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SECOND SCREENING

Second Screening Politics in the Social Media Sphere: Advancing Research on Dual Screen Use in Political Communication with Evidence from 20 Countries

Homero Gil de Zúñiga and James H. Liu

The pervasive use of multiple technological tools to engage with media and political content (i.e., TV sets, laptops, tablets, smartphones, etc.) has deeply altered the way citizens around the world consume information and discuss public affair issues. Many are using 2, or even several “screens” at the same time to do so, a phenomenon known as second or dual screening.

The goal of this article is twofold. First, it introduces a set of novel studies published as a special section devoted to second screening. Second, based on nationally representative original survey data collected in twenty societies (N = 22,033), the study depicts a snapshot of second screening habits for news and politics around the world. Findings reveal that young people tend to second screen more than older counterparts. Similarly, there are also differences in political behaviors between groups of high and low frequency second screen users. More intensive users tend to politically express themselves in social media, and participate more often in offline political activities. On the other hand, results indicate little or no differences between these two groups in terms of their voting behavior.

For many people across the globe, social media remains omnipresent in everyday life (Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016; We Are Social & Hootsuite, 2017). Its general impact on social life has been empirically documented at many levels.

Homero Gil de Zúñiga (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is the Medienwandel professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Vienna, and Research Fellow at Departamento de Comunicación y Letras, Universidad Diego Portales, Chile. His research addresses the influence of new technologies and digital media on people's daily lives and the overall democratic process.

James H. Liu (Ph.D., UCLA) is professor and head of the School of Psychology at Massey University in New Zealand. His research is in cross-cultural, social, and political psychology, specializing in social representations of history and their relationship to identity, prejudice, and international relations. He has more recent interests in global consciousness and digital influence—how systems like liberal democracy and hierarchical relationalism function to create global social order.

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For instance, social media has altered economic behaviors (Benkler, 2006; Kirtiş & Karahan, 2011), medical and health management of diseases (Hawn, 2009; Merolli, Gray, & Martin-Sanchez, 2013), law and governmental policies (Bertot, Jaeger, & Hansen, 2012; Janssen, Charalabidis, & Zuiderwijk, 2012), and even social and family relations (Oh, Ozkaya, & LaRose, R, 2014; O'Keeffe, & Clarke-Pearson, 2011). The field of political communication is not immune to this trend (Garret et al., 2012). Social media touches most aspects of social and public life (Papacharissi, 2016); consuming news, discussing important issues with others, getting closer to journalists, interacting with political officials, and reaching governmental bodies is viable with just a few taps of the fingers (Bennett, 2012; Howard & Parks, 2012; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2013).

In the last decade, scholars have amply observed several important effects of social media use on political behavior. In particular, when people use social media for specific news and informational purposes, they are also more likely to discuss public affairs, express political attitudes and opinions online, and learn about political issues (Bode, 2016; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). They are also more open to political persuasion (Bond et al., 2016), more likely to participate in protests and in political activities more broadly, and engage in political consumerist undertakings (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Bode, 2017; Boulianne, 2015; Gil de Zúñiga, Copeland, & Bimber, 2014; Skoric, Zhu, & Pang, 2016; Theocharis & Lowe, 2016; Vaccari et al., 2015; Valenzuela, 2013; Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014). Social media use for news has also been considered a catalyst platform for online deliberation (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013).

But perhaps the most recent phenomena in the areas of social media and digital news are dual screening and multitasking uses of social media. Many citizens today consume live content on TV, or any other screen, while enriching that experience with a second "screen" to interact with that content. As a seminal study on the topic defined it (Gil de Zúñiga, García-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015, p. 5), second screening for news is "a process in which individuals watching television use an additional electronic device or "screen" to access the internet or social networking sites to obtain more information about the program or event they are watching or to discuss it in real time." According to Nielsen (2011), nearly 70% of smartphone owners use the device while watching TV. Dual screening for news and politics has become a burgeoning field, and it will only grow in importance as mobile and multiplatform news technologies evolve in the future (e.g., De la Peña et al., 2010).

Recent work revolving around second screening has pointed out the difficulty many researchers face; a valid measurement of the phenomenon, and what constitutes second screening in terms of the degree and type of involvement are still matters of debate. Survey studies, experimental setting based studies, and "big," trace data analysis have all highlighted measurement and effect inconsistencies. So far, the most daunting challenge is to ascertain and gather reliable data to quantify short and long period effects of second screening habits (Choi & Jung, 2016; Horning, 2017; Moe, Poell, & Van Dijck, 2016; Vaccari, Chadwick, & O'Loughlin, 2015; Van Cauwenberge, Schaap, & Van Roy, 2014; Wells et al., 2016).

Regardless of all the challenges scholars face, and will continue to face in the future, citizens today have before them a new avenue to collect information, relate to elites and political actors, interact with journalists, and get exposed to social and public influencers. This section seeks to shed more light on the effects of second screen use, while addressing some of the current limitations in the field. The section includes cutting-edge research from leading scholars across the world. Their insights reflect not only the complexity of the dual-screening phenomena, but also the potential for democratic engagement and subversive uses of new media technologies.

This special section kicks off with a study set in the context of the United Kingdom national political debates in 2015 (Chadwick, O'Loughlin, & Vaccari, 2017). The data collected and used in the study are novel at two levels. First, in a broader sense, these national-wide political debates are quite recent, as they have been held only since 2010. Little is known about the general effects political debates may have in the U.K. (Chadwick, 2010). Second, the study relies on very timely survey panel data methodological structure. This novel approach relies on data collected directly in tandem with the debates, thus adding much needed validity in terms of claims related to potential second screening effects in the aftermath of a national election. Accordingly, the first wave of the panel data was collected immediately after the political event, and the second, within the interval of one day right after the national UK election took place. The primary goal of the study was to determine the scope and level of influence second screen use may have in participatory and pro-democratic behaviors.

The study also highlights the most prominent motivations citizens have to engage in dual screen use during a political debate. For the most part, people sought further political information, shared information with others, or attempted to influence others with their messages. These findings are consistent with prior scholars who also found similar motivations in different western democracies as for why people tend to second screen while watching news events. All in all, people second screen to expand their knowledge about issues discussed or covered on television (or another screen), as well as to discuss those important issues with others in social media (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015; Shah, Hanna, Bucy, Wells, & Quevedo, 2015).

Building on this argument of political engagement, the piece by Lin and Chiang (2017) elaborates on the social factors that may drive political engagement online and offline in Taiwan. Relying on survey data from about 1,000 second screen users, and employing structural equation modeling tests, the paper finds that dual screening news content is a positive predictor of both online and offline political activities in Taiwan. Furthermore, they elaborate on the notion that online political engagement may also further explain the way citizens engage politically in a face to face setting. In other words, online participation will also mediate the effect of second screen use on offline political participation.

Also using a political participatory context as a baseline and fundamental aspect of their study, McGregor and Mourão (2017) showed that second screen uses may not always lead citizens to increased political contribution and involvement. Relying on U.S. national survey data, their study used stringent autoregressive methodology to show that

people who reported less favorable views of Donald Trump, and engaged in second screening during the last U.S. election campaign, participated less in politics.

The findings of McGregor and Mourão may, to some extent, be explained by the work by Hayat and Samuel-Azran (2017). In this study, and also relying on U.S. data, the authors examined the Twitter conversation patterns of those who engaged in past national elections. The authors show that the overall Twitter network generated in their methodology was visibly similar (homogeneous) in terms of the political views of those in the network. That is, second screeners tend to get exposed to networks that rather “exhibit homophily interaction.”

It may be then, that second screening is highlighting the role of social influences and self-curated networks in political outcomes. The final study included in this study by Barnidge, Gil de Zúñiga, and Diehl (2017) addresses this idea, though they took a slightly different approach. The authors sought to test whether second screening would have an effect on another indispensable benchmark of democracy, political persuasion and attitude formation (Mutz, Sniderman, & Brody, 1996). For a healthy democracy to function, people need to be informed (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1997). The need for this information helps citizens contextualize current events, thus facilitating the political decision making in the future (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McLeod & Detenber, 1999). Being influenced through social media while second screening, and the tendency to reformulate one’s political opinions based on information they come across on social media, may be driving attitude formation, because people are exposed to new information or opinions, discussion disagreement, social cues, and news all at the same time (Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016; Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016). With this in mind, the authors used a representative U.S. panel survey to highlight that a second screen use, particularly for news, drives political persuasion at a later time. In other words, people who dual screen in a political context, also tend to change their mind about political and public affairs more often than those who second screen less.

Dual Screen Use in Political Communication Across the World

The studies in this section offer a unique snapshot into second screening behaviors in a few countries. It is currently unknown how prominent second screening is beyond the Western world. The subsequent goal of this article is to provide an empirical snapshot of second screen news use across the world. With that goal in mind, and based on multi-country representative survey data, the article seeks to shed light on whether people in some countries engage in second screening for news and political content more than in others. Similarly, with these data the study seeks to provide initial answers on whether there are second screen use age differences in the twenty countries surveyed. Last, within the explorative nature of this piece, it is also of interest to advance initial cross-cultural data on the ways dual screen use may relate to political processes, and pro-democratic behaviors online and offline. Accordingly, the following research questions will be addressed:

- RQ₁: Do young citizens second screen or dual screen for news and public affairs more so than older adults?
- RQ₂: Are there differences between second screen or dual screen users (low versus high) and their level of political expression in social media?
- RQ₃: Are there differences between second screen or dual screen users (low versus high) and their level of offline political participation?
- RQ₄: Are there differences between second screen or dual screen users (low versus high) and their voting behavior in local and national elections?

Methods

Sample

The data employed in this study draw from the *Word Digital Influence Project*, a collaboration between a research group based at Massey University in New Zealand, and the Media Innovation Lab (MiLab) at the University of Vienna. A two-wave panel data was collected in 22 countries from the Americas, Asia, Europe, and South Africa (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). In order to achieve the most comparable and reliable data set among different countries with different languages, researchers relied on a large group of participating scholars from each country involved to perform the translation of all items. Afterwards, the surveys were translated employing either back-translation with a team approach (Behling & Law, 2000; Thato, Hanna, & Rodcumdee, 2005), or the committee approach (Brislin, 1980). Survey administration was performed by the MiLab at University of Vienna with the help of an online poll survey platform: Qualtrics. The data were gathered concurrently in all countries from September 14 to 24, 2015. In order to sample the subjects across all countries, the researchers partnered with Nielsen, a popular media polling company based in the United States, which curates a massive pool of potential respondents across 22 countries that encompasses more than 10 million individuals. From this pool, Nielsen generates the final sample in each country based on stratified quota sampling techniques to create samples whose demographics closely matched those reported by official census agencies (see Callegaro et al., 2014).

This study only includes data from 20 countries, since the data collected in South Africa, and India were representative only for Johannesburg and New Delhi, and accordingly, the author decided to exclude them from the analysis. The largest sample was collected in Ukraine ($n = 1,223$), and the smallest in Korea ($n = 943$); the overall mean sample size for all countries was also over a thousand cases ($M = 1,067$; $SD = 238$). Overall, the cooperation rate was relatively high, averaging 77% across the panel (AAPOR, 2016; CR3). Since Nielsen partners with companies that employ a combination of panel and probability-based sampling methods, the limitations of web-only survey designs are minimized (Bosnjak, Das, & Lynn, 2016). However, some parameters of the panel invites are unknown, and therefore traditional response rates are not calculated (AAPOR, 2016) (see Tables 1, 2, and 3).

Table 1
Demographic Breakdown by Age, Gender and Race for 22 Country Study versus Census Data

	Age Group					Gender		Race		
	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–64	65+	Female	Male	Asian	Black	White
1. Argentina	15.2(17.3)	24(21.4)	20.8(17.6)	34.2(28.4)	5.8(15.3)	51.7(53.1)	48.3(46.9)	–	–	71.7
2. Brazil	5.7(8.7)	29.4(15.7)	29.4(15.7)	20(13.5)	3.7(13)	49.8(51.4)	50.2(48.6)	1.7(.5)	12.6(7.9)	68.1(46.2)
3. Chile	26.3(14.8)	30(21.1)	19.7(18.4)	20.7(32.1)	3.2(13.7)	51.3(51)	48.7(49)	–	–	–
4. China	10.5(12.7)	31.5(14.9)	27.9(18.2)	27.2(24.3)	2.9(8.9)	44.4(48.8)	55.6(51.2)	–	–	–
5. Estonia	11.1(9.7)	17.8(17.9)	15.1(17)	33(32.4)	22(23)	54.3(48.2)	50.6(45.7)	–	–	97.8(68.2)
6. Germany	11(6.2)	26(15)	43.8(24.6)	8.3(5.1)	10.9(17)	53.9(51)	46.1(49)	–	–	–
7. Indonesia	19.1(12.5)	36.9(24.3)	26.2(21)	13(24.2)	.6(4.8)	59.6(49.9)	38.9(50.1)	76.2(40.2)	–	–
8. Italy	10.9(7.1)	21.9(11.5)	27.9(15.1)	34.4(28.7)	5(21.9)	54.8(51.5)	44.2(48.5)	–	–	–
9. Japan	4.1(5.9)	13.4(13.9)	26.7(17.8)	45(32)	10.9(30)	41.6(51.3)	57.1(48.7)	99.3(98.6)	–	–
10. Korea	16.7(11.5)	24.4(16.1)	24.3(19.6)	31.7(36.8)	2.8(15.9)	46.7(46.2)	53.3(53.8)	–	–	–
11. N. Zealand	7.1(9.4)	13.2(16.6)	15.2(18.6)	36.7(35.5)	24(19.7)	56(52.1)	43.2(47.8)	7.8(11.6)	–	77(75.1)
12. Philippines	17.7(9.2)	35.3(16.1)	25.9(12.4)	15.8(15.9)	1.3(4.8)	49.7(61.2)	39(50.2)	–	–	–
13. Poland	13.9(10.7)	21.4(19.6)	22.6(18.1)	34.1(33)	8(18.6)	54(52.3)	46(47.7)	–	–	–
14. Russia	18(13.6)	24.2(19.7)	26(16.6)	28.6(34.3)	2.5(15.6)	50.2(53.8)	48.4(46.2)	–	–	–
15. Spain	11.7(7.4)	21.9(14.9)	26.4(16.9)	36.8(25.6)	2.9(17.3)	51.7(50.6)	46.5(49.3)	–	–	–
16. Taiwan	15.4(15.5)	30.6(17.7)	30.6(18.7)	22.6(34.1)	1(13.9)	49.2(50.1)	50.8(49.9)	–	–	–
17. Turkey										
18. UK	4.3(8.7)	12.8(17.7)	17.6(16.9)	42.7(33.4)	22.6(23)	54.1(51.4)	45.9(48.6)	3.1(6.9)	1.2(2.9)	91.9(87.6)
19. Ukraine	13(7.8)	38.6(19.8)	26.6(17.5)	14.8(25.5)	1(19)	44(54.8)	54.9(45.1)	–	–	86.1(83)
20. U.S.	8.4(9.9)	13.5(13.6)	14.8(12.8)	42.7(26.2)	20(15.5)	59.5(50.8)	40.5(49.2)	3.5(5)	5.8(12.6)	83.3(73.8)

Note. Census data reported in parenthesis, based on official estimates. Dashes indicate demographics not directly comparable. See Table 3 for notes.

Table 2
Demographic Breakdown by Education, Homeownership, and Marital Status for 22 Country Study versus Census Data

	Education				Homeownership			Marital Status			
	High School or less	Some College	College	College Degree+	Graduate Degree+	Own	Rent	Married	Divorced	Single	Widowed
1. Argentina	54(85)	13.1(9.4)	26.7(5.7)	—	—	—	—	53.2(52.8)	12.2(10.6)	32.4(28)	2.2(8.5)
2. Brazil	52.2(39.4)	47.8(60.5)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Chile	22.8(80.6)	44.2(12)	33(16.6)	—	—	62.1(80.6)	37.9(19.4)	44.7(44.3)	8.3(3.1)	46.3(47.2)	.7(5.4)
4. China	9.3(15)	23(5.5)	58.7(3.7)	7.6(3)	—	88.9(85.4)	11.1(11.9)	76.2(71.3)	1.4(1.4)	21.8(21.6)	.6(5.7)
5. Estonia	44.6(64)	16.5(9.4)	14.5(7.8)	24.2(17.2)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. Germany	60.9(85.3)	—	7.2(1.3)??	31.8(14.5)	—	44.1(41.3)	55.9(48.6)	54.5(54.8)	19.5(8.5)	21.4(28.2)	4.6(8.5)
7. Indonesia	25.7(41.6)	13.1(29.2)	53.9(18.2)	4.7(10.9)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8. Italy	52(49.7)	—	31.2(13.5)	—	—	79.3(72)	20.7(18)	56(48.4)	5.1(2.2)	37.5(41.9)	1.4(7.5)
9. Japan	44.3(62.3)	14.4(16.4)	33.9(19.5)	7.4(1.8)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10. Korea	31.8(56.5)	11.6(14.3)	56.6(29.3)	—	—	59.4(53.8)	40.6(46.2)	51.5(60.8)	2.5(4.2)	45(26.9)	—
11. N. Zealand	33.5(38.2)	28.3(8.2)	24.4(12.1)	13.7(5.7)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12. Philippines	5.5(7.1)	—	70.2(3.5)	—	—	66(61.6)	34(12.1)	50.3(45.3)	4.3(1.2)	43.2(43.5)	2.2(4.2)
13. Poland	48.8(79.4)	15.4(7.6)	35.8(13)	—	—	80.5(83.5)	19.5(16.5)	67(57.7)	7.5(5)	22(27.8)	3.5(9.5)
14. Russia	25.4(64)	10.6(4.2)	63.9(30.9)	3.5(1)	—	—	—	56.2(49.7)	6.3(8.3)	18.4(20.7)	—
15. Spain	18.6(46)	44.1(22.1)	37(31.9)	—	—	77.7(79.7)	21.4(20.3)	62.4(54.6)	6.4(5.2)	29.6(32.4)	1.3(7.6)
16. Taiwan	21.9(57)	18.2(12.2)	46.1(24.6)	13.8(6.3)	—	70.1(84)	29.9(16)	41.6(51.1)	47.9)	50.6(34.7)	.3(6.3)
17. Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
18. UK	30.2(29.3)	31.9(20.5)	38(27)	—	—	65.1(64.8)	35.2(34.8)	48.5(41.5)	11.6(6.6)	31.7(46.4)	3.7(5.2)
19. Ukraine	13.7(56.5)	—	31(20.7)	61.7(14.6)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20. U.S.	22.8(40.8)	33.5(29.1)	28.3(18.7)	15.4(11.4)	—	67.9(63.1)	32.1(36.9)	50.9(47.7)	12.9(11)	33.3(27)	(5.9)5.9

Note. Census data reported in parenthesis, based on official estimates. Dashes indicate demographics not directly comparable. See Table 3 for notes.

Table 3
Footnotes on Demographic Breakdown of Country Studies

1. Argentina	2014 World Values Survey. Other Race = Mestizo. Yearly income reported versus Pew 2013: \$19,999 or less 73.3 (31.7); 20,000–49,000 21.3(40.3); 50,000–99,000 4.8(19); 100,000 or more .6(9).
2. Brazil	2013 Brazilian Census data. Numbers for age groups 15–19, 20–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, and 60+. *Census numbers for Brown/Indigenous (45.3%) categories were not recorded in the first wave, and were instead asked in the study as Latino (7.8%); Other = American and Pacific Islander. Language in the census differs from the study on race and education items: High School = High School or less, Some College = High School +. The Brazilian Census the information available is related to the level that people are studying at the moment. Yearly income categories reported as: less than R\$50,000 52.1(79.6); R\$50, 000–100,000 16.3(6.2); R\$100,000+ 13.2(3.1).
3. Chile	2015 population estimates based on INE data.
4. China	2010 Chinese Census made by China's Office for National Statistics.
5. Estonia	2015 population estimates for age and gender; 2011 for ethnicity and citizenship. 2014 for education levels. White = Estonian (official estimates report Russian as 26.1% versus 1% in the study).
6. Germany	2014 Statista estimates. Age categories are 18–24, 25–39, 40–59, 60–64, and 65+.
7. Indonesia	2010 BPS estimates. Asian = Java
8. Italy	2015 ISTAT estimates.
9. Japan	2010–2014 Japanese Census Estimates. Asian = Japanese; Other = Korean, Chinese, or Other. Yearly income categories reported as: 1.5 million yen or less 13.3(10.6); 1.5–3.5 million 28.5(24.3); 3.5–7 million 31.7(38); 7–11 million 18(17.8); over 11 million 8.3(9.3).
10. Korea	2015 population statistics from 2015 resident registration at the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs; 2012 Korea Housing Survey; and 2010 census.

11.	New Zealand	2013 NZ census. In age groups 18–24 = 20–24. White = European; Other = Maori 4.8(12) and Pacific 1.5(5.7). Yearly income categories reported as: \$50,000 or less 41.7(32.9); 50,001–150,000 34.7(40.97); over 150,000 2.8(10.1).
12.	Philippines	2015 population estimates. In age groups 18–24 = 20–24.
13.	Poland	Population estimates for 2011 and 2014 by GUS or Eurostat 2012.
14.	Russia	2010 census estimates.
15.	Spain	2011 Population Census made by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE); 2011 European Union Statistics in Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC); 2011 Labor Force Survey (EPA).
16.	Taiwan	2014 Department of Statistics, Ministry of Interior.
17.	Turkey	2014 UK Census (ONS) estimates for age, homeownership and marital status, otherwise 2011 Census data is used.
18.	UK	2001 Official census data. White = Ukrainian; Russian = 10.9(17.3).
19.	Ukraine	2014 U.S. Census American Community Survey (1-Year Estimates); Census asks about Hispanic (16.9%) ethnicity in a separate question, the study offered Latino (5.1%) as an exclusive option in a single race item.
20.	U.S.	

Measures

Second Screening. The main construct explored in this study is second screening for news and political content, which draws from a previous measurement elaborated by Gil de Zúñiga and colleagues (2015) on second screening for these purposes. The construct taps on individuals' frequency to dual screen while watching TV programs about "political speeches or debates," "news and public affairs," and information about "election coverage." Overall, the index performed quite reliably across all countries (3 items averaged scale, Cronbach's $\alpha = .92$, $M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.75$, with the lowest reliability test obtained in Brazil, Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$; and the highest in United Kingdom, Cronbach's $\alpha = .95$).

Social Media Political Expression. The level of political expression with the social media sphere was captured by including several different ways in which citizens may express their opinions about political and public affair issues in this environment (see Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). Accordingly, the index included these items: "posting personal experiences related to politics or campaigning," "friending a political advocate or politician," "posting or sharing thoughts about politics," "posting or sharing photos, videos, or audio files about politics," and "forwarding someone else's political commentary to other people" (5 items, with a twenty-country Cronbach's $\alpha = .93$, $M = 2.72$, $SD = 1.56$. The lowest Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$ was found in Argentina, Chile, and Estonia; and the countries with highest Cronbach's $\alpha = .95$ were China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom).

Offline Political Participation. This construct makes the distinction between several behaviors that tap the many ways in which citizens can influence the government and their policies offline (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). Offline political behaviors are distinct from online (Gil de Zúñiga, Barnidge, & Scherman, 2016), and casting a vote may have its unique features and characteristics (e.g., Blais, 2000; Campbell, 2006). Thus, building on prior work measuring this behavior (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Verba et al., 1995), the study asked respondents how frequently they engaged in the following activities in the past three months: "attended or participated in a political rally, demonstration, protest, or march," "donated money to a political campaign or political cause," and "participated in groups that took any local action for social and political reform" (3 items, with a twenty-country Cronbach's $\alpha = .92$, $M = 1.87$, $SD = 1.37$. The lowest Cronbach's $\alpha = .84$ was found in Argentina; and the country with highest Cronbach's $\alpha = .96$ was Japan).

Voting. The last construct used in this study registered people's levels of both local and national political involvement in electoral processes. To that end, an index was generated tapping people's frequency to cast their vote in "local" and "national" elections (2 items, with a twenty-country Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .93, $M = 5.38$, $SD = 2.09$. The lowest Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .89 was found in China

and New Zealand; and the countries yielding the most robust Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .98 were Italy, Japan, and Philippines).

Analysis

The study first presents descriptive statistics about dual screening in twenty countries. Next, the study tests whether young people tend to second screen more than their adult counterparts in all these countries (Young = 18–35; Older = 36 and above with an overall Median = 39, SD = 14.57). A set of t-test were employed. Given that for most of the countries a Leven's test for homoscedasticity yielded statistically significant results, when necessary, all tests adjusted the degrees of freedom relying on the Welch-Satterthwaite method (Willink, 2007). Finally the goal of the article was to also compare the differences between a group of more intense second screen users, and the group reporting a more moderate use.¹ As above, country differences were tested employing T-test with the same method. Additionally, given the multiple T-test used in these calculations, all calculations were bootstrapped with 1,000 iterations (Mooney, Duval, & Duvall, 1993).

