. One of the authors told me in an interview that they very intentionally framed the report to appeal to the progressive sentiments of the community:

> I was more worried that people in this progressive, intellectual place would want to say, "It has nothing to do with us or our behavior, or the situations. . . . It's the corporations. It's the Republicans. . . . It doesn't have anything to do with how we as a community are functioning."

They released the report as a way to "call out" Dane County for the dichotomy of progressive politics against apparent systemic oppression, the coauthor said in the interview. Every major news outlet in Dane County covered the report's publication in some way, although none as substantially as was hoped by the report's authors, according to the interview.

The Privilege of the Status Quo—And Its Calling Out

The first way in which this racial project seemed articulated in the public discourse was through both the exercising of and "calling out" of privilege, not only White privilege but also a privilege that comes from being part of a dominant societal structure. This makes sense given that the success of any prevailing ideology entails assertions of privilege, defined here as representations of those benefiting from institutional status quo. This privilege circulates in public discourse and its exercise allows an ideology to thrive, often through taken-for-granted norms and routines that perpetuate domineering thought. Privilege in public, mediated deliberative spaces reflects the power structure of U.S. institutions and policies (Althusser, 2014; Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2008). In these long-time progressive enclaves, a "privilege of Whiteness" permeated the discourse as it manifested in news articles, public hearings, and digital outlets. In these data, reporters lost a chance to reveal the hierarchal structure of the ideology as the status quo, while local politicians and those in charge deflected blame. However, in digital forums, commenters lay bare the privilege and asserted their own authority over the city's story.

Almost all mainstream media outlets covered the report and referred to it consistently, even years after its release. On the whole, their stories neglected to incorporate a multitude of perspectives and failed to do the work of empowering citizens toward action. Rather, reporters themselves (both individuals and as an institutionalized industry group) exercised multilayers of privilege: of being in a media-saturated environment, of being in a place where the values of the power elite reflected those of progressive news outlets, and of being White and middle class with the same kinds of experiences as those in power. To wit, they linked to databases and the report, sourced experts from those with institutional credentials, relied on public hearings for material, and referenced their own past coverage. They fell back on "he-said, she-said" binaries to navigate what one called "sticky" and several called "sensitive" racial tensions. As one example, in the city's largest (and only daily) newspaper, a senior (White) reporter was asked to fill in for another reporter when the report was released. She told me the release "was literally a daily story for me." She could not go to the YWCA Racial Justice Summit where the report was unveiled because "I could either go to the conference or spend my time reporting the story," an organizational constraint that nonetheless meant she did not collect experiential stories from a large group of affected people. In this perspective, her reporter privilege—the ways in which all of those practices of objectivity had developed in the political institution of the press (Sparrow, 1999)—privileges a particular way of "reporting," which was to use the report as the news hook for more binary reporting with sources commenting on the report rather than on the community problem it revealed. Had this reporter adopted a racial lens, she might have enacted a different approach to "reporting the story." Furthermore, although the news accounts detailed the disparity statistics, they largely failed to note that a majority of minorities populated the schools. The reporters missed an opportunity to amplify the Black presence as part of the Madison identity for readers. This was another

exercise in privilege: No one expected there to be a Black presence[7] necessarily in this mainstream public discourse: neither their editors nor their majority White audiences. The account also did not quote any of the narrative in the report. Instead, they quoted officials who called the report "alarming" and "important" and then reified the progressive commitment to equality, as in the following article quoting a White public official:

> Dane County Executive Joe Parisi acknowledged the numbers are "alarming" and the challenge daunting. "It confirms my observation that a rising tide does not lift all boats," Parisi said. "This report is important because it confirms that and quantifies that." But Parisi said there are "nuts and bolts" solutions that leaders and the community can implement to shrink the gap, some of which he is proposing in his 2014 budget. One example is a $350,000 program to be paid for by United Way and Dane County that includes home visits to families of children ages 0 to 3 in the attendance areas of Westside Elementary School in Sun Prairie and Sugar Creek Elementary School in Verona. The program's goal is to support family stability and ensure children are ready for school. Other initiatives include a $250,000 partnership with Operation Fresh Start to operate a year-round Youth Conservation Corps in the county parks and a $65,000 expansion of the Gardens for Empowerment program in which young people who are at risk of failure work in community gardens. (Hall, 2013, paras. 17–21)

Note here how none of these initiatives address reform for the city's infrastructure, indicating a rather essential foundation of trust in the status quo. All of the proposals center the causes for the disparities on the Black communities and "young people who are at risk of failure" rather than on, say, the K–12 educational system, police training implemented by the state, or racially problematic policies. Yet, the causes are couched in a well-known trope of progressives: the dismissal of the conservative mantra that a rising tide lifts all boats (that is, when people at the top prosper, so will people at the bottom—i.e., trickle-down economics of Reagan). By citing mostly White officials, not including the stories of people of color, and failing to report on the structural root of the problem, politicians and journalists privileged the White status quo.

Citizen commenters posted counternarratives to the dominant identity on the websites of news organizations. In these spaces, commenters (both Black and White) sought to assert a different kind of privilege—that of lived experience in the city as being truly "expert" and authoritative: "It was so eye-opening for me to live in Madison as part of a multi-racial family. Most of the time we just experienced ignorance about other cultures—but we also experienced real hate and violent racism." This directly challenged the city's identity. Furthermore, in public Facebook pages run by activists, people worked to expose White privilege. Consider this response to a Facebook post that asked, "Do parents need an ally when meeting with school officials???" after Board of Education member Ed Hughes suggested that Black families did not need a lawyer to meet with school officials: "My guess is that none of Mr. Hughes' children

[7] Here I do not mean that they did not cite Black sources, per se. Almost all of the stories included at least one African American community leader. I am talking more about a fundamental Black presence that would permeate the story as part of an innate framing for the stories, in other words, written from Black perspectives, with a racial lens.

have ever needed an advocate so his presumption that students don't need them is way off base." Hughes, who is White and upper-middle-class, enjoyed privilege that most Black students did not, the commenter implied. Hughes himself visited the post to clarify his statements, demonstrating that these spaces were subject to oversight by the power structure. It needs to be noted that in this Facebook thread, Hughes reasserted that all kids were treated equally in the schools, denying privilege existed, reifying the progressive position, and repairing the dominant ideological formation in the discourse. After he commented in this space, no one else posted and the conversation ended.

Trust and Distrust in a Discourse of Progressiveness

A second mechanism through which the racial formation of Madison was being debated occurred in the expression of trust and distrust. A healthy public discourse in any community provides space for trusting relationships to occur among the various interlocutors because it needs to offer allowance for different ideologies to flourish. Defining trust has proven elusive, but most use the words "willingness to be vulnerable" and "positive expectations" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Researching work groups, Kramer, Hanna, Su, and Wei (2000) noted that "when individuals find their status within a group problematic or uncertain, trust based on group identification becomes problematic" (p. 175). Certainly, we can extrapolate to community groups in which members do not feel part of the dominant group-based ideology, as in Madison. For trust to occur in public discourse, a number of qualities must be present in the exchanges: flexibility, forthrightness, engagement, heedfulness, respect, competence, personal regard for others, benevolence, and integrity (Asen, 2015; Bryk & Scheider, 2002; Mayer, David, & Schoorman, 1995). Asen (2015) argues that trust cannot happen in the absence of engagement on the part of all participants. Of course, this is difficult when the discourse involves varying levels of power and, thus, vulnerability on the part of the participants (Young, 2000).

In its beginnings, the discourse of the Progressive Party articulated a paradigm of distrust toward government, assuming that most of its operations could be subject to reform reliably (Buenker, 1998). Yet, one could argue that the very assumption that reform is possible indicates a fairly fundamental trust in existing institutions (e.g., revolution was not called for). Indeed, in the news articles, (White) reporters assumed a high level of community trust in Madison's government and its institutions, including the schools and news media in town. This was evidenced throughout the copy with constant links to government databases and reports, quotes from experts within those institutions, and stories framed around official meeting procedures. Reporters legitimated those authorized to speak on behalf of institutions, such as the superintendent, and gave them space to espouse their messages. As such, reporters left little room in their stories for alternative conceptions of power in the city. Yet, the journalists expressed distrust of activists—"most of whom have an agenda," said one reporter—as well as of parents and others who refused to allow their name to be used in publication.

Another level of (dis)trust was at work as well: a distrust that community members would not give the reporter the benefit of the doubt in coverage of race issues. One (White) reporter said,

> The core truth is we are White people writing about Black people and you are aware of all of these assumptions being made. I think the intentions have always been good, but if you say something wrong you can throw . . . any *progress* you have made is gone.

Note again the word *progress*, suggesting to fully commit to a racial lens would impede progress. Furthermore, White reporters shy from delving into racial tension because they worry their motivations will be questioned and their connections to the community will be shattered. This indicated the absence of several of our needed qualities for a trusting relationship in public talk, including the positive expectation that their audience members will approach their journalism with a flexibility of mind. The reporters sense the community's distrust—and reciprocate distrust.

School officials, established bloggers with strong progressive ties, and others who enjoyed a sense of belonging in Madison also reported that they relied on each other, other officials and administrators, the heads of local nonprofits in town, and experts in the academy for the information they authored for public consumption. Interviews indicated that trusting relationships developed behind the scenes among the major information-exchange players. For example, the (White) superintendent organized editorial board meetings with the local news media; she said in an interview: "The trust-building with the media is helpful because when there is a story that we may have problems with, . . . we feel like we've got a strong enough relationship that we can share our concerns" (interview,)By meeting in private—a circumstance not afforded to most citizens—the institution of the schools can help craft the publicly mediated message and perpetuate the dominant ideology of progressivism in the process. This networking also built trust between the two institutions.

Online, those authoring content in public spaces about achievement disparities contested levels of trust for media, the government, and each other. Distrust reigned for both the local media and the schools. In this comment about a *Capital Times*' article that suggested it would let the community lead the race discussions, a writer responded, "'When we're ready?' There's a statement that drips with the same paternalism underlying your whole approach." In another exchange in which an African American activist posted about how he declined to help a national news team interested in reporting on Madison's disparities after the journalists refused to put in writing the gist of the story, commenters from Black communities heralded him: "You cannot trust the media," wrote one. Many posters related how the schools failed to listen, ignored their children, and did not seem to want their participation in racial dialogues. The rampant sarcasm, lack of respect, questioning of competence, and general absence of heedfulness on behalf of commenters toward the city's institutions dismissed the official versions of the city collective. The city's institutions, these citizens asserted, failed time and again to take positive action in relation to racial relations. In the absence of meaningful engagement, trust could not be achieved.

Finally, these online citizen contributors cautioned each other about individuals with an expressed interest in the topic of racial achievement disparities. For example, one Black activist described an encounter with a White former principal from a local school, now retired and interested in helping the cause. The activist asked on his Facebook page what questions he should ask him. Wrote one, "I'd ask him what has he or others in his trusted circle already done or is doing to promote change

(is this a commitment or a project)?" Another wrote, "I know he is 70 . . . but he is in this for the long haul? What is his motive? . . . Remember the enemy does not want this to come to pass . . . don't let him get a foot hole [*sic*]." In other words, what action would this gentleman take to build trust in the community, given his outsider status? Through these expressions of distrust online, challenges to the White majority in this city emerged. If the reporters and the school officials were painting a portrait of a competent, fair, and equitable system, these comments countered with alternative understandings. Using anecdotes, emotive expressions, and sarcasm, commenting citizens suggested that a more inclusive progressiveness meant one in which participants commit to "the long haul," take into account personal experience, and take action.

Narrative Reclamation in Progressiveness

Finally, this discourse revealed negotiations over what narratives for the city would prevail after a report like "Race to Equity" challenged the historic frame of progressivism. In the years to follow the report, White progressives in power "explained" the disparities while reifying the identity they had worked hard to implement. In one blog post first published in *Isthmus* (Johnson, 2014) and reposted to Progressive Dane's website, the cochair of the group started out suggesting that

> Madison and Dane County have turned their focus to uncovering the causes of troubling racial disparities that are plaguing our communities. However, taking a look at how our own policies produce racial and economic disparities rather than blaming the problem on mere prejudice would better serve the discussion.

But very quickly it became clear he was lamenting the competition of start-up transportation companies Uber and Lyft, concerned with "transportation equity" and lack of regulations. Toward the end of the column, he sharply rebutted the "Race to Equity" report:

> And yes, even those who fashion themselves as leaders of communities of color need to avoid the insidious fatalism that begins to manifest as inferiority and low expectations. The truth is, there are half a million more black men in college than there are in prison; more than half of all black men graduate from high school in four years; and black men make up the same proportion of the college population as they do the general population.

Notice here the positive twist on the original report's facts, a twist that implies no need for reform.

In one story at the anniversary of the report in 2016, the mayor of Madison, Paul Soglin, outright refuted the report in a piece headlined "We Are Not the Worst: Paul Soglin Releases His Own Report on Madison's Racial Disparities" (Becker, 2016). Soglin, who is White, initially came to power as a young mayor aged 28 in 1973 as a hero of the civil rights movement and quickly instituted reform in hiring practices, elderly housing, and the city's bus system. He was reelected in 2011 after decades as a blogger, lawyer, and activist in the city. Using city-specific data (as opposed to the county data of the report) and only a couple metrics (as opposed to the aggregation of all of the statistics in the report), Soglin reported at a

municipal meeting that not only was it "absolutely false" to claim the county was the worst in the nation, but also he wrote in an e-mail distributed to reporters and published in a *Capital Times* article,

> a review of economic progress in the last five years shows that we are probably among the best, if not the best in the United States, in terms of improving both household income as well as lowering the number of families who are living below the poverty line. . . . That has a stigma to it which is very difficult to shake and can slow down our progress if people believe it to be true and consequently act upon it.

Here, again we see continued volleying over the word *progress* and an assertion that any counternarrative would inhibit progressives' mission. The reporter also quoted an author of the original report as well as the obligatory third source—oft-cited community leader and African American Michael Johnson, CEO of the Dane County Boys & Girls Club. Journalists pitted Soglin against the authors of the report in a who-do-you-believe framing rather than analyzing the numbers, making clear Soglin's position in the power structure, or a more communally helpful discussion about why two such different versions of the truth were being circulated.

In their coverage of the report, journalists fell back on common tropes, repetitive sources, and traditional American narratives: If there is a problem, the community will solve it via government infrastructure already in place. Their insistence to get "both sides" belied a political lens with a game frame rather than a racial analysis. The story of this response was documented by reporters via the public officials entrusted to protecting the city's identity. For example, instead of focusing on the structure that caused the disparities, one PBS reporter in the wake of the report told the story of Black people being helped by the government safety nets. The last line, citing two prominent African American men, read, "Both Reverend Gee and Noble Wray are optimistic that addressing the thorny issue of racial disparity here in Wisconsin could become a template for other communities around the country." Madison and its American values of industriousness could serve as a role model to other cities in this journalism, despite the evidence showing no improvement at all. Thus, journalists reinforced these structures.

For some commentators committed to a view of Madison as a highly livable, welcoming city, the idea that something was wrong pointed to the problems or "culture" of Black communities as opposed to the system. Victims of the disparities were repeatedly framed as "other" in these public textual spaces. Under a news article, this person wrote in May 2014,

> I don't dispute for a moment that the root of the problem . . . is racism. However, the situation has evolved over a long time such that removing racism tomorrow would not solve the issues that exist in Black communities.

Here, we see a common meme in the sample's community spaces, particularly under news stories. The writer "admits" racism may have been responsible for the issue in the beginning, but now the "problem" resided firmly in the Black community. These commenters urged the community to not assign blame (i.e., to not undermine the progressively built and operated structures propping up the idyllic identity).

Meanwhile, on activist Facebook pages and news sites, people rejected this discourse of progressiveness and called it out as an ideology that had evolved into being not about reform but rather about power, the status quo, and Whiteness. Gloria Ladson-Billings, a nationally renowned African American professor of education at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, noted in a 2014 op-ed piece that

> if you decide not to notice anything that contradicts your narrative, chasms can very easily develop. The problem with not noticing is that we all are diminished by decisions by the mainstream to put its head in the sand over racial inequities. (para. 2)

Ladson-Billings and others described "two Madisons," as this commenter wrote,

> Man . . . stay AWAY from Madison, if you're Black and male. . . . They don't want us there . . . except to farm us into their jails and state prisons. The few who are USED by them . . . will soon be marginalized once they start speaking up louder . . . left to suffer slowly under alcoholism, drugs, and depression.

White people then are portrayed as evil masters; note the use of the word *farm* evoking slavery and an oblique reference to the *New Jim Crow* book by Michelle Alexander that had been making the rounds in Madison at the time that argued that White people had turned the criminal justice system into a new kind of slavery to keep Black people in check. These online interlocutors countered the stated values of industriousness with a commitment to children and talk about fundamental needs: "If we don't take care of our own, we will all eventually suffer," wrote another. This group worked to reclaim the progressive narrative and tried to refocus the discourse around collective action:

> We don't have any time to play games or be a part of a charade. Our aim is to get our babies and adults educated, and our parents and adults life-sustaining career ladder jobs. We are not interested in the conversation; we are interested in the action.

Social media platforms offered a chance for direct identity subversion. For example, in a Facebook post, Reverend Alex Gee, an African American community leader, anointed a new group of "community fathers":

> I just attended the Public Policy Forum of Greater Madison. . . . The audience was brilliant older (and one younger) Black men who challenged, cautioned and celebrated my #JustifiedAnger work. . . . #CommunityFathers is what I call these kinds of men!!

Here, Gee elevated this group of minorities to "community fathers," a term typically referring to a town's (usually White male) founders credited with the original identity formation of a place. These new city architects in their "challenge" could redesign Madison through their articulation of the place's values even as they also "cautioned" Black people from involving White people in fixing the systems. These contestations of assumed value systems in public community spaces undermined the citywide dominant ideology practiced as progressive politics.

Conclusions

In this article, I contend that progressivism had become a racially problematic status quo in Madison, Wisconsin. A political ideology stained with an enduring Whiteness has racially formed this place such that what should have been a model of egalitarian practice had become a racial project perpetuating discrimination. Furthermore, we can see how even at this opportunity of racial reckoning, those engaged in bolstering the progressive dominance of the politics in the city reified Whiteness via the public discourse. The mechanisms for this formation were revealed to be assertions of privilege, expressions of trust in local institutions, and a reclamation of the progressive narrative that was under attack in public discourse, while the mostly White journalists, policymakers, and political operatives as part of the teachers' union, Progressive Dane, and other influential organizations enacted long practices routines to "explain" away the "Race to Equity" report. This discourse that dominated took seriously the call to action but only in terms of "fixing the Black community" rather than reforming the progressive-managed institutions such as the criminal justice system or the schools. Policymakers and others instituted an invisible foundation of Whiteness through ignoring the report's references to systems of oppression, relying on government reports and experts associated with the very organizations responsible for the disparities, and changing out the racial lens the report employed for a political one to justify past and present inactions toward true reform. These were some of the discursive strategies used to prop up the status quo and reiterate an enduring trust in government institutions and the news media's authority to report on them.

However, in digital spaces, a counterdiscourse emerged that supported the report as an antiracist project: calling out privilege, revealing chasms of distrust, and offering alternative narratives. Citizens in these places reapplied the racial lens of the report and worked to undermine the dominant message that reinforced the racial formation of Madison. In these dialogues, we witnessed an unsettling of the Whiteness paradigm. As such, this article enhances our understanding of how Whiteness' insidiousness is being countered in digital spaces.

One major takeaway of these findings is for content producers—professional journalists and citizens—in progressive enclaves to resist the paradigm of Whiteness when counter-racial projects offer opportunity for real advancement in race relations. It is my hope that these findings alert progressives to the insidious nature of Whiteness as it is operating within these progressive institutions, take steps to recognize innate racism, and work against it. Journalists might recognize when their reliance on local institutions perpetuates a narrative in the city that hinders progress and introduce an intense questioning of the systems as part of coverage. In addition, this article contributes to the scholarly conversation around Whiteness by documenting the process of racial formation occurring within one public discourse. Future work might take a more macro view of how national antiracial projects such as #BlackLivesMatter infiltrate into these local microcosms and shift public discourse. An understanding of the long tentacles of Whiteness through time and across a community's institutional spaces can produce more comprehensive and holistic scholarship and inform recommendations more grounded in reality.

References

Aldridge, D. P. (2007). Of Victorianism, civilizationism, and progressivism: The educational ideas of Anna Julia Cooper and W. E. B. Du Bois, 1892–1940. *History of Education Quarterly*, *47*(4), 416–446. https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5959.2007.00108.x

Althusser, L. (2014). *On the reproduction of capitalism: Ideology and ideological state apparatuses*. London, UK: Verso.

Asen, R. (2015). *Democracy, deliberation, and education.* University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Becker, A. (2016, October 15). "We are not the worst": Paul Soglin releases his own report on Madison's racial disparities. *The Capital Times.* Retrieved from https://madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-and-politics/we-are-not-the-worst-paul-soglin-releases-his-own/article_ef237923-2c94-5626-b71e-1ea31e76794d.html

Bennett, W. L., Lawrence, R. G., & Livingston, S. (2008). *When the press fails: Political power and the news media from Iraq to Katrina*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Boggs, C. (2001). *The end of politics: Corporate power and the decline of the public sphere*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Brants, K. (2013). Trust, cynicism and responsiveness: The uneasy situation of journalism in democracy. In C. Peters & M. J. Broersma (Eds.), *Rethinking journalism: Trust and participation in a transformed news landscape* (pp. 15–27). Oxford, UK: Routledge.

Bryk, A. S., & Scheider, B. (2002). *Trust in schools: A core resource for improvement*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Buenker, J. D. (1998). *The Progressive era, 1893–1914*. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society Press.

Bush, M. E. (2004). *Breaking the code of good intentions: Everyday forms of Whiteness*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Cook, T. (2005). *Governing with the news: The news media as a political institution*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

DeFour, M. (2012, March 20). How MTI candidates fare in board elections. *Wisconsin State Journal*. Retrieved from http://host.madison.com/wsj/how-mti-candidates-fare-in-board-elections/article_5bf0d28e-710d-11e1-b491-0019bb2963f4.html

DiAngelo, R. J. (2018). *White fragility: Why it's so hard for White people to talk about racism.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (1997). *The souls of Black folk*. Boston, MA: Bedford Books.

Filene, P. G. (1970). An obituary for "The Progressive Movement." *American Quarterly*, *22*(1), 20–34. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/2711670

Fortune, A. (2007). *A philosophical history of American Progressivism* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/304814920/abstract/34DCE52F77204994PQ/1

Freeden, M. (2014). Progress and progressivism: Thoughts on an elusive term. *Political Studies Review*, *12*(1), 68–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12042

Gillborn, D. (2005). Education policy as an act of White supremacy: Whiteness, critical race theory and education reform. *Journal of Education Policy*, *20*(4), 485–505.

Goodnight, T. (1982). The personal, technical, and public spheres of argument: A speculative inquiry into the art of public deliberation. *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, *18*, 214–227.

Habermas, J. (1989). *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hall, D. J. (2013, October 3). "Alarming" racial disparities continue to plague Dane County. *Wisconsin State Journal*. Retrieved from http://host.madison.com/news/local/alarming-racial-disparities-continue-to-plague-dane-county/article_e0362222-f8c2-53aa-9a87-f97e3653b8f1.html

Hardin, R. (2006). *Trust*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Johnson, M.M. (2014, May 7). Citizen: When it comes to racial disparities, policies are often worse than outright prejudice. *Isthmus.* Retrieved from https://isthmus.com/opinion/opinion/citizen-when-it-comes-to-racial-disparities-policies-are-often-worse-than-outright-prejudice/

Kramer, R. M., Hanna, B. A., Su, S., & Wei, J. (2000). Collective identity, collective trust, and social capital: Linking group identification and group cooperation. In M. E. Turner (Ed.), *Groups at work: Theory and research* (pp. 173–196). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Ladson-Billings, G. (2014, January 13). Gloria Ladson-Billings: "Nice Madison" is in denial about racism. *The Capital Times.* Retrieved from https://madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/gloria-ladson-billings-nice-madison-is-in-denial-about-racism/article_31f7e3df-db25-52e8-8033-3b1596e60ff9.html

Leonardo, Z. (2002). The souls of White folk: Critical pedagogy, Whiteness studies, and globalization discourse. *Race Ethnicity and Education*, *5*(1), 29–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/13613320120117180

Lipsitz, G. (2013). Whiteness and war. In W. Crichlow (Ed.), *Race, identity, and representation in education* (pp. 95–115). New York, NY: Routledge.

Mayer, R. C., David, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of Management Review*, *20*, 709–734.

Misztal, B. (1996). *Trust in modern societies: The search for the bases of social order*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Retrieved from https://www.amazon.com/Trust-Modern-Societies-Search-Social-ebook/dp/B00E3AQN4U/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1533931323&sr=8-1&keywords=misztal+trust

Muller, J. (2001). Progressivism redux: Ethos, policy, pathos. In A. Kraak & M. F. D. Young (Eds.), *Education in retrospect: Policy and implementation since 1990* (pp. 59–71). New York, NY: HSRC Press.

Nelson, E., & Winn, L. T. (2013). *Race to equity: A project to reduce racial disparities in Dane County*. Madison, WI: Wisconsin Council on Children and Families. Retrieved from http://racetoequity.net/

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (2014). *Racial formation in the United States*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Powell, J. A. (2012). *Racing to justice: Transforming our conceptions of self and other to build an inclusive society*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Reid-Brinkley, S. R. (2012). Ghetto kids gone good: Race, representation, and authority in the scripting of inner-city youths in the Urban Debate League. *Argumentation & Advocacy*, *49*(2), 77–99.

Robinson, S. (2018). *Networked news, racial divides: How power and privilege shape public discourse in progressive cities*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Introduction to special topic forum: Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. *The Academy of Management Review*, *23*(3), 393–404.

Schafer, A. R. (2001). W. E. B. Du Bois, German social thought, and the racial divide in American Progressivism, 1892–1909. *Journal of American History*, *88*(3), 925–949.

Snyder, J. A. (2015). Progressive education in Black and White: Rereading Carter G. Woodson's *Miseducation of the Negro*. *History of Education Quarterly*, *55*(3), 273–293. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/hoeq.12122

Sparrow, B. H. (1999). *Uncertain guardians: The news media as a political institution*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Thelen, D. P. (1972). *The new citizenship: Origins of progressivism in Wisconsin, 1885–1900*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Retrieved from https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/handle/10355/15699

Tuchman, G. (1972). Objectivity as strategic ritual: An examination of newsmen's notions of objectivity. *American Journal of Sociology*, *77*(4), 660–679.

Tuchman, G. (1980). *Making news*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Urban, G. (2000). *A discourse-centered approach to culture*. Tucson, AZ: Hats Off Books.