Results

This article sought to present the first global and explorative view on the use of multiple screens to consume and discuss political content. The first table in the study shows the different items used in the construct of second screening, with three different items, and the overall construct performance as a whole and across all twenty societies (Table 4 and Figure 1). Descriptive data from the study reveal that across these twenty countries three quarters (75.4%) of the subjects in the study dual screen while watching TV news or political content. There are some notable differences between countries. A large chunk of the population in Turkey, China, and Brazil engage in second screening behaviors frequently (95.6%, 93.6%, and 89.5%, respectively; Figure 1). On the other hand, people in Germany, United Kingdom, and United States tend to second screen much less (52.7%, 56.1%, and 54.5%, respectively).²

Similarly, young people consistently second screen for news and political content more often than older adults, with three exceptions. In the entire sample, young people ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 1.69$) correspondingly dual screen more than older adults ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.74$; $t\text{-value} = 26.57$, $df = 19907$, $p < .001$). These statistically significant differences remain for all countries (see Table 5 and Figure 2) excluding Japan (young, $M = 3.39$, $SD = 1.67$; older, $M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.57$; $t\text{-value} = -.91$, $df = 939$, $p = .363$), Turkey (young, $M = 4.12$, $SD = 1.44$; older, $M = 4.13$, $SD = 1.53$; $t\text{-value} = -.17$, $df = 917$, $p = .868$), and Ukraine (young, $M = 2.80$, $SD = 1.62$; older, $M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.55$; $t\text{-value} = .50$, $df = 1175$, $p = .618$) where young and older adults tend to second screen about the same (see Table 2, Figure 2). These results provide empirical evidence to address the RQ₁.

Table 4
Second Screening Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliability in 20 Countries

How often do you second screen during the following types of television programs?											
Country	Political speeches or debates		While watching the news		During election coverage		Scale		Reliability index	Second screen users	Sample N
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	Grand M	SD	Cronbach's α	%	
ALL	3.00	1.88	3.27	1.85	3.16	1.93	3.14	1.75	.92	75.4	21629
Argentina	3.01	2.13	3.15	1.90	3.26	2.19	3.14	1.85	.89	72.2	1116
Brazil	3.41	1.98	4.25	1.85	3.73	1.95	3.79+	1.66	.83	89.5	1086
Chile	3.54	2.12	3.72	1.86	3.72	2.16	3.66+	1.85	.88	82.8	964
China	3.84	1.54	4.07	1.50	3.85	1.59	3.92+	1.42	.91	93.6	1004
Estonia	2.84	1.66	2.80	1.85	2.91	1.85	2.85-	1.62	.89	75.3	1168
Germany	2.25	1.72	2.46	1.80	2.36	1.81	2.36-	1.67	.93	52.7	1053
Indonesia	3.25	1.72	3.81	1.73	3.58	1.76	3.54+	1.57	.89	86.9	1080
Italy	3.04	1.87	3.05	1.76	3.06	1.92	3.06-	1.72	.93	71.2	1041
Japan	3.27	1.77	3.67	1.68	3.52	1.82	3.48+	1.59	.90	87.3	975
Korea	2.93	1.73	3.38	1.64	3.17	1.77	3.16	1.45	.89	84.1	943
New Zealand	2.28	1.81	2.50	1.68	2.45	1.87	2.41-	1.66	.92	58.4	1157
Philippines	3.33	1.64	3.65	1.64	3.49	1.72	3.49+	1.54	.91	88.0	1064
Poland	2.50	1.70	2.77	1.77	2.64	1.75	2.63-	1.64	.94	63.6	1060
Russia	2.44	1.68	2.85	1.83	2.44	1.68	2.57-	1.62	.94	64.9	1145
Spain	3.10	1.88	3.33	1.84	3.39	1.96	3.27+	1.75	.92	77.2	1019
Taiwan	3.47	1.84	3.57	1.67	3.55	1.83	3.52+	1.65	.92	85.4	1008
Turkey	3.94	1.67	4.18	1.56	4.26	1.74	4.12+	1.47	.86	95.6	961
UK	2.44	1.86	2.60	1.85	2.59	1.96	2.55-	1.67	.95	54.5	1064
Ukraine	2.61	1.68	3.07	1.75	2.72	1.74	2.79-	1.59	.92	73.5	1223
United States	2.39	1.85	2.52	1.80	2.54	1.91	2.48-	1.75	.94	56.1	1161

Note. All items measured on 7-point scales where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 7 = *strongly agree*. + Country M difference with respect all countries grand M is positive for Second Screening scale at $p < .01$ or better. - Country M difference with respect all countries grand M is negative for Second Screening scale at $p < .01$ or better.

Figure 1
Percentage of Second Screen Users by Country





Table 5
Second Screen Use Comparison Between Young and Older Adults in 20 Countries All t-test statistical analysis have been adjusted with Bonferroni normalization and bootstrapped (5,000 times) for robustness.

Country	Young adults group		Older adults group		Levene's Test for Homoscedasticity		Comparison T-statistics			Group samples N
	M	SD	M	SD	F	p-value	t-value	df	p-value	
ALL	3.49	1.69	2.86	1.74	45.12	.001	26.57	19907	.001	9131/12234
Argentina	3.54	1.82	2.84	1.81	1.64	.200	6.21	1099	.001	453/648
Brazil	3.87	1.64	3.68	1.69	.61	.434	1.85	1033	.065	561/464
Chile	3.90	1.78	3.26	1.88	4.45	.035	5.22	767.1	.001	550/372
China	4.15	1.29	3.71	1.49	21.41	.001	4.99	988.9	.001	463/528
Estonia	3.26	1.72	2.66	1.53	9.53	.002	5.63	615.2	.001	354/782
Germany	2.79	1.73	2.16	1.60	10.32	.001	5.54	577.9	.001	321/704
Indonesia	3.67	1.51	3.29	1.66	8.75	.003	3.55	665.9	.001	686/358
Italy	3.59	1.64	2.77	1.71	9.37	.002	7.51	759.7	.001	359/661
Japan	3.39	1.67	3.50	1.57	3.03	.082	-.91	939	.363	188/753
Korea	3.28	1.54	3.07	1.56	.10	.755	2.07	923	.038	420/505
New Zealand	3.18	1.78	2.14	1.52	25.34	.001	8.93	440.3	.001	289/852
Philippines	3.66	1.52	3.17	1.56	3.12	.078	4.92	1001	.001	616/387
Poland	2.81	1.66	2.52	1.63	1.15	.284	2.68	1031	.007	395/638
Russia	2.76	1.61	2.39	1.60	.82	.365	3.86	1120	.001	509/613
Spain	3.64	1.65	3.05	1.77	7.84	.005	5.20	805.2	.001	366/625
Taiwan	3.65	1.65	3.39	1.65	.34	.560	2.48	977	.013	484/495
Turkey	4.12	1.44	4.13	1.53	2.23	.135	-.17	917	.868	561/358
UK	3.38	1.86	2.33	1.72	3.84	.051	7.59	1036	.001	200/838
Ukraine	2.80	1.62	2.75	1.55	2.19	.139	.50	1175	.618	712/465
United States	3.23	1.88	2.26	1.65	13.88	.001	7.57	393.6	.001	264/875

Note. Where Levene's test for equality of variances yielded unequal variance in the groups, the assumption violation was corrected adjusting the degrees of freedom using the Welch-Satterthwaite method. Also, t-test statistical analysis have been bootstrapped (1,000 times).

Figure 2
Second Screen Means by Groups (Young/Older)



The next set of research questions (RQ₂ and RQ₃) attempted to address a descriptive relationship between dual screen users, political expression levels in social media, and offline political behavior activities. More specifically, these questions revolved around the notion of whether more intense second screen users will tend to engage more in these activities than those who presented a more moderate level of dual screen activity. Results indicate that for both activities, in all countries, second screen use matters. The groups that reported higher levels of dual screen use also reported higher levels of political expression in social media (for the entire sample high second screen use: $M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.59$; low second screen use: $M = 2.05$, $SD = 1.19$; $t = 69.67$, $df = 19376.5$, $p < .001$) and offline political participation (for all countries high second screen use: $M = 2.38$, $SD = 1.61$; low second screen use: $M = 1.37$, $SD = .81$; $t = 57.76$, $df = 15356.4$, $p < .001$) (Table 6 and Table 7, and also Figure 3 and Figure 4 for complete individual country details).

Table 6
Social Media Political Expression Comparison Between Low and High Second Screen Users in 20 Countries

Country	High second screen use		Low second screen use		Levene's Test for Homoscedasticity		Comparison T-statistics			Group samples N
	M	SD	M	SD	F	p-value	t-value	df	p-value	
ALL	4.40	1.59	2.05	1.19	1319.37	.001	69.67	19376.5	.001	10832/10450
Argentina	3.52	1.63	2.65	1.38	28.35	.001	9.50	1039.4	.001	453/648
Brazil	4.02	1.54	2.83	1.37	7.81	.005	12.83	825.19	.001	668/364
Chile	3.52	1.52	2.45	1.29	17.62	.001	11.48	882.73	.001	549/375
China	3.73	1.50	2.27	1.18	23.66	.001	16.12	653.67	.001	694/281
Estonia	2.41	1.25	1.82	.90	54.21	.001	8.62	769.81	.001	458/676
Germany	2.91	1.59	1.50	.91	267.63	.001	14.57	391.29	.001	305/717
Indonesia	3.89	1.43	2.46	1.23	7.23	.007	17.12	952.62	.001	636/406
Italy	3.69	1.53	2.37	1.35	6.23	.013	14.59	994.59	.001	504/510
Japan	2.01	1.36	1.38	.79	170.23	.001	8.91	902.87	.001	547/397
Korea	2.77	1.54	1.54	.88	250.90	.001	14.85	723.14	.001	456/456
New Zealand	2.80	1.41	1.70	.95	130.36	.001	13.13	463.47	.001	334/802
Philippines	3.82	1.37	2.46	1.16	9.72	.002	16.86	942.96	.001	594/401
Poland	3.46	1.46	2.21	1.28	13.65	.001	13.81	709.56	.001	377/643
Russia	3.63	1.28	2.18	1.20	8.53	.004	17.49	707.29	.001	390/717
Spain	3.65	1.49	2.41	1.30	8.01	.005	14.03	987.68	.001	513/481
Taiwan	2.96	1.43	2.00	1.05	63.81	.001	12.07	970.89	.001	563/410
Turkey	3.65	1.54	2.12	1.14	35.23	.001	15.96	512.88	.001	688/226
UK	2.83	1.71	1.52	.92	360.93	.001	13.64	479.78	.001	365/670
Ukraine	3.51	1.35	2.24	1.21	7.90	.005	16.63	938.67	.001	476/709
United States	3.18	1.59	1.82	1.07	118.84	.001	14.74	522.78	.001	363/768


Note. Where Levene's test for equality of variances yielded unequal variance in the groups, the assumption violation was corrected adjusting the degrees of freedom using the Welch-Satterthwaite method. Also, t-test statistical analysis have been bootstrapped (1,000 times).

Table 7
Political Participation Offline Comparison between Low and High Second Screen Users in 20 Countries

Country	High second screen use		Low second screen use		Levene's Test for Homoscedasticity		Comparison T-statistics		Group Samples N
	M	SD	M	SD	F	p-value	t-value	df	
ALL	2.38	1.61	1.37	.81	7915.86	.001	57.76	15356.4	10505/10877
Argentina	2.25	1.54	1.66	1.02	132.18	.001	7.59	916.54	535/574
Brazil	2.51	1.70	1.43	.89	299.09	.001	13.54	1039.6	679/363
Chile	2.32	1.54	1.37	.78	309.47	.001	12.44	870.99	556/376
China	2.81	1.60	1.61	.96	167.93	.001	14.37	840.94	700/281
Estonia	1.47	.95	1.20	.54	102.04	.001	5.33	664.06	461/677
Germany	2.46	1.60	1.35	.80	435.57	.001	11.49	372.71	307/721
Indonesia	2.80	1.64	1.45	.89	320.81	.001	17.11	1025.8	643/402
Italy	2.53	1.63	1.41	.88	431.52	.001	13.64	770.88	503/512
Japan	1.43	1.04	1.15	.54	101.05	.001	5.54	858.13	545/396
Korea	1.93	1.42	1.18	.59	384.77	.001	10.46	598.39	452/464
New Zealand	1.82	1.30	1.25	.63	235.54	.001	7.75	391.32	328/807
Philippines	2.47	1.61	1.42	.81	378.12	.001	13.57	941.61	601/406
Poland	2.65	1.56	1.53	.94	286.15	.001	12.80	546.48	381/646
Russia	2.18	1.47	1.30	.75	339.42	.001	11.13	510.94	397/725
Spain	2.55	1.58	1.60	.96	256.74	.001	11.44	850.19	512/485
Taiwan	2.23	1.44	1.49	.91	169.44	.001	9.86	957.70	567/408
Turkey	2.75	1.63	1.54	1.01	141.24	.001	13.16	619.77	692/226
UK	2.02	1.47	1.22	.64	434.28	.001	9.89	439.87	364/668
Ukraine	2.24	1.42	1.31	.71	469.16	.001	13.20	637.28	478/716
United States	2.14	1.51	1.32	.75	328.21	.001	9.85	452.63	366/773


Note. Where Levene's test for equality of variances yielded unequal variance in the groups, the assumption violation was corrected adjusting the degrees of freedom using the Welch-Satterthwaite method. Also, t-test statistical analysis have been bootstrapped (1,000 times).

Figure 3
Social Media Political Expression by SS Groups (High/Low)



The last research question (RQ₄) dealt with whether there were differences in people's voting behaviors in local and national elections, considering their second screen habits. Here the data are less conclusive. In the overall sample, as well as in ten out of the twenty countries, there is no statistical significant result whatsoever in people's voting mean difference between those who are high second screen users, and those who do not report engaging in dual screening habits (for the entire sample high second screen use: $M = 5.18$, $SD = 1.95$; low second screen use: $M = 5.19$, $SD = 2.19$; $t = -.066$, $df = 21142.8$, $p = .94$). For six countries, China, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, and Ukraine, high dual screen levels yielded higher voting means. In other words, in these countries the group of people who reported higher levels of second screen use, also reported casting their vote in local and national elections more frequently (Table 8 and Figure 5). On the other hand, in Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and United Kingdom, people who tend to vote more frequently also tend to dual screen for news and political content less frequently (Table 8 and Figure 5).

Figure 4
Political Participation Offline by SS Groups (High/Low)



Discussion

Dual screen use for news is an interactive media behavior that is here to stay, with more and more people second screening within a political context while watching live content on TV in each election cycle (Pew, 2012). Political and informational dual screening behavior is a phenomenon that proliferated under the umbrella of today’s multi-platform, multi-device, multi-tasking, and pervasive digital media environment. The present study introduced five exceptional, yet diverse pieces that will help scholars better understand and contextualize second screening as an additional use of social media sphere in the political and social realms.


Although research in this area is clearly in its infancy, these studies as a whole depict new ways in which more flexible and liquid communicative behaviors will shape the political public sphere for years to come. From being informed to discussing politics; from

Table 8
Voting Comparison Between Low and High Second Screen Users in 20 Countries

Country	High second screen use		Low second screen use		Levene's Test for Homoscedasticity		Comparison T-statistics			Group Samples N
	M	SD	M	SD	F	p-value	t-value	df	p-value	
ALL	5.18	1.95	5.19	2.19	305.81	.001	-.066	21142.8	.94	10433/10849
Argentina	6.32	1.35	6.43	1.31	3.45	.064	-1.30	1094	.19	529/567
Brazil	5.77	1.69	5.70	1.91	4.74	.03	.54	671.52	.59	673/363
Chile	4.76	2.17	4.67	2.47	27.92	.001	.566	730.88	.57	550/374
China	2.91	1.55	1.92	1.13	79.18	.001	11.12	700.63	.001	700/280
Estonia	5.98	1.67	6.09	1.71	.15	.703	-1.03	1136	.30	458/680
Germany	5.31	1.91	5.50	2.11	2.65	.104	-1.33	1019	.18	304/717
Indonesia	5.05	1.61	4.66	2.03	53.49	.001	3.26	708.58	.001	638/401
Italy	5.60	1.64	5.87	1.89	1.93	.165	-2.37	1009	.018	498/513
Japan	5.02	2.13	4.46	2.47	36.67	.001	3.59	770.13	.001	537/394
Korea	5.25	1.93	5.08	2.19	12.22	.001	1.21	901.05	.226	454/460
New Zealand	5.39	1.98	5.78	1.87	5.50	.019	-2.98	569.31	.001	326/803
Philippines	5.14	1.87	5.05	2.12	16.88	.001	.721	779.71	.471	598/400
Poland	5.30	1.65	5.27	1.94	13.98	.001	.228	903.37	.819	382/649
Russia	4.91	1.85	4.50	2.10	18.05	.001	3.34	887.39	.001	390/721
Spain	5.31	1.84	5.62	1.95	.78	.378	-2.58	986	.01	506/482
Taiwan	4.92	1.89	4.59	2.21	29.53	.001	2.44	786.50	.01	567/406
Turkey	6.06	1.46	5.96	1.77	9.58	.001	.79	33.84	.433	679/225
UK	5.19	2.10	5.50	2.17	.33	.567	-2.21	1037	.027	363/676
Ukraine	4.45	1.99	3.94	2.31	33.00	.001	4.13	1124.6	.001	481/717
United States	5.31	1.95	5.41	2.15	5.97	.015	-.85	790.18	.397	368/768

Note. Where Levene's test for equality of variances yielded unequal variance in the groups, the assumption violation was corrected adjusting the degrees of freedom using the Welch-Satterthwaite method. Also, t-test statistical analysis have been bootstrapped (1,000 times).

Figure 5
Voting by SS Groups (High/Low)



being politically persuaded to participating in political activities, second screen use effortlessly complements citizens' information and discussion habits. In doing so, it mediates other political behaviors, becoming an influential pro-democratic tool (sometimes, although not always).

Additionally, this piece also sought to shed a more broad, explorative empirical light on the ways in which people use different "screens" to relate to news and political information across twenty countries. Drawing on a large scale multi-country data collection, the study present us with some answers, just as it opens many other questions for future research. The large survey helps answer the following questions: Who tends to dual screen more, young or older citizens? Are there countries that seem to reveal higher levels of second screening behavior for news and public affairs? Are there political behavior differences between those who tend to dual screen more intensively and those who reflect a more moderate use?

Results show that from the pool of countries included in the study, people in Turkey, China, and Brazil seem to embrace second screening as an additional information and communication reinforcement mechanism. For these countries, second screen use remains very high, in the vicinity of 90%. In contrast to these countries, results indicate that people do not tend to second screen as much in Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States, with levels around 50%. One potential explanation may be that for the former set of countries, second screening becomes a more essential informational tool as they might not solely rely on a precarious, and less trustworthy, journalistic media. In contrast, in Germany, the United States, and the UK, the media journalistic market is more established, and freedom of the press might be preserved more diligently (Reporters without Borders, 2016).

This “information accuracy” motivation may also be visible through a different and complementary angle. For all countries, young people tend to engage in second screening more than older adults, lending support to the idea that millennials may have a more natural relationship with technology and the informational possibilities it may bring up attached to it. However, this age differential effect is not to be found in only three countries (two of them being Brazil and Turkey). It would make sense that if the majority of the population is dual screening in these two countries due to the information accuracy need, generational dual screen use gaps may be mitigated (for other discussions on news and age gap differential effects, see Johnson, Hays, & Hayes, 1998; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2004).

Other findings of the study highlight how second screening matters for political behaviors beyond information purposes. In all twenty countries, people who tend to engage more in dual screen use (high second screen users’ group) also tend to report higher levels of political expression in social media. Consistently across many societies, while dual screening, citizens tend to follow-up with the news and political content they are watching on TV, which seamlessly enables them to post their thoughts about those issues in social media, or enables them to discuss those public affair issues concurrently. As the findings of this study highlight, intensive dual screen use also relates to higher levels of participation in offline political activities such as attending political rallies, marches, or protests, or donating money to political campaigns, etc.

However, this trend is not consistent with voting behaviors. With respect voting, in some countries, differences in second screening conduct are not relevant at all (for half of the pooled countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Germany, Korea, Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and United States). In some countries, the high second screening group would also tend to vote more frequently in local and national elections (China, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Taiwan, and Ukraine). Finally, for some countries, those who report second screening less actually cast their votes more frequently (i.e., Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and United Kingdom). Thus, there is no clear pattern of second screening habits and voting behavior.

In any case, for those countries where second screen use may not be associated with voting behavior in a direct form, it may do so via the reinvigorated association with social media political expression and other forms of offline political engagement. That is, second screen use may directly affect the way in which people express themselves politically, and engage in political activities, and these two may, in turn

be associated with casting votes in local and national elections (for similar mediating effects see Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014). By all means, this theoretical explanation serves as a future research question that needs to be empirically and fully addressed.

This study, in conjunction with the other five different studies of this special section, depicts a broad and useful picture of how dual screening is shaping the political realm across the world. Second screening shapes the way non-elites relate more closely to journalist, and political figures and entities (Chadwick et al., 2017), and contributes to fostering a discursive public sphere with space open to political persuasion, perhaps because people get exposed to newfangled information and ideas (Barnidge et al., 2017). Second screening also generally helps people further engage in the political process in many different countries (Gil de Zúñiga, 2017; Lin & Chiang, 2017), but not under all given conditions. For instance, in the context of the past contentious U.S. political campaign, when people held negative views about Trump, second screening during news made people detach from this process (McGregor & Mourão, 2017). Perhaps, some of this effect may be explained in the light of the Hayat and Samuel-Azran study (2017), for second screen users tend to rely more on homogenous information, further fueling the notion of Twitter echo-chambers.

All in all, this study and the rest of the dual screen use articles included in this special section, helps readers better understand and contextualize the effects of second screening politics in the social media sphere. Yet, research in this area is barely beginning, presenting scholars with a thrilling and exciting new area of inquiry, but also posing a challenging and puzzling avenue for future research. This section serves as one of the first steps in that direction.

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Notes

1. The twenty-country grand mean for second screening was used to compute two groups ($M = 3.18$, $SD = 1.75$). Those below the mean were selected for the *Low* use group (49.8%), and those above the mean were computed as the *High* (48.3%).
2. A Chi square test indicated the difference between the percentages from countries with low and high use was statistically significant at $p < .001$

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Why People Dual Screen Political Debates and Why It Matters for Democratic Engagement

Andrew Chadwick, Ben O'Loughlin & Cristian Vaccari

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SECOND SCREENING

Why People Dual Screen Political Debates and Why It Matters for Democratic Engagement

Andrew Chadwick, Ben O'Loughlin, and Cristian Vaccari

Dual screening during televised election debates is a new domain in which political elites and journalists seek to influence audience attitudes and behavior. But to what extent do non-elite dual screeners seek to influence others, particularly their social media followers, social media users in general, and even politicians and journalists? And how does this behavior affect short- and longer-term engagement with election campaigns? Using unique, event-based, panel survey data from the main 2015 UK general election debate (Wave 1 = 2,351; Wave 2 = 1,168) we reveal the conditions under which people experience agency, empowerment, and engagement now that social media have reconfigured broadcast political television.

Digitally mediated commentary now accompanies broadcast political media events of all kinds, reconfiguring Dayan and Katz's classic (1992) model of media events. Building on our earlier research, we define this as dual screening and conceptualize it as "the bundle of practices that involve integrating, and switching across and between, live broadcast media and social media" (Vaccari, Chadwick, & O'Loughlin, 2015, p. 1041).

Previously we studied the 2014 EU election debates in the United Kingdom and found that active, "lean-forward" dual screening practices, such as commenting live on social media as a debate unfolds, and engaging with conversations via Twitter hashtags, have the strongest and most consistent positive associations with political

Andrew Chadwick (Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Science) is professor of Political Science and co-director of the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London. His book *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power* (Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 2017) was awarded the International Journal of Press/Politics Book Award and the American Political Science Association Information Technology and Politics Section Best Book Award.

Ben O'Loughlin (Ph.D., University of Oxford) is professor of International Relations and co-director of the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London. His book *Strategic Narratives* (Routledge, 2013) won the International Studies Association 2016 Best Book Award for International Communication and his new volume is *Forging the World* (University of Michigan Press, 2017).

Cristian Vaccari (Ph.D., IULM University in Milan) is reader in Politics and co-director of the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London. His latest book is *Digital Politics in Western Democracies: A Comparative Study* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

engagement (Vaccari et al., 2015). In this article, we shift our focus to motivations and influence and their links with cognitive and behavioral engagement. We break new ground in two ways. First, we use uniquely suitable data to assess the significance of dual screeners' motivations to acquire information, share information and opinions, and influence others, including politicians and journalists. Second, we analyze the links between these motivations and individuals' short-term and longer-term engagement with an election campaign.

Our data for this article come from Britain's live, televised 2015 general election debate, broadcast by national channel ITV on April 2, 2015. With 7.4 million viewers (a 33 percent evening audience share) this was the main television event of the campaign and the first debate in British history to feature all seven major and minor party leaders on one stage. We used large-scale Twitter data to identify a sample of individuals who dual screened the debate. We then ran our own custom-designed, two-wave panel survey on this sample and analyzed the responses using a series of multivariate statistical models ($N = 2,351$ for wave 1; 1,168 for wave 2).

Our research design avoids some of the limitations of existing work on dual screening. Not only does our approach get *inside* individuals' live dual screening experiences, it also allows us to look *outside* the live moment and explore how these experiences may explain subsequent attitudes and behaviors, both online *and* offline. We were also able to examine the characteristics of large numbers of social media users and go beyond examining influence by small numbers of politicians and media professionals. And, in contrast with previous research, we were able to design a custom survey that explicitly tapped individuals' motivations to influence others, as well as their estimated success in doing so.

There is much at stake here for the future of democratic engagement. Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, and Gil de Zúñiga end their recent study of online opinion leaders (2015, p. 9) by questioning whether "prosumer" behavior online contributes to "the democratic process at large." While the concept of influence often has pejorative associations with elite manipulation and spin, the long tradition of research on opinion leadership stretching back to Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) is more positive: if sufficiently diffused, influence-oriented behavior can produce democratic goods for the polity. If dual screening affords individuals the capacity and opportunity to influence others, including elites, and it boosts their behavioral and cognitive engagement, it may make a contribution to the democratic renewal of electoral politics.

Understanding Why People Dual Screen Political Debates: Information, Sharing, Influence, and Engagement

Dual-screening is potentially reshaping political agency and the effects might scale up to alter the structure of communication relating to a televised political debate and the broader election campaign. Debates are now characterized by competition, conflict, and partisanship but also interdependence among actors who attempt to

steer the flow and meanings of debate-related news. Journalists and politicians have integrated social media into their working practices. Broadcasters commission social media sentiment analysis, real-time online polls, and present vox-pop tweets from the viewing public to provide a demotic presence in the studio and post-event “spin room.” However, the power of political staff and journalists is increasingly prone to disruption by social media user-audience networks (Anstead & O’Loughlin, 2015; Chadwick, 2011a, 2011b).

Event-based studies have shown that people use social media to acquire information and news about the campaign, share information and opinions with others, and try to influence the interpretive framing of their online followers, journalists, and politicians (Chadwick, 2011a, 2011b; Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Mascaro & Goggins, 2015; Wohn & Na, 2011). People evaluate and fact-check television presenters and try to place marginalized issues on reporters’ agendas. They create and circulate specific hashtags, send publicly accessible tweets to journalists and campaign elites, craft satirical posts in attempts to generate shareable memes and viral information cascades, and try to subvert official news framings through the use of culturally resonant affect, counterpoint, satire, exaggeration, sarcasm, trolling, and fake accounts. This is, in effect, a much more widely distributed, social media-enabled set of behaviors than those identified in Lang and Lang’s (2002) broadcast-era work on the role of television presenter commentary in shaping audience perceptions.

Previous research on the links between motivations and political engagement is also relevant. Our approach here is rooted in the dialogical tradition, which posits that the complex array of motivations and practices involved in an act of public expression can come to reshape the beliefs and behavior of the addresser as well as the addressee (Bakhtin, 1981; for recent work of relevance see, for example, Pingree, 2007; Shah, 2016). There is strong evidence that people are motivated to use the Internet to acquire further information about politics and that this, in turn, can lead to increased interpersonal discussion and political messaging via email (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). Since the rise of social media, attention has shifted to how individuals’ motivations to express themselves in their online social networks can interact with news use and spur political engagement (Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). There is also evidence of a broader shift toward an “actualizing” style of citizenship nourished by self-expressive behavior (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). Similarly, Vraga, Anderson, Kotcher, and Maibach (2015) found that issue-specific engagement using Facebook is associated with enhanced political efficacy and self-reported opinion leadership. Study of the motivations for dual screening, as opposed to social media use in general, is in its infancy. However, Gil de Zúñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, and McGregor (2015) found that information-seeking and the motivation to discuss politics with others were linked to dual screening for news as well as subsequent online engagement.

The communicative context during and immediately after a televised debate is relatively fertile. These are long and complex events containing many policy statements and subtle behavioral cues, very few of which become salient in journalists’ reports and audience reactions. When they do become salient, it makes a difference to individuals’

responses (Shah, Hanna, Bucy, Wells, & Quevedo, 2015). Older studies of traditional (not dual-screened) viewing of U.S. primary and presidential debates have shown that these events can affect individuals' levels of information, attitudes to the candidates, engagement, efficacy, and even vote choice (see for example Benoit, Hansen, & Verser, 2003; McKinney & Warner, 2013). Good data are thin on the ground in the UK context because live party leaders' debates only began in 2010. However, in that year the Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg enjoyed a surge in his personal ratings after his appearance in the televised debates, when dual screeners introduced the hashtags #iagreewithnick and #nickcleggsfault (Chadwick, 2011a).

We should also examine the short-term "opportunity structure" (Chadwick, 2011b, pp. 5–8) that now shapes engagement immediately after a broadcast event. Getting involved soon after a debate offers individuals the opportunity to influence others' perceptions of the debate itself. Actions can be timed for when politicians, campaign workers, professional journalists, and political activists are involved in a struggle to define the candidates' key strengths and weaknesses. However, post-debate actions like contributing to post-debate donation surges, voting in online petitions and polls, or following a party leader on Twitter are not narrowly instrumental; they are also indirect information signals designed to influence broader perceptions. These forms of engagement leave visible traces that can be read by others as signs of support for a candidate or cause (Chadwick, 2013, pp. 124–125).

This is all the more important because substantial proportions of social network users are relatively uninterested in politics and/or undecided in their political preferences. These individuals might gain campaign engagement benefits from being serendipitously exposed to dual-screened content about a televised political debate.¹ At the same time, more politically interested dual screeners may learn more about the "rules of the game" of politics (Holton, Coddington, Lewis, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015, p. 2540) and how to more successfully exercise influence over others.

In light of these themes, we based our study on four research questions. The first two probed individuals' motivations to dual screen the ITV debate and their perceptions of the outcome of their behaviors. The third and fourth probed the subsequent implications of dual screening for short-term and longer-term forms of engagement with the election.

RQ₁: What kinds of motivations lead Twitter users to dual screen political debates and what kinds of social and political characteristics are associated with these motivations?

RQ₂: How do individuals perceive the influence-related outcomes of their dual screening experiences?

RQ₃: Are there any relationships between dual screening behaviors and engagement in the important post-debate opportunity structure immediately after a debate?

RQ₄: Are there any relationships between dual screening a debate and engagement that persists until after election day?

Research Design and Method

By 2015, 27 percent of Britain's population reported checking their social media feeds while watching television.² By 2013, 22 percent of the British population used Twitter, making it the second most popular social networking site in the United Kingdom, after Facebook. And, by 2014, 60 percent of UK Twitter users reported using the service while watching television (Vaccari et al., 2015, p. 1047).

The unique nature of dual screening requires research designs that integrate the digitally mediated, episodic, personalized, and event-based forms of political engagement that are now important for politics. We deployed two custom-built surveys: one immediately after the event and a second the day after election day. While we acknowledge that self-reports are no substitute for directly observed behavior, it is only from surveys that we can learn about how large numbers of individuals actually experience dual screening and what they tend to do outside of the live, dual screening moment.

The April 2, 2015 ITV #Leadersdebate. Professional media covered the ITV leaders' debate intensely. The 2-hour broadcast attracted 7.4 million viewers—a large (33%) audience share for the evening.³ We defined our population as those Twitter users who posted at least one tweet about the debate during a 6-hour period—the 2 hours before the debate, during the debate itself, and the 2 hours immediately after the debate had ended. We chose this time frame in order to tap both the build-up to the debate and the initial discussions on its outcome, when Twitter activity spikes and interpretive frames are up for grabs (Chadwick, 2011a). To identify our population, we mined Twitter's Streaming API⁴ from 6 p.m. until midnight on April 2 for tweets containing “#leadersdebate,” which ITV had earlier announced as the event's official hashtag. This was a Twitter trending topic in Britain during the entire day and the top trending topic in Britain and worldwide during the debate. In total, we collected 516,484 tweets (including retweets) posted by 164,262 unique users. From this population we randomly selected a sample of 32,854 users. We then used several Twitter accounts—created specifically for this project and clearly indicating our institutional affiliation and research—to invite these users to take our Wave 1 survey. The Wave 1 survey invitations were sent between April 3 and April 6, 2015; responses were collected until April 12, 2015.⁵

In total, 2,351 users completed our Wave 1 survey—7.2 percent of the 32,854 Twitter users to whom we sent invitations. Respondents took, on average, about 23 minutes to complete the survey. Of these 2,351 respondents, 1,832 provided their Twitter name and/or email address and agreed to be contacted by us in future. This enabled us to survey these 1,832 respondents again immediately after election day, for our Wave 2 survey. Wave 2 ran from the day immediately after the general election (Friday, May 8) to June 16, 2015, and generated 1,168 responses. These 1,168 respondents thus constitute our two-wave panel for exploring longer-term engagement with the campaign. Despite our unorthodox method, the panel had a healthy retention rate of 64 percent. Our online appendix provides extensive information on the characteristics of our respondents and the survey questions we used

for our analysis below, as well as evidence from a separate benchmarking survey we conducted on a nationally representative sample of UK Internet users. The benchmarking data show that our sample is remarkably similar to our target population and our data are well-suited to our research questions. As we shall see below, our cross-sectional data revealed significant associations between motivations, perceived outcomes, and short-term engagement. Our panel data yield insights on the enduring influence of dual screening. Most studies of social media and engagement have relied solely on cross-sectional data. Panel designs tend to find fewer and weaker associations between media and engagement (Boulianne, 2015), but generate robust estimates of stability and change because they allow us to control for the values of the dependent variables measured at an earlier point in time.

Results

We adopted a multi-phase approach, in which the dependent variables differ according to the research question.

RQ₁: Motivations for Dual Screening the Debate: Information, Sharing, Influence, and their Attitudinal and Behavioral Correlates

To identify motivations for dual-screening the debate, our survey contained three pairs of questions about the importance of acquiring new information, sharing information and opinions with others, and attempting to influence other social media users and professional media. Respondents attributed greater importance to acquiring information (mean = 4.00, SD = 1.55) and sharing information and opinions (mean = 3.98, SD = 1.72) than influencing other social media users and professional media (mean = 2.55, SD = 2.04; all variables range 0–6). Table 1 shows how individuals' socio-demographic characteristics, political characteristics, and social media use predict these motivations.

The data reveal interesting differences in the variables that predict the three sets of motivations we investigated. While women were significantly more likely to dual screen to acquire information, men were significantly more likely to seek influence. Those who scored low on political efficacy and who did not feel they were learning enough from the campaign to make an informed choice were significantly more likely to dual screen to acquire information, as were those who reported greater levels of political news use. Those who identified with a political party and reported higher levels of political efficacy were significantly more likely to aim to share information and opinions while dual screening, while those who sought to influence others had significantly higher levels of interest in politics.

Levels of attention to the campaign were positively and significantly associated with the motivation to acquire information and to share information and opinion. Online political engagement was positively and significantly associated with all three

Table 1
Factors Predicting Motivations for Dual Screening the Debate (Ordinal Logistic Regression, Wave 1 Survey)

	Information	Sharing	Influencing
Gender (male)	-.480***	-.127	.225**
Age (years)	-.023***	-.020***	-.009**
Education (age of completion)	-.114**	-.136***	-.071
Income (monthly household before tax)	-.018**	-.018*	-.013
Interest in politics	.097	.112	.195*
Internal political efficacy	-.036*	.041*	.031
Identifying with a party	.254	.309*	.225
Level of attention to the campaign	.235**	.342***	.165
Learning enough from the campaign	-.188*	-.031	.078
Index of political news use	.030**	.000	-.001
Index of offline political engagement	.006	.030***	.038***
Index of online political engagement	.008***	.008***	.008***
Frequency of access to Twitter	.206**	.261***	.084
Frequency of access to other social media	.012	.046	.095*
N	1973	1962	1924
Cox and Snell R^2	.102	.177	.186
-2 Log-likelihood	6733.56	6640.52	6817.46

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized slope coefficients for the independent variables. *** $p \leq .001$ ** $p \leq .01$ * $p \leq .05$.

motivations, while offline political engagement was positively and significantly associated with the motivation to share content and influence others. Frequency of access to Twitter was positively and significantly associated with the motivation to acquire information and share information and opinions, while frequency of access to other social media was positively and significantly associated with the desire to influence others.

RQ₂: Perceived Influence-Related and Cognitive Outcomes of Dual Screening

In Table 2, we show how dual screening shaped individuals' sense of their own agency to influence others and the feeling they had learned information that was valuable for their vote decision. We asked respondents to state if their comments on the debate on Twitter influenced four distinct groups we chose for their rank order in terms of probable difficulty: their own Twitter followers, Twitter users in general, journalists, and politicians. In the aggregate, our respondents were modest in assessing their ability to influence others: 55.6 percent claimed to have at least "a little" influence on their own followers, 38 percent on Twitter users in general, 11.7

Table 2
Factors Predicting Perceived Influence on Others as a Result of Dual Screening (Logistic Regression, Wave 1 Survey) and Usefulness of Dual Screening in Assisting with Voting Decision (Ordinal Logistic Regression, Wave 1 Survey)

	Influence on one's followers	Influence on Twitter users	Influence on journalists	Influence on politicians	Assistance with voting decision
Gender (male)	.335**	.116	.082	-.183	-.281**
Age (years)	-.005	.006	-.002	-.008	-.012***
Education (age of completion)	.032	-.057	.061	-.102	-.097
Income (monthly household before tax)	.004	-.004	.009	.001	-.008
Interest in politics	-.146	-.318*	-.110	-.136	-.318**
Internal political efficacy	.029	.030	.024	.006	-.048*
Identifying with a party	.065	-.154	-.553	-.121	-.003
Attention to the campaign	.054	.250	.165	-.179	-.028
Learning enough from the campaign	.001	-.167	.142	.398	.142
Index of political news use	.000	.000	.060**	.031	.016
Index of offline political engagement	.012*	.013*	-.007	.014	.003
Index of online political engagement	.020***	.010**	.010*	.009	.006
Frequency of access to Twitter	.120	.042	-.083	-.004	.284***
Frequency of access to other social media	-.042	-.030	-.087	-.128*	-.013
<i>Importance of motivation for dual screening the debate</i>					
Acquiring information	.076	.098*	.015	.134	.372***
Sharing information and opinions	.175***	.117*	-.072	-.128	.133**

(continued)

Table 2
(Continued)

	Influence on one's followers	Influence on Twitter users	Influence on journalists	Influence on politicians	Assistance with voting decision
Influencing others	.162***	.190***	.242***	.268***	.115***
<i>Specific dual screening practices</i>					
Watched the debate live	.284	.207	-.002	.322	.186
Tuned in after reading about the debate on social media	.186	.280*	.455*	.428*	.356**
Read about the debate on social media	-.054	-.022	.278	.192	.145
Commented on the debate on social media	.179*	.231**	-.016	.001	-.018
<i>Encountering debate information on Twitter</i>					
Via posts on timeline	.109	-.111	-.182	-.014	.361*
Via hashtags (#)	-.011	.306*	.339	.577*	.253*
Via mentions (@) and Twitter direct messages	.513***	.390**	.292	.165	.044
Via searching tweets	-.138	-.068	.090	-.055	.022
Constant	-3.523***	-3.409***	-4.727***	-3.971***	1.698**
N	1445	1451	1447	1450	1422
Nagelkerke R ²	.265	.224	.116	.140	.282
-2 Log-likelihood	1633.34	1689.71	966.01	913.23	3270.84

Note. cell entries are unstandardized slope coefficients for the independent variables. ***p ≤ .001 **p ≤ .01 *p ≤ .05

percent on journalists, and 11.2 percent on politicians. We also asked respondents how much they believed discussing the debate on Twitter helped them in their voting decision. A plurality of respondents (42.8%) claimed it was “somewhat helpful”; 12.9 percent deemed it “very helpful.”

Together with independent variables relating to social and political characteristics, [Table 2](#) also includes variables measuring particular dual screening behaviors and Twitter affordances that we found in our previous research to be important for shaping political engagement (Vaccari et al., 2015). We included the following: whether an individual had watched the debate live on television, tuned in to the debate after having read about it on social media, or read about or commented on the debate on social media. The variables that tap specific Twitter affordances for dual screening were: reading tweets about the debate in one’s timeline, encountering information via hashtags, being sent an @message or a direct message about the debate, and searching for comments on the debates using the Twitter search bar. Finally, we added the motivational dependent variables from our first model—acquiring information, sharing information and opinions, and seeking influence—as *independent* variables. This allowed us to gauge whether these motivations were in fact satisfied.

[Table 2](#) shows that all three motivations for dual screening the debate—acquiring information, sharing information and opinions, and influencing others—positively and significantly correlate with the view that dual screening assisted with deciding how to vote. The motivation to dual screen to influence others was positively and significantly associated with respondents’ perceptions that they had influenced all of the groups we asked about: their Twitter followers, Twitter users in general, journalists, and politicians. The desire to share information and opinions was positively and significantly associated with respondents’ perceptions of having influenced their immediate Twitter network and the broader network of Twitter users, but not journalists and politicians. Those who mostly valued acquiring information were significantly more likely to feel they had influenced Twitter users in general.

Consistent with our findings on motivations from [Table 1](#), men were significantly more likely than women to perceive that their comments on Twitter were influential on their followers, but women were significantly more likely to report that dual screening was useful for their voting decision.

[Table 2](#) also unearths intriguing relationships between the perceived outcomes of dual screening and important political characteristics. Those with higher levels of political news use were significantly more likely to report their discussions on Twitter had an influence on journalists. Respondents who were more politically engaged offline were significantly more likely to perceive that their discussions influenced their followers and Twitter users in general, as were respondents with higher levels of online engagement, though these latter individuals also felt significantly more influential on journalists. By contrast, political interest and efficacy were negatively and significantly associated with finding the discussions useful for deciding how to vote, while political interest was also negatively and significantly associated with perceived influence over Twitter users.

Perceptions of influence and assistance with voting decision were also associated with specific dual screening practices and Twitter affordances. Our measure of serendipitous exposure—tuning in to the television debate after reading about it on social media—was positively and significantly correlated with acquiring information that helped with deciding how to vote and with perceived influence on Twitter users, journalists, and politicians. Similarly, those who followed debate hashtags were significantly more likely to see themselves as influential on Twitter users and on politicians. Engaging with hashtags and seeing debate-related posts on one's timeline were also positively and significantly associated with finding dual screening useful in deciding how to vote. Respondents who commented on the debate on social media and who received debate-related tweets mentioning their username or direct messages also reported significantly higher levels of influence on their followers and Twitter users in general.

RQ₃: Dual Screening and Immediate Post-Debate Engagement

Our third research question investigates relationships between dual screening behaviors and engagement in the immediate aftermath of the debate. The dependent variable measuring post-debate engagement is an index comprising eight different activities, including, for example, signing an online petition related to the debate, donating money, voting in an online poll related to the debate, or signing up to volunteer for a party or cause. These speak to our discussion about short-term, post-debate engagement as both direct intervention in politics and indirect information signaling designed to influence the perceptions of others. The average value of the index of post-debate engagement, which ranges from 0–8, was 1.38 (SD = 1.45). Because the dependent variable is a count, we employed Poisson regression with robust standard errors.⁶ As with Table 2, we build on our previous model by adding the dependent variables from the previous table—perceived influence on others and assistance with voting decision—as independent variables.⁷

As Table 3, column 1 shows, those identifying with a party and those more engaged online and offline reported participating in a significantly higher number of post-debate activities. In addition, the perception that dual screening assisted with one's voting decision and the perception of having influenced others were positive and significant predictors of post-debate engagement. Interestingly, the motivation to dual screen to acquire information was positively and significantly associated with post-debate engagement, but the motivations to share content and to influence others were not.

Specific dual-screening behaviors and Twitter affordances also matter for short-term post-debate engagement. In a finding that echoes Vaccari et al. (2015), relatively active behaviors such as commenting on the debate on social media, encountering hashtag-centered discussions and searching for information using the Twitter search bar are positive and significant predictors of post-debate engagement. Even relatively passive social media behaviors such as reading about the debates on social media and receiving mentions and direct messages

Table 3
Factors Predicting Post-Debate Engagement Activities (Poisson regression, Wave 1),
Attention to the Campaign (Ordinal Logistic Regression, Waves 1–2) and Having
Learned Enough from the Campaign (Logistic Regression, Waves 1–2)

	1. Post-debate engagement (Wave 1)	2. Attention to campaign (Waves 1–2)	3. Learned enough from campaign (Waves 1–2)
Gender (male)	.004	.090	.023
Age (years)	–.008***	–.009	–.024**
Education (age of completion)	–.006	–.196	–.364**
Income (monthly household before tax)	–.005	–.017	.019
Interest in politics	.066	1.577***	–.093
Internal political efficacy	–.003	–.050	.078
Identifying with a party	.182*	–.130	.181
Attention to the campaign	.012	1.931***	–.051
Learning enough from the campaign	.064	.418	1.848***
Index of political news use	–.007	.024	.042
Index of offline political engagement	.009***	.017	.005
Index of online political engagement	.006***	–.006	.008
Frequency of access to Twitter	–.034	.421*	.294
Frequency of access to other social media	–.013	–.186*	–.116
<i>Importance of motivation for dual screening the debate</i>			
Acquiring information	.046*	–.089	.005
Sharing information and opinions	.010	–.045	–.108
Influencing others	–.022	.064	.031
<i>Specific dual screening practices</i>			
Watched the debate live	–.019	.574	–.190
Tuned in after reading about the debate on social media	.011	.143	–.485
Read about the debate on social media	.139**	.243	.100
Commented on the debate on social media	.146***	.301*	.325*
<i>Encountering debate information on Twitter</i>			
Via posts on timeline	.110	.165	.591
Via hashtags (#)	.198***	–.053	.062

(continued)

Table 3
(Continued)

	1. Post-debate engagement (Wave 1)	2. Attention to campaign (Waves 1–2)	3. Learned enough from campaign (Waves 1–2)
Via mentions (@) and Twitter direct messages	.092*	.070	–.290
Via searching tweets	.351***	.251	–.101
<i>Outcomes of dual screening</i>			
Influence on others	.113*	–.106	.125
Assistance with voting decision	.170***	–.130	–.035
Constant	–1.520***	5.671***	–.436
N	1342	730	719
Chi Square	655.11	374.31	128.44
–2 Log-likelihood	3974.82	581.26	526.39

Note. Cell entries are unstandardized slope coefficients for the independent variables. When Attention to the campaign is the dependent variable, the independent variable for Attention to the campaign was measured at wave 1. When Learned enough from the campaign is the dependent variable, the independent variable for Learned enough from the campaign was measured at wave 1. *** $p \leq .001$ ** $p \leq .01$ * $p \leq .05$

about the debate were positively and significantly associated with post-debate engagement.

RQ4: Dual Screening and Longer-Term Engagement

Our final research question concerned the relationship between dual screening the debate and any engagement that persists until after election day. Here we use our panel data, which we gathered in the post-election survey. In both waves, the majority of our respondents said they were following the campaign “very closely”: 59 percent in Wave 1; 70 percent in Wave 2. In Wave 1, 72 percent reported they were learning enough to make an informed choice; in Wave 2, 81 percent reported this.

As columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 reveal, we found important relationships between dual screening and cognitive engagement during the remainder of the campaign. Respondents who commented via social media on the debate were more likely to increase both their attention to the campaign and their perceptions that they had learned enough to make an informed choice. These relationships are statistically significant even after controlling for all the variables shown in Table 3—including the value of the dependent variables recorded at Wave 1.

Discussion

How do we make sense of these results? In this section, we show how they shed light on the motivations for dual screening and how these motivations relate to individuals' social and political characteristics (RQ₁); how dual screening assists with vote choice and contributes to the perception of influence over others (RQ₂); how it shapes engagement in the immediate post-debate opportunity structure (RQ₃); and how it provides longer-term cognitive benefits (RQ₄).

With regard to RQ₁, dual screening is seen by many respondents as an opportunity to fulfill their civic duties by plugging information gaps left by routine campaign news. Individuals who felt they had not learned enough from the campaign and who had a weaker sense of their own political efficacy were particularly keen to dual screen to acquire information. Dual screening's role as a civic ritual is confirmed by our finding that even those who were paying close attention to the campaign and who reported higher levels of news usage still wanted to dual screen to acquire and share information. These people already had a relatively rich diet of political information but they dual screened to further enrich it. This civic ritual role was also highlighted by the positive associations between respondents' political participation and their motivations for dual screening. Dual screening to spread information and influence others is a new and important part of the political behavior of those who already have the broadest engagement repertoires, both online and offline.

However, dual screening to influence others is a strident act of citizenship, and more likely to lead to active agency. This may contribute to explaining the gender agency divide we found, with women more likely to be motivated to acquire information and men more likely to be interested in influencing others. This surprising finding raises important questions, which we discuss in our Conclusion.

Our results show that dual screening the debate had important positive cognitive engagement outcomes, even after controlling for a wide range of other variables (RQ₂). Those who were motivated to influence journalists and politicians clearly found dual screening useful for doing so. Those who mostly valued sharing information and opinions could see that their behavior might have had some influence on their immediate Twitter network and the broader network of Twitter users, but not on journalists and politicians. Thus, there is an important divide here. On one side are individuals who are highly motivated to achieve interpersonal influence, and who wish to take opinion leadership to new heights by orienting their behavior toward influencing not only their own Twitter followers but also professional media and politicians. This behavior partly reverses the direction of flow in traditional models of opinion leadership: it involves individuals acting back on elites rather than simply retransmitting elites' messages. On the other side of the divide, however, sit those who follow a more conventional model of opinion leadership that involves sharing information and opinion, and influencing their own followers and Twitter users in general, but not media and political elites. We revisit the significance of this divide in our Conclusion.

The positive association we found between higher levels of news use and the perception of having influenced journalists while dual screening augments this point about information flows. As highlighted in our conceptual discussion, qualitative studies of the integration of social media behavior with broadcast content have found that individuals use social media to introduce information that journalists and political actors find useful in their strategies to bolster or contest an emerging interpretation (Chadwick, 2011a, 2011b). The findings from this study refine this point: individuals who regularly engage with news are more likely to use social media to plug in to news-making assemblages and try to influence journalists during a televised debate. This suggests that news consumption in general is an important civic driver in the dual screening environment.