United States Census Bureau. (2010). Decennial census of population and housing [Report]. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/decade.2010.html

van Dijk, T. A. (1991). *Racism and the press*. London, UK: Routledge.

van Dijk, T. A. (1993). *Elite discourse and racism*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.

van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse analysis as ideology analysis. In *Language and Peace* (pp. 17–33). Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing. Retrieved from http://dare.uva.nl/search?arno.record.id=12605

van Dijk, T. A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, *11*(2), 115–140. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310600687908

Winant, H. (2004). Behind blue eyes: Whiteness and contemporary U.S. racial politics. In M. Fine (Ed.), *Off White: Readings on power, privilege, and resistance* (pp. 3–16). New York, NY: Routledge.

Young, I. M. (2000). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4668–4688 1932–8036/20180005

Routine Adjustments: How Journalists Framed the Charleston Shooting

WILLIAM P. CASSIDY
Northern Illinois University, USA

BETTY H. LA FRANCE
Northern Illinois University, USA

SAM BABIN
The University of Iowa, USA

This article presents an analysis of U.S. national newspaper coverage of the 2015 mass shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. A two-dimensional measurement scheme of time and space is used to examine media frames. Results suggest that journalists incorporated attributes unique to this tragedy into their reports by using a wide variety of frames that remained relatively consistent throughout the first 30 days of coverage. Compared with the results of studies of similar events, our analysis finds that news coverage of the Charleston shooting was more likely to use the past time frame (36%) and the societal/past combination frame (18%).

Keywords: framing, routines, mass shootings, content analysis, Charleston

Since 1982, more than 90 mass shootings have taken place in the United States, with more than 40 occurring since 2012 (Follman, Aronsen, & Pan, 2017). Some of the more horrific events have taken place in recent years, such as the October 2017 shooting at a Las Vegas country music festival—the worst mass shooting in modern U.S. history with 58 deaths (Waxman, 2017); the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida, with 49 casualties in June 2016; and the shooting in December 2012 at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut with 28 deaths, including 20 young children. Research has found that nearly one-third of such shootings worldwide between 1966 and 2012 were in the United States (Lankford, 2016). According to one article, "When it comes to gun massacres, the United States is tragically exceptional. There are more public mass shootings in the United States than any other country in the world" (Christensen, 2017, para. 1).

William P. Cassidy: bcassidy@niu.edu
Betty H. La France: blafrance@niu.edu
Sam Babin: sam-babin@uiowa.edu
Date submitted: 2018–02–13

Copyright © 2018 (William P. Cassidy, Betty H. La France, and Sam Babin). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

The increasing frequency of mass shootings has meant that stories about them appear more regularly and are featured prominently in the media (Dahmen, Abdenour, McIntyre, & Noga-Stryon, 2017). In fact, one *New York Times* reporter describes being on a "tragic reporting circuit," having written about four mass shootings in an eight-month span (Turkewitz, 2016, para. 5). Many observers believe that the regularity of such events ultimately results in reporting that is standardized and formulaic. For example, *Washington Post* reporter Paul Farhi (2015) notes:

> For the news media, America's epidemic of mass shootings have devolved into a grim routine. . . . Most follow the same playbook. Deploy reporters to the scene quickly. Interview eyewitnesses and families of the victims and the shooters. Check social media for clues to the attackers' identity. Bring on the law enforcement experts for comment. (paras. 1–2)

Mullin (2015) comments on the "familiar elements of mass shooting coverage" (para. 12) in television news reports about the shooting deaths of 14 people in San Bernardino, California, and writes, "the sense of routine was . . . palpable" (para. 13). His story includes a tweet from journalist Nick Bauman of *The Huffington* Post that reads, "Someone just sent an internal email to our reporters about stories on this shooting with the phrase 'You know the drill' in it. Sadly true" (Mullin, 2015, para. 3).

According to Goodykuntz (2015), once details of a mass shooting are sorted out, "the fights begin" (para. 5) between pro- and anti-gun control sources. "This goes back and forth for a while," he notes. "President Obama is mentioned—praised or vilified, . . . predictably depending on your political leanings—and . . . we move on" (para. 6).

Some scholars, critics, and journalists (e.g., Dahmen et al., 2017; Farhi, 2015; Goodykuntz, 2015) contend that such routine reporting makes it easier for the public to move on as well. Even former president Obama addressed the topic. "Somehow this has become routine," he said while offering condolences to the victims of the October 2015 mass shooting at Umpqua College in Oregon. "The reporting is routine. My response here at the podium ends up being routine . . . we've become numb to this" (Jackson, 2015, para. 5).

A developing area of academic research examines news media coverage of mass shootings, focusing primarily on school shootings (e.g., Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Muschert & Carr, 2006; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Some researchers, such as Muschert (2007), have called for studies that investigate a wider variety of such events, and Holody and Daniel (2017) find that coverage of a mass shooting at an Aurora, Colorado, movie theater differed from results reported in several studies of school shootings. Therefore, this research seeks to add to the limited body of work examining nonschool shootings via a content analysis of the 2015 shooting in Charleston, South Carolina, at the historically Black Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church, where, during a Bible study session, a 21-year-old avowed White supremacist shot and killed nine people. Among the victims was the church's pastor, Rev. Clementa Pinckney, who also served as a state senator.

How the news media addressed the Charleston shooting is worthy of investigation because its complexity can provide insight into how journalists address these tragedies. In addition to discussions of gun control, issues such as race, the Black Lives Matter movement, hate crimes, the White supremacist movement, and religion were significant components of coverage. The shooting also intensified debate over calls to remove the Confederate flag from government buildings in South Carolina and other Southern states.

The Shooting in Charleston

At 8:17 p.m. on Wednesday, June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof entered the church, posed as a prospective member, and took part in an ongoing Bible study session for nearly an hour (Ellis, Brumfield, & Edwards, 2015) before opening fire (Held, 2017). Eight church members died at the scene and a ninth died at a hospital (Ellis, Payne, Perez, & Ford, 2015). One survivor reported that Roof said he would spare her so that she could "tell the story" (Schuppe & Morrison, 2017).

Roof was arrested the next morning and offered no remorse for the killings. He reportedly said he had intended to start a "race war" (Held, 2017) and that his actions were necessary because of an epidemic of Black-on-White crime (Sack & Blinder, 2016). He was found guilty and sentenced to death (Hawes & Evans, 2017) and is currently sitting on federal death row (Schuppe & Morrison, 2017).

Predictably, Roof's crimes prompted more debate about gun control (Jervis, 2015). The National Rifle Association argued that stricter gun laws would not prevent future shootings. However, President Obama said the shooting could have been prevented had it been more difficult for Roof to purchase the Glock semiautomatic handgun he used to kill his victims (Jervis, 2015).

Given strong evidence that Roof's actions were racially motivated and elaborately planned, his charges included federal hate crimes (Shoichet & Perez, 2015). "We think that this is exactly the type of case that the federal hate crimes statutes were, in fact, conceived to cover," U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch said. "Racially motivated violence such as this is the original domestic terrorism" (Shoichet & Perez, 2015, para. 2).

The Charleston shooting also provided impetus for Black Lives Matter protests (el-Nawawy & Elmasry, 2018). Just two months before the shooting, Pinckney helped lead a prayer vigil for Walter Scott, an African American who was shot and killed by a local police officer while attempting to run away. Pinckney also advocated for legislation requiring police officers to wear body cameras while on duty (Weaver & Bowers, 2015).

Furthermore, the shooting reopened public debate about the ethics of displaying the Confederate flag on government grounds, most notably at the South Carolina State House (Bradner, 2015). The flag, often considered a racist symbol, was seen by many as disrespectful toward the victims and their families (Blaser, 2015; Henderson, 2015; Taylor 2015) and was ordered removed from government buildings in July 2015 (Ellis et al., 2015).

To date, only one published study of media reports about the Charleston shooting has appeared. Using critical discourse analysis, el-Nawawy and Elmasry (2018) examine how *Anderson Cooper 360°* on CNN and *The O'Reilly Factor* on Fox News covered the incident and found crucial differences between the two programs. *Anderson Cooper 360°* focused on humanizing the shooting victims and highlighting the community of Charleston's response to the tragedy. Portrayals suggested that the city "defeated the challenge of a racist crime with solidarity, resilience, grace, faith and forgiveness" (el-Nawawy & Elmasry, 2018, p. 949). On the other hand, *The O'Reilly Factor* focused on defending the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, stressing that institutional racism no longer exists in the United States. Although both programs addressed racism, they suggested that most Americans are not racist and "ignored the structural context of racism that creates the conditions under which racist violence thrives" (el-Nawawy & Elmasry, 2018, p. 955).

Framing Media Coverage of Mass Shootings

Many analyses of coverage of mass shootings use framing theory, which has become a popular area of research for communication scholars (Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016; Weaver, 2007). Framing is especially helpful in such studies because of its connection to journalistic practice and professional routines (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014), which Shoemaker and Reese (2014) define as the "patterned, repeated practices, forms and rules that media workers use to do their jobs" (p. 165). Entman (1993) wrote:

> To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52)

A media frame, according to Tankard (2001), is a "central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration" (pp. 100–101). McCombs and Ghanem (2001) write that framing is "the construction of an agenda with a restricted number of thematically related attributes to create a coherent picture of a particular object" (p. 70). Shoemaker and Reese (2014) note that, "as journalists write news stories, they can consciously or unconsciously add one frame or another, because that's what they have been trained to do and because frames help the facts make sense" (p. 176).

Weaver (2007) notes that framing's popularity "may have to do with the ambiguity or the comprehensive nature of the term. 'Frame' can be applied to many different aspects of messages and to many different types of messages" (p. 144). Frames can be conceptualized as independent or dependent variables (Scheufele, 1999). Furthermore, there is no consensus on a specific set of frames used by journalists (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Ghanem (1997) points out that most studies use framing to apply to a single event, making cross-issue generalizability difficult, and Bichard (2006) cites "a need for an accurate framing measurement strategy and categorization that is applicable to a variety of media platforms" (p. 331).

Chyi and McCombs (2004) developed a two-dimensional measurement scheme of examining frames to address cross-issue generalizability in a systematic fashion. Several studies of media coverage of mass shootings have employed their framework (e.g., Holody & Daniel, 2017; Kwon & Moon, 2009; Muschert & Carr, 2006; Park, Holody, & Zhang, 2012; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014), which organizes the measurement of frames around the dimensions of time and space, because they "represent central organizing ideas in journalistic practice" (p. 25). The space dimension consists of five levels, viewed as a continuum: (1) At the individual level, the news event is framed within a scope limited to the individuals involved in an event; (2) at the community level, the news event is framed as relevant to a particular community; (3) at the regional level, the news event is framed as relevant to a more general population such as residents of a metropolitan area or state; (4) at the societal level, the news event is framed in terms of social or national significance; and (5) at the international level, the news event is framed from an international perspective. The time dimension consists of three levels: past, present, and future. The two dimensions are combined and sorted by space and time.

Chyi and McCombs (2004) first applied their framework in a study of *New York Times* coverage of the 1999 Columbine school shooting in Littleton, Colorado. They found that 54% of the stories were framed at the societal level in terms of space, and 70% utilized the present time frame. The societal/present combination was most prominent, with 39% of the stories employing these frames. In addition, stories with the past time frame tended to use the individual space frame, and the future time frame was associated with use of the societal space frame.

Muschert and Carr (2006) examined coverage of eight lower-profile school shootings between 1997 and 2001. Their results were similar to Chyi and McCombs' (2004) in that societal was the leading space frame and present was the leading time frame. The number of stories using the societal frame was a bit lower than in Chyi and McCombs, at 40%, and more stories (86%) were framed as present. The societal/present frame combination was most prominent at 31%, followed closely by the community/present frame with 29%. Frame changing was more likely to occur in these eight events.

Schildkraut and Muschert (2014) compared Columbine coverage with that of the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Connecticut. Their analysis revealed similarities in that the societal space frame and the present time frame were most prominent. However, differences were noted in the use of space frames. The societal space frame declined after the first 10 days in coverage of Sandy Hook, but use of the same frame increased over time in Columbine coverage. In addition, the individual/present frame combination was much more likely (22% vs. 7%) to be used in stories about Sandy Hook. This increased attention on the victims led the researchers to speculate that journalistic routines changed in the 13 years between events.

Holody and Daniel (2017) found that national and local newspapers differed in their coverage of the shooting in Aurora, Colorado, where 12 people were killed at a movie theater. National newspapers focused on the individual and societal space frames, with each type of frame appearing in 43% of the articles. Local newspapers also employed the individual space frame most (44%) but also made significant use of the community frame (40%). The individual/present frame combination was most prominent, appearing in nearly 40% of the national newspaper articles and in more than 32% of the local newspaper articles. The researchers propose that this combination was dominant because journalists tended to concentrate on the specifics of the shooting being covered.

Scholars have also used Chyi and McCombs' (2004) framework to assess the quality of media coverage of other issues. In a study of urban newspaper reporting about methamphetamine use, Schwartz and Andsager (2008), find that frequent use of the present frame along with an emphasis on the individual frame in articles not mentioning gay men provide evidence that journalists did not view methamphetamine use as a serious problem among the general population. Cassidy (2017) employed the framework to analyze sports journalists' coverage of the coming-out announcements of National Basketball Association veteran Jason Collins and football All-American Michael Sam. Although the individual/present frame combination was most prominent, significant use of community and societal frames indicates that coverage went beyond the basics and discussed larger issues facing gay professional athletes.

Some scholars have voiced criticism of Chyi and McCombs' (2004) framework. Park, Holody, and Zhang (2012) state that "the analytic scheme reduced rich details of the shooting incidents to the point that it was difficult to determine what the findings meant in terms of audience understanding of an incident" (p. 479). Other studies have added to or altered the framework in various ways. Kwon and Moon's (2009) examination of the Virginia Tech shooting incorporated collectivistic storytelling into the time and space frames because the authors were comparing U.S. and South Korean newspapers. Cassidy (2017) added two identity-based components to the space frames (professional basketball/football community and gay athlete) because there was little geographic relevance to examining coverage of Collins and Sam.

The present study extends Chyi and McCombs' (2004) framework by examining the time and space frames present in each paragraph of stories about the Charleston shooting. Previous studies have used the individual story as the unit of analysis. Although, as Chyi and McCombs (2004) note, "framing is not about every aspect or attribute of an object" (p. 31), it is possible, given the complexity of issues surrounding the Charleston shooting, that multiple frames are present in stories. Relatedly, Graber (2005) contends that studies coding only small portions of news stories can omit important themes. Thus, analyzing each paragraph might provide additional detail and insight into the routines of mass shooting coverage, aiding our understanding of journalism.

Research Questions

Given the unique circumstances of the Charleston shooting and that research into mass shootings in general, and nonschool shootings in particular, is a developing research area, four research questions are proposed:

RQ1: How many news stories about the Charleston shooting were published and how were they distributed during the first 30 days of coverage?

RQ2: What is the distribution of space frames during the first 30 days of coverage?

RQ3: What is the distribution of time frames during the first 30 days of coverage?

RQ4: Are there any relationships between the use of space and time frames in combination during the first 30 days of coverage?

Method

Content analysis was used to answer our research questions. Articles from *The New York Times*, *USA Today*, *The Wall Street Journal,* and *The Washington Post* were examined based on their status as leading, influential national newspapers. Wanta and Hu (1993) have explained that such papers can have an agenda-setting effect because they often impact how issues are covered by other media organizations. The four newspapers have also been cited in many studies as elite and/or prestige publications (e.g., An & Gower, 2009; Carpenter, 2007; Davidson & Wallack, 2004; Golan & Lukito, 2017; Kwon & Moon, 2009; Lacy, Fico, & Simon, 1991).

The LexisNexis Academic database was used to select articles from *The New York Times*, *USA Today*, and *The Washington Post.* Full-text keyword searches were conducted for "Charleston" from the "newspaper" source for a 30-day period (June 17–July 16, 2015) to mirror other studies of mass shootings (e.g., Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Holody & Daniel, 2017; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). To acquire *The Wall Street Journal* portion of the sample, one of the authors obtained a subscription, allowing access to the paper's archives. The relevant articles were selected using "Charleston" as the search term for the same 30-day period. For all the papers, stories where the Charleston shooting was the main focus or played a prominent role were chosen for analysis, as were stories written as a consequence of the shooting (Holody & Daniel, 2017). Letters to the editor were not included. Stories appearing in multiple newspapers were coded once.

The articles were coded for the date of publication and word length. Every headline and paragraph of the articles was coded for the space frame and the time frame. Headlines were included because Chyi and McCombs (2004) instructed coders to utilize article headlines when deciding on the most prominent frames.

The space frame consists of five levels: (1) The *individual* level includes discussion of individuals involved in the Charleston shooting (e.g., the victims, the gunman, their family members), interactions among them, or descriptions of their acts, reactions, or background information; (2) the *community* level includes discussion of the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church, Charleston, or any other single community or a particular group; (3) the *regional* level includes discussion of the Charleston metropolitan area, the state of South Carolina, or any other state or region—in other words, the impact of the event on a metropolitan area, state, or region; (4) the *societal* level includes discussion of concerns and/or events with nationwide interests—in other words, the impact of the Charleston shooting on the nation as a whole; and (5) the *international* level includes discussion of the global impact of the Charleston shooting, related phenomena or social problems seen in other countries, or the interaction between multiple countries.

The time frame consisted of three levels: (1) The *past* level includes discussion of previous events that have no direct link to the Charleston shooting (e.g., other potentially race-related shootings, the status of race relations in the nation, the life story of any of the victims or the gunman) or analysis with a historical perspective; (2) the *present* level includes discussion of events or developments surrounding the Charleston shooting at the time of the event or immediate or short-range consequences of the shooting; and (3) the *future* level includes discussion of the long-term effects of the Charleston shooting, suggestions for solutions, actions to be taken, or changes in policy that may prevent similar events from occurring.

Two of the authors served as coders. For reliability purposes, 17 articles (approximately 12%) were analyzed by both, consistent with recommendations of leading content analysis texts (Neuendorf, 2017; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2014). Using Scott's π, the level of agreement was .83 for the time frame variable and .80 for the space frame variable.

Results

A total of 136 articles were analyzed. These articles varied in word count (*M* = 946, *mode* = 1,411, *Mdn* = 847, *minimum* = 246, *maximum* = 2,426, *SD* = 443) and number of paragraphs (*M* = 21, *mode* = 14, *Mdn* = 19, *minimum* = 4, *maximum* = 62, *SD* = 11). Addressing RQ1, most articles on the shooting appeared within the first five days (*N* = 62, 46%) and the second five days (*N* = 41, 30%), with coverage of the event diminishing over time (in the third five days, *N* = 16, 12%; in the fourth five days, *N* = 6, 4%; in the fifth five days, *N* = 8, 6%; in the sixth five days, *N* = 3, 2%). Coverage was split between the number of articles appearing in *The New York Times* (*N* = 57, 42%) and *The Washington Post* (*N* = 48, 35%), with substantially less coverage in *USA Today* (*N* = 16, 12%) and *The Wall Street Journal* (*N* = 15, 11%).

The data were examined using two complementary analyses to answer RQ2 and RQ3. First, because each paragraph in the articles was coded for a space frame and a time frame, the number of paragraphs representing these frames was calculated for each article. This analysis revealed that, on average, the societal frame appeared the most (*M* = 7.73 number of paragraphs, 37%) followed closely by the individual frame (*M* = 7.54, 33%). Paragraphs representing the community frame occurred less (*M* = 4.92, 20%). The regional (*M* = 1.94, 9%) and international frames (*M* = 0.10, 1%) were not generally used. As might be expected, the time frame used the most was present (*M* = 11.11 number of paragraphs, 53%), and this was followed by the past frame (*M* = 7.60, 33%). The future frame was used sparingly (*M* = 3.39, 14%).

Visual inspection of the space frame and time frame codes indicated relatively low levels of variability. In other words, journalists who employed a space frame tended to use that frame throughout their writing. To test this assessment empirically, standard deviations were calculated for each article with respect to both the space and time frames. Analyses revealed support for frame consistency within each article. For the space frame, the modal standard deviation was 0 (*M* = 0.75, *Mdn* = 0.80, *minimum* = 0.00, *maximum* = 1.64, *SD* = 0.51) with a negatively skewed distribution (−0.20). Likewise, there was little variation in the use of the time frame in these articles (*M* = 0.45, *mode* = 0.00, *Mdn* = 0.46, *minimum* = 0.00, *maximum* = 1.05, *SD* = 0.28) with a negatively skewed distribution (−0.14). To determine whether the article length is related to the variability of the use of the space and time frames, correlational analyses were conducted. Articles that had higher word and paragraph counts did not have greater variability in their use of the space frame ($r = -.07$, $p = .22$; $r = -.09$, $p = .14$, respectively) or in use of the time frame ($r = .13$, $p = .06$; $r = .02$, $p = .40$, respectively).

Although minimal variation is seen overall, any pattern where variation did occur could offer insight into how the articles about the shooting were structured. Figure 1 represents the locations (paragraph numbers) in articles about the Charleston shooting where changes in the use of space frames occurred.



Figure 1. Location of modal space frame changes based on paragraph number.

The correlation between paragraph number and modal space frame was significant (r_s = −.18, p = .02). Longer articles tended to use the individual and community frames, while shorter articles focused on the societal frame. Figure 2 illustrates the locations in the articles where changes in the use of time frames occurred. There was no correlation between article length and modal time frame (r_s = .10, p = .13). The modal paragraph length for these articles was 14, so the data were analyzed as they specifically related to articles that were between 1 and 14 paragraphs long. Results from this dichotomization revealed that shorter articles showed no relationship between paragraph number and modal space frame (r_s = .03, p = .43). For these articles, the individual, community, and societal frames appeared regularly regardless of article length. A significant negative correlation exists between paragraph number and modal time frame (r_s = −.31, p = .02), revealing that articles approaching 14 paragraphs focused on the past time frame. The interpretation for articles longer than 14 paragraphs did not differ from the overall correlational results for the number of paragraphs and the modal space frame and the modal time frame discussed above (number of paragraphs and modal space frame, r_s = −.15, p = .09; number of paragraphs and modal time frame, r_s = .03, p = .34).



Figure 2. Location of modal time frame changes based on paragraph number.

The second, complementary analysis included computing an overall space frame and time frame code for each article. This task was accomplished by taking the modal paragraph score for the space frame and the modal paragraph score for the time frame so that each article had two overall scores: one representing the modal space frame for that article and one indicating the modal time frame for that article. Although this overall score for the space and time frames reflects traditional approaches to coding frames (e.g., Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014; Schwartz & Andsager, 2008), the method of calculation is unique to the current investigation. In a few instances, articles were written so that two frames occurred most frequently (i.e., multiple modes existed) for the space frame (N = 5), the time frame (N = 5), and the space/time frame (N = 1). Unfortunately, given the infrequent appearances of multiple modes, no meaningful comparisons with this subset of articles could be made. Therefore, to answer RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4, results were ultimately calculated using the overall space and time frames in the remaining 125 articles. The societal space frame was employed most often (N = 54, 44%), followed by the individual space frame (N = 38, 30%) and the community frame (N = 26, 21%). The regional frame was little used (N = 7, 5%), and the international frame never appeared as the modal frame in any of the articles. The articles primarily used the present (N = 68, 54%) and past (N = 45, 36%) time frames, while few articles relied on the future time frame (N = 12, 10%). Therefore, with respect to RQ2, journalists writing about the Charleston shooting tended to focus on societal, individual, and community frames during the first 30 days of coverage. Regional concerns were unlikely to be addressed, and international implications of the event were not covered. Answering RQ3, these data reveal that journalists concentrated on presenting immediate consequences (i.e., present frame) of the shooting or on linking events that happened before the shooting (i.e., past frame).

RQ4 asked whether a relationship exists between the use of specific space frames and the use of time frames. As shown in Table 1, when journalists focused on future implications of the shooting, they considered the societal impact of the event.

Table 1. Cross-Tabulations for Use of the Space Frame and the Time Frame (N = 125).

	Time frame		
Space frame	Past	Present	Future
Individual	11 (9%)	27 (21%)	0 (0%)
Community	10 (8%)	16 (13%)	0 (0%)
Regional	2 (1%)	5 (4%)	0 (0%)
Societal	22 (18%)	20 (16%)	12 (10%)
International	—	—	—

Note. The international space frame did not appear as the most common frame in any article.

Articles employing the past or present time frames tended to discuss individual, community, and societal issues surrounding the Charleston shooting. No articles focused on international issues associated with the event.

Because news and opinion articles might differ in their use of space and time frames, additional analyses were conducted to explore this possibility. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 2 for opinion articles—defined as stories written by columnists or those labeled as editorials, op-eds, or opinion pieces. There were 28 articles coded as opinion articles (*The New York Times*, n = 9; *The Washington Post*, n = 15; *The Wall Street Journal*, n = 4). Of these articles, 24 had unimodal space or time frames and could be analyzed. As Table 2 reveals, articles focused on the societal frame with past and present information featured. The remaining news articles (n = 101) demonstrated the same pattern of findings as those presented in Table 1.

Table 2. Cross-Tabulations for Use of the Space Frame and the Time Frame for Opinion Articles (N = 24).

	Time frame		
Space frame	Past	Present	Future
Individual	2 (8%)	1 (4%)	0 (0%)
Community	1 (4%)	2 (8%)	0 (0%)
Regional	2 (8%)	1 (4%)	0 (0%)
Societal	10 (43%)	4 (17%)	1 (4%)
International	—	—	—

Note. The international space frame did not appear as the most common frame in any article.

The data were examined to determine whether a relationship exists between when an article was published within the first 30 days of the shooting and the modal space frame and modal time frame. Results revealed no relationship between date of publication and the use of a particular space frame (r_s = .13, p = .07), but a positive correlation was found between date of publication and the use of the time frame (r_s = .20, p = .01), indicating that articles published later in the 30-day window tended to highlight future-oriented issues such as suggestions for policy action and long-term effects.

Discussion

This research contributes to the growing body of literature examining media coverage of mass shootings in the United States. Whereas much of the earlier work examined school shootings, this effort broadens the focus and deepens our understanding through an analysis of the Charleston shooting—a tragedy that was arguably more complex than some other mass shootings and one that did not take place at a school. While the overall results note some similarities in the coverage of Charleston and other mass shootings, some intriguing differences were also found (see Table 3). Discussing how our findings fit in the context of other studies utilizing Chyi and McCombs' (2004) framework provides additional insight into developments and changes in the routines of journalists covering such tragedies.

Table 3. Comparison of Results Across Studies; Percentages of Space Frames and Time Frames Used in National Newspaper Stories.

	Space frame					Time frame		
	Individual	Community	Regional	Societal	International	Past	Present	Future
Columbine	17	29	2	52	0	16	71	13
Other schools	21	29	2	48	0	10	78	12
Sandy Hook	18	16	16	46	4	8	84	8
Aurora[a]	43	8	2	43	4	16	70	14
Charleston	30	21	5	44	0	36	54	10

Coverage of the Charleston shooting was prominently featured in the four newspapers examined (N = 136), but some earlier events received more media attention during the first 30 days of coverage. For example, there were 170 and 132 articles, respectively, in *The New York Times* following the Columbine and Sandy Hook shootings (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). There were 117 articles published about the Aurora shooting in *The New York Times* and *USA Today* (Holody & Daniel, 2017). In this study, however, only 73 articles appeared in those two papers. Thus, the relative dearth of media attention given the Charleston shooting lends some credence to complaints that coverage of mass shootings has become more routine; because of the frequency of mass shootings, they do not merit as much attention as they once did.

However, coverage of Charleston was extensive in terms of article length. As noted earlier, the average article length was 946 words. Although most studies of mass shootings do not report information about article length, national newspaper articles covering the Aurora shooting tended to be considerably shorter (M = 702; Holody & Daniel, 2017). One reason for this could be that the Charleston shooting prompted discussion of a host of societal issues beyond gun control, and that was borne out in the depth of the articles, if not their number.

Adding to the argument that the Charleston shooting was a unique event is the relative lack of frame changing throughout the first 30 days of coverage. Previous studies of mass shootings found extensive changes in framing. Chyi and McCombs (2004) found shifts from the individual to societal space frame in later stories about Columbine, while the opposite was true in stories about Sandy Hook (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). This contrasts with the results here, where we found no relationship between date of publication and use of the space frame. Schildkraut and Muschert (2014) suggested that journalistic routines regarding use of the space frame may have changed since Columbine. But the results of this study indicate that changes in use of the space frame over the duration of coverage may have more to do with the details of a specific event. However, in keeping with much of the research on mass shootings, a positive correlation was found between publication date and use of the future frame, which tended to appear in articles published later in the 30-day period.

While previous studies have found relative overall consistency of frame usage, the increased use of the individual space frame (stories about individuals involved) in coverage of more recent mass shootings has prompted researchers to conclude that journalists' routines have shifted in light of the increased regularity of

mass shootings (Holody & Daniel, 2017; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). The results of this study bear that out as well, though not to the degree of Holody and Daniel (2017), who found more than double the use of the individual space frame in national newspaper stories about the Aurora shooting, compared with Chyi and McCombs (2004) and Schildkraut and Muschert (2014; see Table 3). But the finding of 30% usage of the individual frame in coverage of the Charleston shooting is a substantive increase over several studies of earlier shootings. Also worth noting is that the shooters in both Charleston and Aurora did not die at the scene, unlike Columbine and Sandy Hook. So one reason for the increase in use of the individual frame could be because there was additional and ongoing information about both perpetrators. Supporting this contention are findings that longer articles (more than 14 paragraphs) about the Charleston shooting tended to utilize the individual frame. However, the lower overall percentage of individual frames for this study when compared with Holody and Daniel (2017) also lends some credence to speculation that the complexity of the Charleston shooting led to more consistency and variety in frames used, as does the finding that the community frame (stories focusing on Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church and Charleston) also tended to be used in longer stories.

Similar to results of previous research, the societal space frame (stories focusing on the impact of the shooting on the nation as a whole) was the leading space frame of this study. However, more attention was given to community frames and regional frames (stories focusing on South Carolina or the South in general) than in Holody and Daniel (2017; see Table 3). Also consistent with the findings of other studies is the use of the present time frame. However, coverage of the Charleston shooting was much more likely than coverage of other shootings to use the past frame (see Table 3). The increased use of the past frame seems logical here considering the bounty of information available about the shooter. Numerous stories delved into Roof's background and on how he came to be a White supremacist. Also, some of the victims were prominent citizens of Charleston—most notably Pinckney, the church pastor and a state senator. Holody and Daniel (2017) speculate that increased use of the past frame is an indication that "mass shootings are no longer the unknown" (p. 92).

No time/space frame combination dominated overall coverage of the Charleston shooting. Individual/present was the leading combination at 21%.[1] The same combination led coverage of the Aurora shooting, but at a much higher percentage (39.8%; Holody & Daniel, 2017). Societal/present was also prominent in Charleston, with 16% of stories adopting this combination.[2] Similarly, this was also the second leading combination in the Aurora study. But, once again, the percentage was much higher at 29%. The societal/present frame combination tended to dominate coverage of school shootings. For example, 49% of stories about Sandy Hook focused on societal/present (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014).

[1] An example of the individual/present combination is: "A white gunman opened fire Wednesday night at a historic black church in downtown Charleston, S.S., killing nine people before fleeing and setting off an overnight manhunt, the police said" (Horowitz, Corasaniti, & Southvall, 2015, p. A15).

[2] An example of the societal/present combination is: "The shooting massacre of a black pastor and his parishioners at a South Carolina church on Wednesday night once again confronted President Obama with a moment of racial turmoil in a country that for all its progress has yet to completely shed the burden of hatred and division" (Baker, 2015, p. A18).

Perhaps the most compelling difference in coverage of Charleston when compared with other mass shootings is the finding that 18% of the stories focused on the societal/past combination.[3] This combination was a minor component of Columbine and Sandy Hook coverage, with 2% and 3%, respectively, of the articles falling into that category (Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). This result also speaks to the uniqueness of Charleston. Because this event raised a multitude of other societal issues beyond gun control, it seems that journalists felt the need to provide historical background information related to these topics in their coverage. Although previous research does not report data on opinion articles, it seems logical that the uniqueness of Charleston is also evident by the fact that 43% of the stories employed this frame combination, and nearly two-thirds (64%) of these articles adopted a societal space frame. In addition, the community/past frame combination was featured more in stories about Charleston than it was in stories about other mass shootings (7% vs. 4% in Columbine and 0% in Sandy Hook; Chyi & McCombs, 2004; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014).

In Columbine coverage, Chyi and McCombs (2004) noted that "journalists . . . enhance issue salience on the media agenda through frame-changing" (p. 31), while Schildkraut and Muschert (2014) write that "the media used continual frame changing" (p. 36) in their reports about Sandy Hook. On the other hand, McCombs and Ghanem (2001) state that framing emanates from a restricted number of attributes. Similarly, Holody and Daniel (2017) note that "most coverage of a single event . . . tends to use a small number of similar frames" (p. 90). These perspectives are worthy of consideration in light of the findings of this study, which finds little evidence of frame changing in coverage of the Charleston shooting. However, a fairly wide variety of frames were employed consistently throughout the 30-day period due to the event's connection to a host of other relevant issues; these could be considered extended frames, defined as frames other than those that made the event news in the first place (Chyi & McCombs, 2004). The fact that such details can be discovered by using Chyi and McCombs' measurement scheme for media frames further speaks to the framework's applicability for studying media content, especially for research on journalistic practice and routines.

To that end, when designing this study, we decided to code every paragraph and headline for each story about the Charleston shooting because we hypothesized that, given the complexity of the event, doing so would provide a fuller and more detailed account of how journalists cover mass shootings. However, relatively low levels of variability were found in the articles. In other words, journalists consistently employed a single space and time frame throughout a story. Thus, the results here provide additional support for Chyi and McCombs' (2004) original decision to code for an overall space and time frame for each article.

Like all research studies, this study has some limitations. First, we examined only leading national newspapers. It is possible that other forms of media would use different space and time frames and combinations. An examination of local media might also produce different results. For example, Holody and Daniel (2017) found differences between national and local newspapers in their study of the Aurora shooting. This research, like many other studies of mass shootings, examined only the first 30 days of coverage. Although results have consistently shown that coverage tends to subside long before 30 days, it is possible that examining coverage for a longer duration would provide additional useful information. Other research has demonstrated

[3] An example of the societal/past combination is: "Police are investigating the fatal shooting of nine African Americans at AME Church in Charleston, S.C., as a hate crime committed by a white man. Unfortunately, it's not a unique event in American history" (Butler, 2015, p. B1).

that the average time an issue remains on the public agenda is slightly more than 18 months (McCombs & Zhu, 1995).

Another potential limitation is that this research—like many studies of mass shootings—did not pinpoint the placement of the articles in the newspapers. However, studies have shown that how and what types of stories are featured on the front page are in a state of flux due to the newspaper industry's attempts to deal with economic pressures exacerbated by audience migration to the Internet (Tanikawa, 2017). This suggests that page placement may not be as important as it once was. However, the substantial media attention devoted to the Charleston shooting makes it very likely—especially during the initial days of coverage, when the vast majority of the stories were published—that the articles were prominently positioned overall.

As noted earlier, the measurement scheme employed here has come under some criticism by scholars who think it is lacking in nuance (Park et al., 2012). Chyi and McCombs (2004) acknowledge this, noting that their purpose was "not to describe the specific details . . . but to examine framing as a process in journalistic practice" (p. 31). However, the two-dimensional measurement scheme is valuable in that it enables comparison of coverage of various mass shootings. This is important—particularly for a study such as this one, which is interested in examining journalistic routines—because it allows patterns and differences in coverage of similar events to be easily observed, unlike many other framing studies whose measurement can only be applied to a single incident (Bichard, 2006; Ghanem, 1997) or those whose framework is more general, such as Iyengar's (1991) classification of episodic and thematic frames.

Conclusion

The term *routine* has been mentioned consistently throughout this manuscript. Indeed, some of the initial paragraphs mention observers and scholars lamenting that it has become routine to cover and write about mass shootings because of their frequency. For the most part, however, those comments are not complaints about the routines used by journalists to do their jobs. Gaye Tuchman (1973), the author of several classic ethnographic studies of how news is made, notes that journalists need routines because they are expected to report on "unexpected events on a routine basis" (p. 111). She further states that, "without some routine method of coping with unexpected events, news organizations, as national enterprises, would flounder and fail" (p. 111). Certainly, mass shootings are "predictably unpredictable" news events in that they occur with increasing regularity, yet one cannot predict when and where they will happen. Thus, they are still extraordinarily important events and fall into a typification Tuchman (1978) describes as "what a story." Berkowitz (1992) found that existing routines for these types of stories acted as a baseline of sorts for coverage, but that journalists improvised to incorporate additional elements of importance to that particular what-a-story into their reports. That same kind of adjustment can be seen when comparing coverage of Charleston with that of other mass shootings. Reporters used many of the enduring narrative strategies and routines developed over the years, but their coverage of the shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church—particularly the consistent use of a wider variety of frames, along with increased attention to the societal/past frame combination—shows they also incorporated attributes unique to this tragedy into their stories. This, in turn, suggests that journalistic routines for covering mass shootings are shifting and evolving and are thus not as formulaic and rote as some critics contend.

References

An, A-K., & Gower, K. K. (2009). How do the news media frame crises? A content analysis of news coverage. *Public Relations Review*, *35*(2), 107–112.

Baker, P. (2015, June 19). A sense at the White House of horror, loss and resolve. *New York Times*.

Berkowitz, D. (1992). Routine newswork and the what-a-story: A case study of organizational adaptation. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*, *36*(1), 45–60.

Bichard, S. L. (2006). Building blogs: A multi-dimensional analysis of the distribution of frames on the 2004 presidential candidate web sites. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, *83*(2), 329–345.

Blaser, R. (2015, June 24). Too much focus is on the Confederate flag. *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved from http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/evanston/lifestyles/ct-evr-blaser-confederate-flag-tl-0702-20150624-story.html

Bradner, E. (2015, June 30). Confederate flag debate: A state-by-state roundup. *CNN Politics.* Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/29/politics/confederate- flag-state-roundup/

Butler, A. (2015, June 21). Is an accused killer called a terrorist? Not if he's White. *The Washington Post*.

Cacciatore, M. A., Scheufele, D. A., & Iyengar, S. (2016). The end of framing as we know it . . . and the future of media effects. *Mass Communication and Society*, *19*(1), 7–23.

Carpenter, S. (2007). U.S. elite and non-elite newspapers' portrayal of the Iraq War: A comparison of frames and source use. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, *84*(4), 761–776.

Cassidy, W. P. (2017). *Sports journalism and coming out stories: Jason Collins and Michael Sam.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Christensen, J. (2017, October 5). Why the US has the most mass shootings. *CNN.* Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/27/health/u-s-most-mass- shootings/index.html

Chyi, H. S., & McCombs, M. (2004). Media salience and the process of framing: Coverage of the Columbine school shootings. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, *81*(1), 22–35.

Dahmen, N. S., Abdenour, J., McIntyre, K., & Noga-Stryon, K. E. (2017). Covering mass shootings: Journalists' perceptions of coverage and factors influencing attitudes. *Journalism Practice*, *12*(4), 456–476.

Davidson, A. E., & Wallack, L. (2004). A content analysis of sexually transmitted diseases in print news media. *Journal of Health Communication*, *9*(2), 111–117.

Ellis, R., Brumfield, B., & Edwards, M. (2015, July 10). S.C. governor signs bill to remove Confederate flag from capitol grounds. *CNN Politics*. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/us/south-carolina-confederate-battle-flag/

Ellis, R., Payne, E., Perez, E., & Ford, D. (2015, June 18). Shooting suspect in custody after Charleston church massacre. *CNN*. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/18/us/charleston-south-carolina- shooting/index.html

el-Nawawy, M., & Elmasry, M. H. (2018). Is America "post-racist"? How *AC 360* and *The O'Reilly Factor* discursively constructed the Charleston church shooting. *Journalism Studies*, *19*(7), 942–959.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, *43*(4), 51–58.

Farhi, P. (2015, December 3). Media fall into pattern with coverage of mass shootings. *The Washington Post.* Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/media-fall-into-pattern-with-coverage-of-mass-shootings/2015/12/03/ab5001e6-9a09-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html?utm_term=.092340f390f2

Follman, M., Aronsen, G., & Pan, D. (2017, November 15). A guide to mass shootings in America. *Mother Jones*. Retrieved from https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map/

Ghanem, S. I. (1997). Filling in the tapestry: The second level of agenda setting. In M. E. McCombs, D. L. Shaw, & D. H. Weaver (Eds.), *Communication and democracy* (pp. 3–14). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Golan, G. J., & Lukito, J. (2017). Newspaper editorial pages frame China similarly. *Newspaper Research Journal*, *38*(2), 215–230.

Goodykuntz, B. (2015, October 1). Shooting coverage routine: That's the story. *Arizona Republic.* Retrieved from https://www.azcentral.com/story/entertainment/movies/billgoodykoontz/2015/10/01/shooting-coverage-routine-column/73178584/

Graber, D. (2005). Political communication faces the 21st century. *Journal of Communication*, *55*(3), 479–507.

Hawes, J. B., & Evans, J. (2017, June 1). Second Emanuel AME Church shooting anniversary events feature worship, unity. *The Post and Courier.* Retrieved from https://www.postandcourier.com/church_shooting/second-emanuel-ame-church-shooting-anniversary-events-feature-worship-unity/article_be874d48-46d1-11e7-8c0f-cfa6d34dbb37.html/

Held, A. (2017, September 19). Dylann Roof asks to fire legal team of "biological enemies." *National Public Radio.* Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/19/552025083/dylann-roof-asks-to-fire-legal-team-of-biological-enemies

Henderson, N. (2015, June 24). Inside the battle over the Confederate flag. *CNN Politics*. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/21/politics/south-carolina-confederate-flag-debate/

Holody, K. J., & Daniel, E. S. (2017). Attributes and frames of the Aurora shootings: National and local news coverage differences. *Journalism Practice*, *11*(1), 80–100.

Horowitz, J., Corasaniti, N., & Southvall, A. (2015, June 18). South Carolina police search for shooter at Black church. *The New York Times.*

Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Jackson, D. (2015, October 1). Obama: "Our thoughts and prayers are not enough." *USA Today.* Retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/10/01/obama-oregon-shooting-umpqua-community-college-roseburg/73169262/

Jervis, R. (2015, June 19). Charleston shooting renews gun control debate. *USA Today.* Retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/19/gun-debate-charleston-shooting/28993771/

Kwon, K. H., & Moon, S-I. (2009). The bad guy is one of us: Framing comparison between the US and Korean newspapers and blogs about the Virginia Tech shooting. *Asian Journal of Communication*, *19*(3), 270–288.

Lacy, S., Fico, F., & Simon, T. F. (1991). Fairness and balance in the prestige press. *Journalism Quarterly*, *68*(3), 363–370.

Lankford, A. (2016). Public mass shooters and firearms: A cross-national study of 171 countries. *Violence and Victims*, *31*(2), 187–199.

McCombs, M. E., & Ghanem, S. I. (2001). The convergence of agenda setting and framing. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world* (pp. 67–81). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

McCombs, M. E., & Zhu, J-H. (1995). Capacity, diversity and volatility of the public agenda: Trends from 1854 to 1994. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *59*(4), 495–525.

Mullin, B. (2015, December 2). Routine sets in for journalists covering mass shooting. *Poynter.* Retrieved from https://www.poynter.org/news/routine-sets-journalists-covering-mass-shooting

Muschert, G. W. (2007). Research in school shootings. *Sociology Compass*, *1*(1), 60–80.

Muschert, G. W., & Carr, D. (2006). Media salience and frame changing across events: Coverage of nine school shootings, 1997–2001. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, *83*(4), 747–766.

Neuendorf, K. A. (2017). *The content analysis guidebook* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

Park, S-Y., Holody, J. J., & Zhang, X. (2012). Race in media coverage of school shootings: A parallel application of framing theory and attribute agenda setting. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, *89*(3), 475–494.

Riffe, D., Lacy, S., & Fico, F. (2014). *Analyzing media messages: Using quantitative content analysis in research* (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Sack, K., & Blinder, A. (2016, December 9). Jurors hear Dylann Roof explain shooting in video: "I had to do it." *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/us/dylann-roof-shooting-charleston-south-carolina-church-video.html

Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication*, *49*(1), 103–122.

Schildkraut, J., & Muschert, G. W. (2014). Media salience and the framing of mass murder in schools: A comparison of the Columbine and Sandy Hook massacres. *Homicide Studies*, *18*(1), 23–43.

Schuppe, J., & Morrison, J. (2017). Dylann Roof sentenced to death for Charleston church massacre. *NBC News.* Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/charleston-church-shooting/dylann-roof-sentenced-death-charleston-church-massacre-n705376

Schwartz, J., & Andsager, J. L. (2008). Sexual health and stigma in urban newspapers' coverage of methamphetamine. *American Journal of Men's Health*, *2*(1), 56–67.

Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D. (2014). *Mediating the message in the 21st century: A media sociology perspective*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Shoichet, C. E., & Perez, E. (2015, July 22). Dylann Roof faces hate crime charges in Charleston shooting. *CNN.* Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/22/us/charleston-shooting-hate-crime-charges/index.html

Tanikawa, M. (2017). What is news? What is the newspaper? The physical, functional and stylistic transformation of print newspapers, 1988–2013. *International Journal of Communication*, *11*, 3519–3540.

Tankard, J. W. (2001). The empirical approach to the study of media framing. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world* (pp. 95–106). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Taylor, J. (2015, June 22). The complicated history of the Confederate flag. *Political News from NPR*. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/22/416548613/the-complicated-political-history-of-the-confederate-flag

Tuchman, G. (1973). Making news by doing work: Routinizing the unexpected. *American Journal of Sociology*, *79*(1), 110–131.

Tuchman, G. (1978). *Making news: A study in the construction of reality*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Turkewitz, J. (2016, June 30). What it's like to cover mass shootings—one after the other. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/insider/repeating-a-delicate-reporting-routine-after-four-mass-shootings.html

Wanta, W., & Hu, Y-W. (1993). The agenda-setting effects of international news coverage: An examination of differing news frames. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *5*(3), 250–264.

Waxman, O. (2017, October 4). Las Vegas was the deadliest shooting in modern U.S. history: Here's why "modern" is so important. *TIME*. Retrieved from http://time.com/4968108/las-vegas-deadliest-shooting-modern-us-history/

Weaver, D. H. (2007). Thoughts on agenda setting, framing and priming. *Journal of Communication*, *57*(1), 142–147.

Weaver, M., & Bowers, P. (2015, June 18). Charleston shooting: State senator Clementa Pinckney among victims. *The Guardian.* Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/18/charleston-church-shooting-state-senator-victim

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4646–4667 1932–8036/20180005

Business Strategies of Korean TV Players in the Age of Over-The-Top (OTT) Video Service

EUN-A PARK[1]
Western State Colorado University, USA

This article is a comparative analysis of business models and strategies employed by firms in the South Korean digital video marketplace facing competition from over-the-top (OTT) content services. It analyzes the strategies of South Korean firms, including traditional access providers (e.g., telecom companies) deploying content, traditional content providers (cable networks) seeking new delivery channels, and terrestrial content and access providers (terrestrial broadcasters). Unlike third-party services, such as Netflix, that came up in competition with existing broadcasters and upended traditional paradigms of pay TV markets, South Korean OTT has emerged as extensions of established pay TV services. Thus, OTT services in Korea became an extension of established players' offerings and part of their N-screen strategy, further entrenching their market position.

Keywords: over-the-top, OTT video, business models, Korea TV players

The entry of low-cost, subscription-based over-the-top (OTT) video streaming services has shaken up the complex, vertically integrated television distribution industry that has long been dominated by the traditional multichannel pay TV providers: In Korea, these include cable, satellite, and telco operators (Skot, 2014). OTT video services may be defined as those provided by an online content provider (such as Netflix) over the infrastructure of a last-mile broadband access provider unaffiliated with the online content provider. A market research report forecasts rapid growth of global OTT video markets: Revenues were $16.3 billion in 2015 and are estimated to reach $27.8 billion by 2019 (PwC, 2016).

Consumers are increasingly streaming or downloading long-form video programming (mainly movies and TV shows) by using OTT video services and sometimes unsubscribing from traditional video providers (Arolovitch, 2015). This phenomenon—described as "video cord-cutting" or "over-the-top (OTT) bypass"—suggests that the business models of traditional TV service providers are under threat (Banerjee, Rappoport, & Alleman, 2014).

OTT services were initially provided by specialized OTT video content providers such as Netflix, unaffiliated with traditional TV providers. As a result, traditional pay TV service providers have experienced

Eun-A Park: epark@western.edu
Date submitted: 2016–08–31

[1] A version of this article was presented at TPRC 2015.

Copyright © 2018 (Eun-A Park). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

subscriber losses and revenue slowdowns, as OTT providers have gained market share. In December 2016, according to comScore data, more than 49 million homes accessed at least one OTT service. There are now 11 OTT services in the United States that reach one million or more homes in a given month (Rich, 2017). Meanwhile, the top pay TV operators, tracked by the media research firm Leichtman, had 93.3 million subscribers in the first quarter of 2017—a 1% dip from the same period a year earlier (Rodriguez, 2017).

Pay TV providers are responding to this new threat by experimenting with new services such as (1) multiscreen (N-screen): "everywhere, anywhere" services; (2) monetizing content beyond the subscription; (3) online pay TV packages: a fully OTT model; (4) "cloud pay TV," accessed through an application on smart TV sets; and (5) hybrid broadcast/broadband services (Gartner, 2013, cited in Song, 2013). Not only pay TV providers, but also all types of service providers, including terrestrial broadcasters, IT companies, and device manufacturers wishing to enter the TV media business, have begun to provide services in OTT form (Crandall, 2014; Korea Information Society Development Institute [KISDI], 2013; Song, 2014).

Despite the criticality of OTT video services, not many studies have been conducted on business models and strategic positioning of TV players, except in consulting firm reports or company trade reports (ABI Research, 2014; Aidi et al., 2013; Ross & Erasmus, 2013; Song, 2013). Therefore, this study aims to compare and contrast the business models and strategies of South Korean TV players as a case study. As a case study, this article examines a phenomenon, namely the responses of established Korean video providers to OTT, within the context of a broadcasting/telecommunications ecosystem. We use Schumpeter's theory of innovation, as discussed next, to help identify the critical variables in the case—the identity of the innovating entrepreneurs and the market structure in which they operate. The case investigation is open-ended and involves both quantitative and qualitative data from a variety of sources, including government publications, industry reports, trade press articles, and news media reports. The case covers the period from the introduction of OTT services to the present.

First, it should be explained why we focused on the South Korean market for the case study. South Korea has emerged as a leader in broadband and telecommunications (OECD, 2017a). South Korea was also one of the first markets to see the emergence of a highly competitive online video market in which many competitors such as YouTube, Olleh TV mobile, Oksusu (previously Btv Mobile and Hoppin), LG U+HDTV, POOQ, and Tving. Thus, it may legitimately be asked whether this is the future of OTT markets everywhere. Third, compared with many other markets, a more diverse set of providers are operating in South Korea, including telecom providers, mobile companies, terrestrial broadcasting companies, and cable TV systems. Using the South Korean market as a case study allows the responses of a broader set of video providers to be examined. Therefore, this article, as an analysis of business models and strategies employed by firms in the digital video marketplace facing competition from OTT content services, focuses on the Korean TV market. It analyzes the strategies of all players, including traditional over-the-air broadcasters, pay TV providers, telecommunication network providers, and the new OTT service providers.

The article is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical foundation of the article, Joseph Schumpeter's theories of creative destruction and innovation, is discussed. Next, the section titled "Defining OTT Video" defines OTT video to make a clear distinction from other OTT services, such as mobile VoIP. In the section titled "Impact of OTT Video," the impacts of OTT video are addressed, and the response

of traditional communications service companies to the threat are discussed. The following section examines the Korean firms' responses to the emergence of OTT services. Finally, in the conclusion, we return to the article's theoretical concerns and present and discuss its main conclusions.

Schumpeter's Creative Destruction and Innovation

It is commonly observed that markets are in a constant process of change, with products, firms, and business models entering the market and keeping pace with changes in consumer tastes and preferences, technology, and regulation. Economists have put forward many explanations for these changes, which often occur in business cycles (for a survey, see Arnold, 2002), including interest rate, credit availability, and technology. In contrast to these "exogenous" explanations, Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1940), an influential theorist on markets and market evolution, posited that economic change is almost exclusively driven by endogenous factors, specifically, innovation within firms. According to a recent summary of Schumpeter's thought, "economic development was an emergent property arising from endogenous systemic change and not a response to external stimuli" (Juma, 2014, p. 6). Schumpeter's seminal work developed the notions of creative destruction and disruptive innovation (Schumpeter, 1942), making it a useful framework for the analysis of a market-disrupting innovation like OTT.

According to Schumpeter, four key elements drive market evolution (Juma, 2014). First, market developments are driven by innovation, "the creation of new combinations including new products, new production methods or processes, new organizational forms, new markets, and new sources of raw materials and inputs" (Juma, 2014, p. 6). OTT video services fit the mold of innovation in this definition because they represent the combination of new modes of delivery and new business models, albeit often with existing media content. The second element is entrepreneurship: Entrepreneurs develop and/or implement the innovation in response to the market opportunities they identify. Third, entrepreneurs as change agents "disturb the equilibrium of the steady-state and cause economic discontinuities" (Juma, 2014, pp. 7–8). He argued that the quest for profit (or surplus value) encourages investment in the creation of new technologies. These investments eventually will lead to the obsolescence, or destruction, of older technologies and any business models that are dependent on them. These discontinuities are evident in the case of OTT, based on data provided later in the article. The fourth element of market evolution consists of financial institutions and credit-providing agencies, which support entrepreneurs and indirectly assume the risk of innovation.