It would be a mistake, however, to simply state that dual screening reinforces existing engagement inequalities. After all, our results show that political interest and efficacy were negatively associated with finding the discussions useful for deciding how to vote, while political interest was also negatively associated with perceived influence over Twitter users in general. What this means is that respondents who were *less* politically efficacious and *less* interested in politics received relatively *greater* cognitive and influence benefits from dual screening the debate. They were more likely to see their behavior as influencing Twitter users in general and to see dual screening as having helped with their vote decision. Although this finding should be treated with some caution because our survey respondents as a whole were skewed toward the politically interested, it nonetheless reveals how dual screening can boost the capacity of people who are less engaged in politics but drawn into social media discussion of high-stakes, broadcast political events.

In addition, serendipitous exposure to the debate via dual screening provided important cognitive and influence benefits. People who were not planning to watch the debate, but who ended up tuning in on television after reading about it online, derived the greatest cognitive and influence rewards. They reported influencing Twitter users in general, journalists, and politicians, and acquiring information that helped with deciding how to vote. We consider this finding related to influence benefits particularly surprising and powerful. Not only does it generally reinforce the finding that dual screening can boost the capacity of the less engaged, it also reveals how a specific bundle of behaviors that are such an important part of the dual screening experience—switching to dual screen using social media *and* television after reading about an event on social media—can empower individuals to exercise opinion leadership. Hashtags also play a role here. They appear to enable individuals to explore content and interact with users to which they may not normally be exposed. This may explain why people who engaged with hashtags also experienced influence and cognitive benefits.

Our results also indicate that dual screening spurs those who are already politically engaged to try to extend their influence by engaging in the immediate post-debate opportunity structure (RQ₃). Dual screening now appears to be well integrated with existing online and offline engagement repertoires and partisan identifications. However, it is not simply that dual screening provides these opportunities for

the highly engaged. As the results show, those who were more likely to be open to influence (because they sought information rather than sought to share information and influence others) also reported higher levels of post-debate engagement. We see this as a positive outcome for those with a comparatively weaker sense of agency. Influence-seekers are not the only ones who become politically active after dual screening a debate; information-seekers do, too.

Finally, commenting on a debate while dual screening plays an important role in enhancing long-term cognitive engagement with a campaign (RQ₄). This was the case even among those who were already attentive to, and learning from, the campaign. Indeed, while we have taken care to address the complexity of the relationships between dual screening motivations, perceived outcomes, and engagement, taken overall, the practice of commenting on the debate via social media emerges as one of the most important variables in our analysis. It positively predicts perceived influence on one's Twitter followers and Twitter users in general (RQ₂), immediate post-debate engagement (RQ₃), and longer-term attentiveness and learning (RQ₄).

Conclusion

We found significant evidence that dual screening has some positive influences on individuals' sense of political agency and both their short- and longer-term engagement with an election campaign. These influences derive from the complex, reconfigured context of today's televised political debates.

Our analysis also sheds light on how power might come to be exercised in the post-debate opportunity structure. Dual screening enables individuals to continue to assert their agency in the important immediate post-debate period, and signal their support for a candidate or party to others. Indeed, our finding that party identification is positively linked with post-debate engagement suggests that further research might explore the role parties play in structuring how citizens express their support during the period when frame dominance is being determined.

Our study provides further evidence that the hybrid mix of television and social media can lead to positive outcomes for democratic engagement beyond those who are political "junkies" (cf. Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015; Vaccari et al., 2015). Dual screening is not simply a "weapon of the strong." While we caution that our sample is skewed toward the politically interested, we still found evidence that those who were less politically efficacious and less politically interested were more likely to receive cognitive and influence-related benefits from dual screening. For these individuals, dual screening appears to be useful for learning about the election and gaining influence over Twitter users beyond their own followers, though this influence does not extend to journalists and politicians. Similarly, those who sought to acquire information from the debate actually reported higher levels of post-debate engagement. Dual screening appears to have nudged these information-seekers to get involved immediately after the debate. Serendipity plays a role here, too. The greatest cognitive and influence rewards were experienced by those who did not

actually plan to watch the televised debate but who ended up watching after reading about it on social media. This is an intriguing reversal of an earlier process identified by Bimber and Davis (2003), who found that serendipitous exposure to a candidate via television prompted individuals to search for the candidate online and get more involved in a campaign.

Social media affordances are important in explaining the difference dual screening can make to political television. Using social media to read about and to comment on the debate, encountering Twitter hashtags, searching Twitter, and being exposed to debate-related messages posted by others mentioning one's username were all associated with higher levels of immediate post-debate engagement. Those who followed discussions on hashtags reported that their comments had influenced Twitter users in general and politicians; they also reported that such conversations assisted with vote choice. And, as our Wave 2 data revealed, social media use during dual screening also had positive longer-term influences on cognitive engagement with the campaign. Even after controlling for a wide range of other variables and the responses of individuals at Wave 1, commenting on the debate on social media was positively associated with increased attention to the campaign and learning enough to make an informed vote choice. Social media, particularly Twitter, are essential ingredients for political engagement during and after mediated political events. They make it more likely that people will feel empowered, become politically engaged immediately after the debate, acquire information that is useful in forming political judgments, and maintain higher levels of cognitive engagement during the rest of the campaign.

Taken together, these findings are important confirmation of the additional benefits of increased agency, empowerment, and engagement that people experience now that social media have reconfigured previously unidirectional, broadcast-only political television.

At the same time, our argument is tempered by two important caveats. The first is our finding that there is a *motivations and influence divide*. There are highly motivated influencers who strategically and, in their own assessments, successfully influence their own Twitter followers, Twitter users in general, journalists, and politicians. As we mentioned in our theoretical discussion these people reverse the top-down direction of flow of Katz and Lazarsfeld's (1955) classic two-step flow model of opinion leadership, further complicating what "personal influence" actually means in today's media systems (Dubois & Gaffney, 2014). On the other side of this divide are those who prioritize sharing information and opinions and only see their influence spreading as far as their own Twitter followers and Twitter users in general. Of course, influence over Twitter users beyond one's immediate followers should not be dismissed lightly: it is an agentic act. However, because it is not aimed at elites, it conforms more closely to the traditional top-down model of opinion leadership.

The second caveat is our unexpected identification of what we tentatively label the *gender agency divide*. In the case of the 2015 ITV leaders' debate, women dual screeners were more likely to be *information-seekers* and report that dual screening had assisted with their voting decisions. Men were more likely to be *influence-seekers* and

report that they had achieved influence over others. Does dual screening political debates therefore reinforce patterns of gender inequality unearthed by previous research on political engagement (see for example Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 2001)? Is this finding unique to our data or related in some way to a complex array of other gender-related variables that we did not include in our design? It could be that under certain conditions women are less motivated than men to engage in the active commenting practices that are important for achieving influence. Recent evidence from Bode's (2016, pp. 12–13) study of online engagement in the United States suggests there are few gender differences but there is a divide based on the visibility of an engagement behavior: men are more likely to post about politics; women are more likely to comment on others' postings and disconnect from others for political reasons. However, Bode did not study dual screening, and in any case our findings suggest that men's and women's motivations and perceived outcomes can differ markedly, and these might condition their engagement behaviors. Of course, it could be that men have unrealistic expectations and/or inflated views of their own agency. Either way, the gender agency divide is an important avenue for future research.

Indeed, much further research is needed in this area. One important factor is how the content of people's social media posts interacts with their self-reported behaviors. Future research must aim to identify the achievement of influence, not just reports of influence, as we did here. This is a formidable challenge, but one that will continue to center dual screening research on essential questions of agency and democracy.

Supplemental Data

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2017.1309415>

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Notes

1. Data from the 2015 British Election Study (BES) post-election survey show that that 41.8 percent of the 52.8 percent of total survey respondents who reported using either Facebook or Twitter were "not very interested" or "not at all interested" in politics (N = 2,987). See

- <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com>. For the importance of serendipitous exposure from dual screening see Vaccari et al., 2015.
2. See <http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/>.
 3. See <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/03/7m-people-watched-leaders-debate-itv-seven-etchingham>.
 4. Twitter's Streaming API allows researchers to retrieve public Twitter messages in real time, together with relevant metadata. See <https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview>.
 5. The surveys were hosted at Qualtrics. For more detail on the survey and question wording please consult our online appendix.
 6. As the ratio between the model's Chi square coefficient and the number of degrees of freedom is lower than 1 (.969), we can conclude that overdispersion does not affect our data and that our model overestimates the standard errors.
 7. Here we recoded perceived influence on others as a combined measure. See the online appendix.

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Trisha T.C. Lin & Yi-Hsuan Chiang

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SECOND SCREENING

Dual Screening: Examining Social Predictors and Impact on Online and Offline Political Participation Among Taiwanese Internet Users

Trisha T.C. Lin and Yi-Hsuan Chiang

This study investigates how social factors affect Taiwanese Internet users' dual screening use and its impact on online and offline political participation. The Web survey recruits 961 dual screen users. Structural equation modeling results show that bridging social capital and perceived social presence are significantly associated with dual screening use. Dual screening is positively related to online and offline political participation. Dual screening use strongly influences offline political participation when mediated by online political participation. Moreover, alternative media trust is positively related to online political participation, whereas mainstream media trust shows a negative association.

Introduction

Dual screening, which involves the use of one screen device to engage in social and communicative activities while viewing audiovisual content on another, has increased dramatically in recent years (Warren, 2013). Myriad media consumers in various countries have used two screen devices to conduct communicative activities and watch videos simultaneously. Owing to fast technological advancements, dual screening has become prevalent media behavior when users have low thresholds to accessing, consuming, and producing digital content via connected devices (Lochrie & Coulton, 2011; Nielsen, 2014). Using social media as back channels empowers

Trisha T.C. Lin (Ph.D., University of Hawaii, Manoa) is the associate professor at Department of Radio and Television, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. Her research interests focus on examining emerging interactive digital media with two approaches: socio-technical system analysis and socio-psychological user research. She also published papers in the areas of mobile media and communication, new media convergence, digital journalism, and health communication.

Yi-Hsuan Chiang (Ph.D., National Taiwan Normal University) is an associate professor at Radio-TV-Film, Shih Hsin University, Taiwan. Her research interests are in the areas of new media user behavior, including social media, mobile communication, and big data. She also served as a consultant in InsightXplorer and BeamMedia for digital media research and infographics.

audiences to interact with content producers and like-minded people while watching TV. Vaccari, Chadwick, & O'Loughlin (2015) argued that the term "second screening" was problematic as it suggested the universal mode of switching—TV first and social media second. However, TV viewing can sometimes be treated as the secondary activity when users pay primary attention to other screen tasks (Jago, Sebire, Gorely, Cillero, & Biddle, 2011). Thus, this study thus focuses on dual screening use in the context of political participation and examines predictors and outcomes of viewing political videos on one device and engaging in politics-related activities on another (e.g., news consumption and social media discussions).

Many TV audiences have used Internet-empowered second screen devices to follow political events, search information, and share opinions via Twitters during live shows (Sasseen, Olmstead, & Mitchell, 2013; Verizon, 2012). Most viewers of live political shows tweeted personal opinions, including emotional or informative posts, which recreated pseudo group TV viewing experiences (Wohn & Na, 2011). A recent content analysis research that examined tweets about political talk shows revealed how subgenres of TV content has influenced the types of discussions and engagement second screeners (Giglietto & Silva, 2014). Political participation was associated with news consumption on the Internet and social media (Holt, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Ljungberg, 2013; Shah et al., 2007). Gil de Zúñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, & McGregor (2015) identified second screening for news as a significant predictor of online political participation. Vaccari et al. (2015) found that dual screening while watching political debate videos was correlated with political engagement. Built upon past studies' exploratory results, this research further examines social predictors of dual screening in consuming political news and videos and their impact on online and offline political participation in an Asian context.

To address the research gap, a Web survey in March 2016 recruited 961 Taiwanese Internet users who have had prior dual screening experiences to engage in online communicative and social activities related to their consumption of political videos (e.g., news, current affairs, and talk shows). Many Taiwanese have increasing dual screening habits for video consumption (Statista, 2016b) and keen participation in politics and elections (Sullivan, 2013); thus, Taiwan provides an appropriate case to examine the relationships of social factors affecting politics-related dual screening practices (i.e., perceived sociability, perceived social presence, and bridging social capital) and their effects on online and offline political participation. The findings will provide important insights to academics in studying emerging multiscreen social TV and political communication, as well as practitioners in political campaigns and TV industries.

Theoretical Background

A growing body of research shows that individual political participatory behaviors are shaped by their media consumption and interpersonal discussions (Calenda & Meijer, 2009; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). They are consistent with the perspectives of the communication mediation model (CMM) that emphasizes how news information, when mediated by face-to-face interpersonal discussions, can raise awareness about collective problems, highlight opportunities for political participation and lead to individual engagement in various political activities (McLeod et al., 1999). An implicit premise of CMM postulates that communicative behaviors largely mediate the effects of media consumption on users' participatory behaviors. Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2014) found that political expressions on social media significantly mediated the relationship between social media news consumption and political engagement. As dual screening facilitates the consumption of political content (e.g., news and videos) and online political communication (Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014), the CMM can provide an insightful theoretical basis to investigate such emerging phenomenon.

Based on CMM, individuals with extensive and heterogeneous discussion networks are likely to encounter a variety of politically active individuals with diverse opinions, which can enhance their discussions and reflections about political and public affairs (Leighley, 1990). Social media and online forums allow users to connect with people outside their pre-existing social groups and locations, thus facilitating the formation of virtual communities around shared interests (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007). Ellison et al. (2007) stated that bridging social capital was essential to the formation of online linkages of weak ties. The mediated communication of dual screening can reach geographically dispersed virtual groups with similar political interests. These users can also connect with heterophile others to discuss diverse topics about politics. Additionally, past social TV (STV) studies have found bridging social capital as a strong predictor and mediator of user engagement (Lim, Hwang, Kim, & Biocca, 2015; Lin et al., 2016). It is reasonable for this study to concentrate on examining the association of dual screening, a type of STV, and its association with bridging social capital on heterogeneous weak ties. Several STV studies have provided strong support to regard the social components (e.g., perceived sociability, perceived social presence, and bridging social capital) as predictors that influence STV attitude and intention to use (Hwang & Lim, 2015; Kim & Sundar, 2014; Lin et al., 2016; Shin, 2013; Shin & Kim, 2015).

Moreover, dual screening is a form of media multitasking that allows users to swiftly shift attention to various tasks on two screens. In the context of dual screening for political participation, users seek political information and consume media content on one screen, while they actively engage in discussions, elaborations, and reflection on political issues via social media on a separate screen. These complementary tasks on two screens likely increase user involvement and strengthen the

effects on political participation, instead of reducing cognitive resources allocated to media tasks. Hence, this study proposes a CMM process integrating social concepts to explain how politics-related dual screening use that undertakes political content consumption and political discussions on separate screens influences online and offline political participatory behaviors.

Political Participation

According to Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, (1995, p. 38), political participation refers to activities with the intent or effect of influencing government actions. Several researchers have developed their definition and measured offline political participation with items such as attending protests, making campaign donations, and writing letters to public officials (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Saldaña, McGregor, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015). The emergence of the Internet and social media has brought new ways of participating in elections and public affairs (Chadwick & Howard, 2008). Unlike mass media's one-to-many communication, computer-mediated political participation can empower individuals from a grass-roots level to reach out to both political figures and the masses (Castells, 2007). Traditional offline participation can be executed online, such as signing online petitions and writing emails to politicians. The Internet also facilitates unique online expressive participation, like posting or commenting on political issues or subscribing to political parties' Facebook pages (Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, & Shah, 2010). Many scholars have regarded online political participation as a related but separate construct from offline participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Skoric, Ying, & Ng, 2009).

Online and offline political participation are the dependent variables in this dual screening research. Comparatively, online participation requires lesser time and commitment and is arguably less resource intensive than offline participation (Vitak et al., 2011). Online political participation is sometimes viewed as a supplement to traditional modes of participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010). Various online activities can coordinate the mobilization of offline political efforts (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). Hence, online political activities can influence offline participation and thus we hypothesize:

H₁: Online political participation is positively associated with offline political participation.

Dual Screening Use and Political Participation

Dual screening involves intentional information seeking, passive media consumption, and active online communicative and social activities. Dual screening for

political participation is defined in this study as a hybrid practice in which users utilize two screens for viewing political content and communicating with others about politics. The various types of political content include political breaking news, “live” coverage of political debates, and interviews with politicians (Giglietto & Silva, 2014; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015).

Early computer-mediated communication (CMC) studies found the positive influence of purposive information seeking and online expressions on participatory behaviors (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010; Shah et al., 2007; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). Exposure to online information about the U.S. presidential campaign was significantly related to offline political participation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Other studies in the United States and Asia have consistently reported that using the Internet and social media for accessing, discussing, and reproducing online political information had direct and indirect associations with various forms of offline participation (Vitak et al., 2011; Wang, 2007). Social media use for news consumption showed a strong relationship with online and offline political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Saldaña et al., 2015). All in all, these findings are consistent with CMM’s key theoretical assumption that the more people participate in interpersonal discussions, the more likely they will consume news media information, reflect on the content, and engage in political participation (McLeod et al., 1999).

Despite the increasing popularity of dual screening, few scholarly studies have explored its relationship with political participation. Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2015) showed that second screening for news was a significant predictor and mediator of online political engagement. Vaccari et al.’s (2015) panel survey during the British parliamentary elections revealed a strong association between second screeners’ active “lean-forward” practices (i.e., information searching and online discussions) and their political engagement. Based on the aforementioned studies, dual screening for political participation is likely to positively affect both online and offline participation and we hypothesize that:

H_{2a}: Dual screening use is positively associated with online political participation.

H_{2b}: Dual screening use is positively associated with offline political participation.

Bridging Social Capital

Social capital, a multidimensional construct, refers to the resources available to people through social interactions (Lin, 2001). It can be divided into bonding and bridging social capital at the individual level (Putnam, 2000). Technological affordances of the Internet and social media increase the convenience and capability to maintain and interact with vast social networks, which are beneficial for bridging social capital (Ellison et al., 2007; Resnick, 2002). As past studies suggest a more direct link between heterogeneous networks and democratic and civic engagement

(Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; McLeod et al., 1999), this study only focuses on bridging social capital that exchanges resources among widely diffused networks of reciprocity. Bridging social capital in the context of political participation can result from informal discussions and interactions on social media (Skoric et al., 2009). Such digital spaces can facilitate political discourse and re-education of citizens to participate in public affairs (Vitak et al., 2011). Although the relationships between social capital and online news consumption have been confirmed (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Kim, 2007), the role of bridging social capital with regard to dual screening for political participation remains underexplored. Dual screeners of political videos are likely to have social conversations with people in heterogeneous networks, thereby expanding their access to various perspectives on political issues. Thus we propose the following:

H₃: Bridging social capital is positively associated with dual screening use.

Perceived Sociability

This study on dual screening focuses on the concept of perceived sociability in CMC research. Preece (2001) defined perceived sociability as how the technical features and social policies of online communities advance group members' social interactions for shared purposes. Dual screening can be identified as a kind of STV because its video viewers interact with other audiences using various modalities of social media. In the context of STV, Shin and Kim (2015) regarded perceived sociability as the characteristics of the technology-mediated communication environment that support a state of being sociable, and where viewers find interaction with one another a pleasant experience. Perceived sociability plays an instrumental role in users' attitude toward social media adoption (Keenan & Shiri, 2009) and their use intention (Gao, Dai, Fan, & Kang, 2010). Shin's STV study (2013) found that perceived sociability positively affected users' attitude and intention to use. Another recent study showed that perceived sociability of STV, when mediated by bridging social capital, had an indirect positive association with program loyalty outcomes such as repeating video viewing and using social media for interactions (Lin et al., 2016). As perceived sociability of dual screening is likely to encourage the continued consumption of political content and increase online social interactions, we propose the following:

H_{4a}: Perceived sociability is positively associated with bridging social capital.

H_{4b}: Perceived sociability is positively associated with dual screening use.

Perceived Social Presence

Many scholars agree that virtual co-presence is an essential concept in understanding active engagement in online media use (Kim & Biocca, 1997; Song & Hollenbeck, 2015). In CMC studies, perceived social presence is a psychological variable that goes beyond the virtual presence of other social actors and generates subjective experiences of closeness and connectedness in mediated communications (Heeter, 1992; Lombard & Ditton, 1997). The present study adopted the definition from Hwang and Lim (2015) and regards perceived social presence as the extent to which dual screening facilitates the experience of being psychologically present with others and the perceptual illusion of non-mediation.

The influence of perceived social presence on user behavior or intention has been extensively studied in the context of virtual environments (Chung, Han, & Koo, 2015; Kear, Chetwynd, & Jefferis, 2014). Shin (2013) reported a positive effect of perceived social presence of STV on user attitude and intention to use. Lim et al. (2015) found that social presence, when mediated by channel commitment, predicted sports channel loyalty. A recent study found that perceived social presence of STV and its bridging social capital mediated the effect of perceived sociability on program loyalty (Lin et al., 2016).

The low entry barriers and affordances of social media allow audiences that consume similar audiovisual content to interact with one another and establish communities through bandwagon cues such as hashtags, share, or likes (Hwang & Lim, 2015; Kim & Sundar, 2014). The immediacy and responsiveness of such back-channel communication while viewing videos can create virtual co-viewing experiences (Johns, 2012). Thus, given that dual screening involves the use of social media and online channels to facilitate interpersonal communication, this study expects that the perceived social presence of dual screening will stimulate audiences to actively engage in politics. Hence, we hypothesize:

H_{5a}: Perceived social presence is positively associated with bridging social capital.

H_{5b}: Perceived social presence is positively associated with dual screening use.

Media Trust and Offline Political Discussions as Control Variables

This study selects (mainstream and alternative) media trust and offline political discussions as control variables in testing the proposed hypotheses because their influences have been identified in literature over political participation and media effects (Gil de Zúñiga, Bachmann, Hsu, & Brundidge, 2013; Kauffhold, Valenzuela, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010). Trust in news media refers to the belief in the professionalism of journalistic practices (Liebes, 2001). Past research has confirmed that media trust influenced

people's selection of news media (Johnson & Kaye, 1998; Tsfaty & Capella, 2003) and moderated media effects on audiences (Jackob, 2010; Kioussis, 2001). According to Kaufhold et al. (2010), although consuming professional news and citizen journalism both led to political participation, people who trusted professional news media more were relatively less involved in political activities. In comparison, individuals who consumed and trusted citizen news more tended to engage more in online political discussions and online political participation (Rojas & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010). Additionally, Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2013) identified the influential effects of expressive online news use on political participation, especially when people engaged in active political discussions. In the context of dual screening, people conveniently utilize easy-to-use connected screens to seek diverse political content and discuss issues with other users via social media, which likely increase interpersonal discussions, engagement, and online and offline political participation. Figure 1 shows the research model to test the proposed associations between variables hypothesized in this study.

Methodology


Research Context

Taiwan has a robust democratic political system with multiple parties. The majority of Taiwanese have high levels of political interest and participate actively in a vibrant election culture (Lee, 2015; Sullivan, 2013; Wang, 2007). The results of Taiwan's 2016 general election reaffirmed the third peaceful transfer of power and elected its first female president (Lee & Schreer, 2016). Taiwan has an advanced ICT environment and over 19 million Internet users with a penetration rate of over 80% (Statista, 2016a). Industry reports have shown that 72% of multiscreen users in Taiwan owned second devices (Louisse, 2015) and 68% of Taiwanese used smartphones to consume online content while watching TV (Statista, 2016b). Overall, Taiwan provides a pertinent context for this research to investigate dual screening for political participation.

Data Collection

The cross-sectional Web survey was conducted in March 2016, two months after Taiwan's 2016 general election. To participate, the respondents must fulfill the criteria of Internet users with prior dual screening experiences to engage in online political discussions related to political videos (e.g., news, current affairs, and talk shows). The respondents were randomly selected from a Taiwanese online panel owned by InsightXplorer. The online panel represents the age (median = 40 to 44 years old) and gender (male = 49.7%, female = 50.3%) distribution of Internet users in Taiwan (TWNIC, 2015). Although a total of 1,045 respondents completed the Web survey, this study had 961 valid respondents after data cleaning. The sample

Figure 1
Research Model



size calculator for structural equation modeling (SEM) (Soper, 2016) shows that the final sample size ($N = 961$) satisfies the required sample size for model testing ($N = 161$). The gender distribution of the final sample (male = 50.2%, female = 49.8%) is close to the situation of Taiwanese Internet users. The average age of the respondents is 40.25 years old ($Min = 20$, $Max = 80$, $SD = 11.98$) which is similar to the median age of Taiwanese Internet users.

Measurement Items

The majority of items were adapted from past studies in English. This study adopted a rigorous language translation process (Forsyth, Kudela, Levin, Lawrence, & Willis, 2007) to retain the survey questions' meaning during translation. Considering that Mandarin is the first language in Taiwan, the items were first translated from English to Mandarin by bilingual researchers. Staff from InsightXplorer also conducted back-translation and made revisions. Several target participants and native Chinese speakers later pre-tested the questionnaire. The final review was conducted before disseminating the Web survey to ensure translation accuracy.

The analysis of the survey items shows adequate psychometric properties (Appendix 1). First, most of the factor loadings of the items were above .70, indicating adequate reliability. Next, all multi-item constructs obtained an average variance extracted value of more than .50, indicating discriminant validity. No issues related to multicollinearity exist because the tolerance values ($> .20$) and variance inflation factors (< 5) were within benchmarks. Table 1 shows the zero-order correlation matrix of the study variables.

Online Political Participation. Online Political Participation ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 2.63$) is a six-item measurement of online political participation adapted from Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga (2011) and Saldaña et al. (2015). A 10-point Likert scale was used to indicate responses (1 = *never*, 10 = *always*), when asking respondents how often they signed or shared an online petition, or participated in online political polls, and so on. The items showed excellent reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = .97$).

Offline Political Participation. The six-item measurement of offline political participation ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 2.61$) was adapted from three studies (Campbell & Kwak, 2010; Jung et al., 2011; Saldaña et al., 2015). A 10-point Likert scale was used to indicate responses (1 = *never*, 10 = *always*), when asking respondents how often they donated money to a campaign or political cause, attended a political rally, and so on. The reliability of the items is excellent (Cronbach's $\alpha = .98$).

Perceived Sociability. Perceived sociability ($M = 4.13$, $SD = 1.72$) was measured by three items adapted from Shin (2013) with excellent reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$). A 7-point Likert scale was used to indicate responses (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Table 1
Zero-order Correlation Matrix

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Age	-											
2. Gender (1 = Male, 0 = Female)	.09**	-										
3. Political affiliation (1 = DPP, 0 = Non DPP)	-.02	.00	-									
4. Mainstream media trust	.09**	.00	.63*	-								
5. Alternative media trust	.01	.02	.14**	.82**	-							
6. Offline political discussion	.01	.05	-.01	.21**	.19**	-						
7. Dual screening use	.02	.01	.05	.49**	.49**	.25**	-					
8. Perceived sociability	.02	.03	.10**	.46**	.53**	.22**	.43**	-				
9. Perceived social presence	.03	.70*	.12**	.47**	.54**	.18**	.45**	.82**	-			
10. Bridging social capital	.01	.06	.12**	.44**	.54**	.22**	.44**	.81**	.84**	-		
11. Online political participation	-.01	.69*	.11**	.57**	.67**	.27**	.51**	.46**	.53**	.52**	-	
12. Offline political participation	-.02	.06	.09**	.53**	.60**	.29**	.50**	.43**	.51**	.51**	.88**	-

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Perceived Social Presence. Perceived social ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.72$) presence was measured using three items adapted from Hwang and Lim (2015). A 7-point Likert scale was used to indicate responses (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). The reliability of the items is excellent (Cronbach's $\alpha = .95$).

Bridging Social Capital. Bridging social capital ($M = 4.09$, $SD = 1.60$) was measured by six items adapted from Ellison et al. (2007). A 7-point Likert scale was used to indicate responses (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). The reliability of the remaining items was still excellent after removing one ("I feel I am part of the dual screening community") as a result of poor factor loading ($< .60$), (Cronbach's $\alpha = .95$).

Dual Screening Use. Dual screening use ($M = 2.55$, $SD = 1.67$) was measured by three items that asked respondents about their likelihood to used dual screening when watching current affairs, political live events and news, and participating in the political discussions related to content on another screen. A 4-point Likert scale was used to indicate responses (1 = *rarely*, 4 = *always*). The reliability of the items is adequate (Cronbach's $\alpha = .71$).

Control Variables. Age, gender, political affiliation, mainstream and alternative media trust, and offline political discussion were used as control variables. Pertinent control variables from the literature related to political participation were identified (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010; Ikeda & Boase, 2011). This study treated age as a ratio variable (i.e., 20 to 80) and gender as a nominal variable (1 = male, 0 = female). Political affiliation was considered a nominal variable by asking respondents whether they voted for the presidential nominee of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Taiwan's current ruling party) in the 2016 election (1 = yes, 0 = no). The results show that 33.7% of the respondents voted for DPP ($N = 324$). Items for mainstream media trust ($M = 4.01$, $SD = 1.28$, Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$) and alternative media trust ($M = 3.97$, $SD = 1.29$, Cronbach's $\alpha = .96$) were adapted from Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2015) and measured by a 7-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *complete trust*). Finally, offline political discussion was assessed by asking respondents about the number of hours spent on face-to-face political discussions weekly ($M = 3.14$, $SD = 5.38$).


Results

Hypothesis Testing

SEM via Mplus 7 was performed to analyze the relationship between variables in the research model. The results of the fit indices generally indicate that the research model has a good fit to the data: $\chi^2/df = 2.39$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .96, TLI = .96, SRMR = .05 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Figure 2 shows the research model with

Figure 2
SEM Results of the Proposed Model

Note. $\chi^2/df = 2.39$, $RMSEA = .04$, $CFI = .96$, $TLI = .96$, $SRMR = .05$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Non-significant control variables (i.e., age, gender and political affiliation) are not shown in the figure.



standardized paths along with control variables that have significant paths (i.e., mainstream and alternative media trust and offline political discussion).

After controlling for the effects of age, gender, political affiliation, (mainstream and alternative) media trust, the results show that online political participation has a positive association with offline political participation ($\beta = .79, p < .001$). Thus H_1 is accepted. Next, dual screening for political participation is positively associated with online political participation ($\beta = .35, p < .001$) and offline political participation ($\beta = .10, p < .01$). Therefore, H_{2a} and H_{2b} are accepted. Factors predicting online and offline political participation can explain 52% and 80% of the variance, respectively.

The results also support H_3 because bridging social capital is positively associated with dual screening use ($\beta = .24, p < .01$). However, perceived sociability is only positively associated with bridging social capital ($\beta = .40, p < .001$). Thus, H_{4a} is accepted but H_{4b} is rejected. Finally, perceived social presence is positively associated with bridging social capital ($\beta = .50, p < .001$) and dual screening use ($\beta = .23, p < .05$). H_{5a} and H_{5b} are accepted. Factors predicting bridging social capital and dual screening use can explain 83% and 49% of the variance, respectively. Table 2 summarizes the results of the hypothesis testing.

Mediation Analysis

A mediation analysis via Mplus 7 was performed to further determine whether online political participation mediates the association between dual screening use and offline political participation. We compared the indirect and direct effects of dual screening use toward offline political participation via online political participation (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The results supported online political participation as a mediator between dual screening use and offline political participation, because the value of its indirect effect ($\beta = .28, p < .001$) is larger than its direct effect on offline political participation ($\beta = .10, p < .01$).

Alternative Model

As theoretically dual screening use may be regarded as a predictor of bridging social capital to foster the development of weak ties over the Internet, this study tests the reverse logic of an alternative model. The SEM results are shown in Figure 3.

Before examining the statistical significance of the associations in the alternative model, the two models' SEM model fit parameters must be compared. Table 3 shows that both models satisfy conventional benchmarks proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999) (i.e., χ^2/df , RMSEA, CFI, TLI and SRMR). Next, we checked their Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values. As past studies suggested that the model with lower AIC and BIC values has greater model fit (Kuha, 2004; Vrieze, 2012), the initial model has greater model fit than the

Table 2
Summary of Hypothesis Testing

	Hypothesis	β	Decision
H ₁	Online political participation is positively associated with offline political participation	.79***	Accept
H _{2a}	Dual screening use is positively associated with online political participation	.35***	Accept
H _{2b}	Dual screening use is positively associated with offline political participation	.10***	Accept
H ₃	Bridging social capital is positively associated with dual screening use	.24***	Accept
H _{4a}	Perceived sociability is positively associated with bridging social capital	.40***	Accept
H _{4b}	Perceived sociability is positively associated with dual screening use	-.11	Reject
H _{5a}	Perceived social presence is positively associated with bridging social capital	.50***	Accept
H _{5b}	Perceived social presence is positively associated with dual screening use	.23*	Accept

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3
Model Fit Comparison

Model	AIC	BIC	χ^2/df	RMSEA	CFI	TLI	SRMR
Initial	96,908.75	97,726.57	2.39	.04	.96	.96	.05
Alternative	113,247.73	114,216.46	2.58	.04	.96	.96	.04


alternative model. In sum, the results support the arguments that users’ perceived social predictors (bridging social capital, perceived social presence, and perceived sociability) elicit greater dual screening use than the reverse logic, which can influence online and offline political participation.

Discussion and Conclusion

Based on CMM’s theoretical basis, this study examines the predictors of dual screening for politics-related content and the impacts on online and offline political participation among Taiwanese Internet users. Although past studies showed that perceived sociability and social presence predicted the intention to use STV (Shin, 2013; Shin & Kim, 2015), this research found social presence was the only factor

Figure 3
SEM Results of the Alternative Model

Note. $\chi^2/df = 2.58$, $RMSEA = .04$, $CFI = .96$, $TLI = .96$, $SRMR = .04$. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, n.s. = non-significant. Control variables (i.e., age, gender, political affiliation, mainstream and alternative media trust, and offline political discussion) are not shown in the figure.



associated with dual screening for political participation. The findings indicate that feeling virtual co-viewing political videos and communicating with others have positive effects on dual screening use for political participation. According to Cameron and Geidner (2014), when individuals had the dual viewing of political videos and tweets, their judgments to conformity were heavily influenced by political ideology, personal values, and public opinions. Given that the main goals of dual screeners in the current study are to understand complex political issues or engage in political activities rather than socialization, it explains why perceived sociability that reflects users' assessment of pleasantly meeting and interacting with netizens via online screen activities shows no association with dual screening use for political participation.

Nonetheless, bridging social capital in this study is identified as the key social factor positively affecting dual screening for political participation. Past studies have suggested a link between heterogeneous online social networks and political engagement (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Political participation, online or offline, requires mobilizing many people to make collective actions across social circles and geographical boundaries. These explain our results that bridging social capital motivates dual screening use for political participation, because it can facilitate users meeting weak ties or new people with shared political interests, gain awareness of diverse perspectives, and engage in different participatory activities.

Similar to past studies (Kaufhold et al., 2010; Rojas & Gil de Zúñiga, 2010), this research finds that alternative media trust has a strong positive association with online political participation, while mainstream media trust is negatively related to it. Nonetheless, they both fail to influence dual screeners' offline political participation. Mass media news (also shown on affiliated Web sites) and alternative media content (e.g., Web-only news, citizen journalism, and social media news) in Taiwan have diverse political standpoints in terms of political party support and social issues. Moreover, Taiwanese have relatively low trust in the credibility of mainstream media news. Dual screeners who distrust mass media and regard political content from alternative media as credible are likely to consume Internet political content and participate in politics online.

In addition to the positive relationship between online and offline political participation, this study finds that dual screening use has a greater association with online political participation than offline political participation. Dual screening improves user convenience to participate in political activities via the Internet (e.g., online petition and donation to political campaigns) by utilizing screen devices for communicative activities on social media. Furthermore, the mediation analysis supports the reinforcement effect of online political participation on the offline participation in relation to dual screening use. In other words, dual screeners who engage in online political participation have a strong tendency to participate in offline political activities. As Christensen (2012) argued that virtual participants in politics tend to be active and competent citizens, dual screeners are likely to reduce the negative impact of "slacktivism," improve online political engagement, and enhance offline

participation by elaborations and reflection after consuming political videos and content.

With respect to theoretical contributions, although past studies have identified social capital as a key determinant of users' political and civic participation (Kaufhold et al., 2010; Kim, 2007), the influence of social factors (e.g., social presence and sociability) on dual screening use for politics-related activities in Asia has not been explored yet. Given that the literature on the relationship between dual screening and offline political participation is lacking, this pioneering study can bridge the research gap. Political engagement is often regarded as the cornerstone of a healthy and well-functioning democracy (Mutz, 2006); thus, this study sheds light on factors affecting the use of emerging dual screening and the effects on online and offline political participation. These results can help politicians and policy-makers devise effective strategies to utilize the new forms of political communication. Moreover, dual screening in social conversations about TV programs has a two-way positive causal effect on ratings (Nielsen, 2013); the dual screening insights inform TV producers and content providers of the significance of identified social factors and encourage their use of the factors to increase audience engagement across screen devices.

Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations that can be addressed in future research. First, alternative models can be developed to understand this emerging dual screening phenomenon. Relevant psychological factors such as polychronicity and multitasking should be examined as potential predictors of politics-related dual screening use. Future studies may compare the platforms that influence dual screening use (e.g., smartphone, tablet, laptop, or TV) and interpersonal communication on online and offline political participation. Furthermore, research can also be conducted to investigate how dual screening adopters and non-adopters differ in their online political participation. These research models can provide various insights about how dual screening use can be translated to online and offline political participation. Second, although our three-item dual screening use scale has adequate reliability, because dual screening use is an evolving phenomenon, future research can refine the measurement to better conceptualize and operationalize this concept. For example, dual screening use can be divided into active and passive activities which likely affect users' media engagement levels and determine their online and offline participation. Some may study the associations of diverse dual screening activities on various screen devices with political participation or other applications. Finally, although using SEM to analyze survey data can predict the relationship of variables, the significant associations found in this study cannot be interpreted as causations. To overcome this limitation, experiments can be conducted to test certain aspects of the research model.

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Appendix 1. List of Items

Dual screening use (1 = never, 5 = always)

To what extent have you use used dual screening...

1. When watching current affair content?
2. When watching political live events and news?
3. To participate in political discussions related to content consumed on another screen?

Online political participation (1 = never, 10 = always)

In the past 12 months, how often did you engage in the following activities?

1. Signed or shared an online petition.
2. Participated in online political polls.
3. Participated in an online question-and-answer session with a politician or public official.
4. Created an online petition.
5. Signed up online to volunteer to help with a political cause.
6. Donate money to a campaign or political cause via Internet.

Offline political participation (1 = never, 10 = always)

In the past 12 months, how often did you engage in the following activities?

1. Attended/watched a public hearing, neighborhood or school meeting.
2. Contacted an elected public official.
3. Attended a political rally.
4. Participated in any demonstrations, protests, or marches.
5. Donated money to a campaign or political cause.
6. Participated in groups that took any local action for social or political reform.
7. Get involved in public interest groups, political action groups, or political campaigns.

Perceived sociability (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. I consider using dual screening a way to find pleasant conversations.
2. I find using dual screening pleasant to interact with the content on the device.
3. I can meet and socialize with people through dual screening activities.

Perceived social presence (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. I feel like I was physically communicating with others when undertaking dual screening activities.
2. I feel like I was watching videos with friends undertaking dual screening activities.
3. I feel like many people were watching videos with me at the same time undertaking dual screening activities.

Bridging social capital (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)

1. I feel I am part of the dual screening community. (removed from analysis)
2. Interacting with people through dual screening makes me want to try new things.
3. Interacting with other dual screen users makes me feel like a part of a larger community
4. I am willing to spend time on dual screening.
5. Dual screening makes me come into contact with new people all the time.
6. Interacting with other dual screen users reminds me that everyone in the world is connected.

Mainstream media trust (1 = not at all, 10 = complete trust)

To what extent do you trust the following mass media platforms for political information?

1. Television news (including affiliated website)
2. Political talk show programs (including affiliated website)
3. Radio news (including affiliated website)
4. Newspapers (including affiliated website)
5. Current affairs magazines (including affiliated website)

Alternative media trust (1 = not at all, 10 = complete trust)

To what extent do you trust the following alternative media platforms for political information?

1. Citizen journalism news websites
2. News websites available online only
3. Public affairs critics (individual)
4. Public affairs articles (blog)
5. Opinions/comments by Facebook friends
6. Opinions/comments by Line friends
7. YouTube/Facebook videos
8. YouTube/Facebook 'live' web-casting



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SECOND SCREENING

Second Screening Donald Trump: Conditional Indirect Effects on Political Participation

Shannon C. McGregor and Rachel R. Mourão

As second screening becomes more widespread, this study addresses its mediating role on the impact of TV news in political participation online and offline, and how this impact varies across groups. We expand the existing line of research by assessing the moderating role of support for Donald Trump on the established mediated model. Through a cross-lagged autoregressive panel survey design applied to the communication mediation model, our results support the link between second screening and political participation—but the mediating role of second screening is contingent upon attitudes towards Trump. For those who do not view Trump favorably, second screening during news leads to a decrease in political participation, both online and offline. As such, this article adds to the communication mediation model by suggesting that discussion and elaboration may not always be positive antecedents to political participation. When individuals disagree with the message dominating TV news and social media, deliberation via second screening leads to political disengagement.

On August 13, 2015, more 24 million viewers turned to their televisions to watch the first GOP presidential debate featuring Donald Trump. The event was the highest-rated primary debate in television history, and the most watched show in the history of Fox News (Stelter, 2015). As Trump clashed with moderator Megyn Kelly about his past misogynistic comments, second screeners flooded social media chatter with debate posts.

In the following debates, Trump continued to dominate the conversation, drawing millions of viewers with his controversial remarks and confrontational style (Goodin, 2016).

Shannon C. McGregor (M.A., University of Florida) is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Journalism at the University of Texas at Austin, and she will start as an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah in fall 2017. Her research interests are political communication, social media, gender, and public opinion.

Rachel R. Mourão (Ph.D., University of Texas at Austin) is an assistant professor in the School of Journalism at Michigan State University. Her research interests are journalism studies, political communication, new media, and Latin American studies.

Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/hbem.

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In this article we assess the mediating impact of second screening for news on political participation, in particular as it may conduit those who watch TV news in an election season to participatory acts online and offline. Specifically, we ask—can online actions during media events influence one's offline political actions? Taking into consideration the hostile and unusual nature of the 2016 presidential U.S. election, particularly as it relates to social media, we assess the conditional effects of support for a candidate who dominated the political information system during the campaign period on the relationship between second screening for news and political participation. As scholars and practitioners attempt to make sense of the 2016 election, we explore the impact of support for Trump on established models of communication. Building on this, our goal is to unravel the ways in which second screening, as a space for political deliberation, leads to different participatory outcomes for groups belonging to opposite sides of the political spectrum.

Second Screening and Political Participation

Second screening has been conceptualized in political communication literature as a purposive act. While watching a television program, individuals second screen by accessing an additional Web-connected device in order to get more information about or to discuss the program (Gil de Zuñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015). This concurrent and purposive act is one example of hybridity in media (Chadwick, 2013; McGregor, Mourao, Neto, Straubhaar, & Angeluci, 2017).

While second screening is emblematic of the increasing connectedness of individuals, it is not simply another form of multi-tasking. Scholars who have studied second screening as a non-purposive act have raised concerns about cognitive abilities regarding multitasking, specifically finding that it may inhibit factual recall and news comprehension (Gottfried, Hardy, Holbert, Winneg, & Hall Jamieson, 2016; Van Cauwenberge, Schaap, & van Roy, 2014). However, researchers interested in the role of second screening in politics (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011; Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015; Vaccari, Chadwick, & O'Loughlin, 2015) have pushed back against this work on two fronts. First, they conceptualize second screening (or dual screening) as purposive, positioning the act as hybrid, rather than separate acts under which multitasking might fall. Secondly, studies evaluating the effects of second screening on pro-democratic outcomes like elaboration, expression, and political participation move the dependent variable beyond simple knowledge retention into real-world acts with real-world implications.

Second screening well fits Chadwick's concept of the hybrid media system, as an emergent act that embodies the tension between new and old media logics (2013). On the one hand, televised programs or events—produced and broadcast largely by legacy media organizations—make up one aspect of second screening. But to this rather top-down media system enters social media whose networked orientation avails a wider range of voices and acts in political conversations (Freelon & Karpf, 2015), providing at least the potential to shift traditional flows of power. Second

screening, as a virtual form of collocation, is an audience-driven aspect of a converged media atmosphere (McGregor et al., 2017)—one that gives more agency to the viewers and is a key development in the emerging role of the audience in media studies.

When understood as a purposive act, second screening provides individuals with additional information, potentially orienting opinions, all in a space where discussion and elaboration are encouraged. Research demonstrates that the mobilizing potential of news media is largely mediated through these very acts—paths theorized as the communication mediation model (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Shah et al., 2007) and the cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2001; Eveland, Shah, & Kwak, 2003). These relationships may be especially strong when information seeking and expressive acts are carried out on the Internet or social media (Gil de Zuñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). A previous study tested this hypothesis for second screening, finding that second screening during news events conduits the influence of television news to online political participation (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015). Likewise, Vaccari et al. (2015) find increased political engagement driven by what they typify as “active” second screening behavior—such as commenting on the news event being broadcast.

In the media effects tradition, under which much TV research was conducted, the audience was usually treated as passive or reactive. While we do not suggest that the audience has always been “passive”—there is no doubt that individuals may now use social media as a tool by which to have a more active role in politics and communication. In fact, this more active role seems to temper the “negative” effects television may have on political attitudes and participatory behavior (Avery, 2009; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Mutz & Reeves, 2005).

TV news has been the focus of much research because of its dominance as a source of information, even with the rise of the Internet as a space for news (American Press Institute, 2014; Pew, 2011). For example, more than half of Americans surveyed by Pew found some form of television news the most helpful source for learning about the 2016 election, with most reporting cable news was most helpful (24%). Just behind cable news, 14 percent reported that social media was most helpful for learning about the election (Pew, 2016).

The role of second screening in political participation has been studied in the U.S. context, but the data were not collected during a politically compelling period in time, like a presidential election (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015). As Vaccari et al. point out, second screening (or dual screening) takes on increased relevance for politics during campaign periods where highly mediated events like debates draw strong second screen attention (2015). Gil de Zuñiga and colleagues (2015) suggest that second screening for news during elections may more strongly affect online participation. Based on this literature, this study uses a cross-lagged panel design to test the following hypotheses using data from two time points (T_1 and T_2):

H_{1a}: Second screening for news (T_1) will mediate the path between TV news consumption (T_1) and online political participation (T_2).

Furthermore, previous research has not probed the possible effects of second screening on offline participation in the U.S. context. While many studies link social media use to online political acts, some have sought to explore its reach into offline political participation. Using social media to seek political information, one motivation for second screening (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015), has been linked to offline participation in politics (Gil de Zuniga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009). Others are motivated to second screen during news by a desire to discuss the program they are watching (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015). Online expression vis-à-vis social media has also been positively related to offline participatory behaviors (Gil de Zuniga, 2009; Gil de Zuniga, Bachmann, Hsu, & Brundridge, 2013; Gil de Zuniga & Valenzuela, 2011). Based on this, we aim to extend our inquiry into the offline realm, hypothesizing that second screening provides a space for information seeking, discussion, and elaboration of TV news that may conduit offline political activities.

H_{1b}: Second screening for news (T₁) will mediate the path between TV news consumption (T₁) and offline political participation (T₂).

Second Screening During Elections, Political Disagreement and Donald Trump

While evidence from the literature suggests a positive impact of second screening to political participation, it would be simplistic to assume this effect is without contingencies. As Valkenburg and Peter (2013) point out, theories of indirect effects, like the communication mediation model, rarely “conceptualize conditional and indirect media effects” (p. 225). This is not to dismiss the communication mediation model, but rather to identify the role of non-media variables that may moderate the relationship between media-use behaviors, like second screening for news, and political acts, in our case, both online and offline participation in politics. While there are a host of attitudes or beliefs that may moderate this relationship, in this study we choose to focus on a singular source of political fervor in U.S. politics: support for Republican candidate (and now president) Donald Trump. Building on literature about political discussions, a feature of second screening (Gil de Zuniga et al. 2015; Vaccari et al., 2015), and disagreement in them, we argue that support for Trump, the most divisive figure in recent political memory, may differentially impact the influence that second screening has on political participation.

A sub-field of political communication scholarship has examined the nature of political discussions on social media platforms. More and more, social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter function as news sources (Pew, 2015). During the 2016 presidential campaign, 44 percent of Americans used social media to learn about the campaign (Pew, 2016). There is some debate about the extent to which

social media networks are politically heterogeneous (e.g., Himelboim, McCreery, & Smith, 2013; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014), but individuals disagree about politics with those in their online social networks to a greater degree than they believe (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010). This political heterogeneity makes one likely to encounter political disagreement on social media (Barnidge, 2015; Choi & Lee, 2015; Lee et al., 2014), but the literature is divided as to whether this disagreement leads to pro-democratic outcomes.

Some studies suggest that such disagreements relate negatively to political participation (Mutz, 2006; Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zuniga, 2012)—conflicting views in posts may foment ambivalence (Hutchens, Hmielowski, & Beam 2015; Mutz, 2006), increase a fear of isolation (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; Noelle-Neuman, 1974), stimulate anxiety (Mutz, 2006), or manifest perceived hostile opinion climates (Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Those who often use social media for news and information, one motivation for second screening (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015), discuss politics less, which may curtail political participation (Lu, Heatherly, & Lee, 2016). On the other hand, others suggest political disagreement drives participation (Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Wasimel-Manor, & Nisbet, 2006; Song & Eveland, 2015), in part by availing alternative perspectives (Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002; Scheufele et al., 2006) and fostering reflection, learning, and knowledge gains (Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zuñiga, 2011).

In the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, there was perhaps no greater source of disagreement than the candidacy of Donald Trump. Trump supporters and protesters have come to physical blows at his campaign rallies (Associated Press, 2016). Critics claim Trump's inflammatory rhetoric begets this violence (Barbaro, Parker, & Gabriel, 2016), and its riotous effects manifest on social media as well. Trump has a social media following that mirrored his electoral popularity. Trump supporters were more likely to criticize Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton's sanity, intelligence, and to sexually excoriate her appearance (Nugent & Pierson, 2016). Trump's campaign was also an unprecedented news media phenomenon, receiving the equivalent of \$1.9 billion in TV coverage (Confessore & Yourish, 2016).

In the first time period in which our survey was fielded, coverage of Trump largely focused on his anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant statements in the wake of the Paris and San Bernardino terrorist attacks. Later in the winter and spring, when we fielded our second survey wave, election coverage remained focused on Trump (Silver, 2016). Between November and February, the times our survey data were collected, Trump mocked *The New York Times* reporter Serge Kolakeski for his congenital disability, retweeted fabricated statistics about black crime, got into a dispute with Pope Francis, and proposed a total ban on accepting Muslim refugees (Rupar & Dewan, 2016). By the end of February, Trump had won the primaries in New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada. Add to this Pew's finding that, in February, Americans rated cable news as their "most helpful" source of election information, followed closely by social media (2016)—two platforms dominated by coverage of Trump and his messaging.