A critical concern in applying Schumpeter's framework to the OTT case is the identity of the entrepreneur. The conflict may be traced back to Schumpeter's own writing. In *The Theory of Economic Development* (Schumpeter, 1949), Schumpeter argued that innovation would arise from new firms outside the dominant core of an industry, stating that "in general it is not the owner of stage-coaches who builds railways" (Schumpeter, quoted in Juma, 2014, p. 7). However, elsewhere, Schumpeter has also stated that innovation happens in large firms that have surpluses to invest in R&D (Schumpeter, 1942). This sort of innovation happens within business models and tends to confirm the dominance of large firms. Smaller firms, according to this latter view, do not have the investible surpluses, technical know-how, or managerial expertise to produce market-challenging innovations. Established firms tend to avoid disruptive innovations,

or actively oppose them. They tend not to change business models, even when the business models face threats.

In the years since Schumpeter, many scholars have examined the locus of innovation in markets (Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Agrawal, Cockburn, Galasso, & Oettl, 2014; Koeller, 1995; Rogers, 2004), specifically examining if there is a relationship between firm size and innovation. Acs and Audretsch (1987) found that the innovative advantage of large versus small firms is dependent on market structure. They stated that "large firms have an innovative advantage in markets characterized by imperfect competition, but small firms have the innovative advantage in markets more closely approximating the competitive model" (p. 567). As we will show, market structure is a critical factor to explain the evolutionary path taken by the Korean OTT markets.

Defining OTT Video

For the purposes of this article, OTT video services may be defined as those provided by an online content provider (such as Netflix) over the infrastructure of a last-mile broadband access provider unaffiliated with the online content provider. "Unaffiliated" here means that there is no vertical integration or other joint ownership between the content provider and the broadband access provider. Therefore, any video service, including communications or video, provided to consumers by third parties unaffiliated with the entity providing the Internet access might be considered an OTT video service. OTT services may be provided to a variety of user platforms (computers, tablets, smartphones, and other mobile devices), and over a variety of broadband connections (fixed and mobile). Some OTT providers have negotiated carriage arrangements with content distribution networks or with last-mile Internet Access Points (IAPs) to make it easier for end users to access their content (Wyatt & Cohen, 2014). For the purposes of a working definition in this article, we do not consider such arrangements as violating the "nonaffiliation" condition; third parties are negotiating fee-based arrangements with ISPs for transmission of their data to end users as OTT video services.

OTT is a promising model for content distribution that takes advantage of current network infrastructure to deliver television and movie programming over the Internet, rather than through a traditional cable or satellite connection. Although the OTT video service originated from the wired broadband market, it has been rapidly migrating to the mobile video market. The migration has made pay TV providers—cable TV, satellite TV, and Internet protocol television (IPTV) providers—feel threatened about their ability to sustain their pay TV service. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) categorized such OTT providers as online video distributors (OVDs), differentiating them from existing over-the-air broadcasters and multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs)—mostly cable operators and satellite TV providers. However, the FCC recognizes that some companies may offer more than one type of video service, such as an MVPD service and an OVD service (for example, DISH Network/Sling TV), or an MVPD service and broadcast service (Comcast/NBCU; Federal Communications Commission [FCC], 2015). In effect, the legal distinction between content providers, on the basis of their online versus offline status, may erode. Accordingly, the FCC proposed in 2014 that OVDs providing linear streams of programming shall be defined as MVPDs (FCC, 2014). However, the FCC's "linear" definition implied prescheduled, continuous streams of video programming, which none of the dominant U.S. OTT services provided—services such as

Netflix are on-demand services. Therefore, as of the current writing, the FCC continues to draw a distinction between broadcast stations, MVPDs, and nonlinear OVDs (FCC, 2017).

South Korea too is not exceptional in this sense; both existing telecom and media companies have been active OTT providers. However, it can be seen in the article that South Korean OTT services exist in a wider ecosystem of smart media business models (KISDI, 2014), where they compete with close substitutes that do not technically fit the Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications' (2016) definition of OTT services. For example, many Korean video providers have deployed N-screen strategies, which are often conflated with OTT in the Korean media and policy discourse. N-screen refers to "the user interface in which users can seamlessly access to the same contents—pictures, music, data, and video—through many different platforms and devices connected to the Internet" (Choi, 2011, p. 11). N-screen overcomes the restriction of time, space, and devices,[2] and compete effectively with OTT. But these services are closely associated with the pay TV subscription offered by dominant telcos and cable companies and are often consumed as part of a pay TV package.

Therefore, in this article, we draw a distinction between "pure OTTs," as multiplatform content delivery services combining wired broadband, mobile, and traditional platforms delivered on demand by content providers over nonaffiliated access providers (telcos and cable broadband companies), and "OTT-like services," such as N-screen strategies, that are often deployed by dominant carriers to preempt new entrants providing OTT services.

Impact of OTT Video

The breakthrough convergence phenomenon has been changing the traditional value chain (Figure 1). The impacts of the new OTT services are felt at all levels of the value chain, but it is most useful to focus separately on the impacts on traditional video providers and viewers. Regarding impacts on video providers, aggregators and content producers are pursuing direct-to-consumer opportunities, distributors are moving into content production, and hardware producers are offering integrated solutions—combining devices, operating systems, and content access on one platform (McKinsey & Company, 2014). Even though each player started its business from all different sectors, they have converged in the same direction to the areas of content, platform, network, and device (CPND; Song, 2014).

[2] According to K. Hong (n.d.), N-screen is defined a "unified entertainment experience across several devices," meaning that one can flit between watching the same program on one's TV, tablet, or smartphone, with the software automatically adapting the programming to the various formats.



Source: Song, 2014.

Figure 1. Changing value chain.

On the other hand, from the users' perspective, OTT services appear to be as good as previous equivalents even as they offer the additional functionality of being free of a particular network and device, and are provided for free (Song, 2013). It means a reduction in revenues for access providers because of cord-cutting (unsubscribing from pay TV because of the availability of online content) or cord-shaving (downgrading the subscription to the basic plan and buying OTT service instead). "Cord-nevers" are those who have never subscribed to multichannel pay TV services—for example, millennials setting up their first homes and deciding to forgo subscribing to cable in favor of accessing all their video programming from OTTs and other online providers (Alleman, Fontaine, Katz, & Le Champion, 2013; Skot, 2014).

From a business perspective, as OTT services grow and gain profitability while using the network for free, traditional access providers continue to experience a reduction in revenue and profitability.[3] They have opposed OTT services, accusing them of free-riding on their network resources—causing a big chunk of data traffic while generating no revenues for access providers. An industry research firm suggests that telecom companies and pay TV providers could choose from four OTT response strategies: (1) protecting, by blocking OTT services to reduce negative impact; (2) facilitating, by leveraging network assets to offer them to OTT providers for a price; (3) partnering, by offering OTT as third-party services to their own access customers; and (4) competing, by offering the same service (Figure 2).

[3] Global total broadcast TV advertising revenue, consisting of multichannel and terrestrial TV advertising revenue, accounted for 97.2% of global total TV advertising revenue in 2014. But as viewing continues to move away from traditional networks and toward digital alternatives, global total broadcast TV advertising revenue will make up a reduced 94.3% of global total TV advertising revenue by 2019 (PwC, 2015).



Source: Ovum, 2013, cited by Song, 2013.

Figure 2. Telcos and pay TV providers' response strategies to the threat of OTT players.

However, OTT services have increased in relative importance rapidly, and traditional access providers started to recognize that there might be greater prudence and opportunity in cooperation rather than in opposition (Ovum, 2013, cited in Song, 2013). For example, the Mobile World Congress held by the Global System for Mobile Communication Association in February 2014 fully embraced OTT providers in every part of the event and showed such a change of perception. Thus, the cooperation between telecom providers and OTT providers has been increasing (H. Hong, 2014; Song, 2013).

Korean Providers' Responses to OTT

In South Korea, broadband and mobile penetration have risen faster than in most other countries (OECD, 2017b). The Internet usage rate is 82%, with 99% broadband penetration in the household. Since the introduction of smartphones in 2009 in South Korea, the penetration of mobile phones—smartphones (95.5%) and feature phones (4.2%)—has risen to 99.7% of the whole population. Users in their teens and 20s are almost universally likely to own cell phones, while users older than 60 have 78.3% penetration (National Information Society Agency [NIA], 2014). In this environment, cell phones with Internet access have been prospering as the platform for all kinds of communication applications, not only for interacting with people but also for watching videos. South Koreans' email and SMS usage have been decreasing thanks to the increasing use of the mobile messenger services. The

power shift toward the mobile market has made dominant video market players and telecommunication providers more focused on developing a mobile platform (NIA, 2014).

In such developed broadband and mobile platforms, OTT video services have developed and rapidly expanded their market share by double digits annually—by 57% in 2016 alone—reaching revenues of about $430 million (Korea Communications Commission [KCC], 2016). Their share of advertising revenue also keeps increasing (5.8% of all advertisement spending). In streaming video services, the existing communications service providers using multiplatform (N-screen) services have been the innovation leaders. Users of streaming services already account for half of the population, reaching 23.7 million of 50.22 million (in 2013).

The essential requirements for providing OTT services are content, delivery networks (aggregating content), and access (single or multiplatform). But none of the traditional players in the media/telecommunications industries controls all three requirements, resulting in dynamic cross-media entry and partnerships (Lee, 2016). Traditional access providers (e.g., telecom companies) deploying content, traditional content providers (cable networks) seeking new delivery channels, and terrestrial content + access providers (terrestrial broadcasters) seeking additional delivery channels have actively participated in the OTT video service market. For example, traditional access providers (mainly broadband and mobile communication providers) SKT, KT, and LGU+ have launched their own OTT services and used them as a part of N-screen plans. Also, terrestrial broadcasters have offered services such as POOQ, and cable TV providers' offerings include Tving and EveryOn TV. In this context, TV set manufacturers like Samsung and LG, and main portal sites such as Naver and Daum, have added their presence in competition for OTT video services (Song, 2013). However, the existing video providers, including terrestrial broadcasters and pay TV providers, have still been prevalent in market size and power. OTT video services are often provided free with a subscription to a certain package plan level. Free OTT promotion events are often available (Jeon, 2017).

The percentage of total subscribers in the pay TV market is as follows.[4] Cable TV (system operators), at 48.7%; IPTV at 40.3%; satellite at 11%; and OTS (Olleh TV Skylife, KT's combined product of its satellite TV [Skylife] and IPTV [Olleh TV]) at 7.9%. While cable TV subscribers are more, they have been decreasing. Meanwhile, telecom companies' IPTV continues to grow, eroding the pay TV market. Thus, the pay TV market is getting more competitive. On the other hand, three main terrestrial broadcasters' power in programming and rating are still prevalent even with the growth of cable TV networks. Their combined rating (KBS, MBC, and SBS) was 20.1% in 2015, showing a big gap from the most popular cable channel's ratings, 1.61% (MBN). OTT video service users are more likely to subscribe for a pay TV broadcasting than non-OTT users. In a survey conducted by a government research institute, the majority of OTT service users (86%) responded that they would still keep pay TV services.

[4] Pay TV includes analog cable, digital cable, satellite TV, and IPTV, with a total of 94 pay TV providers in 78 broadcasting regions. While cable TV's market share has been slowly decreasing, IPTV has increased its market share. The company with the biggest market share was KT, with its satellite TV (Skylife) and IPTV (Olleh TV) recording 29.3% (KCC, 2016, p. 34).

Such responses indicate that OTT video service is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, the existing pay TV services in South Korea (KCC, 2016).

Despite its rapid growth, likewise, OTT video service has not yet been a threatening force against the existing terrestrial broadcasting and pay TV markets; its market share was only 3.8% of the whole pay TV video market in 2016 (KCC, 2016). Telecom companies' IPTV led the growth of the pay TV market by adding more subscribers than other pay TV subscribers. OTT has been provided as a part of triple or quadruple services, combining video, Internet, telephone, and mobile services. Thus, such combined package subscribers recorded 41.7% of all pay TV subscribers in 2015, and OTT has been used as an attractive complement to the bundled package to make subscribers "stickier" (KCC, 2016).

Pursuing N-screens (Multiplatform)

Unlike the case of the United States, where third-party players (e.g., Netflix) rather than pay TV providers dominate the OTT video service market, the Korean case draws a different picture. Domestic telecommunications service providers, terrestrial broadcasters, cable TV providers, and IPTV providers have led the online video market, vigorously launching OTT-like video services as part of their N-screen strategies. For instance, consumers buy one ID and use it across multiple devices to access content. While global companies like Netflix have focused on obtaining global platforms with market penetration and scale economies, Korean companies focus more on making connections to multiscreens and mobile devices (KISDI, 2013).

OTT video service does not yet have a specific definition in Korea. Online video content providers are large in number and keep evolving because the requirement to enter the market is just registering as a value-added provider. A government report estimates that the top 13 OTT video services occupied 97% of the OTT market in 2016 (KCC, 2016). Their business models include free service with advertisements (54.4%), subscription (15.9%), and a la carte VOD (10.2%; KCC, 2016; see Table 1). As for free services, YouTube and Naver TV Cast were the largest OTT providers. Next, traditional telecom service providers (KT's Olleh TV mobile, SKB's Oksusu, and LGU+'s video portal), terrestrial broadcasters (POOQ), and cable TV providers (Tving by CJ E&M and EveryOn TV by Hyundai HCN) led the market as subscription-based plans (KCC, 2016; KT Economics & Management Research Lab [KT], 2014). However, regarding the total ad revenue of OTT in 2016, YouTube was the top OTT video service. YouTube revenue is 2.5 times higher than Naver and five times higher than the combined OTT revenue of SBS, iMBC, and KBS (Im, 2017).

Furthermore, diversified devices have increased OTT video use on multiple platforms. Thanks to the diversified devices (smartphones and tablets), the total TV rating through traditional TV sets continues to decline—for instance, from 30% in 2008 to 27% in 2013, while N-screen users are rapidly increasing, from 29.8% in 2011 to 53.1% in 2012 (KISDI, 2013). The unique sociocultural factors of South Korea—the overwhelming prevalence of mobile devices and their high use, and an exceedingly mobile population in the urban environment—have contributed to the development of OTT video on N-screens (NIA, 2015). The latter factor is important because Koreans access video content using mobile

devices in nontraditional settings such as restaurants, subways, and public venues, making an N-screen strategy much more attractive and lucrative to service providers.

Table 1. Comparison of Business Models.

Category	Company	Content	Channel	Single or Multiplatform?	Revenue Model
Telecom service providers (IPTV based)	KT—Olleh TV mobile	Terrestrial TV programs, cable TV, movies, children's programs, sports, documentaries, and animations	80 real-time channels (terrestrial TV/cable TV programs) and 140,000 VODs 6 GB a day	Multiplatform (Olleh TV Skylife, Olleh TV live and Olleh TV mobile on PC, mobile, tablets, TV-based OTT, Telebee)	**—Flat rates based on packages —a la carte VOD —Ads before a content plays**
	SK Broadband—Oksusu (BTV Mobile +Hoppin)	A variety of real-time broadcasting, VOD, terrestrial TV programs, new blockbuster movies, popular American dramas, animations, educational programs for children, cable TV programs, etc.	—108 real-time channels (terrestrial TV/cable TV programs), 85,000 VODs, voice search, TV apps (YouTube/Chrome) and Web search —100% LTE data package	Multiplatform (HD VoD on mobile & tablets; full HD video streaming service using the LTE-A network; Oksusu on PC service launched in September 2017; B tv real time, B tv smart, B tv UHD)	**—Flat rates based on packages —a la carte VOD**
	LG U+HDTV—video portal	TV programs, HD broadcasting in real time, 20,000 VOD, etc.	120 real-time channels (70 real-time broadcasting channels), VOD, Google services	Multiplatform[U+TV G (IPTV+Google TV), IPTV U+TV on mobile, tablets]	**—Flat rates based on packages —a la carte VOD**
Terrestrial broadcasters	POOQ	TV programs (real-time and replay). N-screen service from an alliance of four TV broadcasters: MBC, SBS, KBS, and EBS	46 real-time terrestrial broadcasting channels, cable TV channels, VOD	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets), POOQ started to collaborate with telecom IPTV providers for their real-time TV program broadcasting.	**—Flat rates based on packages —a la carte VOD**

Cable TV network	CJ E&M—Tving	Pay content created by terrestrial broadcasters and its cable subsidiary CJ E&M	150 real-time channels (terrestrial broadcasting programs/cable TV channels/foreign channels) and 50,000 movie and drama VODs. Only 80 channels are free.	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets)	**—Free content —Ads before a content plays —Flat rates based on packages (diverse sets of plans depending on channels and content) —a la carte VOD**
	Hyundai HCN—EveryOn TV	Free N-screen TV service, 50 cable TV program providers' real-time programs	250 channels mostly based on cable TV program providers	Multiplatform with a dongle purchase (PC, mobile, tablets)	**—Free —Ads before a content plays —Based on a dongle for the service**
	Dlive	Netflix content by affiliation, Korean cable TV content, entertainment, hobbies, religion, education content	255 channels through Dlive plus OTT set-top box, Netflix content by an exclusive contract, VOD, and 12,000 free content	Multiplatform (OTT set-top box, mobile, tablet, smart TV)	**—Subscription for Dlive special (Cable + OTT)**
Portal site based	YouTube	UCC, TV content, movies, video clips	UCC, broadcasting content with ads, movie VOD	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets)	**—Free —Ads before a content plays —Flat rate: YouTube Red (without ads)**
	Navercast—Naver TV/V Live	UCC, TV content, Web-only content (Web drama, Web entertainment)	—UCC, TV content, movie VOD —Top 100 video clips (edited from TV programs)	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets)	**—Free —Ads before a content plays**
	Kakao TV (Daum TV Pot + Kakao TV)	UCC, TV content, Web-only content	—Real-time TV/VOD — UCC —Memedia*	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets)	**—Free —Ads before a content plays**

Independent OTT company	Pandora TV	UCC, TV content	UCC (memedia), online video sharing	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets)	**—Advertisement to user-submitted video clips —Unlimited storage space for users to upload**
	Afreeca TV	UCC by opening a broadcasting room online	—3,500 real-time channels provided online by individual users (Broadcasting Jockey) —Free Memedia	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets, smart TV application launched in 2017)	**—Free —Ads before a content plays —Viewers can give virtual prizes to BJs —Fee from BJs in changing the prizes to cash**
	Watcha play	25,000 movies, dramas, documentaries, etc.	—Movies, animation, TV broadcasting, music, game, entertainment content, and kids' programming.	Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablets, smart TV application launched in 2017)	**—Free for one month —$7 monthly thereafter**
	GOM TV	**UCC, TV content, movies**	**Online content on GOM player (movies, animation, TV broadcasting, music, games, adult and special entertainment content), free Tving TV**	**Multiplatform (PC, mobile, tablet, smart TV application launched in 2017)**	**—Free content with ads/premium pay per view —Flat rates based on packages (combination of channels)**

Source: KCC, 2016; company sites.
UCC: user-created content.
*Memedia: a collective term for online services that allow a user to post his or her own content, such as blogs, photographs, and personal profiles, on the Internet (Collins English Dictionary).

As for the online streaming service, content service providers with N-screen strategies have been leading the market. At present, about 70% of the VOD market revenue is collected by broadcasters with content, and 30% by N-screen OTT providers. The N-screen service has more than 23 million users, almost half of the whole population. About 4 million of these users pay monthly fees for the service. Recently, more VOD users have switched to monthly subscriptions because of an increase in the a la carte VOD download prices (Song, 2014).

Providing Catch-Up TV Programs on the Go

Since a pay TV consortium, CJ E&M's Tving, began the OTT video service on an N-screen model—mostly to allow users on the go to catch up with TV programs they might have missed—this type of TV watching has sharply increased. Traditional access providers like mobile telecommunications operators SKT, KT, and LGU+ started to provide TV programs on N-screen service, and their paid mobile IPTV subscribers skyrocketed. A terrestrial broadcasters' consortium for OTT, POOQ also successfully increased subscribers underlining the attractiveness of the original content warehouse in Korea. The companies that started OTT video on N-screen for the first time were SK Planet (Telco), POOQ (terrestrial broadcasters' consortium), and Tving (cable TV consortium; Table 2), and their services included diverse functions such as continuous relay watching, program download reservation, and individualized favorite channels register.

Table 2. The First OTT Pioneers and Their Services.

Telecom companies	**Broadcasters**	**Pay TV providers**
SK Planet – Hoppin	MBC + SBS – POOQ	CJ HelloVision – Tving
—VOD on TV through HDMI connection —Browsing using a Bluetooth remote controller. —Continuous watching, reserved download, 30-minute preview, fast upload after live TV shows	—Real-time TV: 30 channels —VOD content —Registering favorite channels and reserved download service	—Unique content (e.g., Game competition, *league of legend*) —Continuous watching on TV

Source: NIA, 2014; Song, 2014.

Bundling IPTV, Broadband, Mobile Communication, and OTT

A significant element of the Korean OTT market has been the mobile OTT video services provided by IPTV providers, as previously mentioned. The 3G telecommunications operators have bundled such mobile OTT video services with their existing services such as IPTV, mobile communication, and broadband access services for a fixed monthly fee. The bundling enables consumers to use OTT video service for a small additional fee once the package is purchased (Table 3).

Table 3. Mobile IPTV Service in South Korea.

Provider	Service name	No. of Subscribers (million)	Monthly fee
KT	Olleh TV mobile	4.60 (1.30)*	5,000 won (USD $4.29)
SKB	B tv mobile pack	5.60 (2.50)*	3,000 won (USD $2.56)
LG U+	U+ HDTV	7.0 (1.80)*	5,000 won (USD $4.29)

*paid subscribers.
Source: KISDI, 2014.

A national survey found that 53.8% of OTT users used the service as a part of a bundling package that could include broadband access, mobile phone, IPTV, or cable TV (KISDI, 2016a). Interestingly, this survey found that pay TV subscribers were more likely to use OTT than non–pay TV subscribers and agreed more that OTT could replace the existing pay TV service as compared with other groups. Thus, it can be speculated that OTT video service is not competing with the existing broadcast or telecom services, but is used as a means to have customers hold the subscribed service plan in Korea. In this scenario, it seems uncertain how an independent OTT video service provider like Netflix can survive.

However, the mobile TV services provided by mobile telecommunications operators, including SKT, KT, and LGU+, can be used only with 4G LTE services. For 3G smartphones, the service is available only with Wi-Fi and not with 3G. Furthermore, with the recent introduction of the LTE-A service, which supports a high speed of 150 Mbps, the environment of the mobile OTT video service was improved (NIA, 2014). Considering the rapidly increasing number of 4G LTE users in Korea, OTT video service as a value-added service will keep growing.

Collaborating With Content Powerhouses

The dilemma of traditional access providers (e.g., telecom companies) is always how to secure quality content. As OTT emerges, the market value of original quality video products has gone up just like the value of original music skyrocketed in the music industry after online piracy. Large media companies that provide an umbrella for diversified types of content creation are poised to remain strong regardless of overall industry dynamics, as long as they produce compelling content (Gimpel, 2013). Traditional access providers and IPTV companies—KT, SKT, and LG—quickly entered into partnerships with broadcasters and, since 2014, have collaboratively offered POOQ as part of their array of services that stream terrestrial broadcasters' original content (KISDI, 2014). However, the relationship between content providers and OTTs continues to be confrontational. In 2017, real-time terrestrial TV streaming on mobile networks was briefly halted and then revived in May 2017; negotiations over pricing between broadcasters and mobile providers broke down and were then resolved (Ju, 2017; H. J. Park, 2016). Continuing conflicts between telecom service providers (IPTV mobile OTT providers) and terrestrial broadcasters stem from the broadcasters' price increases and IPTV providers' growing clout in negotiation. Recently, IPTV providers have increased their content power by securing much original content through business partnerships (Ju, 2017).

South Korean terrestrial broadcasters have played a dominant role in providing original and live TV content, and loading POOQ, their own OTT, on the platform will be an attractive strategy for telecom

companies. Real-time TV shows are extremely popular in many countries, not to mention big sporting events, which tend to have powerful audience appeal and strong brand impact. Thus, it is advised that "where possible, media companies should take advantage of the 'live' phenomenon and provide consumers with unique and premium experiences connected to their propositions—experiences that are difficult to replicate in the digital world" (McKinsey & Company, 2014, p. 6). Thus, in the markets where terrestrial TV broadcasters have dominant market power in providing live TV programs, collaborating with such content powerhouses seems inevitable. Some OTT companies provide the platform for real-time programs and gain a major share of their revenue from the rental of their platform, like Hyundai HCN/Pandora TV's EveryOn TV (KISDI, 2014).

Developing Their Own STB

Traditional pay TV companies have been leading the development of an OTT set-top box (STB), a so-called smart STB device similar to Google TV, to enter the device market. For instance, EveryOn TV developed EveryOn Cast, which can be connected to a TV HDMI unit to receive TV 250 channels. CJ HelloVision's "helloTV smart" and Tbroad's "smart plus" were released in 2013. Prominent IPTV players have also developed an Android OS/HTML5/Google TV/Samsung Smart TV platform based smart STBs that could provide OTT streaming service. For example, KT's "olleh TV smart," SK Broadband's "B TV smart," and LG U+'s Google TV-based "U+ tv G" are STBs released since 2012 (NIA, 2014). Device manufacturers such as Samsung and LG have also developed smart TV sets and simultaneously developed smart and social applications in their classic TV sets. In the absence of independent OTTs that can compete against traditional communications service providers, Korean OTT players have kept the device manufacturers in check (Song, 2014). Samsung and LG have focused on platform leadership and application development, and for a while, they allied with major apps developers; however, currently they seem to be reverting to their original business: manufacturing advanced smart TV/UHDTV sets with the upgraded user experience.

Conclusions

This article is an analysis of business models and strategies employed by South Korean firms in the digital video marketplace facing competition from OTT content services, using Schumpeter's model of innovation. It analyzed the strategies of all players, including traditional access providers (e.g., telecom companies) deploying content, traditional content providers (cable networks) seeking new delivery channels, and terrestrial content and access providers (terrestrial broadcasters).

The Schumpeterian model draws attention to four factors in market evolution: the nature of innovation; entrepreneurship; market disruption and obsolescence of older business models; and the role of financial resources and incentives. The impact of each of these factors was evident in the Korean case. OTT as an innovation emerged earlier in South Korea because of the technology and business environment prevailing in that country. A unique aspect of Korea was the much faster diffusion of mobile devices and the higher speed of broadband networks (OECD, 2017b). As a result, Korean viewers switched to online media consumption, forcing established players and new entrants to deploy their content to wired and mobile broadband platforms, following the viewers. However, OTT as innovation was enabled only by ancillary innovations in technologies (e.g., set-top boxes), content, and business models (e.g., N-screen strategies).

A critical concern in applying Schumpeter's framework to the OTT case is the identity of the entrepreneur. Schumpeter himself argued in different places that innovation will arise from new firms outside the dominant core of industry, or in large firms that have surpluses to invest in R&D. Other scholars who examined the locus of innovation have also found contrasting results (Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Agrawal et al., 2014; Koeller, 1995; Rogers, 2004). Acs and Audretsch (1987) found that the innovative advantage of large versus small firms is dependent on market structure, with large firms having an advantage in imperfectly competitive markets and smaller firms in competitive industries. The Korean case discussed in this article provides confirmatory evidence for this view: Specifically, the audiovisual market, characterized by large oligopolistic firms, witnessed the emergence of OTT under the control of traditional video content providers, and OTT deployment tended to strengthen the market positions of traditional players. In contrast, the emergence of Netflix as a third-party OTT video provider challenged traditional broadcasters in the United States.