We theorize second screening as a communicative mediating process (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015), but posit that this path may be contingent on other factors.

Political disagreement on social media has been shown to both encourage and discourage political participation, so effects driven by perceived disagreement or hostile environments may moderate the effects of second screening for news on participatory action. We take up a timely, politically relevant, and highly divisive attitude—support for Trump—and test its role as a moderator in this relationship.

H_{2a} : Support for Trump (T_1) will moderate the relationship between second screening for news (T_1) and online political participation (T_2).

H_{2b} : Support for Trump (T_1) will moderate the relationship between second screening for news (T_1) and offline political participation (T_2).

Methods


This article adds to the communication mediation model of second screening proposed by Gil de Zuñiga et al. (2015) by probing the contingent effect of Donald Trump attitudes on the increase in political participation between November 2015 and February 2016 (Figure 1).

Sample

This project uses data from a two-wave U.S. national panel study conducted by the Digital Media Research Program at the University of Texas—Austin. The first wave was administered between November 20 and December 18, 2015. The second

Figure 1
Proposed Research Model

Note. The indirect effect of TV News for increase in online/offline political participation through second screening between December 2015 and February 2016 is contingent upon levels of support for Trump.



wave was conducted in February 2016. Both waves were administered online via Qualtrics and matched to U.S. Census data.

Participants for the first wave were recruited from a standing panel managed by Survey Sampling International (SSI). To assure national representativeness, quotas were established matching the distribution of demographics (age, gender, and race) to the U.S. Census, following the recommendation from previous research (Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2007; Kim & Chen, 2015; Shah et al., 2007). The first wave had a total of 848 completed responses. For the second wave, 426 of the participants completed the questionnaire, yielding a 50 percent retention rate. Appendix I contains the demographics of the sample of participants, compared with the U.S. Census.

Measures

This study assesses the impact of three types of variables on online and offline political participation: 1) demographics, 2) sociopolitical variables, including attitudes towards Trump, and 3) news media use, including TV news use and second screening for news.

Dependent Variables.

Online Political Participation. This variable refers to the level of political engagement via online-based activities. Participants were asked how often have they been involved in the past 12 months in the following online activities on a 10-point scale (1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time*): "Joined a political meeting in support or against a particular candidate, party or issue," "sent an email or message (Facebook comment, tweet) to a national, state or local government official about an issue," "contributed money online or via text message to a political candidate, party or issue," "created, shared or signed an online petition," "volunteered to help with a political cause or candidate's campaign online," and "sent a letter to the editor to a newspaper or magazine by email or text message." The items were combined into a single scale ($\alpha = .95$, $M = 3.19$, $SD = 2.61$ for time 1, and $\alpha = .96$, $M = 3.21$, $SD = 2.70$ for time 2).

Offline Political Participation. Levels were measured using six items asking how often participants engaged in the following activities in the last 12 months on a 10-point scale (1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time*): "Attended a political meeting in support or against a particular candidate, party or issue," "contacted a national, state or local government official by telephone, mail or in person about an issue," "contributed money by mailing a check or calling in a credit card number to a political candidate, party or issue," "created, shared or signed a petition," "volunteered to help with a political cause or candidate," and "sent a 'letter to the editor' by regular mail to a newspaper or magazine." The items were combined in a scale ($\alpha = .91$, $M = 3.38$, $SD = 2.57$ for time 1; $\alpha = .92$, $M = 3.45$, $SD = 2.68$ for time 2).

*Independent Variables of Interest.*¹

TV News. Participant's use of television for news was assessed by combining four items measuring how often they got news from: cable news (e.g., CNN, Fox News, MSNBC), broadcast national news (e.g., ABC, CBS, NBC), local news (local affiliate stations), and comedic news programs (e.g., *Daily Show*). The mean for this variable was 5.84 ($\alpha = .72$, range 1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time*, $SD = 2.19$).

Second Screening for News. For this item, participants were asked how often they second screened in the last 12 months during the following: live political speeches or debates, live election coverage, and live news broadcast on a 10-point scale (1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time*). The three items were combined in a single scale ($\alpha = .93$, $M = 5.51$ $SD = 2.75$).

Trump Attitudes. Our analysis includes the moderating impact of attitudes towards Donald Trump. To measure this item, participants were asked to what extent do they agree with the statement: "Donald Trump is going to make America great again" on a 10-point scale where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 10 = *Strong Agree* ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 3.20$).

Independent Variables as Controls.

Demographics. This study controls for the following demographic characteristics of the participants: age ($M = 43.67$, $SD = 13.99$), gender (female = 50.7%), education² ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.31$, range: 1 = *less than high school* to 6 = *Postgraduate or professional degree, including master's, doctorate, medical or law degree*), income ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.53$, range: 1 = *Less than \$10,000* to 8 = *\$200,000 or more*) and race (white = 63.1%).

Discussion Network Size. This item was a combination of two questions: How many people have you talked to about politics or public affairs a) online, and b) offline ($M = 5.90$, $SD = 9.62$).

Political Knowledge. For this variable, participants were asked to respond the following open-ended questions, which were recoded into "right" or "wrong": "What job or office does Joe Biden hold?," "for how many years is a United States senator elected?," "what job or political office does John Roberts currently hold?," "which party has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives?," "who has the final responsibility to determine if a law is constitutional or not?," "which organization's documents did Edward Snowden release?," "the U.S. recently announced that it would be re-establishing diplomatic relations with which country?," "to comply with the health care law, most Americans need to have health insurance coverage when they?," and "John Boehner recently retired from what job or office?" The average number of correct responses was $M = 5.47$ ($SD = 1.44$).

Strength of Partisanship. This item was a folded scale of questions asking “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent,” “On social issues, where would you place yourself on a scale of 0–10, where 0 = *Strong conservative* and 10 = *Strong liberal*” and “On economic issues, where would you place yourself on a scale of 0–10, where 0 = *Strong conservative* and 10 = *Strong liberal*.” The items were folded and averaged, with the final scale ranging from 1 = *weak partisanship* to 5 = *strong partisanship* ($\alpha = .87$, $M = 3.05$, $SD = 1.44$)

Efficacy. Six items measured levels of efficacy on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 10 = *strongly agree*: “People like me can influence government,” “I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics,” “I have a good understanding of the important political issues facing our country,” “No matter whom I vote for, it won’t make a difference,” “Parties are interested in people’s votes rather than their opinions,” and “People like me don’t have any say in what the government does.” ($\alpha = .70$, $M = 5.42$, $SD = 1.48$). The last three items were reverse coded.

Data Analysis

Our hypotheses were tested using a two-wave panel data design consisting of three steps. First, mediation models were run using Hayes PROCESS macro model 4 for both online and offline political participation to test research H_{1a} and H_{1b} . Then, the full moderated mediation model (Figure 1) was tested using Hayes’s PROCESS macro Model 14 (Hayes, 2013), which allows for the assessment of indirect effects contingent upon the levels of a third variable (in this case, support for Trump). All moderated mediation models were auto-regressive; that is, we accounted for the levels of political participation in time 1 in predicting participation in time 2.

Finally, we zoom in on the moderation effect of Trump attitudes via a set of regressions assessing the relationship between second screening for news and online/offline political participation. The indirect effects by groups were then graphed using Hayes PROCESS macro model 1. All tables presented have the three relations proposed by Kenny (2005) for a cross-lagged panel design: a) synchronous or cross-sectional, b) simple lagged, and c) autoregressive controlling for stability relations. The cross-sectional regression assesses the impact of second screening for news on time 1 to online/offline participation on time 1. The simple cross-lagged model analyzes the impact of second screening for news on time 1 to online/offline participation on time 2. Then, autoregressive cross-lagged models between second screening for news on time 1 and participation on time 2 were run with a term for political participation on time 1 entered as an independent variable. The goal is to control for stability relations between the outcome variable at T1 and T2. Autoregressive cross-lagged models, such as the ones presented here, allow for the

assessment of the influence of the predictor on the outcome beyond the previous level of that same outcome, which can indicate causal patterns (Kenny, 2005).

Results

Before delving into the full models, bivariate correlations reveal that second screening for news is strongly associated with online (Time 1: $r = .586, p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .471, p < .001$) and offline political participation (Time 1: $r = .546, p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .460, p < .001$) in both times 1 and 2. Support for Trump, our moderating variable, is also positively associated with political participation online (Time 1: $r = .396, p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .378, p < .001$) and offline (Time 1: $r = .384, p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .355, p < .001$).

Online Political Participation

Figure 2 shows the mediation model for the indirect impact of TV news on online political participation through second screening. The coefficient paths among independent (TV news), presumed mediator (second screening for news) and dependent variable (online political participation) are all significant, and the direct effect of TV news on online political participation is fully mediated (c' not significant). The 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects do not contain zero; therefore, mediating effects were evident [H_{1a} supported].

Figure 2
Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Online Political Participation

Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and online political participation on Time 1 were controlled. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.




Figure 3 depicts the full model for the moderated mediation of TV News’ impact on online political participation via second screening. The model reveals that the impact of the mediation is contingent upon levels of Trump attitudes. Figure 3 shows the coefficients and standard errors for each path.

Then, we zoom in on the relationship between second screening and online participation to understand how the interaction with support for Trump manifests. Table 1 shows the linear regression models for online political participation using a cross-lagged autoregressive model. As indicated by the cross-sectional regression (Model 1), those who are male ($\beta = -.097, p < .05$), younger ($\beta = -.115, p < .05$), with larger discussion networks ($\beta = .143, p < .01$), lower levels of political knowledge ($\beta = -.216, p < .001$), and higher levels of support for Trump ($\beta = .274, p < .001$) were more likely to participate online on T1. TV news and second screening for news were also positively associated with higher levels of political participation ($\beta = .112, p < .05$; $\beta = .296, p < .001$, respectively). The interaction term between second screening and Trump attitudes was not statistically significant at T1 (*F*-tests not

Figure 3
Moderated Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Online Political Participation Through Second Screening

Note. The indirect effect is contingent upon support for Trump. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and online political participation on Time 1 were controlled. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.




Table 1.
Cross-sectional (Model 1), Lagged (Model 2) and Autoregressive (Model 3) Linear Regression Models Testing the Moderating Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between Second Screening News Use and Online Political Participation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Block 1: Demographics						
Gender (F = 1)	-0.097*	-0.1*	-0.064	-0.071	0.018	0.012
Age	-0.115*	-0.115*	-0.208***	-0.206***	-0.115***	-0.116**
Education	0.066	0.074	0.053	0.069	0.013	0.024
Income	-0.01	-0.013	0.025	0.019	0.034	0.03
Race (white = 1)	-0.02	-0.005	-0.04	-0.012	-0.039	-0.018
ΔR^2 (%)	9%***		11.8%***		11.6%***	
Block 2: Sociopolitical controls						
Discussion network size	0.143**	0.14**	0.133*	0.128*	0.02	0.018
Political Knowledge	-0.216***	-0.217***	-0.254***	-0.255***	-0.067	-0.07
Strength of partisanship	0.09#	0.086#	0.123*	0.117*	0.057	0.052
Efficacy	0.091#	0.094#	0.071	0.077	-0.002	0.004
Trump attitudes	0.274***	0.126	0.268***	-0.054	0.057	-0.151#
Online political participation	-	-	-	-	0.793***	0.781***
T1						
ΔR^2 (%)	35.2%***		29.2%***		59.9%***	

(continued)

Table 1.
(Continued)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Block 3: News media use						
TV news	0.112*	0.105*	0.105#	0.089	0.017	0.008
Second screening for news	0.296***	0.208*	0.133*	-0.058	-0.107*	-0.231**
ΔR^2 (%)	9.5%***		3%**		0.6%#	
Block 4: Interaction						
Second screening X Trump attitudes	-	0.209	-	0.459**	-	0.301**
ΔR^2 (%)	0.4% N.S.		1.9%**		0.8%**	
Total R^2	54.1%***		45.9%***		73%***	

Note. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. # $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

significant, revealing a poor model fit). The whole model explained 54.1 percent of the variance observed in online political participation in time 1.

Model 2 in Table 1 shows the simple lagged regression models with independent variables from T1 and outcome from T2. Those who are younger ($\beta = -.208, p < .001$), with larger discussion networks ($\beta = .133, p < .01$), lower levels of political knowledge ($\beta = -.254, p < .001$), more strongly partisan ($\beta = .123, p < .05$), and have more positive Trump attitudes ($\beta = .268, p < .001$) were more likely to participate online. Second screening for news was still positively associated with online political participation in time 1, but this effect was contingent upon support for Trump (interaction term $\beta = .459, p < .01$). This model explained 45.9 percent of the variance in online political participation.

Model 3 in Table 1 shows the auto-regressive models for online political participation in time 2, controlling for time 1. As expected, the strongest predictor of participation in T2 was participation on T1 ($\beta = .793, p < .001$). As a whole, second screening for news was *negatively* associated with online political participation ($\beta = -.12, p < .01$), but this effect was contingent upon levels of support for Trump ($\beta = .301, p < .01$). The full auto-regressive model explained 73 percent of the variance. For those who strongly disagree with Trump's statement, the impact of second screening on online political participation was negative ($B = -.19, p < .01$). For those in the middle, second screening also led to less participation ($B = -.09, p < .05$). For Trump supporters, second screening had a positive effect on online participation, although it was not statistically significant ($B = .004, n.s.$). Table 2 shows the conditional indirect effects by group, and the graph in Figure 4 depicts the interaction.

Offline Political Participation

Research H_{1b} inquires about mediating effect of second screening for news in the relationship between TV news and offline political participation. Figure 5 shows that the paths among the mediating variable and outcome are not statistically significant when treating the sample as a uniform group (H_{1b} rejected). The second set of hypotheses (H_{2b}) inquires about a moderated mediation model on the impact of

Table 2.
Conditional Effect of Second Screening on Online Political Participation at Values of the Moderator

Support for Trump	b	SE	p-value	Bootstrap 95% CI [LL, UL]
Low	-.189	.061	.00	[-.309, -.069]
Middle	-.092	.045	.05	[-.181, -.003]
High	.004	.054	.93	[-.102, .111]

Figure 4
Interaction Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between SecondScreening News Use and Online Political Participation (Autoregressive Models)




Figure 5
Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Offline Political Participation

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and offline political participation on Time 1 were controlled. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.





Figure 6
Moderated Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Offline Political Participation Through Second Screening

Note. The indirect effect is contingent upon support for Trump. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and offline political participation on Time 1 were controlled. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.



TV News on offline political participation via second screening, and how it is contingent upon support for Trump for the autoregressive models. Figure 6 depicts this interaction, revealing a significant interaction between second screening and support for Trump— H_{2b} is supported. Table 3 isolates these relationships via three models: cross-sectional (Model 1), simple lagged (Model 2) and autoregressive (Model 3).

For the cross-sectional model, those who are younger ($\beta = -.09, p < .05$), have a bigger discussion network ($\beta = .12, p < .05$), and higher levels of efficacy ($\beta = .112, p < .05$) are more likely to participate offline. Perhaps surprisingly, those with lower political knowledge participated more ($\beta = -.287, p < .001$). A positive view of Trump is positively and strongly associated with offline political participation ($\beta = .286, p < .001$). Those who second screen for news more are also participating offline more ($\beta = .248, p < .001$). The interaction term was marginally significant, but the F -test for R-squared change was not, revealing a poor model fit for the last block in the cross-sectional data. Once again, at time 1, the impact of second screening on

Table 3.
Cross-Sectional (Model 1), Lagged (Model 2) and Autoregressive (Model 3) Linear Regression Models Testing the Moderating Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between Second Screening News Use and Offline Political Participation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Block 1: Demographics						
Gender (F = 1)	-0.094*	-0.1*	-0.022	-0.03	0.043	0.034
Age	-0.077	-0.078	-0.184**	-0.184**	-0.127**	-0.131**
Education	0.074	0.082	0.055	0.073	-0.016	-0.005
Income	-0.005	-0.007	0.047	0.04	0.073	0.071
Race (white = 1)	-0.056	-0.038	-0.075	-0.04	-0.03	-0.008
ΔR^2 (%)	8.7%**		10.8%***		11.5%***	
Block 2: Sociopolitical controls						
Discussion network size	0.12*	0.116*	0.104 [#]	0.097	0.013	0.009
Political Knowledge	-0.287***	-0.286***	-0.213**	-0.214**	0.002	-0.002
Strength of partisanship	0.055	0.052	0.066	0.055	0.031	0.025
Efficacy	0.112*	0.116*	0.082	0.092 [#]	0.009	0.019
Trump attitudes	0.286***	0.088	0.257***	-0.144	0.066	-0.198 [#]
Online political participation T1	-	-	-	-	0.704***	0.683***
ΔR^2 (%)	35.8%***		25.2%***		52.9%***	
Block 3: News media use						
TV news	0.095 [#]	0.083	0.146*	0.128*	0.073	0.062
Second screening for news	0.248***	0.131	0.135*	-0.1	-0.033	-0.188*
ΔR^2 (%)	6.5%***		4.2%***		0.4% N.S.	

Block 4: Interaction				
Second screening X Trump attitudes				
ΔR^2 (%)	-	0.28 [#]	-	0.381 ^{**}
	0.7%	N.S.	2.9% ^{**}	1.3% ^{**}
Total R ²	51.80%		43.10%	66.00%

Note. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. [#] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

participation is not contingent upon support for Trump. The full model explained 51.8 percent of the variance in offline political participation.

For the simple cross-lagged regression (Model 2), age ($\beta = -.184, p < .01$), lower levels of political knowledge ($\beta = -.213, p < .01$), positive Trump attitudes ($\beta = .257, p < .001$), TV news use ($\beta = .146, p < .05$), and second screening for news ($\beta = .135, p < .05$) were associated with higher levels of offline political participation. The interaction term Trump attitudes*second screening was significant, suggesting that the importance of support for Trump in this relationship increased between November 2015 and February 2016 ($\beta = .566, p < .01$). This simple cross-lagged model explained 43.1 percent of the variance in offline political participation.

Model 3 shows the results of auto-regressive lagged models for offline participation, which control for offline participation in T1. In this model, previous participation is the strongest predictor of participation in time 2 ($\beta = .704, p < .001$), and those who were younger were also more likely to participate ($\beta = -.127, p < .01$). The interaction term between Trump attitudes and second screening for news was also significant ($\beta = .381, p < .01$). This model explained 66 percent of the variance observed.

The analysis by group show that for those who strongly disagree with Trump’s message, second screening for news leads to *less* political participation offline ($B = -.118, p < .07$)—see Table 4 and Figure 7. While these results are only marginally significant, the evidence is clear: in November, the impact of TV news for offline participation via second screening was not significant. Then, by February, this interaction became strong and significant. The assessment of the increase in participation between the two times (autoregressive models) indicates that the change happened only among those who strongly disagree with Trump’s message, whom started participating less after watching TV news and second screening during it.


Discussion

As second screening becomes a more widespread practice of news consumption, it’s increasingly important to understand its role in hybrid media systems and its potential effects on politics. This study sought to expand this emerging line of research in several ways. First, we assess the potential for second screening to

Table 4.
Conditional Effect of Second Screening on Offline Political Participation at Values of the Moderator

Support for Trump	B	SE	p-value	Bootstrap 95% CI [LL, UL]
Low	-.118	.067	.07	[-.249, .013]
Middle	.007	.058	.90	[-.107, .1215]

Figure 7
Interaction Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between Second Screening News Use and Offline Political Participation (Autoregressive Models)



conduit offline political engagement. Second, we examine the mediating role of second screening for news on participation in a politically relevant time period, testing the assumption that second screening's effects may be stronger in such times. Finally, we further probe the relationship between second screening and political participation accounting for a source of political disagreement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election: support for Donald Trump.

Previous studies have documented second screening for news provides a space for discussion and deliberation, mediating the relationship between TV news and online political participation (e.g., Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015). Our findings also support the communication mediation model (McLeod et al., 1999; Shah et al., 2007) and cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2001; Eveland et al., 2003), but suggest that discussion and elaboration may not always be positive antecedents to political participation. As previously posited, this effect was stronger in an election period, but unlike previous studies, we found this relationship to be negative for some groups. We also provide a foundation on which to further probe these models in communication research—answering the call to conceptualize effects that are both conditional and indirect (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013).

Taking into consideration the extent of political disagreement fomented by the candidacy of Donald Trump, we find the link between second screening and

political participation is contingent upon support for the candidate. That is, for those who do not support the candidate, second screening for news leads to a decrease in online political participation. In the cross-sectional and simple lagged models, second screening relates positively to participatory acts, but when we control for participation in time 1, the relationship becomes negative. We posit that the dominance of Trump coverage in the campaigning period between our two waves of data collection explains this dramatic shift. When those who do not view Trump favorably second screen during news, like political debates, this leads to a decrease in their political participation.

While participation is certainly a normative democratic ideal, we do not view this finding as entirely deterministic. Those who do not support Trump may indeed be affected by the levels of disagreement they encounter when they second screen, but our second wave of data was collected eight months before the national election. Individuals with anti-Trump attitudes may have simply opted out of politics briefly to avoid the divisive rhetoric, but our study cannot point to the duration of this decrease and whether it impacted voter turnout in the general election.³

From a broader perspective, our findings do suggest that ensuing encounters with political disagreement have the potential to disrupt previously identified pathways by which hybrid media uses may lead to political participation. At the time of our surveys, polls suggested that the candidates were locked in a tight race, but both television coverage of the election and social media posts about it were dominated by Trump. Although social media and news coverage do not mirror polls (Jungheer, 2015), television remains a dominant source of information about politics, with social media serving as an important second source for many as well (Pew, 2016). Our study hints at some of the implications for this dual reliance on television and social media, and future studies should continue this vein of research. Future research should also examine the content of these information streams in conjunction, especially as we show their dual consumption may depress political activity for those who don't support the dominantly covered candidate.

In regard to offline political participation, we do not find that second screening for news conduits TV news viewers to participate in politics as a whole. In our cross-sectional and simple lagged analysis, second screening does relate positively to offline participation, but when controlling for previous levels of engagement, our auto-regressive conditional effects model suggests that this relationship is contingent on support for Trump—similar to our findings regarding online participation: second screening leads those who do not support Trump to participate less.

The social media discussion about the election consistently focused on Trump (Schultheis, 2016), and it was rife with political disagreement and uncivil rhetoric (Nugent & Pierson, 2016). Overall, the more individuals second screened during news, like the six Republican debates that aired during our two-wave survey collection, the less they engaged in participatory acts, but this effect is conditional upon the extent to which one supports Trump. It may be that the near non-stop coverage of Trump, coupled with his dominance of social media, created an atmosphere of disagreement for those not in favor of his candidacy, leading to a negative

relationship with political participation. An alternative explanation is that anti-Trump individuals are active participants in politics, so a decrease between our surveys may indicate they are regressing to more typical levels of participation. The fact that those who do not support Trump in our sample are more educated and report higher levels of political knowledge, timeworn predictors of political engagement, offers support for this argument. It should be noted that our sample might be slightly more educated than the general population, so caution should be taken in drawing strong conclusions regarding the role of education.

One of the limitations of this study is precisely the uniqueness of Trump's candidacy. At this point, it is impossible to know if these findings stem from his controversial persona and the divisiveness of his campaign and presidency, or if presidential campaigning and elections in the United States have changed altogether. Our results show that second screening during political debates has a positive impact on participation for those whose candidate leads coverage and conversation, but leads to disengagement for others.

Another limitation of this study is our use of agreement with Trump's slogan as a measure of support. At the time the survey administration (November 2015 for Wave 1 and December 2015 for Wave 2), more than ten candidates were still in the race for the Republican nomination. Because this study was part of a larger survey on social media and political participation, we had limited space to include more nuanced scale thermometer questions about the Republican race. Since our goal was to assess if the impact of second screening for political participation was contingent upon how much the respondent agreed with the message dominating television and social media coverage, we selected the Trump slogan for two reasons. First, Trump was the clear candidate dominating traditional and social media narratives during the primary debates at the time of our data collection (Gold, 2015; Stepheson, 2015). Second, Trump's slogan was the most clearly divisive message during the campaign, to which we could better infer disagreement with a certain degree of validity. We do, however, recognize that our measure does not capture the full complexity of support for Trump. We urge scholars interested in the topic to further probe how these relationships have evolved once the two major party candidates were selected and conversations on social media became more evenly split. Similarly, we also encourage future papers to use more sophisticated scales of support for a candidate.

Another limitation of this study comes from not necessarily knowing whether people who agree or disagree with Trump's message actually encountered opinions that they agree or disagree with on social media while second screening. This would require a more comprehensive and in-depth study with questions focusing on specific moments of second screening and the frequency at which users encountered disagreement on social media during those events. Yet, we believe this study provides a starting point to understanding how different groups are affected by second screening, the role of disagreement in these processes, as well as a glimpse of the impact of Donald Trump on political communication processes.

Methodologically, we employ a two-wave nationally representative panel survey to test our hypotheses, allowing us to generalize to the broader population and suggest some causal order. Our second wave of data collection came about three months after the first wave, ensuring a high retention rate (50%). Previous studies have found relationships between political discussion and participation in similar periods of time (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2007), but the short period between waves may for some raise doubts about our ability to draw clear causal conclusions. Along this same line of thinking, one of the limitations of this article refers to the two-wave cross-lagged design and our ability to trace clear cause and effects in a mediation model where data from three time periods or an experiment would be more conclusive. Yet, the findings presented here strongly suggest a moderating role of political attitudes and disagreement in the communication mediation process.

Future research should explore the relationship between second screening and political participation across additional attitudinal and political differences. Examining differences across groups may be central to moving the communication mediation model and the cognitive mediation model forward, providing more nuance to the role of discussion, particularly on social networking sites.

In sum, we conclude that online discussion and deliberation vis-à-vis second screening does impact political participation, but the effects are not consistent across the population. The unique and timely case of Trump provided an optimal variable for exploring discussion disagreement in politics. When individuals with anti-Trump attitudes second screen in a highly Trumpified space, they participate less in politics, while second screening has the opposite impact for those with whom Trump's message resonated. So far, for those who don't support Donald Trump, deliberation via second screening leads to political disengagement.

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Appendix 1

Demographic Profile of the U.S. Survey and U.S. Census

	Authors' Study, U.S. Survey, Nov. – Dec. 2015	U.S. Census American Community Survey 2014 (1- year Estimate)	Pew Research Center's Internet, Science & Technology Project (July 2015)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
<i>Age:</i>			
18-24	13.6	12.6	13
25-44	38.5	31.7	33
45-64	36.2	33.9	34
65 or more	11.8	19.3	18
<i>Gender:</i>			
Male	48.2	49.2	49
Female	51.8	50.8	51
<i>Race/Ethnicity:¹</i>			
White	63.8	63.8	65
Hispanic	15.7	16.9	15
African American	12.6	12.6	12
Asian	5.2	5.0	4.0
<i>Education:</i>			
High school or less	21.9	41.6	40
Some college	32.6	29.1	32
Bachelor's degree	26.4	18.3	15
Graduate degree	18.6	11.0	13
<i>Household Income:</i>			
Less than \$49,999	48.7	46.9	55
\$50,000 to \$99,999	32.8	30.0	27
\$100,000 or more	18.5	23	19

¹"Mixed race" or "Other" not included.

Notes

1. For the independent variables, the measures are from time 1.
2. The sample is slightly more educated than the general U.S. population. See Appendix I.
3. Though post-election analysis suggests turnout was a problem among Democrats. See <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-turnout-fell-especially-in-states-that-clinton-won/> and <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-democrats-real-turnout-problem.html>

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SECOND SCREENING

“You too, Second Screeners?” Second Screeners’ Echo Chambers During the 2016 U.S. Elections Primaries

Tsahi Hayat and Tal Samuel-Azran

This article examines second screeners’ conversations during the 2016 U.S. election primaries. Over a 2-week period, we collected Twitter mentions of 3 top cable news shows (N = 49,568) posted while these shows were broadcast. Using social network analysis, we reconstructed the social network of second screeners (N = 27,811) and found that the network exhibits ideological homophily with few cross-camp interactions. Our findings strongly indicate the existence of echo chambers in the second screen realm, with more confined echo chambers identified in networks of Twitter followers in comparison to second screeners. The study provides one of the most comprehensive mappings of the second screening phenomenon during an election campaign to date.

“Second screening,” a term used to describe television viewers’ use of a Web-connected device to access supplementary content while watching a television screen, is a growing trend that applies to 80% of contemporary television viewers, according to several studies (*The Guardian*, 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that scholars have increasingly invested efforts to understand its social and political implications (e.g., Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; Giglietto & Selva, 2014).

Following a study that identified second screeners as particularly political active and engaged (Gil de Zúñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015), the question arises as to whether these encouraging findings extend to second screeners’ online

Tsahi Hayat (Ph.D., University of Toronto) is on the faculty at the Sammy Ofer school of communication, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. Dr. Hayat’s research focuses on complex socio-technical systems, networks of people, artifacts, data, and ideas. Dr. Hayat is particularly interested in how new technologies such as tablets, smartphones, and social media platforms may enable or hinder the transfer of different resources within social networks.

Tal Samuel-Azran (Ph.D., University of Melbourne; M.A., New York University) is the head of the international program at the Sammy Ofer School of Communications. His main fields of research are political communication, new media, and media globalization.

Both authors contributed equally to this manuscript.

Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/hbem.

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conversations. Specifically, it is interesting to examine whether second screeners' conversations reflect healthy democratic discourse in the form of cross-partisan exchanges of ideas or, alternatively, a tendency to form online echo chambers (a common term metaphorically used by media scholars to describe peoples' propensity to converse with like-minded individuals, reinforcing existing views in an enclosed system; Cameron & Geidner, 2014; Sunstein, 2000).

To this end, the study examines the network connections between second screeners of cable news shows during the 2016 U.S. elections campaigns. For the analysis, we selected second screeners of *The O'Reilly Factor* broadcast on Fox News, *The Rachel Maddow Show* broadcast on MSNBC and *Anderson Cooper 360* broadcast on CNN, as our case studies. These political shows were selected not only because they are among the most popular political shows in the United States, but also because the channels on which they are broadcast—Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN, respectively—are identified with the formation of echo chambers among their viewers (Pew, 2010; Stroud, 2008): Fox News is identified with conservative tendencies (Aday, Livingston, & Hebert, 2005; Della Vigna & Kaplan, 2007) and its viewers are twice as likely to be conservatives rather than liberals (Pew, 2010; Stroud, 2008) whereas MSNBC and CNN are identified with liberal tendencies (Feldman, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2012; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005) and their viewers were found to be twice as likely to be liberals than conservatives (Pew, 2010; Stroud, 2008). Thus, an analysis of conversations among the second screening Twitter followers of these shows should clarify whether these conversations reflect the echo-chamber trend evident among television viewers or, alternatively, reflect cross-camp online interactions. These three political shows were also selected because they have large followings on Twitter, allowing an adequately large sample for our social network analysis.

We chose to conduct the social network analysis of second screeners' conversations on Twitter not only because Twitter has been identified as a hub for political conversations (Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & Welp, 2010; Wang, Can, Kazemzadeh, Bar, & Narayanan, 2012), but also because Twitter offers greater access to data about its members than do most online social networks. In our case, Twitter allows access to the extent to which Twitter users follow specific politicians, which provides an indication of their political tendencies (based on the 2015 Americans for Democratic Action [ADA] ratings of these politicians, see below). To capture a substantial volume of Twitter members' conversations, we collected all the tweets between February 29, 2016, the day before Super Tuesday (March 1, 2016), when the greatest number of U.S. states hold primary elections and caucuses, and March 11, 2016, encompassing nearly two weeks of intense political debates on Twitter.

To gain a deeper understanding of the interplay between second screeners' activism and cross-camp interactions, which is important in light of Gil de Zúñiga et al.'s (2015) findings that second screeners are particularly active and engaged, the analysis distinguishes between cross-camp social ties involving second screeners who posted tweets during the shows ("second screeners") versus the social ties among "followers" who merely follow a show's Twitter account

without engaging in second screening activity. This distinction is also important in light of former studies that found that followers who do not actively post messages or participate in online conversations form the great majority of online social media users (Sun, Rau, & Ma, 2014). Altogether, the study sheds light on second screening's contribution to democratic discourse by offering one of the most extensive evaluations of the nature of second screeners' political interactions to date.

Second Screening and its Political Implications

The simultaneous use of a Web-connected second screen—usually a tablet, a smart phone, or a laptop—while watching television has gained ground in the past decade, with the growing popularity of smartphones and tablets. The rise of Web 2.0, replacing unilateral consumption of information from Web sites with bilateral interactions on platforms such as blogs and social networks, further contributed to the popularity of second screening (Mukherjee & Jansen, 2014). Studies largely indicate that slightly more than one third of all television viewers are second screeners. For example, a report released by Nielsen in association with Yahoo revealed that 35% of viewers use a second screen to look up or discuss show-related information with others (Bauder, 2012), and a more recent survey put the number of second screeners who discuss or look up information related to the televised content at 36% (MTM, 2015). Second screening is not merely about looking up information but also about engaging in conversations and interacting with others by logging into a social networking site, although the extent of second screeners' social media interactions (versus other popular activities such as e-shopping or e-mailing) is still under assessment.

Not surprisingly, recent studies have begun to analyze the nature of these online conversations among second screening viewers of television shows, focusing on genres such as sports, entertainment, and public affairs (Barberá et al., 2015; Hayat, Samuel-Azran, & Galily, 2016). Although most studies of second screening and politics and public affairs do not directly address the issue of cross-camp interactions in second screeners' conversations, which is the focus of the current study, their findings offer significant insights on the main behavioral trends of second screeners during political shows and thus provide a foundation for our hypotheses. Several studies point to the democratically promising nature of second screener conversations. For example, a 2014 study conducted in Italy encompassing nearly 2.5 million tweets by second screeners of 1,076 talk shows revealed that second screeners regularly debated and offered their own interpretations of statements pronounced by politicians on television in political talk shows (Giglietto & Selva, 2014). Another positive indication of second screeners' political conversations emanates from the aforementioned study by Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2015) which found that second screening is a significant predictor of online political participation: Second screeners not only proactively seek information and elaboration of TV news while it

is being aired but also tend to discuss political issues on social networks more than their peers.

In contrast, Cameron and Geidner's (2014) study which is, to the best of our knowledge, the only analysis that addresses second screeners' tendency to avoid discussions of conflicting issues, strongly indicates that second screeners' conversations reflect conformism. In their experiment, a Twitter feed was integrated into entertainment and political television broadcasts and manipulated to convey either provocative positive or negative opinions on political issues, in order to examine second screeners' willingness to challenge these statements (Cameron & Geidner, 2014). The analysis revealed that participants' opinions mostly conformed to the opinions appearing in the manipulated Twitter feeds in nearly all of the topics analyzed, with the exception of the feed on the highly polarizing topic of gun control. The authors rely on Asch's classic studies of group pressure effects (Asch, 1951, 1955) to explain second screeners' reluctance to express divergent opinions, claiming that second screeners sought to avoid pressure from other social network members, which resulted in the formation of echo chambers. Our analysis contributes to current knowledge via a social network analysis of second screeners' real-life interactions during primetime political shows aired during heated elections primaries. We believe that this method offers a more authentic description of second screeners' on-the-ground political discourse patterns.

Echo Chambers in Online Social Networks

The question of whether citizens, specifically voters, avoid engaging with opinions that contradict their own is a crucial issue for democracy studies and has been debated by media and communications scholars for decades. An important milestone in the history of this debate is Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, which posits that after people commit to an attitude, belief, or decision, they tend to gather information that supports it and disregard contradictory information to avoid post-decisional conflict. Contrary to Festinger's arguments, several media and communication studies found no support for selective exposure (e.g., Freedman & Sears, 1965; Sears & Freedman, 1967). Following Katz (1968), who argued for the theory's strong relevance and validity in the media context, subsequent studies found evidence of selective exposure among media consumers (Frey, 1986; Mutz & Martin, 2001), and a 2009 meta-analysis confirmed that studies on selective exposure indicate a moderate preference for congenial over uncongenial information (Hart et al., 2009).

With the rise of 24/7 cable news networks in the 1980s and 1990s, many studies turned to examine whether viewers of these channels, identified by political affiliation as the conservative Fox News (Aday et al., 2005; Della Vigna & Kaplan, 2007; Jamieson & Capella, 2008) versus the liberal CNN and MSNBC channels (Feldman et al., 2012; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005), mostly hold matching political views, thus indicating selective exposure (Jamieson & Capella, 2008). A 2010 Pew Research

Center survey found that Republicans are indeed about as twice as likely as Democrats to report watching Fox News regularly, whereas Democrats are as twice as likely as Republicans to report watching CNN and MSNBC regularly. Stroud's (2008) analysis of news consumption data on the 2004 U.S. elections also identified that conservative Republicans are significantly more likely to read newspapers that endorsed Bush, listen to conservative talk radio, watch Fox, and access conservative Web sites, whereas liberal Democrats are more likely to read newspapers that endorse Kerry, listen to liberal radio, watch CNN and MSNBC, and access liberal Web sites. The findings of these studies strengthen the validity of the selective exposure theory in the context of U.S. cable television news consumption.

The growing popularity of the Web since the mid-1990s has attracted scholars who extended the study of cable news channels to explore the Web's potential to promote exchanges of diverse opinions. As early as in 2000, Sunstein, who examined online responses to Bill Clinton's impeachment and to the 2000 presidential campaign, identified people's tendency to expose themselves to online information that reinforces their existing views, arguing that political Web discourse resembles an echo chamber—an enclosed room used for producing reverberating sounds—because people selectively choose online forums that reinforce their existing views. Studies that explored this proposition in the Web 2.0 era found that Web users were indeed attracted to like-minded bloggers and ideas, contributing to the formation of echo chambers. Adamic and Glance's (2005) study, which measured the extent of interactions between 2004 liberal and conservative election blogs, found clear differences in liberal and conservative blogs networking patterns: Conservative blogs linked to each other more frequently and created a denser pattern of interlinks than did liberal blogs, providing evidence of echo chambers in the Republican blogosphere. A 2009 analysis of over 1,000 comments on 33 leading blogs revealed that agreement outnumbered disagreement in blog comments by more than 3 to 1 (Gilbert, Bergstrom, & Karahalios, 2009), providing further support for the blogosphere echo-chamber argument.

Scholars are slightly more divided over the existence of echo chambers in the online social networks realm, which is the platform examined in the current study. Most existing evidence indicates social network echo chambers. Using a behavior-tracking study, Garrett (2009a) found that conservatives consistently seek support for their positions on social networks, forming echo chambers. A subsequent 2011 study (Boutyline & Willer, 2011) tested the echo-chamber hypothesis on a dataset of 237,244 personal networks of American Twitter users and found that conservatives are highly connected to each other in Twitter groups. A series of network and content analyses of Twitter networks formed around 10 controversial political topics (Himmelboim, McCreery, & Smith, 2013) also identified echo chambers, arguing that on Twitter "birds of feather flock together." Colleoni, Rozza, and Arvidsson (2014), who investigated political homophily on Twitter using a combination of machine learning and social network analysis, also identified echo chambers, with higher levels of political homophily among Democrats. Finally, a more recent study using a dataset of nearly 150 million tweets found that echo chambers formed around most

political issues, including the 2012 presidential elections, and that liberals were less likely than conservatives to form echo chambers (Barberá et al., 2015).

In stark contrast to these disheartening accounts of echo chambers on social networks, a high-profile analysis by Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic (2015) published in *Science*, offers evidence of healthy cross-camp exchanges. This study found that, on average, more than 20% of any given individual's Facebook friends who reveal their ideological affiliation are from the opposing party, a finding that weakens the social media echo-chamber notion and highlights social networks' potential as platforms of exposure to diverse political views and cross-camp communications.

Although the debate continues, our first hypothesis, which is in line with the fact that most studies of Web 2.0 indicate echo chambers, is:

H₁: Second screeners' conversations with the Twitter followers of *The O'Reilly Factor*, *The Rachel Maddow Show*, and *Anderson Coopers 360* television shows will reflect echo chambers.

Our second hypothesis relates to a comparison of second screeners (Twitter followers who post tweets while watching *The O'Reilly Factor*, *The Rachel Maddow Show*, and *Anderson Cooper 360*) versus show followers (who follow the Twitter accounts of these shows but do not actively participate in debates and conversations during the broadcasts). Importantly, while former studies used the term "lurker" to describe individuals who tend to follow rather than actively participate in online discourse (Sun et al., 2014), we use the term "follower," which we believe is more accurate in the present study, as we could not verify whether or not Twitter members who posted no comments during the show were actually reading other people's posts, but only that they were registered show followers. Followers have been identified as being less active and more conformist in comparison to second screeners, as indicated in Cameron and Geidner's (2014) experiment, thus having higher tendency to form particularly confined echo chambers. Thus, we expect second screeners to have less extreme political tendencies compared to followers. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is

H₂: Show followers will tend to form more confined echo chambers compared to second screeners.

Method

Social network ties represent various types of relationships, including collaboration, kinship, shared ideologies, economic exchange, and communications. Social Network Analysis (SNA) focuses on the structure of relationships among units (nodes), whether individuals, groups, or organizations, and on how these relationships affect network processes (Hayat & Mo, 2015). The basic premises underlying

SNA are: (1) nodes and their actions are interdependent of their relational structure, and nodes are not viewed as independent autonomous units; (2) links between nodes are channels for the flow or exchange of material or non-material resources; (3) a network is an environment that provides incentives and opportunities for, or constraints on individual action; and, (4) a network represents patterns of ties between individual nodes that persist over time (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

The current article focuses on social ties that represent interactions among second screening Twitter followers of popular political TV talk shows. Using a network approach, Twitter follower networks can be described using the following scheme: Each Twitter follower is represented as a node in the network, and nodes are connected to one another by an edge if a following/follower relationship between them exists. Thus, the use of SNA in online media consumption research can become a valuable and a fundamental resource for understanding the characteristics of individuals who are involved in second screen activity. As we will discuss, we can identify the political inclinations of second screeners by studying their Twitter ties, specifically the politicians they follow. Where information on individuals' political affiliation is identified in this manner, SNA can be particularly useful in accurately identifying echo chambers in second screening activity.

Data Collection

Our study uses data from Twitter, an internet platform through which users connect and communicate with each other. Data collection proceeded in three steps that are described in the following sections.

Step 1

Using the data in "Government & Social Media Wiki" (<http://govsm.com/w/Main> Page), we compiled a complete list of all Twitter accounts of the members of the U.S. 114th Congress. The political score of each congressperson was taken from the 2015 Americans for Democratic Action ratings of the 114th Congress members. The ADA publishes an annual report of the voting records of congresspersons and assigns each a score based on their voting record, from 0.0 (*most conservative*) to 1.0 (*most liberal*). ADA scores constitute a widely accepted measure of political position.

Step 2

We then constructed a list of all the Twitter followers ("show followers") of the following shows: (1) *The O'Reilly Factor*, an American cable television news and talk show broadcast daily on the Fox News Channel, hosted by political commentator Bill O'Reilly; (2) *The Rachel Maddow Show*, a daily news and opinion television program

that airs on MSNBC; and (3) *Anderson Cooper 360*, an American television news show aired on CNN and hosted by the American journalist Anderson Cooper.

We also collected all the tweets posted about these shows during the broadcasts in the defined data collection period. To do so, we only collected tweets that were posted while each show was aired and that contained “mentions” of the shows’ Twitter account (or the shows’ hosts). A mention is a tweet that contains another Twitter user’s @username anywhere in the body of the tweet, and typically indicates that the tweet concerns the mentioned user. Our assumption is that any tweet tweeted while a show is being broadcast, containing a mention of the show’s Twitter account or its host’s name, is likely to represent second screening activity. At the end of this step, we had a complete list of Twitter followers of each show, and a list of the tweets made while the shows were aired in the period between Monday, February 29, 2016 and Friday, March 11, 2016.

Step 3

We constructed a list of all the Twitter followers who posted a tweet while the show was broadcast (second screeners). We assigned to each second screener an inferred political score (P-score) based on the simple average of the ADA scores of all congresspersons he or she follows. Thus, people who follow more than one congressperson have a P-score that is equal to the average of the ADA scores of all congresspersons they follow. Our approach relies on the assumption that people’s political preferences will, on average, reflect those of the congresspersons they follow. Prior literature on selective exposure to political information suggests that this assumption is reasonable since people seek information from those with similar political views (Garrett, 2009b; Gelman, 2009).

Our final dataset included the following for each of the three shows in our sample: (1) a list of show followers and their political scores; and (2) a list of second screeners and their political scores. The dataset also enables us to calculate the Silo index (SI) of second screeners, which is an additional measure of second screeners’ tendency to interact with politically like-minded people. Specifically, we assessed whether conservative second screeners (defined by a P-score lower than 0.5) interacted on Twitter with liberal second screeners (defined by a P-score higher than 0.5). The Silo index, ranging from -1 (*all ties are external*) to 1 (*all ties are internal*), reflects the proportion of interactions among members of the same camp (conservative or liberal), as opposed to external interactions involving members of the other camp. In our case, an SI of 1 indicates an extreme echo chamber, where individuals only interact with other politically like-minded individuals. The SI index also allowed us to compare the SI indices of the followers of the three television shows.

The data collected in Step 2 were collected using a dedicated scraping tool written by the authors specifically for this project, designed to query the Twitter’s streaming API; No other third party tools were used for the data collection process. API, the acronym for “Application Programming Interface,” is a set of instructions and protocols that allow

users to access a Web-based software application. Twitter's streaming API (<https://dev.twitter.com/>) offers access to new public Twitter messages and their associate "meta-data," such as the user who posted them, date, location, language, and so forth (Rossi & Giglietto, 2016), as soon as the data are available. Notably, there is no guarantee that the API captures *all* tweets that match the tracking criteria: Temporary interruptions may cause gaps in transmission that even a secondary check through the search API cannot fill. Thus, in line with previous work on Twitter API data collection (e.g., Bruns & Stieglitz, 2013), we introduce a small margin of error in our captured data, and treat the resulting datasets as close approximations rather than as completely exhaustive representations of the data described in Steps 2 and 3 above.

Given that the dataset is restricted to Twitter users who follow the Twitter accounts of three shows, a natural critique of our data is that our sample may not be representative of either (a) viewers of TV shows at large, or (b) Twitter users and social media users at large. On the first point, it is well established that social media users are younger, more highly educated, more likely to be non-white, and more likely to use mobile devices, than the general population (Pew, 2010). While we concede that our sample is not representative of the population of TV viewers at large, it is important to emphasize that social media is an important sector to study in and of itself. Moreover, a focus on social media allows us to compare our results to other groups of TV viewers.


On the second point, it is quite plausible that our sample, comprising users who follow the Twitter accounts of at least one of these three cable news shows, may tend to disproportionately include individuals with strong ideological views and stronger preferences for linking to like-minded users (Halberstam & Knight, 2014). While we argue that followers of these cable news shows are an important subsample of social media users, especially when considering ideological segregation, our selection criteria admittedly may make it difficult to compare our results to other measures.

Results

Our data were collected for each of the three shows between Monday, February 29, 2016 and Friday, March 11, 2016. As depicted in [Figure 1](#), second screeners, who are show followers who posted tweets during a show, constitute a subset of a show's Twitter followers. Similarly, politically engaged second screeners of a show (show followers who posted while the show was aired and who follow at least one congressperson) constitute a subset of the show's show followers. Note that politically engaged followers constitute a minority of each show's Twitter followers (and politically engaged second screeners constitute a small subset of this minority). Our study focuses on politically engaged show followers and second screeners.

As depicted in [Table 1](#), we recorded 959,000 followers of *The O'Reilly Factor* Twitter account, 387,462 of whom follow at least one congressperson. The average P-score of these politically engaged show followers is 0.36. While the show was aired in this period, 18,200 tweets mentioning the show's name were posted by

Figure 1
Show Followers, Second Screeners, and Subsets



9,782 unique Twitter users, of whom 6,758 politically engaged second screeners; their average P-score was 0.23. Thus, of the 387,462 politically engaged show followers, 6,758 were identified as second screeners in our study (see [Table 2](#)). An independent-samples t-test indicated a significant difference in the P-score of the politically engaged show followers ($M = .37$, $SD = .13$) and the P-score of the politically engaged second screeners ($M = .23$, $SD = .07$) conditions; $t(8) = 2.68$, $p < .01$. Given our large sample size, we further calculated the Cohen's effect size. Unlike significance tests, these indices are independent of sample size. Cohen's effect size value ($d = 1.34$) suggested high practical significance.

For *The Rachel Maddow Show*, we recorded 3,970,000 show followers, of whom 492,381 are politically engaged followers. The average P-score of politically engaged show followers is 0.72. The 11,766 tweets mentioning the show name while it was aired were posted by 4,192 unique Twitter users, 2,745 of whom follow at least one politician; Their average P-score was 0.68. Thus, the group of 489,636 politically engaged show followers includes 2,745 politically engaged second screeners (see [Table 2](#)). An independent-samples t-test indicated a significant difference in the scores of the P-score of the politically engaged show followers ($M = .72$, $SD = .11$) and the P-score of the

Table 1
Show Followers and Second Screeners

	The O'Reilly Factor		The Rachel Maddow Show		Anderson Cooper 360°	
	Show followers	Second screeners	Show followers	Second screeners	Show followers	Second screeners
N	959,000	9,782	3,970,000	4,192	7,600,000	12,837
Follow at least one congressperson	387,462	6,758	492,381	2,745	762,328	3,859
P-score	0.36	0.23	0.72	0.68	0.63	0.52

Table 2
Politically Engaged Show Followers

	<i>The O'Reilly Factor</i> followers		<i>The Rachel Maddow Show</i> followers		<i>Anderson Cooper 360°</i> followers	
	Show followers	Second screeners	Show followers	Second screeners	Show followers	Second screeners
Follow at least one congressperson	380,704	6,758	489,636	2,745	758,469	3,859
Average number of congresspersons followed (SD)	2.3 (.7)	2.56 (1.2)	1.62 (.8)	2.13 (.9)	2.07 (.6)	1.94 (1.4)
P-score	0.37	0.23	0.72	0.68	0.63	0.52

politically engaged second screeners ($M = .68$, $SD = .13$) conditions; $t(8) = 2.47$, $p < .01$. Cohen's effect size value ($d = .33$) suggested small to medium practical significance.

Finally, for *Anderson Cooper 360°*, we recorded 7,600,000 followers (this number also includes the followers of Anderson Cooper's personal Twitter account), 387,462 of whom follow at least one congressperson. The average P-score of the politically engaged show followers is 0.36. A total of 19,562 tweets mentioning the show's name while it was aired were posted by 12,837 unique Tweeter users, 3,859 of whom follow at least one politician; Their average P-score was 0.23. Thus, the group of 758, 469 politically engaged show followers includes 3,859 second screeners (see Table 2). An independent-samples t-test indicated a significant difference in the scores of the P-scores of the politically engaged show followers ($M = .64$, $SD = .07$) and the second screeners ($M = .52$, $SD = .21$) conditions; $t(8) = 1.94$, $p < .01$. Cohen's effect size value ($d = .77$) suggested a medium to large practical significance.