Several reasons might be cited for this phenomenon. First, reinforcing the oligopolistic nature of the Korean market, terrestrial broadcasting content continues to be popular in the country, although it has gradually decreased over the years because of growth in the pay TV market: The three primary terrestrial broadcasters recorded 20.1% in combined ratings, and pay TV channels 16.9% in 2015 (KCC, 2016). Even on OTTs, Korean audiences continue to be loyal to broadcast content: An international consumer survey of online video viewing habits in France, Germany, India, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States found that South Koreans preferred TV shows to movies, unlike most countries, where movies were the most viewed content (Limelight Networks, 2017).

A second factor is that cable prices are comparatively lower in South Korea than elsewhere in the world, reducing the incentives for cord-cutting and cord-shaving. Compared with a "cable TV only" price of above $100 in the United States, for example (Pressman, 2016), Koreans pay a monthly average of only about $47 for bundled packages that include Internet, TV, and landline phone; $20 for "Internet only"; and as little as $10 for "pay TV only" service (KISDI, 2016b).

For these reasons, OTT has been offered as an inexpensive addition to the main service pack rather than as a substitute for the traditional pay TV service. Although users are likely to consider OTT as a similar service to pay TV, it is not yet considered a substitute for pay TV (KISDI, 2014). Thus, in South Korea, the advent of OTT video has not triggered a process of Schumpeterian market disruption/creative destruction—a period in which radical innovations and new technological combinations destroy "old" economic structures and create "new" ones, as Schumpeter suggested (Schumpeter, 1942; cited in Evens, 2013).

Schumpeterian creative destruction is more evident in the Netflix case, where dominant commercial broadcasters potentially perceived the threat from OTT TV but were unable to change their business models. As Acs and Audretsch (1987) have argued, the more competitive U.S. market may have generated fewer surpluses that could have been invested to confront OTTs, or given more allowance to experiment with new business models. Korea's public-television-dominant oligopolistic broadcast model might have given its providers greater freedom to experiment.

The role of finance and financial institutions (Schumpeter's fourth factor) may also be examined. Two factors contributed to the continued dominance of the traditional video content providers: greater access to investible financial resources, and the nature of financial incentives Korea's public service dominated the broadcast system. First, as shown, broadcasters' content continued to be popular in Korea for much longer, and traditional content providers did not witness the erosion of broadcast market shares that characterized most other markets. The most attractive and popular content in Korea was broadcast programming and shows, which the established broadcasters were able to control more effectively. Retransmission of broadcast content (terrestrial and cable networks) has been most popular in Korean OTT. "Real-time broadcasting" and "Replay on the go" have been widespread due to a couple of factors: First, some OTT services are deployed by existing traditional television providers as part of their multiscreen strategies, and second, the urban culture of high smartphone use creates a large installed base of mobile handsets that makes mobile streaming an attractive proposition for broadcasters. Korean traditional content providers, therefore, had greater investible internal resources than providers in other countries. Thus, OTT services in Korea became an extension of established players' offerings and part of their N-screen strategy, further entrenching their market position. In the United States, by contrast, services such as Netflix had gained a significant market share of viewership and scale economies before the traditional audiovisual providers woke up to the threat.

Despite the popularity of their own content, South Korean telecom players have been actively collaborating with content providers (KT Olleh TV + POOQ). More diverse suppliers of video programs naturally led to growing importance of content, and content differentiation and development of exclusive content on each platform are growing in importance. Thus, building solid partnerships with companies that own complementary resources is considered to create a competitive advantage in this broadband television environment. Thus, such strategic alliances seem inevitable to share distinctive resources and competencies (Liu & Chan-Olmsted, 2003). Heightened competition for platform leadership—competition and collaboration on multiple fronts— has stimulated the development of OTT and associated devices.

The second economic factor is the nature of financial incentives. In Korea, public broadcasters have less incentive to avoid or oppose disruptive innovations because their business models do not involve the profit motive to the same extent as the commercial broadcasters that were Netflix's primary competitors. The United States is dominated by commercial broadcasters, whereas Japan and Korea still have dominant public broadcasters. The "public service" mandate might be interpreted as a call to serve audiences where they exist (if audiences are going online, public broadcasters might follow them there).

In effect, South Korean public TV broadcasters were "platform agnostic," preferring to preserve their audience shares, whatever the consequences for revenue and profits (E.-A. Park, 2017). This allowed them to defend their audience share against new entrants, whereas in the United States, the broadcasters' stubborn defense of their platform was ultimately counterproductive. In the Schumpeterian model, established firms tend to avoid disruptive innovations, or actively oppose them. They tend not to change business models, even when the business models face threats. Paradoxically, Korean traditional broadcasters' less commercial orientation enabled them to avoid this trap: They embraced the new OTT technology, which in the long term enabled them to stave off competition from emergent players.

As a result of the combined impact of these factors, the early innovations in OTT services in the South Korean market came from established media and telecom companies. In other countries where audience losses for traditional broadcasters were slower to manifest, established players did not deploy OTT services early enough, leaving the space open to upstart providers such as Netflix. The Korean case suggests some responses from traditional audiovisual providers facing competition from OTT services. Korean traditional broadcasters were able to successfully incorporate OTT into their business models—at least to date—because they creatively, dynamically, and proactively deployed their own offerings in a way that did not cannibalize their existing content offerings, but extended them to new platforms. Paradoxically, facing a threat from new media earlier than in other countries seems to have helped Korean broadcasters in the long run. Whether broadcasters in other countries can emulate the Korean strategies remains to be seen.

References

ABI Research. (2014). *Over the top (OTT) and multiscreen video services*. Retrieved from https://www.abiresearch.com/market-research/product/1016143-over-the-top-ott-and-multiscreen-video-ser/

Acs, Z. J., & Audretsch, D. B. (1987). Innovation, market structure, and firm size*. The Review of Economics and Statistics*, *69*(4), 567–574.

Agrawal, A., Cockburn, I., Galasso, A., & Oettl, A. (2014). Why are some regions more innovative than others? The role of small firms in the presence of large labs. *Journal of Urban Economics*, *81,* 149–165.

Aidi, L., Markendahl, J., Tollmar, K., Selvakumar, E., Huang, J., & Blennerud, G. (2013). *Mobile music business models in Asia's emerging markets*, presented at the International Conference on Mobile Business (ICMB 2013) [e-conference], Paper 2. Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/icmb2013/2

Alleman, J., Fontaine, G., Katz, R., & Le Champion, R. (2013). Video cord-cutting: Introduction. *Communications and Strategies*, *92*(4), 43–61.

Arnold, L. G. (2002). *Business cycle theory*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Arolovitch, A. (2015). Streaming: The new normal? *Broadcasting & Cable*, *145*(25), 16. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1699227926?accountid=13158

Banerjee, A., Rappoport, P. N., & Alleman, J. (2014). Forecasting video cord-cutting: The bypass of traditional pay television. In J. Alleman, A. M. Patricia, & P. N. Rappoport (Eds.), *Demand for communications services-insights and perspectives* (pp. 59–82). New York, NY: Springer.

Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications. (2016). *BEREC report on OTT services.* Retrieved from http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/reports/5751-berec-report-on-ott-services

Choi, S. (2011). Diffusion of N-screen service and outlook of content business. Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA). *Focus*, *2011*(11), 39.

Crandall, R. W. (2014). "Over the top": Has technological change radically altered the prospects for traditional media? In J. Alleman, A. M., Patricia, & P. N. Rappoport (Eds.), *Demand for communications services-insights and perspectives* (pp. 33–57). New York, NY: Springer.

Evens, T. (2013). Platform leadership in online broadcasting markets. In M. Friedrichsen (Ed.), *Handbook of social media management: Value chain and business models in changing media markets* (pp. 477–491). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Federal Communications Commission. (2014). *Notice of proposed rulemaking, in the matter of promoting innovation and competition in the provision of multichannel video programming distribution services.* Retrieved from https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-210A1.pdf

Federal Communications Commission. (2015). *Media bureau seeks comment on the status of competition in the market for the delivery of video programming*. Retrieved from https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-15-784A1.pdf

Federal Communications Commission. (2017). *18th annual report on the status of competition in the market for the delivery of video programming*. Retrieved from https://www.fcc.gov/document/18th-annual-video-competition-report

Gimpel, G. (2013). *Five pressing issues shaping the future of TV & video*. The MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers/2013.05_Gimpel_Five%20Pressing%20Issues%20Shaping%20the%20Future%20of%20TV%20Video.pdf

Hong, H. (2014). *The trend of cooperation between telecommunication providers and OTT providers*. Retrieved from http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/publication/selectResearch.do?cmd=fpSelectResearch&sMenuType=2&controlNoSer=2&controlNo=13467&langdiv=1

Hong, K. (n.d.). *N-screen connected devices 2014 anywhere, anytime, any device and cloud.* Retrieved from https://www.bogotobogo.com/WebTechnologies/n-screen_connected_devices.php

Im, Y. B. (2017). Kakao and Naver's TV competition while YouTube watching. *Naver magazinecast Appstory*. Retrieved from http://navercast.naver.com/magazine_contents.nhn?rid=1103&contents_id=134221

Jeon, J. Y. (2017, March 28). The current state of domestic OTT users—OTT use ↑ willingness to pay for contents. *ET News.* Retrieved from http://www.etnews.com/20170328000131#

Ju, S. H. (2017, May 5). KT mobile IPTV resumes SBS VOD except LGU+. *News1*. Retrieved from http://news1.kr/articles/?2985879

Juma, C. (2014). Complexity, innovation, and development: Schumpeter revisited. *Policy and Complex Systems*, *1*(1), 4–21.

Koeller, C. T. (1995). Innovation, market structure and firm size: A simultaneous equations model. *Managerial and Decision Economics*, *16*(3), 259–269.

Korea Communications Commission. (2016). *2016 video market competition report.* Retrieved from http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/board/selectSingleBoard.do?cmd=selectSingleBoard&boardId=GPK_RND_DATA&seq=32313&reStep=&ctx=

Korea Information Society Development Institute. (2013). *2014 ICT industry outlook of Korea*. Retrieved from http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/board/selectSingleBoard.do?cmd=selectSingleBoard&boardId=GPK_RND_DATA&seq=29268&reStep=&ctx=

Korea Information Society Development Institute. (2014). A study on assessment systems for smart media competition. *KCC Research KCC–2014–19*. Retrieved from http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/publication/selectResearch.do?cmd=fpSelectResearch&sMenuType=3&controlNoSer=4&controlNo=13613&langdiv=1

Korea Information Society Development Institute. (2016a). *Domestic broadcasting trend analysis*. Retrieved from http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/board/selectSingleBoard.do?cmd=selectSingleBoard&boardId=GPK_RND_DATA&seq=32301&reStep=&ctx=

Korea Information Society Development Institute. (2016b). *Korean media panel survey*. Retrieved from http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/board/selectSingleBoard.do?cmd=selectSingleBoard&boardId=GPK_RND_DATA&seq=32335&reStep=&ctx=

KT Economics & Management Research Lab. (2014). 2014 ICT 10 appreciable issues. *Issue Crunch Special Report*. Retrieved from https://www.digieco.co.kr/KTFront/board/board_view.action?board_seq=8493&board_id=strategy

Lee, S. H. (2016). TV contents distribution and prospect in accordance with the environmental change of broadcasting market. *Information and Communications Policy*, *28*(622), 1–17. Retrieved from http://www.kisdi.re.kr/kisdi/fp/kr/publication/selectResearch.do?cmd=fpSelectResearch&sMenuType=2&controlNoSer=2&controlNo=13894&langdiv=1

Limelight Networks. (2017). *Market research: The state of online video 2017*. Retrieved from https://www.limelight.com/resources/white-paper/state-of-online-video-2017/

Liu, F., & Chan-Olmsted, S. M. (2003). The partnership between the old and the new: Examining the strategic alliances between broadcast television networks and Internet firms in the context of convergence. *The International Journal on Media Management*, *5*(1), 47–56.

McKinsey & Company. (2014). *Global media report 2014*. Retrieved from https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Media%20and%20Entertainment/Our%20Insights/Global%20Media%20Report%202014/Global%20Media%20Report%202014.ashx

National Information Society Agency. (2014). *National informatization white paper*. Retrieved from http://www.nia.or.kr/site/nia_kor/ex/bbs/View.do?cbIdx=44086&bcIdx=15183&parentSeq=15183

National Information Society Agency. (2015). *National informatization white paper*. Retrieved from http://www.nia.or.kr/site/nia_kor/ex/bbs/View.do?cbIdx=44086&bcIdx=16442&parentSeq=16442

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2017a). *Fixed and mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (Dec. 2017).* Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/broadband-statistics/

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2017b). *OECD broadband portal.* Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/oecdbroadbandportal.htm

Park, E.-A. (2017). Why the networks can't beat Netflix: Speculations on the U.S. OTT Services Market. *Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance*, *19*(1), 21–39.

Park, H. J. (2016, September 20). *Over-the-top (OTT) services in Korea*. Regional Standardization Forum for Bridging the Standardization Gap (BSG), New Delhi, India. Retrieved from https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/bsg/201609/Documents/OTT%20Services%20in%20Korea_BSG_HJP.pdf

Pressman, A. (2016, September 23). The average cable TV bill has hit a new all-time record. *Fortune*. Retrieved from http://fortune.com/2016/09/23/average-cable-tv-bill/

PwC. (2015). *Global entertainment and media outlook, 2015–2019*. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2015/digital-and-traditional-media-divide.html

PwC. (2016). *Entertainment & media outlook 2016–2021*. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/entertainment-media/outlook.html

Rich, M. (2017, April 10). OTT breaks out of its Netflix shell. *comScore*. Retrieved from http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Blog/OTT-Breaks-Out-of-Its-Netflix-Shell

Rodriguez, A. (2017, June 16). With more than 50 million U.S. subscribers, Netflix has finally surpassed cable TV. *Quartz.* Retrieved from https://qz.com/1007227/netflix.nflx-now-has-more-us-subscribers-than-cable-tv/

Rogers, M. (2004). Networks, firm size and innovation. *Small Business Economics*, *22*(2), 141–153.

Ross, S. W., & Erasmus, L. D. (2013, July). *Evolving the network operator's business model in an OTT environment using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps*. 2013 Proceedings of PICMET 2013: Technology Management in the IT-Driven Services, San Jose, CA.

Schumpeter, J. (1942). *Capitalism, socialism, and democracy*. New York, NY: Harper.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1949). *The theory of economic development.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.187354

Skot, T. A. (2014). *Value chain dynamics and evolving consumer demographics in the American television industry* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.

Song, M. (2013). *Global OTT landscape & strategic directions of CPND*. KT Economics & Management Research Lab (South Korea). Retrieved from https://www.digieco.co.kr/KTFront/board/board_view.action?board_seq=8441&board_id=skill

Song, M. (2014). OTT video business strategies. *Digieco Report: Issue & Trend*: KT Economics & Management Research Lab (South Korea). Retrieved from https://www.digieco.co.kr/KTFront/board/board_view.action?board_seq=8795&board_id=issue_trend

Wyatt, E., & Cohen, N. (2014, February 23). Comcast and Netflix reach deal on service. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/business/media/comcast-and-netflix-reach-a-streaming-agreement.html

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4615–4640 1932–8036/20180005

Imbalances in On-Demand Documentary Offerings. The Case of a Small Media Market: Belgium

CATALINA IORDACHE
ELINE LIVÉMONT
imec-SMIT-Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

In the digital age, transnational audiovisual flows have grown exponentially, bringing the discussion on the imbalance in global media flows back into focus. In an attempt to address a gap in flows research, the current article focuses on a genre that has received limited attention, namely documentary. Although documentary is a genre that can go beyond commercial and entertainment goals, it is still prone to the same imbalance in distribution, mainly driven by commercial interests. To this end, the present article conducts a flow study on the video-on-demand documentary offerings in Belgium. The available titles are analyzed based on (1) country of origin, (2) language, and (3) filming locations. Results indicate a continued dominance of productions from the "global North," particularly on international platforms active in Belgium. Although Belgian documentary is underrepresented, and primarily on offer by local platforms, there is evidence of a geo-linguistic market.

Keywords: documentary, audiovisual flow, media flow, flow studies, Belgium, video-on-demand, small media market

The debates on the imbalance of global communication flows, started in the 1970s within the UNESCO framework, are still given close attention to this day (Hepp, 2015). Having been discussed by a series of schools of thought, research on media flows has taken new shapes throughout time, developing together with changes in national markets and political systems, regional trade agreements, and new production ecosystems, as well as novel distribution platforms and consumption patterns (Chalaby, 2016; Hesmondhalgh, 2013; Winseck, 2011). Globalization and digitalization are the main factors that need to be taken into consideration for an updated account of media flow studies, which are still primarily focused on power imbalance and commercial interests.

In the context of intensified over-the-top (OTT) content delivery, it is important to consider, and try to assess, the influence online distribution has on the offering of audiovisual media products, as well as the many ways in which this has disrupted the global media industry. Studies estimate that by 2020, online viewing will account for more than 30% of all video consumption (Arthofer, Hardarson, Kon, Lee, & Rose,

Catalina Iordache: catalina.iordache@vub.be
Eline Livémont: eline.livemont@vub.be
Date submitted: 2018–08–27
Copyright © 2018 (Catalina Iordache and Eline Livémont). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

2016), and while some local players have joined the online market, there is still a clear domination of global players, particularly U.S.-owned companies (Arthofer et al., 2016).

The aim of the present article is not only to conduct a flow study that reflects on these new trends, but also to shift the focus on a genre that has been given limited attention within the field of flow studies: documentary. Despite its distinctiveness, media production and distribution studies, including flows research, often neglect documentary or discuss it as part of the amalgam of "audiovisual" productions. In addition, existing research mainly consists of empirical studies in large English-speaking countries (Bullert, 1997; Nash & Corner, 2016; Zoellner, 2009), with a limited focus on documentaries in small regions or countries (Haase, 2016; Patino, 2014). To this end, the study aims to identify the ways in which digitalization has shaped the discussion on transnational flows within the framework of a small media market: Belgium. Moreover, how does this apply to the documentary genre?

The first part of the article traces the development of flow studies throughout time and will discuss documentary as a particularly interesting genre within the general theory of global media and communication flows. The second part draws up an inventory of available video-on-demand (VOD) platforms available in Belgium and aimed at the Belgian audience—either through geographical confines, such as geo-blocking, or through cultural means, such as language and specific content. These platforms include the online libraries of Belgian broadcasters, international platforms, and other locally based VOD platforms. The third part of the article analyzes the titles on these platforms by looking at (1) the country of origin, (2) the language, and (3) the filming locations. The article concludes with a discussion on the share of locally produced documentaries on local versus international digital platforms compared to imported content, as well as an account of the countries of origin for the latter. The findings are contextualized through a closer look at the platforms themselves, as well as the specifics of the Belgian market.

Media Flows Theory

Although the international debate on the "free flow of information" and the imbalances in the global arena have fundamentally evolved since the UNESCO debates in the 1970s, flows theory has never lost its relevance in the discussion on the global trade of media and communication products. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate, calling for a balanced transnational flow, has recently been revived in academic circles (Hafez, 2011), as well as in UNESCO's policy on the promotion of cultural diversity (Hepp, 2015).

Initiated by the reaction of countries in the "developing South" against the so-called "one-way flow" of communication from the "global North," represented by Western powers, research into media flows is discussed by various schools of thought. Political economy, cultural studies, and economic analysis set the foundations of theoretical and empirical investigation into the transnational distribution and consumption of media content. In more recent years, they have been joined and complemented by research in media economics, international communication, cultural globalization, and media innovation. At the onset, critical political economists (Schiller, 1971; Smythe, 1981) frame the unequal flow of global communication through concepts such as media and cultural imperialism, discussed within the broader framework of dependency

(Biltereyst & Meers, 2000), cultural hegemony, and an imbalance of power driven by commercial interests (Hamelink, 1983; Mattelart, 1979).

In the 1980s, the "two-way flows" thesis gains traction, pointing at signs of resistance from the "global South" against the hegemony through new transnational networks referred to as "counterflows" or "contra-flows" (Thussu, 2007). The cultural studies thesis, however, gives more weight to media consumption and audience reception (Liebes & Katz, 1990) and considers emerging theoretical paradigms such as postmodernism and postcolonialism (Sinclair, Jacka, & Cunningham, 2002). In the 1980s the focus falls on audience reception studies, mainly conducted on popular U.S. television programs (see Ang, 2005; Liebes & Katz, 1990). The results point toward the existence of critical audiences that filter the content through their own values and cultural background. Also during the late 1980s, the economic analysis school examine media flows through the working of the global media trade, thus focusing on global linguistic markets (Wildman & Siwek, 1988), the interaction of demand-side market size and the "cultural discount" factor (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988), and a country's domestic television infrastructure and its influence on the supply-side market size (Waterman, 1988). Economic models thus focus on the importance of a large and strong domestic media market, in the process of global export, especially in the case of large, wealthy countries such as those in the "global North."

Moving forward into the 1990s, the discussion on global media flows takes on a more complex nature. Global flows become multilayered, and media distribution and consumption become heavily disrupted by technological advancements and new developments in the world economy. In this context, cultural globalization is given rising attention, as it is believed to support processes of modernization (Hafez, 2011, p. 97) and increasing diversity, which goes against the trends of cultural homogenization, or Americanization, discussed at the onset of the media flows theories. New concepts such as "glocalization" (Robertson, 1995), "localization" (Straubhaar & Duarte, 2005), and "hybridity" (Garcia Canclini, 1995) are used to investigate new media flows, focusing on the key role played by local and regional cultures in adapting foreign content to appeal more to domestic audiences. According to scholars, these create "heterogeneous disjunctures" (Appadurai, 1996) that transform global transnational flows into a complex and highly interesting field of study. Similarly, Straubhaar's (2007) notion of "cultural proximity" highlights the significance of local markets even more, pointing toward the development of geo-cultural or geo-linguistic markets as regions with a shared cultural, linguistic, and historical heritage that function as coherent mediascapes (Hesmondhalgh, 2013; Straubhaar, 2007).

Although these new trends point toward a certain levelling in global media distribution, scholars warn against rendering the discussion obsolete, as there are still clear imbalances in transnational media flows (Hafez, 2011). Audiences may prefer domestic content over foreign, but the financial imbalance and difficulties in media production are still evident throughout the world. Thus, competing with a global media giant remains a challenge, especially when the U.S. has been adopted by large parts of global audiences as a "second culture" (Gitlin, 2003) due to its ubiquity and familiarity. Therefore, although the cultural imperialism thesis has received substantial criticism over the years, the imperialistic character of media (Fuchs, 2010) is still highly relevant in researching shifts in global capitalism. However, flows studies need to develop a new way to analyze the new hybrid and localized media products as both evidence of

transnational commercialization, but also expressions of audience autonomy (Artz, 2017, p. 100), especially in a global media system where transnational collaborations have visibly intensified (Robinson, 2017).

Flows research on small regions or countries is limited. However, small media markets, such as Belgium, make for interesting case studies due to their marginal language reach, specific policies, and market and production practices (see Lowe & Nissen, 2011; Puppis, 2009; Trappel, 2014). Small media markets can be particularly interesting for transnational media flows, as they do not benefit from a profitable "home-market effect" (Linder, 1961), which limits their potential for export. Small regions are also more likely to impose protective measures for the promotion of domestic content (Trappel, 2014), which may influence the volume of imports, but also that of local production. Moreover, small regions that share a language with a larger neighboring media market may see a strong effect of the geo-linguistic market that affects both the production and distribution of media products.

Focus on Documentary

Documentary films and series have particular characteristics that set them apart from other audiovisual products, such as feature films and drama, in form, production, and distribution practices, as well as audiences (Corner, 1996; Hardie, 2008; McLane, 2012; Nash, Hight, & Summerhayes, 2014; Nichols, 2017).

An important feature of documentary is that budgets for the genre are generally strained. Especially in Europe, documentaries are primarily financed by and distributed through public service institutions such as film funds and public broadcasting companies (Sørensen, 2012; Zoellner, 2009, p. 504). Without a doubt, other audiovisual genres, such as fiction film and television programs, also receive public support (see Murschetz, Teichmann, & Karmasin, 2018). However, documentary professionals in Europe claim to struggle particularly hard to finance and monetize their works in an increasingly commercially oriented media landscape (Macnab, 2015). Doyle (2013, pp. 95, 168) links documentary to the concept of "merit goods" to illustrate that certain media products lack commercial value and are underproduced by the free market, which further points to the precarious sustainability of documentary production. Various studies show that European documentaries are remarkably dependent on public broadcasting (Debrett, 2007; Livémont, Donders, & Pauwels, 2017; Sørensen, 2014; Vinuela, 2018; Zoellner, 2009), which has also become increasingly under pressure. Recent trends of deregulation in many European countries, the rising political strains on public broadcasters, the decrease in public broadcasting license fees, and the convergence between public and commercial television (Armstrong & Weeds, 2007, p. 119; Elstein, Cox, Donoghue, Graham, & Metzger, 2004)—especially on generalist channels (Farchy & Ranaivoson, 2011)—put the already precarious production and distribution strategies of documentaries under higher pressure (Sørensen, 2012, pp. 730–731).

The uncertainties concerning funding and distribution possibilities in the fast-changing media landscape only add to these tensions. Nevertheless, some authors (e.g., Armstrong & Weeds, 2007) claim that digitalization and internationalization may provide new favorable circumstances for "merit good" productions, as new players have entered the documentary scene, by distributing and even investing in documentary production. Netflix is a clear example of this trend, as it has made feature-length documentary

a core pillar of its service, both in order to demonstrate its dedication to quality cinema and to distinguish its catalog from the usual television programming (Sharma, 2016, p. 143). This new transnational, digital context brings a decrease in production and distribution costs, better audience targeting, and Long Tail business models that can support niche content (Anderson, 2006). Although these claims are opposed by many authors (e.g., Doyle, 2016; Lobato, 2009; Sørensen, 2012; Syvertsen, 2003), opportunities and challenges present themselves in an increasingly internationalized, digitalized, and less public-service-driven media landscape. These developments make the present day an even more interesting time to include documentary in the study of transnational media flows.

But what do we talk about when we talk about "documentary"? As the genre has experienced a great expansion in time, partly due to the advent of television, with various documentary formats and styles having been developed throughout the years (Beattie, 2004; Kilborn & Izod, 1997; Nichols, 2017), different types of audiovisual content are currently defined as "documentary." As a consequence, there are multiple debates within academia and the professional field about the genre's definition (see Corner, 2002). Although the aim of this article is not to contribute to this discussion, we consider a series of defining elements of the documentary genre to guide our analysis. We keep in mind that "documentaries are about real people" (Nichols, 2017, p. 6), that they "are about reality; they're about something that actually happened" (Nichols, 2017, p. 5), and that they primarily depend on a natural setting (Corner, 2002, pp. 263–264), as opposed to reality TV or docu-drama, which require predefined stages and/or highly scripted stories (Hill, 2007; Kilborn, 2003). Finally, documentaries are not "surveillance footage and informational or how-to films (...), conveying information in a straightforward, often didactic manner" (Nichols, 2017, p. 105).

Unlike the elements that are essential to the success of fiction works, the topic of a documentary is of key importance to its success and, thus, its distribution and consumption (Hardie, 2008). To this end, the biography of a national political or cultural figure will have fewer chances to cross national borders, the same way a topic of global interest and recognition, such as travel or nature documentaries, will appeal to a much wider global audience (Fürsich, 2003). By increasing its global investment in original content (Lambrechts, 2018), Netflix stands out in the VOD market as a powerful disruptor, ensuring exclusive rights on works it buys directly from productions companies. Through its investments Netflix also contributes to the increasing commercialization of the genre, as the majority of the titles in its catalog deal with global topics, both easy to market on a global scale and often based on some pre-existing awareness by audiences (Sharma, 2016, p. 148).

Methodology

Although flows research has a long-lasting tradition, a systematic methodology for flow studies has never been formulated (see Iordache, Van Audenhove, & Loisen, forthcoming). However, two main types of empirical studies have been identified: one that is more descriptive but comprehensive in terms of coverage of countries, and one that takes a more analytical approach and typically covers only a limited sample or even individual countries, trying to identify causal relations between the factors identified in the investigation of flows (Oh, 2001, p. 33).

The present study takes a microlevel approach to flows studies and employs a case study on the documentary offerings in Belgium. The "Belgian media market" is particularly interesting, as it is divided into two main media markets,[1] each with their own regional government and language. The Dutch-speaking part of Belgium (i.e., Flanders and Brussels, where Flemings are a minority) has a multiplayer market, with a strong public broadcaster (VRT). Although small, the Flemish media market is rather strong, as there is high demand and supply for domestic content, particularly Flemish drama (Dhoest, 2011, p. 15). Despite its cultural proximity to the Netherlands, the region is not dependent on its larger neighbor (Biltereyst, 1992, p. 537), with which it also shares the Dutch (Flemish) language. The French-speaking part of Belgium (Wallonia and Brussels) is somewhat smaller and also has one public broadcaster (RTBF) and a series of commercial channels. Wallonia is located in the linguistic sphere of influence of a major media player, France, which has led to increased competition with French media companies and a higher dependency on French audiovisual content. Compared to Flanders, Wallonia has developed a weaker domestic market and is less competitive in the area (Lits, 2012).

Developments in media distribution and consumption make research in the field of flow studies even more problematic. In the context of increasing digitalization, new tools and methods need to be applied for data gathering, as well as data analysis and visualization. To this end, the present article combines traditional methods of flows research with new (digital) tools in an attempt to adapt to new means of online content delivery. As on-demand catalogs are interactive, curated databases of content, data gathering has become more complex (Lobato, 2018). For this article, we analyze the catalogs of 17 VOD platforms in Belgium for entries on documentary film. The primary criteria for choosing the platform is for it (1) to have documentaries on offer, (2) to be made available to the Belgian audience, and (3) to be aimed at the Belgian audience through a regional (Flemish and/or Walloon/Brussels) or national catalog. Thus, our sample consists of: (1) 12 local on-demand/catch-up platforms of national broadcasters or VOD services of digital cable providers, available through a Belgian IP address, (2) and five international platforms, which are geo-blocked services with a dedicated library for Belgium. It also needs to be mentioned that the platforms themselves are quite different in terms of ownership and funding, target audience, and business and delivery models—including catch-up TV, subscription video-on-demand (SVOD), and transaction video-on-demand (TVOD) (see Table 1 for more details). Due to this mix, a number of them are (partly) subsidized, either through public broadcasting companies, such as VRT NU and RTBF Auvio, or regional funding, such as Dalton (Flemish government) or UniversCiné (Creative Europe and Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles). With regard to typology, the chosen platforms can be categorized as: content aggregator/cable operator, broadcaster/publisher, or commissioner/publisher. The categorization reflects the blurring lines between content production, delivery, and aggregation, particularly by distribution platforms that now promote themselves through their original/exclusive content, such as Netflix and Amazon Prime.

[1] There is also a minority German-speaking community in Belgium, but its media market is underdeveloped.

Table 1. VOD Platforms.

	Platform	Content aggregator/ cable operator	Broadcaster/ publisher	Commissioner/ publisher	Private	(Partly) subsidized	TVOD	SVOD	Catch-up TV	Target audience: French community	Target audience : Flemish community
Local	VOO	✓			✓		✓			✓	
	Proximus	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓
	Stievie		✓		✓				✓		✓
	Yelo Play	✓			✓			✓		✓*	✓
	Vier		✓		✓				✓		✓
	VRT NU		✓			✓			✓		✓
	VTM		✓		✓				✓		✓
	DVDPost	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓
	Dalton	✓				✓		✓			✓
	Be TV	✓			✓			✓		✓	
	RTBF Auvio		✓			✓			✓	✓	
	UniversCiné	✓				✓	✓			✓	✓
International	Amazon Prime			✓	✓		✓			✓	✓
	YouTube			✓	✓		✓			✓	✓
	Google Play	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓
	iTunes	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓
	Netflix			✓	✓			✓		✓	✓

** Telenet is a Flemish-based operator that is primarily present in Flanders (and parts of Brussels) but is currently in the process of expanding to Wallonia (Source: https://press.telenet.be/)*

The data were gathered using an online web-scraping program and manually on platforms where the scraping tool could not be used. The aim was to compile all the documentary titles available on these platforms on a regular day of the week. For this research, the data were gathered on March 2, 2018.[2] For certain local platforms, we obtained the full list of titles for the requested date directly from the platform. In addition to the catalog list, we also required information regarding each title. For increased consistency, we aimed to compile this information from the same source. We chose the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) website as the primary source for the additional data, as it provides the required information on genre, language, country of origin, production company, and year of release for a large number of titles. When the title was not available on IMDb, we obtained the information from the platforms themselves or other online sources, such as film databases, the websites of distributors and production companies, press releases, trailers, etc.

Regardless of the aforementioned difficulties in defining documentary works and distinguishing them from other types of fiction and nonfiction content, we have collected every title cataloged under the documentary genre by the platforms themselves. However, in our attempt to maintain a certain consistency within the titles analyzed, we considered some of the components of documentary as defined earlier. To this end, we decided to exclude a number of titles from our analysis, such as docu-dramas, sports and adventure

[2] The database can be made available by the authors upon request.

films, tutorials, and reality-TV formats that we found to be heavily "scripted," but had been cataloged by the platforms as documentaries. Alongside these, we also left out recordings of live music or sports events. This selection process led to the exclusion of 484 titles that we considered did not belong to the documentary genre, leaving a total of 3,545 unique titles for the analysis. Taking into consideration that some of the titles were present on more than one platform, the total number of records analyzed in the study is 4,417. For the present analysis, each individual title is considered as a single record, regardless of whether it was made up of one (film) or more parts (diptych, series).

The main purpose of the analysis is to conduct a distribution flow study, thus identifying the country of origin of each documentary. This is determined by the information provided on IMDb or by the country of origin of the film's production company. Language and filming locations are other significant indicators in the analysis. Additional information gathered, such as the year of release and the platform on which it was available, is used in the analysis to contextualize the findings. The analysis is completed with data on documentary production and distribution, with particular attention to the specifics of a small media market.

Main Findings

Contextual Factors

The findings of the present study need to be contextualized for the specifics of the Belgian case. As previously mentioned, Belgium is a small media market (Puppis, 2009), characterized by a limited number of players, a small audience, and low advertising potential, as well as limited export possibilities, not least due to its language divide. At the same time, however, we must also take into account Belgium's position as a Western European country with a relatively high GDP and its flourishing domestic production sector, especially in Flanders (Wauters & Raats, 2018). In terms of VOD penetration, Belgium is currently above the European average; revenues from on-demand services are expected to continue a steady growth, especially in the SVOD segment (Statista, 2018).

A first interesting finding was that four out of the five top platforms—with more than 200 titles each—are international (Figure 1) and owned by U.S.-based media giants Google (YouTube and Google Play), Netflix, and Apple (iTunes). Moreover, out of the total number of records (4,417), almost half (2,028) are found in the iTunes library. Interestingly, the second largest documentary offering is found on the local OTT platform UniversCiné, a Belgian-EU subsidized platform that offers independent films, with websites in both French and Dutch. In comparison, the wide majority of remaining local platforms had a very limited online documentary offerings.



Figure 1. Total number of unique titles on each platform.

With regard to the year of release (Figure 2), the calculation was conducted for 99% of records. Our findings show that 15% of the documentaries were available on more than one platform. Moreover, it is primarily recent productions that overlap.



Figure 2. Year of release.

This can also be observed when looking at the 10 films that are available on most platforms (Table 2), nine of which were released in the last five years. When considering the titles themselves, they are all big-budget, well-known documentaries: seven of them received nominations or awards at large international film festivals, while the remaining three deal with global topics such as wildlife and music celebrities.

This confirms research that opposes the Long Tail theory, pointing out that although there is a clear lengthening of the tail, consumers' appetite for hits continues to grow, following the "superstar phenomenon" (Rosen, 1981), where individual best-sellers become even more popular (Elberse & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). The theory claims there is increasingly more niche content available as more platforms aim to reach wider audiences. However, this does not seem to be the case, as our data demonstrate that platforms make use of documentary titles to compete for audiences. Our findings also show that the more recent productions are more present on international platforms, while titles found on local platforms cover a more balanced time span, including older productions alongside more recent ones. However, although the Long Tail theory was linked to the emergence of so-called "infinite-inventory" retailers (Goel, Broder, Gabrilovich, & Pang, 2010, p. 201), we need to point out that the majority of our platforms have rather limited catalogs, particularly the local ones.

Table 2. Documentaries Available on Most Platforms.

	Original Title	Production country or countries	Release Year	Spoken language(s)	Available on # international platforms	Available on # local platforms
1.	*Visages Villages*	France	2017	French	3	4
2.	*Fuocoammare*	Italy, France	2016	Italian, French	3	3
3.	*Swagger*	France	2016	French	3	3
4.	*Trophy*	UK, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, U.S.	2017	English	3	3
5.	*20,000 Days on Earth*	UK	2014	English	4	1
6.	*African Safari*	Belgium, France	2013	English	3	2
7.	*Berlin*	UK, U.S.	2007	English	3	2
8.	*Cobain: Montage of Heck*	U.S.	2015	English	4	1
9.	*Dernières Nouvelles du Cosmos*	France	2016	French	3	2
10.	*I Am Not Your Negro*	Switzerland, France, Belgium, U.S.	2016	English, French	3	2

Country of Origin

The analysis on the country-of-origin parameter was conducted on 97.5% of records, for which the information was available to us. This number includes all countries involved in a production, either as a single production country or involved in a coproduction. Our findings show that the top six consists exclusively of Western countries (Figure 3). There are visibly more U.S. and UK productions present on the international platforms, but local platforms contain more Belgian productions, as well as a significantly high number of French productions. Research conducted in 2016 by the European Audiovisual Observatory (EAO) for film on over-the-top VOD platforms in Europe produced results along the same lines, as it points to a

share of approximately 60% U.S. productions, while films produced in Europe reached only 20/25%, on SVOD and TVOD respectively (EAO, 2016).



Figure 3. Number of records by production country—international vs. local platforms.

For a more in-depth understanding of the analysis of country of origin, we separate the documentaries produced by a single country from the ones that are the result of coproductions. We have this information for 4,305 records (97.5% of our dataset). Out of these records, 74% (3,206) were single country productions, and 26% (1,099) were coproductions. The percentage is in line with general European data, according to which coproductions account for approximately 24% of overall film production volume in Europe from 2010–2015 (EAO, 2017).

Documentaries produced by one country originated in 62 different countries (Figure 4). The top five countries of origin are, again, exclusively Western countries, with the U.S. leading by almost three times the number of titles produced by the second country. Although the diversity of countries is very wide, two-thirds of these have only contributed fewer than 10 records to the on-demand catalogs we have consulted, and more than half have contributed fewer than three. According to an EAO study on the production of feature films between 2007 and 2016 (including both fiction and documentary), the top five producing European countries are the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy (EAO, 2017). Although some of these are also present in our top 10, it's important to highlight our rankings of Belgium and France as the third

and fourth production countries, as well as the presence of the Netherlands and Switzerland in the top 10, pointing to the importance of local and regional markets.


1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
1,411
383
356
319
123
86
81
63
36
35
32
29
26
25
23
18
14
13
13
11
9
9
8
7
6
6
6
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1



Figure 5. Single production country of origin—all other platforms vs. iTunes catalog.

Fewer titles are the result of coproductions (26%), but the diversity in countries involved is much higher, with 140 different countries, compared with 62 for single country productions. Although the majority of the top 25 coproducing countries (Figure 6) are primarily from the "global North," the diversity is much wider, including also countries from Asia, South America, and one from Africa. However, the top 10 countries are very similar to the countries discussed prior, with some differences. The top four production countries remain the same, with slight changes in ranking, while the U.S. continues to be in the lead, with a significant advantage over the country in second place, which is France.



Figure 6. Top 25 countries involved in coproductions.

Unfortunately, our quantitative analysis does not take into consideration the weight of each coproduction country, which may skew the results by placing minority production countries at the same level of importance as the majority countries. A more in-depth analysis should be conducted as follow-up, and should rank the countries based on their financial contribution to each production, for a more accurate

picture of the coproduction market. This may point to interesting findings, especially with regard to small media markets and former colonies that share a language with strong media markets, such as the UK and France. Research in other genres (see Bondebjerg et al., 2017) has shown that certain regional and linguistic affinities play an important role in such transnational collaborations, as do tax incentives available in some markets (Baltruschat, 2002). A recent EAO study already found Belgium to be one of the top minority coproducing partners in Europe in global film collaborations (2017, p. 27) and the leading country for interactions in minority coproductions with European producers, "underscoring the country's specialization in minority co-production (due to its size, shooting infrastructure, languages and, most importantly, subsidies and fiscal incentives)" (EAO, 2017, p. 39).

Language

To complement the findings on the country of origin, we consider it important to also analyze the different languages in which the documentaries are available, taking into account that some productions combine more than one language, but also that the audio on some might not be the original, as some productions have been dubbed in the local language, in the case of French. This parameter was calculated for 97% of the titles, and 118 different languages were identified. The main finding is that for 72.9% of the documentaries analyzed, at least one of the languages was English. The second most popular language is French, but this is present in only 20.16% of the titles, while the third most popular language, German, is already down to 5.6% of all titles, followed closely by Spanish, with 5.32%, and Dutch, with 4.11%. The only non-Western language in the top six is Arabic, present in 2.43% of the documentaries studied.

When looking at the most popular languages on the different platforms (Figure 7), we found that English is overwhelmingly present on international platforms, while local platforms show more documentaries in French than in English.



Figure 7. Number of records by language—international vs. local platforms.

Filming Location

Regional indicators are used in literature to account for the success of local productions over foreign imports (see Biltereyst, 1991). Filming locations are increasingly connected to the cultural specificity of a production, among other elements, and thus included in domestic or regional public funding schemes for film, including documentary. A number of European "cultural tests" encourage the location of a story in a certain area as part of point-based systems of eligibility. This is also the case with regional funding schemes available in Belgium for Flanders (Screen Flanders, 2018), Wallonia (Décret 23-02-2017, 2017), and the Brussels region (Screen Brussels, 2018). Particularly in the case of documentary, diversity may not only be reflected in the country of origin and language of content, but also in the filming locations, as these may be linked to the topic of the documentary. As previously discussed, the topic is one of the elements that sets documentaries apart from other audiovisual productions.

In the context of the present article, it is interesting to determine whether the filming locations correspond with the findings in country of origin or whether they presented a wider diversity. Although the analysis of this parameter was limited by the lower number of records for which we were able to gather information on filming locations, namely 51%, the findings are still interesting.

We identify 163 different countries (Figure 8).



Figure 8. Filming locations.

The diversity is much wider than in the case of country of origin, as more countries all over the world are represented, including countries that were absent from the countries of production list. However, the top six filming locations correspond to the top six production countries (Figure 9).



Figure 9. Top filming locations.

Discussion

We believe our findings to be in line with the key elements discussed in flows research. To contextualize the analysis, we first need to take a look at the *platforms* themselves. As previously mentioned, all the international platforms with a specific catalog for Belgium are private, U.S.-owned, media tech giants. Although exact numbers for VOD market share are difficult to come by, YouTube, Netflix, and Amazon Prime have particularly been in the spotlight lately as rapidly expanding platforms that owe their success to the impressive financial capital they have access to (Sandvine, 2018). By definition, these platforms rely on the distribution of content through advanced technology. Their business models are supported by investments in innovation and global expansion (Statista, 2018), which places them at the heart of the contemporary transnational media flows discussion. When looking at the local platforms, less than half are linked to a broadcaster, and a third are (partly) subsidized. It is also interesting to mention that different local platforms target audiences from the different regions of Belgium, either through language (VOD platforms only in French or Dutch) or content itself. The international platforms, however, target the entire Belgian territory through one catalog, available in the different local languages, and often also in English.

The main thread of the findings points to a continued dominance of Western productions, primarily originating from the U.S. and seconded by the UK. This follows the lines of the long-lasting debate rooted in cultural imperialism scholarship and can thus be attributed to a series of trends and realities of the global media system. Even as it went beyond a purely ideological explanation that saw powerful Western countries in general, and the U.S. in particular, attempting to "conquer" or "(re)colonize" territories in the "developing South" through a form of soft power, the cultural imperialism thesis is still referred to in discussing global imbalances in the cultural domain. Most often, realities of commercial imbalance and power struggles rooted in the "new imperialism" of media and communication (Fuchs, 2010, p. 56) continue to describe the global mediascape through increased concentration and transnationalization. This becomes obvious in the case of our documentary study first of all when focusing on the *size of the offering*, as four of the top five platforms belong to the usual suspects: U.S.-owned transnational tech giants Apple, Netflix, and Google. In comparison, available local platforms, although much more numerous, have astonishingly poorer libraries—half of them showing 20 documentaries or fewer, as opposed to the enormous iTunes library, which accounts for over 2,000 titles, almost half our entire dataset.

The imbalance is not only made obvious by the wide gap in the size of the catalogs, but also by the core indicator of *country of origin*. The data shows a clear overall domination of Western productions, with a strong lead by the U.S., followed by the UK. A very interesting finding is, however, the difference in country of origin when comparing documentaries offered by international platforms versus the ones on local platforms. This points to the importance that authors like Straubhaar (2007) have assigned local and regional markets, as audiences do seem to prefer content that they can relate to culturally and historically, with Belgium ranking third and fourth in the respective counts for single country productions and coproductions. This aspect is even more important for the documentary genre where, as previously mentioned, the topic is of central interest to the audience. Also due to the topic, the country of origin becomes more easily recognizable in a documentary, compared to the majority of fiction genres.

The importance of the geo-linguistic market effect is demonstrated by the strong presence of neighboring media giant France, especially in coproductions. Not only is France one of the top producing markets in Europe, but it is also an important source of media content for the French-speaking community of Belgium. Interestingly, though, the case is not the same for the Netherlands. In the order of single production countries, the Netherlands is ranked eighth, and only ninth for coproductions. In this context, we need to consider the differences between the stronger media market of Flanders and the one in Wallonia, which is weakened by competition with larger French companies. This trend is evident for the productions of drama, as Wallonia is often a minority partner in coproductions with France, but Flanders collaborates less with neighboring Netherlands (Raats, Evens, & Ruelens, 2016). French-Belgian coproductions have been ranked as the most frequent bi-national coproduction tie-ups in feature films, including fiction and documentary, produced between 2010 and 2015, while Belgian-French productions were also in the top five (EAO, 2017, p. 29). The significant number of German productions may also be explained through shared regional cooperation and cultural and historical background, as well as the noteworthy size of the German market itself.

When looking at the level of available funding for the production of documentary, the gap between public service broadcasters (PSB) in small versus larger markets becomes even more apparent. To this end, leaving U.S. productions aside, the remaining top players are public organizations such as BBC, Arte, ZDF, and the Australian ABC. Moreover, it was interesting to find that for the 26% of documentaries that we identified as coproductions, a wide diversity of production countries is involved, namely 140—over twice as many as involved in single country productions. These elements confirm the precarious funding situation that documentaries find themselves in, still depending largely on public support and encouraging collaborations between countries in order to produce more. Although our analysis could not take into account the contribution in cofinancing, it is still interesting to remark the global diversity of the top 25 most encountered countries, stretching from North and South America to Europe, Asia, and Africa. Nevertheless, it would be instrumental for future research into the topic to also consider the collaboration between majority and minority players, especially for the Belgian case, which is found to be one of the leading minority coproducing partners in Europe (EAO, 2017).

In the case of international documentary coproductions, the focus tends to fall less on local stories that may be relevant for the domestic market and more on topics of international appeal, such as nature, sports, international celebrities, and common histories (Baltruschat, 2002). Within flows research, this could be associated with the concept of "delocalization" (Straubhaar, 2007), where other audiovisual products are stripped of culturally specific elements in order to make them more popular with foreign audiences and thus more easily exportable. This discussion can be linked to our next point of attention: *language*. As our findings show, English is overwhelmingly present in 72.9% of the data available. This becomes even more striking when considering the overall count of different languages present in the dataset (118). The dominance of the English language in the study can be attributed to the following factors. First, there is a notable representation of powerful English-speaking media players in the production process, as the U.S., the UK, Canada, and Australia are among the six leading nations in the single country production category. Second, the aforementioned "delocalization" trend has led other producing countries to adopt English as the primary language in order to increase their chances of export, especially when the documentary deals with a topic

of regional or international interest. As discussed in the previous sections, there is also proof of a strong geo-linguistic market, where French plays a central role. Therefore, even though its share was only at 20.16% of the total, this is still noteworthy in the context in which the following most popular languages from powerful media markets, such as German, Spanish, and Dutch, are only found in 5.6% of the titles or less. The language findings can be further contextualized by the difference between international and local platforms, as the former are all English-speaking organizations and represent over two-thirds of the documentary offerings analyzed. The latter set carries a majority of documentaries in French, followed by English.

Due to the specific character of documentary as a genre, we believe the findings on *filming locations* may add to the current flows discussion. Although the top results point to the same countries that are in the lead for production, the extensive diversity in locations, consisting of 163 different countries, may relate to a wider diversity in documentary topic and further to an enhanced interest in more culturally diverse content. However, it must be said that the primary production countries remain representatives of the "global North." Although insufficient research has been conducted on this specific area, we would like to also reflect on the discussion within media flows studies on global news. As the leading news agencies in the world expanded and broadcast news coverage from and to the entire globe, criticism from the "developing South" pointed to a Western perspective that filtered the information that was then sold back to the developing world (see Meyer, 1989; Mowlana, 1998). In-depth analysis would be required in order to study this particular aspect, both in terms of the content itself and the documentary offerings in the developing countries used as filming locations, but we believe it could add valuable nuance to the discussion.

Last but not least, we believe our findings can advance research and academic reflection on the underresearched genre of documentary. The key observation is related to the difficulties in defining the genre, as well as outlining the different factors that separate it from other forms of fiction, as is the case with docu-drama and nonfiction compared to journalistic programs, live events, action and adventure videos, and reality television. A second remark points to the increasing commercialization of the genre, whereby PSB organizations and domestic or regional funding remains scarce and thus limits the production and distribution of local documentary. This creates a viable market for new players such as Netflix that have been increasingly investing in commercial documentary for their libraries all over the world.

References

Anderson, C. (2006). *The Long Tail: Why the future of business is selling less of more* (1st ed.). New York, NY: Hyperion.

Ang, I. (2005). *Watching Dallas: Soap opera and the melodramatic imagination* (Nachdr.). London, UK: Routledge.

Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Armstrong, M., & Weeds, H. (2007). Public service broadcasting in the digital world. In P. Seabright & J. von Hagen (Eds.), *The economic regulation of broadcasting markets: Evolving technology and challenges for policy* (pp. 81–149). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Arthofer, F., Hardarson, Á., Kon, M., Lee, E., & Rose, J. (2016, September 20). The future of television: The impact of OTT on video production around the world. Retrieved from https://www.bcg.com/publications/2016/media-entertainment-technology-digital-future-television-impact-ott-video-production.aspx

Artz, L. (2017). Commentary: Transnational capitalism and the new political economy of transnational media. *The Political Economy of Communication*, *5*(2), 95–101.

Baltruschat, D. (2002). Globalization and international TV and film co-productions: In search of new narratives. Presented at Media in Transition 2: Globalization and Convergence, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Beattie, K. (2004). *Documentary screens: Nonfiction film and television*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Biltereyst, D. (1991). Resisting American hegemony: A comparative analysis of the reception of domestic and us fiction. *European Journal of Communication*, *6*(4), 469–497. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323191006004005

Biltereyst, D. (1992). Language and culture as ultimate barriers? An analysis of the circulation, consumption and popularity of fiction in small European countries. *European Journal of Communication*, *7*(4), 517–540. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323192007004005

Biltereyst, D., & Meers, P. (2000). The international telenovela debate and the contra-flow argument: A reappraisal. *Media, Culture & Society*, *22*(4), 393–413. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344300022004002

Bondebjerg, I., Redvall, E. N., Helles, R., Lai, S. S., Søndergaard, H., & Astrupgaard, C. (2017). Networks and patterns of European TV drama co-production. In I. Bondebjerg, E. N. Redvall, R. Helles, S. S. Lai, H. Søndergaard, & C. Astrupgaard, *Transnational European television drama* (pp. 79–97). Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62806-6_4

Bullert, B. J. (1997). *Public television: Politics and the battle over documentary film*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Chalaby, J. K. (2016). Television and globalization: The TV content global value chain. *Journal of Communication*, *66*(1), 35–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12203

Corner, J. (1996). *The art of record. A critical introduction to documentary*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Corner, J. (2002). Performing the real: Documentary diversions. *Television & New Media*, *3*(3), 255–269.

Debrett, M. (2007). Professionalising documentary production. *International Journal of the Arts in Society*, *1*(3), 93–99.

Décret 23-02-2017. (2017). *Décret modifiant le décret du 10 novembre 2011 relatif au soutien au cinéma et à la création audiovisuelle* [Order amending the order of 10 November 2011 relating to the support of cinema and audiovisual works]. Retrieved from http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/decret/2017/02/23/2017030134/moniteur

Dhoest, A. (2011). When regional becomes national: The production and reception of Flemish TV drama in a culturally divided country. *Critical Studies in Television*, *6*(2), 13–23.

Doyle, G. (2013). *Understanding media economics*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Doyle, G. (2016). Resistance of channels: Television distribution in the multiplatform era. *Telematics and Informatics*, *33*(2), 693–702. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2015.06.015

EAO. (2016). *Origin of films and TV content in VOD catalogues and visibility of films on VOD services*. Strasbourg, France: European Audiovisual Observatory.

EAO. (2017). *Film production in Europe – Production volume, co-production and worldwide circulation*. Strasbourg, France: European Audiovisual Observatory.

Elberse, A., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2006). *Superstars and underdogs: An examination of the Long Tail phenomenon in video sales* (Working Paper No. 07–015). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School.

Elstein, D., Cox, D., Donoghue, B., Graham, D., & Metzger, G. (2004). *Beyond the charter: The BBC after 2006*. London, UK: The Broadcasting Policy Group.

Farchy, J., & Ranaivoson, H. (2011). Do public television channels provide more diversity than private ones? *ENCATC Journal of Cultural Management and Policy*, *1*, 50–63.

Fuchs, C. (2010). New imperialism: Information and media imperialism? *Global Media and Communication*, *6*(1), 33–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/1742766510362018

Fürsich, E. (2003). Between credibility and commodification: Nonfiction entertainment as a global media genre. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, *6*(2), 131–153.

Garcia Canclini, N. (1995). *Hybrid cultures: Strategies for entering and leaving modernity*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Gitlin, T. (2003). *Media unlimited: How the torrent of images and sounds overwhelms our lives*. New York, NY: Holt.

Goel, S., Broder, A., Gabrilovich, E., & Pang, B. (2010). Anatomy of the Long Tail: Ordinary people with extraordinary tastes. In *Proceedings of the Third ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining* (pp. 201–210). New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery.

Haase, A. (2016). 'The golden era' of Finnish documentary film financing and production. *Studies in Documentary Film*, *10*(2), 106–129.

Hafez, K. (2011). *The myth of media globalization* (Reprinted). Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.

Hamelink, C. J. (1983). *Cultural autonomy in global communications: Planning national information policy*. New York, NY: Longman.

Hardie, A. (2008). Rollercoasters and reality: A study of big screen documentary audiences, 2002–2007. *Particip@tions*, *5*(1), 22.

Hepp, A. (2015). *Transcultural communication*. Chichester, West Sussex, and Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Hesmondhalgh, D. (2013). *The cultural industries* (3rd ed.). London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Hill, A. (2007). *Restyling factual TV: Audiences and news, documentary and reality genres*. London, UK: Routledge.

Hoskins, C., & Mirus, R. (1988). Reasons for the U.S. dominance of the international trade in television programmes. *Media, Culture & Society*, *10*, 499–515.

Iordache, C., Van Audenhove, L., & Loisen, J. (forthcoming). Global media flows: A qualitative review of research methods in audio-visual flow studies. *International Communication Gazette*.

Kilborn, R. (2003). *Staging the real: Factual TV programming in the age of Big Brother*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Kilborn, R., & Izod, J. (1997). *An introduction to television documentary: Confronting reality*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Lambrechts, S. (2018, April). *Netflix is doubling-down on European content, with $1 billion to spend on new shows and movies*. Retrieved from https://www.techradar.com/news/netflix-is-doubling-down-on-european-content-with-dollar1-billion-to-spend-on-new-shows-and-movies

Liebes, T., & Katz, E. (1990). *The export of meaning: Cross-cultural readings of Dallas*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Linder, S. B. (1961). *An essay on trade and transformation*. New York, NY: John Wiley.

Lits, M. (2012). *Les médias francophones en Belgique: enjeux identitaires* [Francophone media in Belgium: Identity challenges]. *Alternative Francophone*, *1*(5), 55–66.

Livémont, E., Donders, K., & Pauwels, C. (2017). *De documentaire als 'merit good' op de publieke omroep: Theorie, beleid en praktijk in Vlaanderen* [Documentary as 'merit good' on the public broadcaster: Theory, policy and practice in Flanders]. *Tijdschrift Voor Communicatiewetenschap*, *45*(4), 286–302.

Lobato, R. (2009). The politics of digital distribution: Exclusionary structures in online cinema. *Studies in Australasian Cinema*, *3*(2), 167–178. https://doi.org/10.1386/sac.3.2.167/1

Lobato, R. (2018). Rethinking international TV flows research in the age of Netflix. *Television & New Media*, *19*(3), 241–256. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476417708245

Lowe, G., & Nissen, C. (2011). *Small among giants. Television broadcasting in smaller countries*. Gothenburg, Sweden: Nordicom.

Macnab, G. (2015, November). *Mind the (funding) gap*. Retrieved from https://www.idfa.nl/industry/daily/2015/background/mind-the-funding-gap.aspx

Mattelart, A. (1979). *Multinational corporations and the control of culture: The ideological apparatuses of imperialism*. Hassocks, UK: Harvester Press.

McLane, B. (2012). *A new history of documentary film*. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Meyer, W. H. (1989). Global news flows: Dependency and neoimperialism. *Comparative Political Studies*, *22*(3), 243–264. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414089022003001

Mowlana, H. (1998). *Global information and world communication: New frontiers in international relations* (2nd ed., reprint). London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Murschetz, P. C., Teichmann, R., & Karmasin, M. (2018). *Handbook of state aid for film: Finance, industries and regulation*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Nash, K., & Corner, J. (2016). Strategic impact documentary: Contexts of production and social intervention. *European Journal of Communication*, *31*(3), 227–242.

Nash, K., Hight, C., & Summerhayes, C. (2014). *New documentary ecologies*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nichols, B. (2017). *Introduction to documentary*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Oh, J. (2001). International trade in film and the self-sufficiency ratio. *Journal of Media Economics*, *14*(1), 31–44. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327736ME1401_03

Patino, C. (2014). Analysing the formal and informal documentary film distribution markets in Colombia. *Journal of Media Practice*, *15*(1), 39–57.

Puppis, M. (2009). Media regulation in small states. *International Communication Gazette*, *71*(1–2), 7–17. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048508097927

Raats, T., Evens, T., & Ruelens, S. (2016). Challenges for sustaining local audiovisual ecosystems. Analysis of financing and production of domestic TV fiction in small media markets. *Journal of Popular Television*, *4*(1), 129–147.

Robertson, R. (1995). Glocalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity. In Featherstone, M., Lash, S. and Robertson, R. (Eds.), *Global modernities* (pp. 25–44). London, UK: SAGE Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446250563.n2

Robinson, W. I. (2017). Debate on the new global capitalism: Transnational capitalist class, transnational state apparatuses, and global crisis. *International Critical Thought*, *7*(2), 171–189. https://doi.org/10.1080/21598282.2017.1316512

Rosen, S. (1981). The economics of superstars. *American Economic Review*, *71*(5), 845–858.

Sandvine. (2018). *The global Internet phenomena report*. Retrieved from https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/phenomena/2018-phenomena-report.pdf

Schiller, H. I. (1971). *Mass communications and American empire*. Boston, MA: Beacon Books.

Screen Brussels. (2018). *Règlement du fonds d'investissement dans l'audiovisuel de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale* [Rules on the investment funds for the audiovisual in the Brussels-Capital Region]. Retrieved from http://screen.brussels/fr/fund/regles-du-fond

Screen Flanders. (2018). *Screen Flanders. Application guidelines*. Retrieved from https://screenflanders.be/uploads/files/downloads/Screen_Flanders_Application_Guidelines_2018_DEF.pdf

Sharma, S. (2016). Netflix and the documentary boom. In K. McDonald & D. Smith-Rowsey (Eds.), *The Netflix effect: Technology and entertainment in the 21st century* (1st ed., pp. 143–154). New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic.

Sinclair, J., Jacka, E., & Cunningham, S. (Eds.). (2002). *New patterns in global television: Peripheral vision*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Smythe, D. W. (1981). *Dependency road: Communications, capitalism, consciousness, and Canada*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Sørensen, I. (2012). Crowdsourcing and outsourcing. The impact of online funding and distribution on the documentary film industry in the UK. *Media, Culture & Society*, *34*(6), 726–743.

Sørensen, I. (2014). Channels as content curators. Multiplatform strategies for documentary film and factual content in British public service broadcasting. *European Journal of Communication*, *29*(1), 34–49.

Statista. (2018). *Digital media report 2018. Video-on-demand*. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/study/38346/video-on-demand-2018/

Straubhaar, J. D. (2007). *World television: From global to local*. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications.

Straubhaar, J. D., & Duarte, L. G. (2005). Adapting U.S. transnational television channels to a complex world: From cultural imperialism to localization to hybridization. In J. K. Chalaby (Ed.), *Transnational television worldwide: Towards a new media order* (pp. 216–253). London, UK: I.B.Tauris.

Syvertsen, T. (2003). Challenges to public television in the era of convergence and commercialization. *Television & New Media*, *4*(2), 155–175.

Thussu, D. K. (Ed.). (2007). *Media on the move global flow and contra-flow*. London and New York: Routledge.

Trappel, J. (2014). Small states and European media policy. In K. Donders, C. Pauwels, & J. Loisen (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of European media policy* (pp. 239–253). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vinuela, A. (2018). Television documentary production in France: Policy interventions and the assessment of quality. *Critical Studies in Television*, *13*(2), 227–243. https://doi.org/10.1177/1749602018763681

Waterman, D. (1988). World television trade. *Telecommunications Policy*, *12*(2), 141–151. https://doi.org/10.1016/0308-5961(88)90006-7

Wauters, D., & Raats, T. (2018). Public service media and ecosystem sustainability. Towards effective partnerships in small media markets. In G. F. Lowe, H. van den Bulck, & K. Donders (Eds.), *Public service media in the networked society: RIPE@2017* (pp. 175–191). Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom.

Wildman, S. S., & Siwek, S. E. (1988). *International trade in films and television programs*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

Winseck, D. R. (2011). The political economies of media and the transformation of the global media industries. In D. R. Winseck & D. Yong Jin (Eds.), *Political economies of the media: The transformation of the global media industries* (pp. 3–48). London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.

Zoellner, A. (2009). Professional ideology and program conventions: Documentary development in independent British television production. *Mass Communication and Society*, *12*(4), 503–536.

International Journal of Communication 12(2018), 4593–4614 1932–8036/20180005

It's Only a Game, Let's Leave Politics Out of It: Mega-Sporting Events, Broadcasting Rights, and Network News Bias

CATIE SNOW BAILARD[1]
George Washington University, USA

MARK MAJOR
Pennsylvania State University, USA

The question guiding our project is whether corporations' broadcasting rights to mega-sporting events influenced the degree of critical coverage of the events reported by their respective networks' news divisions. The question is answered through a content analysis of NBC, ABC, and CBS evening news coverage of the men's 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, both held in Brazil, examining the quantity and content of reports highlighting the controversial features of these two major events. The data suggest that broadcasting rights may influence the quantity and quality of critical coverage; however, this relationship does not apply uniformly across networks. The findings have important implications for the capacity of comprehensive and critical coverage provided by some network news divisions while not undermining the financial interests of their corporate owners.

Keywords: ownership, bias, network news, broadcasting rights, sports journalism

On June 17, less than two months before the start of the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Governor Francisco Dornelles declared a "state of public calamity." Rio, along with most of the country of Brazil, was in a financial crisis that put its commitments to properly hosting the Olympic Games in peril. Rio alone was $5.5 billion dollars in debt (BBC News, 2016). Some hospitals were shut down, other essential public services were rationed, and public workers were not paid as the state of Rio requested emergency funds from the federal government. Olympic tourists were greeted at the airport by police officers protesting over not being paid. Several of the protesting officers held "Welcome to Hell" signs, warning that they could not guarantee visitors' safety (Watts, 2016). One Brazilian commentator referred to the events leading up to the Rio Olympics as "an unnatural disaster" because such drastic actions are usually enacted "for an earthquake or a flood. But the Olympics are a man-

Catie Snow Bailard: cbailard@email.gwu.edu
Mark Major: MarkMajor@psu.edu
Date submitted: 2018-04-15

[1] We thank Andrew Billings, Raymond Boyle, Erin Heidt-Forsythe, David Rowe, and Brad Schultz. Special thanks to Katherine Jahries for her exceptional research assistance.

Copyright © 2018 (Catie Snow Bailard and Mark Major). Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd). Available at http://ijoc.org.

made, foreseeable, preventable catastrophe" (Barbara, 2016, p. SR1). Brazil's bleak situation prompted journalist Dave Zirin (2016) to note that the real Brazil was in stark contrast to the one represented by the American corporate media during the games. This dichotomy between representation and reality serves as a springboard for this article.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the relationship between the financial interests of corporate media owners and news bias. The question guiding the project is whether corporations' broadcasting rights to mega-sporting events influenced the coverage of the events by their respective networks' news divisions. Do news divisions serve as de facto public relations firms for their corporate parent companies when it comes to covering controversial political issues about the sporting event that they have the exclusive rights to broadcast?

A content analysis of NBC, ABC, and CBS network news coverage of the 2014 FIFA World Cup[2] and the 2016 Summer Olympics, both held in Brazil, helps answer these questions examining the quantity and content of news reports highlighting the controversial features of these two major events. ABC held the broadcasting rights to the 2014 FIFA World Cup, whereas NBC was the broadcaster for the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics. CBS, in contrast, did not have any exclusive financial interests in the broadcast of either event. The data suggest that broadcasting rights may influence the quantity and quality of critical coverage; however, this relationship does not appear to apply uniformly across networks. The findings have important implications for the capacity of comprehensive and critical coverage provided by some network news divisions while not undermining the financial interests of their corporate owners.

We join Boyle (2006) in calling on scholars of political communication and media studies to take sports and sports journalism more seriously. Though sports can at times be, as Boyle (2006) puts it, "trivial and unimportant," in many cases sports are "a symbolically significant cultural form that is an indicator of wider social and cultural forces in society" (p. 13). Although this analysis speaks directly to prominent theories and analyses within this sports journalism literature, the implications of our findings also extend far beyond the sports arena. The premise that the financial interests of media conglomerates may, at times, shape the news produced by their respective outlets has a logical basis. And there abide several anecdotes that proponents of this argument can call on to provide evidentiary support. However, there remains a paucity of systematic, empirical analyses of this question. Moreover, the limited analyses that do exist tend to focus on news specific to policy and politics.

This study adds a new dimension to this line of inquiry by demonstrating that the potential for financial interests to shape the news content that media conglomerates produce may be far ranging. This study also contributes to broader literatures related to news production, journalism, and particularly media bias, by identifying and leveraging a unique opportunity to expand empirical insight into the shape and form that media bias may take and by providing a viable, robust model for conducting such an analysis.

[2] Please note that the 2014 FIFA World Cup refers only to the men's national team competition.

Previous Literature on Corporate Ownership and Bias

Our area of inquiry deals with the intersection of corporate ownership and news bias, interested in what informs the mechanisms of, as Dunaway (2013) puts it, "economic driven news behavior" (p. 25). The tension between the public and private functions of the U.S. press is well established. An uncomfortable dichotomy exists in most news organizations between the necessity to earn profits and the desire to fulfill civic obligations that are safeguarded under the U.S. Constitution (Patterson, 2013; Picard, 2005). In addition to its unique constitutional protections, the U.S. press is an outlier among most advanced democracies because the private sector, led by large corporate conglomerates, controls the overwhelming majority of the media that are consumed by American audiences (Picard, 2005). This finding has prompted scholars and policy makers alike to question whether the integrity of the press is compromised by profit-driven corporations, particularly when the interests of the business are in conflict with the public interest. Additionally, the degree to which the financial interests of these corporations may influence news coverage is, according to Bailard (2016), "troublingly broad." Concurring, Picard (2005) asserts that the commercialization and ownership concentration of the media are not as concerning as much as that "there are more and more commercial firms operating for profit that are willing to overtly act in their own self-interest" (p. 343), regardless of the impact on the public good. What is at stake here, Gilens and Hertzman (2000) contend, is the possibility that "a press that systematically slants the news to further its own business objectives threatens to undermine the very foundations of democracy" (p. 383).

A confluence of factors informs the news process. For one, news outlets are subject to market forces. Research suggests that the profit motive, informed by advertising revenue, significantly drives the news process (Baker, 2001; Hamilton, 2004). However, traditional news outlets engaged in accountability journalism—like the three networks examined in this article—are more likely to allow professional norms to dictate news judgments over immediate profit calculations, compared to other formats such as tabloid or entertainment news (Entman, 2005). Professional norms do temper the profit motive. Still, the profit motive is a formidable force and "drives the brand location and decision about a day's news content and style" (Hamilton, 2004, p. 24). Thus, there is a dynamic interplay between the profit motive, advertising demands, and journalistic values. Summarizing the literature, Bailard (2016) states that

> the incentives to create coverage that is favorable to the interests of the media owners is likely the result of journalists' incentives to weigh the preferences of their profit-maximizing owners (both explicitly and implicitly) as well as the preferences of their advertisers. (p. 589)

Scholars have offered a variety of ways to examine corporate ownership and its relationship to bias in the news. For example, Gilens and Hertzman (2000) assess ownership influence based on "issues for which different media owners have different interests" and "whether news content differs in accord with those differing interests" (p. 371). We take the same sensible approach in this article because "it is rare when the interests belonging to this handful of corporations vary from one another in clear, systematic, and measurable ways" (Bailard, 2016, p. 586). Given that the three networks operate in the same market and institutional and journalistic context, it is reasonable to assume that broadcasting

rights function as a significant factor in guiding coverage of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. These two major global sporting events offer us one of those rare opportunities to investigate the degree to which corporate interests—in this case, broadcasting rights—influenced the content and tenor of news divisions' coverage.

The literature is clear that the financial interests of corporate media owners can skew the output of the news. However, scholarship on ownership and news bias is limited in one sense in that it has focused primarily on traditional political topics—be they elections (Dunaway, 2008, 2013; Dunaway & Lawrence, 2015), public policy (Bailard, 2016; Gilens & Hertzman, 2000), or international affairs involving the United States (Chomsky, 1999, 2000; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Kennis, 2015). This project makes a unique contribution to the literature by expanding the scope of inquiry in a novel way through the examination of the politics of two major global athletic events. To paraphrase Gilens and Hertzman's (2000) assessment of news coverage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, we determine whether the three major networks slanted coverage to serve the interests of their corporate parents rather than the interests of their viewing public in their coverage of two important megaevents and their implications not only for Brazil but also for future host countries. To put it another way, did the three networks provide, as Rowe (2007) put it, "challenging, critical, socially responsible sports journalism," or did they adhere to the "toy department" (p. 387) stereotype of disengaged, apolitical content that relegates sports reporting to its lowly status both within and outside of the news profession (see also Boyle, 2006)? Ultimately, the question is whether broadcasting rights had a significant impact on the networks' abilities to adequately represent the "two Brazils," one that is host to multiple megaevents and "another that is mired in structural injustice" (Bailey, Oliver, Gaffney, & Kolivras, 2017, p. 73). The findings of this analysis suggest that broadcasting rights can influence the degree of critical coverage.

Hypotheses

We argue that financial incentives seep into and shape news coverage of events that have implications for the network's parent corporation's bottom line. We argue that this is a result of both implicit and explicit calculations made by journalists and editors regarding the preferences and financial interests of both their profit-maximizing corporate owners and their advertisers (Baker, 2001; Epstein, 1974; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Hamilton, 2004; McManus, 1995). Although the range of issues and events that may affect news corporations' finances is presumably broad, the number of opportunities to conduct empirical tests of this argument is often constrained by the fact that it is unusual when the financial interests of news corporations deviate from one another in clear, consistent, and measurable directions. Fortunately, the ownership of broadcasting rights of high-profile events provides one of these rare opportunities.

In this specific case, we are further advantaged by the fact that both the World Cup and the Olympics took place in the same country, Brazil, within a relatively narrow window of time, which means that these two events were plagued by virtually the same sets of political issues, concerns, and circumstances. We are additionally advantaged by the fact that different networks held the broadcasting rights to the two events—with NBC holding the broadcasting rights to the Rio Olympics and ABC holding the rights to the FIFA World Cup. Moreover, including CBS in the analysis provides a useful point of comparison, as it did not hold the broadcasting rights to either event.

Our contention that the financial interests of news corporations would lead a network broadcasting a particular high-profile event to minimize negative coverage is derived from assumptions supported in the literature. First, a broadcasting network will not want to alienate potential viewers by highlighting the negative effects of these events on the host country. They also would not want to risk alienating segments of their potential audience by casting doubt on the integrity of the event itself (in terms of the fairness of the competition) or on the integrity of the event's athletes or officials. For example, if a competition is believed to be rigged, how invested can audience members be in the outcome of that competition? What is the point of watching? In line with this reasoning is the viewpoint that "conspiracies to predetermine contest outcomes kill which distinguishes sport from other entertainment . . . Such a match is not a sport but show business, and an affront to the moral sensibilities of the spectator" (Quinn, 2009, p. 179).

Another assumption we make is that networks prefer to appeal to and appease advertisers (Baker, 2001; Hamilton, 20054; McManus, 1995), and advertisers have a clear preference that their commercials be associated with content that is of "lighter fare," as opposed to content that may be construed as dark or difficult by audience members (Anderson & Coate, 2000; Brown & Cavazos, 2005; Sunstein, 1999). Thus, potential advertisers may harbor concerns that negative coverage of an event and its impact on vulnerable populations in the host country could elicit a sense of unease among certain audience members in the form of cognitive dissonance among those who feel conflicted about the event. Thus, if an event is portrayed as mired in controversy, if the fairness of the event's competitions or integrity of officiating is called into doubt, or if the harmful implications of that event for local populations are highlighted, it is possible that advertisers may deem that event as too dark or difficult and, thus, not offer attractive advertising space.

Accordingly, we predict that a content analysis of the news coverage of these two events aired by NBC, ABC, and CBS will yield the following findings:

H1: News programs featured more coverage of the event that their network held the broadcasting rights to compared to an event it was not broadcasting.

H2: News coverage of the Olympic Games by NBC (event broadcaster) was less negative than the coverage produced by the two nonbroadcasting networks, ABC and CBS.

H3: News coverage of the World Cup by ABC (event broadcaster) was less negative than the coverage produced by the two nonbroadcasting networks, NBC and CBS.

H4: News coverage of the Olympics by NBC (event broadcaster) was less negative than its coverage of the World Cup (as a nonbroadcaster).

H5: News coverage of the World Cup by ABC (event broadcaster) was less negative than its coverage of the Olympics (as a nonbroadcaster).

H6: Holding broadcasting rights to neither event, CBS news coverage of the World Cup was commensurate in its degree of negativity with its coverage of the Olympics.

Method

Utilizing LexisNexis's archive of broadcast news transcripts, we compiled transcripts of stories about the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics aired on the network evening news programs belonging to NBC (*Nightly News*), ABC (*World News Tonight*), and CBS (*Evening News*). To ensure that the story was primarily about the event itself, we limited the search to stories that mentioned the name of the event in the transcript's headline or lead. This approach also ensured that the stories include some content about the events themselves beyond merely summarizing or reciting the outcomes of that day's competitions. For the Olympics, the names we searched for included "Olympics" and "Summer Games," and for the World Cup, the names included "World Cup" and "FIFA." We also required that the terms "Brazil" or "Rio" be mentioned at least once at any point in the transcript to ensure that the stories were about the 2014 World Cup or the 2016 Olympics in Brazil, as opposed to stories about past or future events held in other countries.

For each event, we searched for stories that were aired during a period of exactly seven years, beginning with the day of the official announcement that each event would be hosted by Brazil through about three months after the conclusion of each event. (We opted to extend the window past the conclusion of the events to ensure that the searches would capture retrospective stories about the events and their impacts after they ended.) For the World Cup, this time frame reaches from October 30, 2007, to October 30, 2014, and for the Olympics, the time span begins October 2, 2009, and ends October 2, 2016.

After the transcripts were compiled, one of the authors scrubbed the transcripts of all identifying information—including show names, networks, and the names of any anchors, reporters, or correspondents. These names were all replaced by generic identifiers (e.g., Network 1, Network 2, Show 1, Newsperson 1) before coding commenced, which would ensure that the coders could not be alerted to which transcript was broadcast by which network, an essential component of maintaining coder objectivity.

The codebook was compiled by the authors and a graduate research assistant by perusing other types of coverage of these events (such as stories published by newspapers and online news sites) to identify the main political criticisms, concerns, and critiques of the events or their impacts on Brazil. Briefly, these negative implications include the misuse of public resources; inhumane or unsafe working conditions; forced housing evictions or relocations; economic recession or other negative effects on national economy; the threat of Zika; terrorism threats or concerns; political instability or law and order concerns in Brazil related to the events; Brazil's being unprepared or behind schedule in providing the necessary logistics for hosting the event; non-Zika health threats to competitors, attendees, or journalists; and mentions of possible corruption or cover-ups that cast doubt on the integrity of the event itself, its athletes, or members of its organizing body. We also included a code for "other" to catch any additional negative implications not otherwise captured by our codebook.

Several pilot tests employing transcripts of the networks' morning news programs were conducted to strengthen the codebook and establish strong intercoder reliability. After this process, the

two coders (one author who neither conducted the search nor scrubbed the transcripts, to remain blind to which stories were aired by which network) and the graduate student coder (who was also blind to the network origin of the stories) independently coded 82 of the evening news transcripts, constituting approximately 45% of the total number of broadcast transcripts included in this analysis (n = 184).[3]

Results

Beginning with H1, we simply compared the number of stories aired about each event by the broadcasting network with those from each of the two nonbroadcasting networks. As Table 1 reveals, for both the World Cup and the Olympics, the broadcasting network (ABC and NBC, respectively) aired nearly twice as many stories than the two nonbroadcasting networks.

Table 1. Number of Stories About World Cup and Olympics Aired by Each Network's Evening News Program.

	NBC	ABC	CBS
World Cup	14	22	14
Olympic Games	67	35	14

Although this finding supports our first prediction, it is also worth noting that this finding might alternatively be explained by simple logistics. Because it is broadcasting the event, that network also has substantially more presence in Brazil and, thus, has more resources on the ground to report stories relevant to that event.[4]

Complicating our findings with H1, we compared the number of stories aired by the three networks prior to the events. Concurrent with the first hypothesis, we expected that the event's broadcaster would air more stories than the two nonbroadcasters. NBC, as the broadcaster of the Olympics, aired slightly more than 50% of all stories among the three networks before the start of the games, meeting our expectations. ABC, on the other hand, failed to meet our expectations, as it did not air the most stories prior to the start of the 2014 World Cup, despite being the event's exclusive broadcaster. NBC aired nearly 64% of the segments among the three networks prior to the start of the World Cup, whereas ABC aired only 18% of the stories.

[3] Please see the Appendix for the specific codes and their respective intercoder reliability scores. Please see the supplementary appendix (https://smpa.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2046/f/Broadcast%20Rights%20and%20News%20Bias%20-%20IJoC%20Supplementary%20Appendix.pdf) for the codebook in its entirety.

[4] Another possible explanation for this finding is access to newsworthy visual material. In other words, the nonbroadcast rights networks may lack copyright access to visual material, thus limiting their ability to report about the event. Our thanks to one of the reviewers for making this point.

To test H2 and 3, we use likelihood-ratio chi-squared tests comparing the number of stories that mention each of the specific negative implications of the events included in the codebook (and in the "other" category). We also conducted Pearson's chi-squared tests and *t*-tests comparing aggregate measures of the presence (or absence) of negatives mentioned in the stories aired by the broadcasting network's news program versus the nonbroadcasting networks' news programs (pooled). These aggregate measures included the percentages of all stories aired by each network that did not mention any negative implications of the event at all and the mean number of negative implications mentioned per story for the broadcasting network relative to the nonbroadcasting networks.[5]

The results of the tests of 2, beginning with the individual codes (i.e., specific negative implications mentioned in a story), there are no significant differences between how NBC (event broadcaster) covered the Olympics versus how ABC and CBS covered it. Moreover, as Table 2 shows, there are several negatives that NBC mentioned more frequently than the other networks. Interestingly, this finding runs contrary to our prediction; however, these differentials do not reach statistical significance.

Table 2. Likelihood Ratio Chi-squared Tests Comparing Mentions of Specific Negative Implications of Olympics in Network News Programs.

Topics mentioned in coverage	Nonbroadcaster	Broadcaster	Likelihood Ratio χ^2	*p*-Value
	ABC & CBS (*n* = 67)	NBC (*n* = 67)		
Misuse of national public resources				
Percentage of stories	3	3		
Number of stories	2	2	.00	1.0
Adjusted residual	.0	.0		
Inhumane/unsafe working conditions				
Percentage of stories	0	0	–	–
Number of stories	0	0		

[5] Likelihood ratio chi-squared tests are appropriate for the analysis of the specific codes because they permit a comparison of the coverage produced by the broadcasting network of the event to that of the two nonbroadcasting networks (pooled). This type of test is also appropriate for the binomial distribution of the dependent variables in these tests, which are binary measures that denote either the presence or absence of specific negatives (i.e., codes) in the stories. Additionally, likelihood-ratio chi-squared tests are preferred to Pearson's chi-squared tests in this case because of the relatively small values of the expected cell frequencies of the specific codes (i.e., there are small expected frequencies in the contingency tables for several of the individual codes). For the tests of the aggregate measures, however, we use Pearson's chi-squared to compare the number of stories with no negatives mentioned at all (because of the multinomial distribution of this dependent variable and the larger expected cell frequencies for this measure) and a two-tailed *t*-test of the mean number of negatives mentioned per story for the broadcasting versus nonbroadcasting networks (because of the continuous distribution of this dependent variable).

Adjusted residual	–	–		
Forced housing evictions or relocations				
Percentage of stories	3	1.5		
Number of stories	2	1	.35	.56
Adjusted residual	.58	−.58		
Economic recession or other negative effects on national economy				
Percentage of stories	1.5	4.5		
Number of stories	1	3	1.08	.3
Adjusted residual	−1.02	1.02		
Threat of Zika				
Percentage of stories	18	16		
Number of stories	12	11	.05	.82
Adjusted residual	.23	−.23		
Terrorism concerns				
Percentage of stories	6	5.5		
Number of stories	4	3	.15	.7
Adjusted residual	.39	−.39		
Political instability or law-and-order concerns in Brazil				
Percentage of stories	7.5	15		
Number of stories	5	10	1.9	.17
Adjusted residual	−1.37	1.37		
Brazil is unprepared/ behind schedule				
Percentage of stories	4.5	6		
Number of stories	3	4	.15	.7
Adjusted residual	−.39	.39		
Non-Zika health threats to competitors, tourists/ attendees, or journalists				
Percentage of stories	13.5	12		
Number of stories	9	8	.07	.8
Adjusted residual	.26	−.26		
Corruption and cover-ups				
Percentage of stories	19.5	16.5		
Number of stories	13	11	.2	.65
Adjusted residual	.45	−.45		

Random public relations disasters				
Percentage of stories	13	10.5		
Number of stories	9	7	.29	.6
Adjusted residual	.53	−.53		

Turning to the aggregate measures, the average number of total negatives mentioned per story is no different for NBC, CBS, and ABC. However, the difference between the percentage of stories aired by NBC that do not mention any negatives at all compared with the percentages of stories aired on the other two networks does run in the direction predicted by our hypothesis. As Table 3 demonstrates, 45% of NBC's stories about the Olympics mention no negatives at all, whereas only 31% of the ABC and CBS stories (pooled) mention no negatives at all. This difference just misses statistical significance; however, at $p = .10$ ($p \leq .11$). This means that, across both the individual measures and aggregate measures, there is limited evidence that NBC covered the Olympics decidedly less negatively than the two nonbroadcasting networks, contrary to our expectations.

Table 3. Tests Comparing Aggregate Measures of Negativity in Network Coverage of Olympics.

Aggregate measures of coverage	Nonbroadcaster ABC & CBS (n = 67)	Broadcaster NBC (n = 67)	Pearson's χ^2	p-Value
Stories with no negatives mentioned (χ^2 test)				
Percentage of stories	31	45		
Number of stories	21	30	2.57	.11
Adjusted residual	−.16	1.6		
Average negatives mentioned in story (two-tailed t-test)				
Mean	.9	.9		1.0
Standard error	.11	.14		

As for H3, the analysis reveals significant differences between how ABC (event broadcaster) covered the World Cup versus how NBC and CBS covered it in regard to three of the specific codes. ABC was significantly less likely to air stories that referenced misuse of public resources, political instability or law-and-order concerns, or Brazil being unprepared or behind schedule. Of note, there is one code that ABC was more likely to mention than the other networks—corruption or cover-ups associated with FIFA or the World Cup. However, there are also several additional negatives that were mentioned less often by ABC than the nonbroadcasting networks, but these differentials just miss statistical significance. Thus, on the whole, ABC was markedly less likely to mention several of the negatives associated with the World Cup than the other networks, as predicted (see Table 4).

Table 4. Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared Tests Comparing Mentions of Negative Implications of World Cup in Network News Programs.

Mentioned in coverage	Nonbroadcaster NBC & CBS (*n* = 28)	Broadcaster ABC (*n* = 22)	Likelihood Ratio χ^2	*p*-Value
Misuse of national public resources				
Percentage of stories	25	0		
Number of stories	7	0	9.01	.003
Adjusted residual	2.53	−2.53		
Inhumane/unsafe working conditions				
Percentage of stories	7	4.5		
Number of stories	2	1	.15	.7
Adjusted residual	.38	−.38		
Forced housing evictions or relocation				
Percentage of stories	4.5	0		
Number of stories	1	0	1.18	.28
Adjusted residual	.9	−.9		
Economic recession or other				
Percentage of stories	4.5	0		
Number of stories	1	0	1.18	.28
Adjusted residual	.9	−.9		
The threat of Zika				
Percentage of stories	0	0		
Number of stories	0	0	–	–
Adjusted residual	–	–		
Terrorism concerns				
Percentage of stories	4.5	0		
Number of stories	1	0	1.18	.28
Adjusted residual	.9	−.9		
Political instability or law and				

Percentage of stories	32	9		
Number of stories	9	2	4.12	.04
Adjusted residual	1.95	−1.95		
Brazil is unprepared/ behind				
Percentage of stories	21	0		
Number of stories	6	0	7.6	.006
Adjusted residual	2.32	−2.32		
Non-Zika health threats to				
Percentage of stories	7	0		
Number of stories	2	0	2.38	.12
Adjusted residual	1.28	−1.28		
Corruption or cover-ups				
Percentage of stories	0	13.5		
Number of stories	0	3	5.17	.02
Adjusted residual	−2.02	2.02		
Random public relations				
Percentage of stories	0	4.5		
Number of stories	0	1	1.67	.2
Adjusted residual	−1.14	1.14		

Regarding the aggregate measures, Table 5 reveals that the difference in the average number of total negatives mentioned in the stories between ABC and the other networks is quite large, statistically significant, and runs in the direction that our hypothesis predicts. However, we do not find a significant difference between the percentage of stories that do not mention any negatives at all. (Although not significant, it is worth noting, substantively, that there is a modest difference that does run in the direction that our hypothesis predicts.) Overall, these findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.

Table 5. Tests Comparing Aggregate Measures of Negativity in Network Coverage of World Cup.

Aggregate measures of coverage	Nonbroadcaster NBC & CBS (*n* = 28)	Broadcaster ABC (*n* = 22)	Pearson's χ^2	*p*-Value
Stories with no negatives mentioned (χ^2 test)				
Percentage of stories	65	73		
Number of stories	18	16	.4	.53
Adjusted residual	−.64	.64		
Average negatives mentioned in story (two-tailed *t*-test)				
Mean	1.04	.32		.05
Standard Error	.31	.12		

For H4 through H6, we test only the aggregate measures of the degree of negativity featured in each network's news coverage of the two events. The rationale motivating this approach is that, although both events were plagued by a nearly identical set of criticisms, it would be imprudent to expect that the same negative implications applied equally or were equally salient across both events. Moreover, such an expectation potentially constructs an easily refutable argument for the analysis, which presents the risk of generating significant differences in the findings that are not actually attributable to whether a network is broadcasting a given event, but more likely attributable simply to the passage of time and the resulting changes in circumstances. Therefore, it is more judicious to test aggregate measures of the degree of negativity portrayed by each network's coverage of each event as a whole, as this is a more difficult test and is a more valid test in light of the temporal dimensions inherent to this analysis.

In this case, there is virtually no difference between the average number of total negatives mentioned per story aired by NBC in its coverage of the Olympics versus its coverage of the World Cup. As for the difference between the percentage of stories that do not mention any negatives, the direction of the difference between NBC's Olympics coverage versus coverage of the World Cup moves in the expected direction of our hypothesis (45% of its stories about the Olympics do not mention any negatives, versus 36% of its World Cup stories); however, this difference does not reach significance (please see Table 6).

Table 6. Tests of Aggregate Measures of Negativity in NBC's Coverage of the Olympics to NBC's World Cup Coverage.

Aggregate measures of coverage	Nonbroadcasting Event: World Cup (n = 14)	Broadcasting Event: Olympics (n = 67)	Pearson's χ^2	p-Value
Stories with no negatives mentioned (χ^2 test)				
Percentage of stories	64	45		
Number of stories	9	30	1.77	.18
Adjusted residual	1.33	−1.33		
Average negatives mentioned in story (two-tailed t-test)				
Mean	1	.9		.39
Standard error	.44	.14		

In summary, there is no significant difference in the aggregate measures of negativity of NBC's news stories about the Olympics (which it was broadcasting) versus NBC's stories about the World Cup (which it was not broadcasting).

Next, our tests of H5 reveal large differences, both substantively and significantly, between ABC's coverage of the Olympics, which it was not broadcasting, and its coverage of the World Cup, which it was broadcasting. Beginning with the difference between the percentage of stories that do not mention any negatives at all, only 37% of ABC's stories about the Olympics did not mention any negatives, whereas a whopping 74% of its World Cup stories contained no negative mentions. The same is true of the average number of total negatives mentioned per story—this average was much lower for ABC's coverage of the World Cup versus its coverage of the Olympics (please see Table 7.)

Table 7. Tests of Aggregate Measures of Negativity in ABC's Olympics Coverage to ABC's Coverage of the World Cup.

Aggregate measures of coverage	Nonbroadcasting Event: Olympics (n = 35)	Broadcasting Event: World Cup (n = 22)	Pearson's χ^2	p-Value
Stories with no negatives mentioned (χ^2 test)				
Percentage of stories	34	73		
Number of stories	12	16	7.99	.005
Adjusted residual	−2.83	2.83		
Average negatives mentioned in story (two-tailed t-test)				
Mean	.8	.32		.02
Standard error	.13	.12		

In summary, there are large and significant differences in ABC's World Cup coverage compared with its coverage of the Olympics, and these differences run in the direction predicted by our hypothesis.

Last, the findings generated by our tests of H6 reveal that there is one sizeable difference between CBS's coverage of the Olympics and its coverage of the World Cup (CBS held broadcasting rights to neither). Similar to ABC's distribution of coverage, the percentage of CBS's stories that do not mention any negatives at all is much lower for the Olympics (28%) than for its coverage of the World Cup (64%). However, it is worth noting that there is no difference between the average number of negatives mentioned per story in CBS's coverage of the Olympics versus its World Cup coverage. This finding suggests that, although CBS aired a larger percentage of World Cup stories that avoided mentioning any negatives at all (similar to ABC), when a CBS story about the World Cup did mention any negatives, the number of negatives mentioned by CBS story was quite large (dissimilar to ABC). Essentially, when CBS went negative about the World Cup, it went very negative in terms of the sheer number of negative implications presented in a given story. Additionally, the average number of negatives mentioned per story was similar for CBS's coverage of the Olympics and its coverage of the World Cup, suggesting relative consistency in its coverage of the two events. Therefore, although there is only mixed support for this hypothesis, it appears that CBS's coverage of the World Cup versus its coverage of the Olympics was relatively commensurate, particularly in comparison to ABC's coverage of these two events (please see Table 8).

Table 8. Tests of Aggregate Measures of Negativity in CBS's Coverage of the Olympics to CBS's Coverage of the World Cup.

Aggregate measures of coverage	Nonbroadcasting Event: Olympics (*n* = 32)	Broadcasting Event: World Cup (*n* = 14)	Pearson's χ^2	*p*-Value
Stories with no negatives mentioned (χ^2 test)				
Percentage of stories	28	64		
Number of stories	9	9	5.35	.02
Adjusted residual	−2.31	2.31		
Average negatives mentioned in story (two-tailed *t*-test)				
Mean	1	1.07		.86
Standard error	.18	.45		

Discussion and Conclusion

We find mixed support for the expectation that corporations' broadcasting rights to mega-sporting events skewed the coverage of their respective networks' news divisions. On the one hand, both broadcasters to the World Cup (ABC) and the Summer Olympics (NBC) found these events more newsworthy compared with the nonbroadcasters. On the other hand, the financial interests of broadcasting rights seemed to only inform ABC's coverage of the World Cup whereas NBC, as the broadcaster of the Olympics, largely failed to conform to the expectations found in scholarship on ownership and media bias. In a little more detail, save for its finding the Olympics more newsworthy than the two nonbroadcasters did, the absence of a positive slant in NBC's coverage is substantiated relative to two other points about its coverage: (a) its own reporting on another event (i.e., the World Cup) that it did not broadcast, and (b) how nonbroadcasting networks reported on that same event (i.e., the Olympics). The opposite is true of ABC. Across these same two points of comparison, ABC's coverage of the World Cup was slanted decidedly in favor of the event that ABC owned broadcast rights to, as predicted by our hypotheses.[6]

[6] Additionally, we ran tests comparing the average number of negatives mentioned per story before and after each event. We find that ABC's coverage does not conform with that of the other networks in how it compares to NBC's coverage of its own event, how NBC and CBS covered the World Cup, and how ABC covered events before the Olympics. Each of these findings mirrors our larger findings regarding a positive slant by ABC in its coverage of the event to which it had the broadcast rights. Please see Tables 9 and 10 in the supplementary appendix for the results of these tests.

One potential explanation for the apparent absence of slant in NBC's coverage of the World Cup versus that of the Olympics arises from consideration of the temporal dimension of this analysis. Seeing that NBC already knew that it would be broadcasting the 2016 Olympics in Brazil when it was reporting on the 2014 World Cup, there may have been an incentive to downplay negativity in its coverage of the World Cup in an effort to favorably set the stage for its subsequent broadcasting event, the Olympics. This would explain the commensurate aspect of our findings: the similarity in the tone of NBC's coverage across these two events, suggesting that profit motives may have, in fact, played a role in how NBC reported on these events after all. However, a profit motive should also encourage NBC to largely shy away from negativity in its coverage of both events. Instead, NBC's coverage of both events revealed some willingness, albeit moderate, to highlight the negative aspects of these events (particularly relative to ABC), which returns us to our original conclusion— NBC's coverage of these events did not closely conform with its corporate owner's financial interests, contrary to predictions. Only additional research will satisfactorily begin to shed light on the complexities revealed by the findings.

A related inquiry is the relatively modest degree of critical coverage across all three networks, despite the multitude of political controversies that plagued these megaevents. All three networks were relatively sparing in their emphasis of the more sordid aspects of the World Cup and the Olympics in Brazil. For example, the majority of coverage across the three networks made no negative mentions of the 2014 World Cup. Though there was more criticism of the Rio Olympics— reaching majority of coverage for ABC, NBC, and CBS—the proportionality of negativity was modest, as evidenced by the mean average of negatives mentioned per story. Scholarship on sports journalism provides helpful explanations for why these patterns persist throughout coverage.

Sporting megaevents are both a global commercial enterprise and a form of media entertainment, and the tension between these two factors, explains Boyle (2006), "helps shape the parameters within which contemporary sports journalism operates" (p. 92). A clear consensus in this literature, as the title of our article implies, is that the financial links between megaevents and news outlets invite the latter to downplay the politics that inevitably inform these global sporting spectacles (Boyle, 2006; Lenskyj, 2016; Rowe, 2007, 2012). Our findings support previous research that shows there is little interest in covering sports through a political, social, or economic lens, opting instead for a "routinely neutral" approach to mega-events (Rowe, 2007).

Sports journalism has long been considered the "toy department" of the news media, held in low regard both within and outside the profession because of its focus on seemingly trivial matters (Boyle, 2006; Rowe, 2007). Research shows that the political economy of sports is underreported or receives superficial treatment (Boyle, 2006; Boyle, Dinan, & Morrow, 2002; Rowe, 2007). Sugden and Tomlinson (2007) observed that much of what qualifies as sports news "is at best trivial and at worst little short of advertising" (p. 44).[7] Boyle (2006) also notes that investigative reporting lacks a strong tradition in this field. It is "largely peripheral" (Boyle, 2006, p. 120) in the realm of sports journalism. Likewise, "critical investigative

[7] Another significant factor contributing to the depoliticized coverage of mega-events is the narrowness of the sources journalists rely on to frame sports stories (Boyle, 2006; Boyle, Dinan, & Morrow, 2002; Rowe, 2007; Sherwood, Nicholson, & Marjoribanks, 2016; Sugden & Tomlinson, 2007).

journalism," Sugden and Tomlinson (2007) contend, "is not the forte of most sports journalism" (p. 58). In other words, investigative and critical reporting are the exception, not the rule, in sports journalism.[8] This finding leads Boyle (2006) to rhetorically ask "if sport is simply a wing of a global, commercial entertainment industry, then should we surprised if sports journalism begins to have much in common with its related journalisms in the showbusiness arena?" (p. 126).

The problem is not limited to sports coverage. "In the age of promotion and media manipulation," argues Boyle (2006), "the challenge to produce uncomplicit sports journalism is, in many ways, simply an extension of those faced by journalists in other spheres of journalism" (p. 127). This is why it is imperative, according to Rowe (2007), that sports reporting "cannot be quarantined from the requirements of critical investigation because of its popular cultural object" (p. 386). Accordingly, we reiterate the call for journalism and political communication scholars to strongly consider incorporating sports news into their research. For example, the quantity and tenor of the sports media's reporting on the politically charged controversy surrounding NFL players' national anthem protests during the 2017 season, and the degree to which that coverage may have been shaped by their network's financial links to the NFL, stands out as one potential avenue to continue such a research agenda. On a related note, in addition to taking sports and sports journalism more seriously, we urge scholars to consider merging media ownership and news bias with the increasingly important role of social media and the ever-shifting political economy landscape of the news media. For example, President Trump took to Twitter to denounce NFL players' kneeling during the National Anthem, and his tweets spurred more news coverage. Moreover, we suggest examining the influence that corporate interests have on sports coverage in political opinion media outlets such as Fox News. In addition, we encourage scholars to investigate how the sports divisions of these news-network conglomerates cover the politics informing their own events (e.g., ESPN's reporting on the World Cup) compared with their rivals' events (e.g., ESPN's covering a Fox Sports event).

Outside of sports journalism scholarship, the tendency for evening news programs to increasingly favor soft news over hard news over recent decades, as market competition increased and audience preferences changed, may also help to explain this pattern of coverage (Hamilton, 2004). Research suggesting that TV coverage, especially coverage from corporate-owned TV stations, is less substantive than newspaper reporting also provides support for this finding (Dunaway, 2008). In addition, investigative news stories about sports "tend to be broken by the print media, and then picked up and developed by the broadcasters" (Boyle, 2006, p. 70). Anecdotally, most of the critical coverage we used to construct the codebook for this study was supplied by newspaper stories, not broadcast reports, provides support for this assessment.

Another point worth revisiting is that our endeavor to empirically measure slanted news coverage that correlates with the financial interests of news corporations—in this case, reporting on events for which a network does or does not own broadcasting rights—does not compare the content of the actual stories aired to some sort of unknown, ideal measure of what truly "objective" or "unslanted" coverage of these

[8] Though Boyle's (2006) claim was made in the context of UK sports journalism, it is applicable to U.S. sports reporting given that mega-events and the media are financially interlinked (e-mail correspondence with R. Boyle, October 14, 2017).

events would look like. The reason for this approach is simple: This ideal objective measure simply does not exist in reality. In its absence, the best alternative available is to compare actual content produced by news outlets on issues and events in which those outlets and their respective parent corporations' bottom lines are clearly and measurably affected in different directions.

By comparing the content of news produced about specific events, across which broadcasting rights varied both by networks and events, we were able to execute a sound empirical test of the potential for financial incentives of news corporations to slant the news coverage that they produce. Although our analysis did reveal a strong positive slant in ABC's coverage of the World Cup, to which it held the broadcasting rights, across two different points of comparison, we did not find as much evidence of a similar slant in NBC's coverage. Our findings both expand, and complicate, the broader literatures on news bias, news production, sports journalism, and journalism studies more broadly. We hope that future research will continue this line of inquiry by seeking out novel opportunities to empirically test the degree to which the financial motivations belonging to news corporations may seep into and slant the content produced by their news outlets.

References

Anderson, S., & Coate, S. (2000). *Market provision of public goods: The case of broadcasting* (NBER Working Paper No. 7513). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w7513

Bailard, C. S. (2016). Corporate ownership and news bias revisited: Newspaper coverage of the Supreme Court's *Citizens United* ruling. *Political Communication, 33*(4), 583–604.

Bailey, K., Oliver, R., Gaffney, C., & Kolivras, K. (2017). Negotiating "new" narratives: Rio de Janeiro and the "media geography" of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 41*(1), 70–93.

Baker, C. E. (2001). *Media, markets, and democracy.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Barbara, V. (2016, July 1). Brazil's Olympic catastrophe. *The New York Times*, p. SR1. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/brazils-olympic-catastrophe.html

BBC News. (2016, June 17). *Rio state declares "public calamity" over finances*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36565901

Boyle, R. (2006). *Sports journalism: Context and issues*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Boyle, R., Dinan, W., & Morrow, S. (2002). Doing the business? Newspaper reporting of the business of football. *Journalism, 3*(2), 161–181.

Brown, K., & Cavazos, R. (2005). Why is this show so dumb? Advertising revenue and program content of network television. *Review of Industrial Organization, 27*(1), 17–34.

Chomsky, D. (1999). The mechanisms of management control at *The New York Times. Media, Culture & Society, 21*, 579–599.

Chomsky, D. (2000). Advanced agent of the Truman Doctrine: The United States, *The New York Times*, and the Greek civil war. *Political Communication, 17*(4), 415–432.

Dunaway, J. (2008). Markets, ownership, and the quality of campaign news coverage. *Journal of Politics, 70*(4), 1193–1202.

Dunaway, J. (2013). Media ownership and story tone in campaign news. *American Politics Research, 41*(1), 24–53.

Dunaway, J., & Lawrence, R. G. (2015). What predicts the game frame? Media ownership, electoral context, and campaign news. *Political Communication, 32*(1), 43–60.

Entman, R. M. (2005). The nature and sources of news. In G. Overholser & K. H. Jamieson (Eds.), *The press* (pp. 48–65). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Epstein, E. J. (1974). *News from nowhere: Television and the news*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Gamson, W. A., Croteau, D., Hoynes, W., & Sasson, T. (1992). Media images and the social construction of reality. *Annual Review of Sociology, 18*, 373–393.

Gilens, M., & Hertzman, C. (2000). Corporate ownership and news bias: Newspaper coverage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. *Journal of Politics, 62*(2), 369–386.

Hamilton, J. T. (2004). *All the news that's fit to sell: How the market transforms information into news*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2002). *Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Pantheon.

Kennis, A. (2015). Indexing state-corporate propaganda? Evaluating the indexing, propaganda and media dependence models on CNN and CNN en Español's coverage of Fallujah, Iraq. *Global Media and Communication, 11*(2), 103–130.

Lenskyj, H. J. (2016). *Sports mega-events legacies: From the beneficial to the destructive* (Transparency International Global Corruption Report). Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/files/content/feature/3.15_SportsMegaEventLegacies_Lenskyj_GCRSport.pdf

McManus, J. 1995. A market-based model of news production. *Communication Theory, 5*(4), 301–338.

Patterson, T. E. (2013). *Informing the news: The need for knowledge-based journalism*. New York, NY: Vintage.

Picard, R. G. (2005). Money, media, and the public interest. In G. Overholser & K. H. Jamieson (Eds.), *The Press* (pp. 337–350). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Quinn, K. G. (2009). *Sports and their fans: The history, economics and culture of the relationship between spectator and sport*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.

Rowe, D. (2007). Sports journalism: Still the "toy department" of the news media? *Journalism*, *84*(4), 385–405.

Rowe, D. (2012). The bid, the lead-up, the event and the legacy: Global cultural politics and hosting the Olympics. *British Journal of Sociology, 63*(2), 285–305.

Sherwood, M., Nicholson, M., & Marjoribanks, T. (2016). Access, agenda building and information subsidies: Media relations in professional sport. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport,* 1–16.

Sugden, J., & Tomlinson, A. (2007). Stories from Planet Football and Sportsworld: Source relations and collusion in sport journalism. *Journalism Practice, 1*(1), 44–61.

Sunstein, C. R. (1999, January). *Private broadcasters and the public interest: Notes toward a "third way"* (University of Chicago Law School, Olin Law and Economics Program, Discussion Paper No. 65). Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=143174

Watts, J. (2016, July 8). "The city should not be this way": Fears over violence in Rio with Olympics near. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/the-city-should-not-be-this-way-fears-over-violence-in-rio-with-olympics-near

Zirin, D. (2016). *Brazil's dance with the devil: The World Cup, the Olympics, and the fight for democracy* (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.

Appendix

Table A1. List of Codes and their Intercoder Reliability Scores.

Codes Representing Specific Negatives Mentioned in News Coverage of the Events	Agreement (%)	Cohen's κ
Misuse of public resources	97.56	.8441
Unsafe or inhumane working conditions	100.00	1
Forced evictions or relocations	100.00	1
Economic recession or other negative effects on national economy	97.56	.4875
Threat of Zika	98.78	.9454
Terrorism threats and concerns	97.56	.6555
Political instability or other law and order concerns	97.56	.9185
Brazil is unprepared or behind schedule	98.78	.9165
Other (non-Zika) health threats to competitors, attendees, and/or journalists	98.78	.9405
Corruption or cover-ups that cast doubt on the integrity of the event itself or its athletes	97.56	.9024
Random public relations disaster	98.78	.9267
No negatives mentioned in story at all	96.34	.9259