These findings support H_+ (second screeners' conversations during *The O'Reilly Show*, *The Rachel Maddow Show*, and *Anderson Cooper 360* reflect echo chambers) and partially support H_2 (Show followers will tend to form more confined echo chambers, compared to the echo chambers formed by second screener who are active posters). Note that our analysis focuses only on the followers of the three shows, and the interactions they have among themselves, thus any interaction between one of the show followers and people who do not follow the show is not included in our dataset.

We used the NodeXL tool (Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010) to map interactions among politically engaged second screeners of the three shows. We defined an interaction among individuals (noted as A, B, C, etc.) if A is a follower of B or if A retweeted a tweet made by B. To examine whether second screeners demonstrated boundary-spanning interactions, we then exported our data to the ORA software package (Carley, Pfeffer, Reminga, Storrick, & Columbus, 2012) to calculate the Silo index among second screeners. Specifically, we looked at whether conservative second screeners (defined by a P-score lower than 0.5) interacted with liberal second screeners (defined by a P-score higher than 0.5).

$$SI_d = \frac{(I - E)}{(E + I)} \quad (1)$$

Here, SI_d represents the Silo index of all the individuals of a specific political orientation (i.e., liberal or conservative), I is the number of internal ties involving individuals of the same orientation (i.e., ties among people with the same political orientation), and E is the number of external ties involving people of a different political orientation). As depicted in Table 3, according to the Silo index for politically engaged second screeners of each of the three shows, second screeners showed a strong tendency to interact with other followers of the same political orientation: Conservatives showed a stronger tendency to interact with other conservatives, and the same was true for liberal second screeners.

Table 3
Internal and External Links among Second Screeners

Show	Internal	External	%	Silo
	Links	Links	Internal links	Index
<i>The O'Reilly Factor</i>	5,478	1,026	84.23%	0.68
<i>The Rachel Maddow Show</i>	2,256	484	82.33%	0.65
<i>Anderson Cooper 360^o</i>	3,241	468	87.38%	0.75

Discussion and Conclusions

The study examined the extent of cross-camp interactions among second screeners around broadcasts of several highly popular political U.S. news shows. The findings indicate that second screeners' interactions indeed reflect echo chambers, supporting our first hypothesis. Using ADA political scores, the average political scores of the followers of *The O'Reilly Factor*, *The Rachel Maddow Show*, and *Anderson Cooper 360^o* are 0.36, 0.72, and 0.63, respectively, almost mirroring Pew 2010 findings regarding liberal echo chambers among CNN and MSNBC's followers and conservative echo chambers among Fox News followers. These findings are further strengthened by a subsequent analysis of second screeners' tweets, which indicates that second screeners comprise two distinct camps with little contact between the liberal and conservative camps (see Table 3). While Gil de Zúñiga et al.'s 2015 analysis identified that second screeners show a high level of political engagement, findings of the current study clarify that this engagement is not expressed in diverse cross-camp interactions but rather in interactions mostly with like-minded Twitter users, illustrating the relevance of Festinger's (1957) long-standing cognitive dissonance theory as well as the selective exposure theory to the second screening realm. These findings are disappointing from the broader perspective of studies of democracy and for hopes that the Web will promote healthy forms of democratic participation and discourse (Davies & Chandler, 2012; Wolfsfeld, Yarchi, & Samuel-Azran, 2015). In this sense, the analysis supports the findings of Cameron and Geidner's (2014) experiment, which indicate a nexus between second screening and echo chambers, and extends their findings to a real-life environment.

Next, an analysis of second screeners versus show followers reveals that conservative second screeners were more conservative than conservative show followers, and that liberal second screeners were also more conservative than liberal show followers, partially supporting our second hypothesis that followers will tend to form more confined echo chambers than those formed by second screeners. These findings also have implications regarding the interplay between political tendencies and second screening, indicating that second screeners are, on the whole, more conservative. Accordingly, we suggest that

Republicans who are second screeners may feel more comfortable than Democrat second screeners in expressing more partisan views on social networks, possibly reflecting more partisan discourse in conservatives' echo chambers. These patterns are intriguing and require further exploration by future studies to determine the reasons behind them. One possible explanation is found in past studies (e.g., Boutyline & Willer, 2011; Garrett, 2009a), which show that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to form echo chambers. Studies also show that conservative forums link to each other more frequently and in a denser pattern (e.g., Adamic & Glance, 2005). Future studies should further examine the interplay between political tendencies with the aim of understanding and developing a theory to explain why conservatives have a stronger tendency to form echo chambers online than do liberals.

Furthermore, findings regarding the ratio of second screeners to followers also contribute to our understanding of social network show follower patterns, and corroborate the "1% rule," which posits that one percent of users contribute the majority of online content (Sun et al., 2014; van Mierlo, 2014). The small proportion of second screeners further illustrates the general spirit of the study's findings that second screeners mostly maintain democratically undesired forms of participation and online conversations. The notion of limited activism among second screeners is reinforced even further by the fact that only a minority of second screeners follow politicians on Twitter (slightly more than one third of *The O'Reilly Factor's* second screen followers, one quarter of *Anderson Cooper 360°* followers and even a smaller proportion of *The Rachel Maddow Show* Twitter followers follow at least one politician on Twitter).

The findings also have implications for political campaigning studies, specifically in the context of online social network platforms. Recent studies show that some politicians consider social networks, most notably Twitter, as a platform where citizens exchange ideas and debate ideologies, and as a major campaigning tool for connecting to and communicating with citizens (Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff, & Harr, 2013), while others question its efficiency to sway voters and therefore use it reluctantly (Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2013). Our analysis, which indicates that Twitter networks functioned as echo chambers during an election campaign, strengthens the latter opinion. The findings—indicating that Twitter users, specifically second screeners, expose themselves mostly to information that is most likely to reinforce their pre-existing views—highlight Twitter's limited potential as a campaigning tool. Instead, the study illustrates that second screeners' conversations during political shows do not promote cross-camp political opinion exchanges on social media and rather heighten polarization, offering another sad illustration of how social media promote more narrow-mindedness than openness (del Vicario et al., 2016; Quattrociocchi, Scala, & Sunstein, 2016).

In conclusion, the current study contributes to our understanding of second screening in the political domain, specifically illuminating that the echo-chamber phenomenon found in online communities also extends to networks of second screeners. Thus, although second screeners are, by definition, active seekers of information about the television contents they consume, their heightened interest and participation in related social networks (as posters or followers) does not translate into democratically healthier political exchanges, and instead strengthen echo chambers. Future studies should follow up on our

findings regarding the differences between followers and posters in the Republican and Democrat camps to understand why Republican posters are more strongly partisan than Democrats, perhaps using other methods such as interviews with posters and followers from both camps. Future studies of second screening should also examine interactions on additional social media platforms and political systems (comparing, for example, multi-party systems and two-party systems) to enhance our understanding of second screening interaction patterns and their instrumental role in promoting new forms of online interactions versus their contribution to the preservation of old habits.

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SECOND SCREENING

Second Screening and Political Persuasion on Social Media

Matthew Barnidge, Homero Gil de Zúñiga, and Trevor Diehl

This article seeks to explain political persuasion in relation to second screening—people's use of a second screen (i.e., smartphone/laptop) while watching television to access further information or discuss TV programs. Employing a two-wave-panel survey in the United States, results show this emergent practice makes people more open to changing their political opinions, particularly among those who habitually use social media for news or frequently interact with others in social media contexts.

Participatory online media afford people greater ability to engage in emergent communicative practices that increasingly help to shape public narratives about political events. Some have argued that this newfound ability gives news audiences more power relative to elite social institutions than they had in the past (Benkler, 2006). That is, individuals have become less dependent on political parties, interest groups, and news media organizations as sources of political information, because they are free to rely on information from other citizens. In this vein, some scholars point toward “second screening” as a communication practice that alters the relationship between news media organizations and their audiences (Anstead & O’Loughlin, 2011; Chadwick, Dennis, & Smith, 2016).

More than two-thirds of U.S. adults own a smartphone (68%), and nearly half (45%) own a tablet computer (Pew, 2015). These devices are often used while

Matthew Barnidge (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is an assistant professor in the Department of Journalism & Creative Media at the University of Alabama. His research specializes in emerging media and contentious political communication with an international perspective.

Homero Gil de Zúñiga (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is the Medienwandel Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Vienna, a research associate at the Center for Information Technology Policy (CITP) at Princeton University, and a research fellow at Universidad Diego Portales de Chile. His research addresses the influence of new technologies and digital media on people's daily lives and the overall democratic process.

Trevor Diehl (M.A., University of Texas at Austin) is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Communication at the University of Vienna. His research interests include emerging media and populism, as well as social media and journalism practice.

watching television, connecting audiences through social media and other online participatory media (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011; Doughty, Rowland, & Lawson, 2011). This "hybrid media" environment offers an entirely different type of media experience, one that embeds citizens in broader public conversations that unfold in real time and involve not only news media, but also other citizens and the content they create (Doughty et al., 2011; Vaccari, Chadwick, & O'Loughlin, 2015). In these environments, citizens are exposed not just to the information they see on television, but also to elite and social opinion cues on social media (Bode, 2015; Bond et al., 2012; Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015). The confluence of these various kinds of political messages connects the opinions and commentary of everyday social media users with the elite political discourse that occurs among political actors and news organizations, and, moreover, this kind of communication environment makes it more likely that people will be influenced by other users' opinions about political and social issues (Turcotte et al., 2015).

If, in these hybrid media environments, people can be more engaged with public conversations about politics—conversations that are characterized by a mixture of news, user-generated content, and social opinion cues—the question arises about whether hybrid media environments make people more open to being persuaded by the information and opinions they encounter in these contexts. We argue that second screening practices make people more likely to use social media content to form and/or change opinions about the political news or events they see on television. To test this argument, we employ a two-wave panel survey of adults in the United States, assessing the relationship between second screening and self-reported openness to political persuasion on social media. Additionally, we assess political dispositions and communication habits that might moderate this relationship, including political efficacy, social media news use, online and offline political talk, and social interaction on social media. Overall, this study contributes to the scholarly conversation about emergent communication practices and the influence of elite institutions versus ordinary citizens.

Second Screening

Also dubbed dual screening (Vaccari et al., 2015), second screening is an emergent communicative behavior facilitated by online media. It is characterized by "a process in which individuals watching television use an additional electronic device, or 'screen' to access the Internet or social networking sites to obtain more information about the program or event they are watching or to discuss it in real time" (Gil de Zúñiga, García-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015, p. 795). Thus, the concept of second screening is comprised of two complementary and related dimensions—information seeking and discussion. These dimensions represent background motivations for engaging in second screening, and

they occur in tandem in response to real time news events or programs (Wohn & Na, 2011).

Some scholars have claimed that second screening redefines the nature of audiences, giving them greater ability to shape public narratives alongside journalistic organizations and political elites (Gillespie & O'Loughlin, 2015). These types of audience contributions are often critical of mass media content (D'heer & Verdegem, 2015; Pond, 2016) and frequently make use of humor, irony, and "memes"—re-appropriations of mass media content typically used for critical commentary (Freelon & Karpf, 2015). These observations have led other scholars to argue that second screening gives news audiences more power relative to news media organizations, politicians, and political parties (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011, 2015; Chadwick et al., 2016). Others note, however, that second screeners often constitute a vocal minority (Bentivegna & Marchetti, 2015), and that political content is a minor topic compared to entertainment (Marchetti & Ceccobelli, 2015). Furthermore, the content to which second screeners respond is typically driven by mainstream news organizations, especially on television (Kim, Lee, & Park, 2015; Vergeer & Franses, 2015). Given these conflicting perspectives, a third group of scholars has described second screening as characterized by a complex interplay between media industries and audiences (Moe, Poell, & van Dijck, 2016; Wilson, 2016).

Research shows that second screening for news and information generally promotes political engagement via online media. For example, second screening is positively related to online political participation (Fitzgerald & Clarke, 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015; Vaccari et al., 2015). Additionally, second screening provides alternative spaces for political discussion (D'heer & Courtois, 2016; D'heer & Verdegem, 2014; Iannelli & Giglietto, 2015) and promotes online content creation (Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Giglietto & Selva, 2014). Thus, second screening provides new ways for people to engage with media content and potentially draws them into political conversations or other forms of online political participation.

Motivations for Second Screening for News and Public Affairs Content

People use media to fulfill particular needs (Katz & Blumler, 1974; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000), and second screening practices reflect, in part, a motivation to seek out additional information while watching a televised event (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015). The motivations for second screening behavior are, to some extent, rooted in a need for orientation. When people are uncertain about how to interpret the events they see on television, they need to orient themselves with public conversations about the event (Matthes, 2006; Weaver, 1980), and the act of engaging in those public conversations in real time (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015; Wohn & Na, 2011) helps people process the information they see on television (Shah et al., 2007a).

This is particularly the case during live news events, where people often turn to social media for event-related information. Second screening a news event gives the audience access to both self-curated news feeds and social opinion cues (Jahng & Littau, 2016; Turcotte et al., 2015). These networks operate alongside traditional media outlets as an addition information source, especially when uncertainty is high. That is, information seeking needs are higher during live news events, as individuals have not yet had time to form an opinion. For example, people rely on social networks for news during times of crisis, extreme weather events, and political debates (Hawthorne, Houston, & McKinney, 2013; Hermida, 2010; Houston et al., 2015).

Second Screening and Political Persuasion

Psychological uncertainty, as well as the subsequent need for orientation, may make people more open to persuasion (Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, & Hewitt, 1988). However, the process of opinion formation is also mediated by communication practices. Research has shown that media use *arising from* orientation needs makes individuals more likely to respond to media cues, which can have an influence on the perception of issue importance (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), candidate evaluation (Golan & Wanta, 2001), and event contextualization (McLeod & Detenber, 1999). Therefore, it is communication, rather than need for orientation, that enables the process of opinion formation or change.

This process occurs because, as people engage with public conversations on social media, they reflect on what they already know and think about the subject at hand. Research shows that this kind of engagement with news media and political discussion promotes cognitive elaboration and reflection (Cho et al., 2009; Shah et al., 2007a), which mediates the influence of communication on observable implications of opinion formation, including political participation (Cho et al., 2009; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Shah et al., 2007a), civic engagement (Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; Shah et al., 2007a), and political consumerism (Shah et al., 2007b). Thus, the political persuasion process on social media closely resembles parallel processes in non-hybrid media environments.

But there are at least two reasons second screening practices may be even more influential than non-hybrid media use in terms of opinion formation and change. First, second screening affords users the ability to engage in communicative processes in real time (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015; Wohn & Na, 2011), which means that news content and social opinion on social media will likely be the first information that second screeners encounter. Research shows that people generally favor the first information they receive about a topic, a cognitive bias called anchoring (Herriges & Shogren, 1996; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). These first impressions tend to weigh more heavily in people's minds when forming opinions (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995).

Second, second screening—which primarily occurs on social media platforms such as Twitter (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011; Doughty et al., 2011; Freelon &

Karpf, 2015; Giulietto & Selva, 2014; Pond, 2016)—allows people to get information not only from television, but also from social media, which expose people to user-generated content and social opinion cues alongside mainstream news content (Bode, 2015; Bond et al., 2012; Turcotte et al., 2015) that non-second screeners are not exposed to. These social cues provide direct evidence of social opinion (Schulz & Roessler, 2012; Spartz, Su, Griffin, Brossard, & Dunwoody, 2015; Thelwall, 2007), which people may take to be representative of public opinion, even if they are not (Lerman, Yan, & Wu, 2015). Online social cues are more likely to be taken as exemplars of public opinion (see, e.g., Zillmann, 2002), encouraging users to extrapolate from these cues to public opinion, at large (Thelwall, 2007). Therefore, exposure to these cues generally makes people more likely to be influenced by other users' opinions (Turcotte et al., 2015), because the perception of public opinion can affect people's own decision-making and evaluative processes (Gunther & Storey, 2003; Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Given that second screening (a) allows people to engage with public conversations in real time, and (b) exposes users to social opinion cues alongside news and public affairs content, we hypothesize that second screening makes individuals particularly likely to form or change political opinions.

H₁: Second screening will be positively related to political persuasion on social media.

Moderating Factors

Although there may be overall effects of second screening for news and public affairs content on political persuasion, literature suggests several factors that may influence this relationship. Given that our prediction regarding the main relationship relies, in part, on participants' attention to social cues, factors that influence whether people are able to interpret these cues, as well as the importance they place on them, could moderate the relationship between second screening and openness to persuasion. The current study explores internal political efficacy, social media for news, overall political discussion, and social and connective uses of social media as possible moderators.

Internal political efficacy is the confidence in one's ability to understand and participate in politics (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). Theory suggests that when faced with a task, people tend to do what they believe they can succeed at (Bandura, 1982; Pingree, 2011). While most literature on internal political efficacy has focused on its influence on behavioral outcomes, such as participation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006), others have noted an epistemic dimension to the efficacy concept (Pingree, 2011). In other words, internal self-efficacy also refers to people's belief in their ability to understand political events and form opinions about them. Because openness to political persuasion in social media contexts depends, to some extent, on understanding the social opinion cues embedded in social media content, the better an individual is able to understand and interpret these cues, the more likely they are to be open to using them when forming an opinion. Therefore, we expect that

internal political efficacy will moderate the relationship between second screening and self-reported persuasion.

H₂: The positive relationship between second screening and political persuasion on social media will be stronger among those who are high in political efficacy than among those who are not.

Social media news use should also influence people's ability to understand the social media content they encounter when second screening. Not all second screeners engage with political or public affairs content. In fact, the most commonly reported motivations for social media use include social and connective motivations (Pew, 2014; Quan-Haase & Young, 2010). Additionally, many people might supplement their television news viewing with games, idle chat, or other entertainment (Doughty, Rowland, & Lawson, 2012; Freelon & Karpf, 2015) rather than additional news.

Those who frequently use the news are more likely to respond to elite political cues in the traditional mass media (Zaller, 1992). In other words, when the valence of elite messaging in media changes, people who habitually pay more attention to the news are more likely to pick up on those changes and alter their political attitudes accordingly (Zaller, 1992). Thus, habitual news users are the most susceptible to the influence of elite media cues. There are good reasons to believe this trend may extend to the influence of social opinion cues in social media environments. In these environments, which are largely self-constructed and socially curated (Hermida, Fletcher, Korell, & Logan, 2012), news content frequently comes along with social endorsements of that content (Messing & Westwood, 2012; Turcotte et al., 2015). Prior research has shown that these social endorsements make people more likely to emphasize the social affiliation of the poster rather than the partisanship of the news source (Messing & Westwood, 2012). In other words, when it comes to using news on social media, people tend to pay close attention to social opinion cues, which can influence both exposure and interpretation of the content. Therefore, people who habitually engage with news content on social media should be more likely to use these social cues to form political opinions during a live event. Thus, we hypothesize that social media news use will also moderate the relationship between second screening and self-reported persuasion.

H₃: The positive relationship between second screening and political persuasion on social media will be stronger among those who frequently use social media for news than among those who do not.

The ability and willingness to comprehend the political content in social media environments are not the only factors that should influence people's opinion formation while second screening. The importance people place on socially curated information and opinion also helps shape how open people are to using social media content when forming an opinion about ongoing events and issues.

One indication that people place high importance on socially derived information is whether they frequently engage in online and offline political talk. Research shows that political talk contributes to political learning (Eveland, 2004), helps people develop and maintain social identities (Walsh, 2004), and helps people form attitudes through deliberative processes (Fishkin, 1991; Gastil & Dillard, 1999). While there are important differences between people who talk politics online and offline (Stromer-Galley, 2002), they share some relevant characteristics. Specifically, evidence suggests that people who engage in political talk, both online and offline, enjoy encountering new information and opinion provided by others in conversation (Hill & Hughes, 1998; Stromer-Galley, 2003). In general, then, both online and offline political talk act as indicators that people place high importance on the ideas and opinions of others, which makes them more likely to rely on those conversations when forming an opinion (Levitan & Verhulst, 2016). Therefore, people who frequently engage in political talk, regardless of the setting, should be more open to the influence of others while second screening. Accordingly, we expect that online and offline political talk will moderate the relationship between second screening and self-reported political persuasion.

H₄: The positive relationship between second screening and political persuasion on social media will be stronger among those who frequently engage in online and offline political discussion than among those who do not.

Research shows that social influence can be just as important as new information when it comes to forming or changing political preferences (Druckman & Lupia, 2000; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987). For example, one study found that knowledge of others' opinions within a social network influences political attitudes even without discussing the issue (Levitan & Verhulst, 2016), a finding that builds on classic research showing that the makeup of opinion within a network can influence vote preferences (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987).

Social media afford users increased ability to interact with friends, family members, and acquaintances (Ellison & Boyd, 2013; Quan-Haase & Young, 2010; Van Dijck, 2013). Arguably, this means that people also have greater ability to monitor their social environments to determine what opinions are socially desirable (Schultz & Roessler, 2012). The more people interact with others on social media, the more likely they are to engage in this kind of social opinion surveillance and to use social opinion as a reference point when forming their own views about an ongoing event. Therefore, we expect that social interaction on social media environments will also moderate the relationship between second screening and self-reported persuasion.

H₅: The positive relationship between second screening and political persuasion on social media will be stronger among those who frequently use social media to interact with others than among those who do not.

Methods

Sample and Data

This study uses data from an online, two-wave panel survey conducted in the United States by Nielsen, a professional media polling organization. Using a stratified quota sampling method, survey respondents were selected from a pool of over 200,000 people who registered to participate in an online panel. Nielsen uses a quota based on gender, age, education, and income to ensure the sample closely resembles the demographic distribution reported by the U.S. Census. Wave 1 of the survey ($N = 2,060$) was collected in December 2013, with a response rate (RR3) of 34.6% (AAPOR, 2011), indicating a relatively high level of survey participation for online panels (see Bosnjak, Das, & Lynn, 2015). The second wave was conducted in March 2014 ($N = 1,024$) and had a very high retention rate (57%, see Watson & Wooden, 2006). The sample is diverse, and it is comparable with both the U.S. population and surveys that use random sampling strategies (see Pew, 2014) in terms of age ($M = 52.7$, $SD = 14.7$), education (Min. = 1, Max. = 8, $M = 3.61$, $SD = 1.44$, Mdn = some college), income (range of scale 1–8, $M = 4.46$, $SD = 1.44$, Mdn = \$50,000–\$59,000), sex (49.9% female), and race (78% white). However, there were a few differences of note. The sample is slightly older, more educated, and includes fewer Hispanics compared with the U.S. Census.

Measures

Political Persuasion on Social Media. The measure of political persuasion on social media, which is based on prior research (Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015; Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2015), relies on respondents' self-reports of their openness to using social media content to form or change an opinion. While these previous studies used three items to measure this construct, they included measures of elite influence on social media. Because the goal of the current research is to isolate the role of peer-to-peer influence, we used the two questionnaire items that most closely reflect this concept and excluded the item measuring elite influence. In both survey waves (1 = *Never*, 10 = *Very Frequently*), questionnaire items asked respondents how often they (a) change their minds about political issues because of information or interactions on social media and (b) how often they reconsider their political views because of information or interactions on social media. These items form reliable measures and were averaged to create the final variable (Wave 1 Spearman Brown coefficient = .96, $M = 1.97$, $SD = 1.82$; Wave 2 Spearman Brown coefficient = .97, $M = 1.97$, $SD = 1.87$).

Second Screening. The second screening variable was also based on prior research (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015), and was measured in Wave 1 with three

items (1 = *Never*, 10 = *Very Frequently*) asking respondents (a) how often they second screen during political speeches or debates, (b) how often they second screen during the news, and (c) how often they second screen during election coverage. These items were averaged to create the final variable (Cronbach's $\alpha = .92$, $M = 2.55$, $SD = 2.39$).

Social Media News Use. Social media news use (see, e.g., Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, Valenzuela, 2012, Lee & Ma, 2012; Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009) was measured with four Wave 1 survey items (1 = *Never*, 10 = *Very Frequently*) asking respondents how often they (a) use Facebook for getting news, (b) use Twitter for getting news, (c) use social media to stay informed about current events and public affairs, and (d) use social media to get news about current events from mainstream media (e.g., CNN or ABC). These items were averaged to create the final variable (Cronbach's $\alpha = .82$, $M = 2.67$, $SD = 2.06$).

Social Media Interaction. Building on previous research (Lee & Ma, 2012; Park et al., 2009), the analysis also controls for individuals' interactivity on social media. Social media interaction was measured with three survey items (1 = *Never*, 10 = *Very Frequently*) using similar scales that asked respondents how often they use social media to (a) stay in touch with family and friends, (b) meet new people who share interests, and (c) contact people they wouldn't meet otherwise. These items were averaged (Cronbach's $\alpha = .75$, $M = 3.57$, $SD = 2.32$).

Frequency of Social Media Use. Analyses also control for overall frequency of social media use on the recommendation of previous literature (Quan-Haase & Young, 2010). Social media use was measured with a single survey item asking respondents how often they use social media on a typical day (1 = *Never*, 10 = *Very Frequently*, $M = 4.15$, $SD = 3.00$).

Traditional News Use. Prior research has linked traditional news use with persuasion (Feldman, 2011), and therefore it was controlled. It was measured with 10 survey items that asked respondents how often (1 = *Never*, 10 = *Very Frequently*) they (a) get news from network TV news (e.g., ABC, CBS, NBC), (b) get news from local television news (local affiliate station), (c) get news from fake news programs (e.g., *Daily Show*, *Colbert Report*), (d) get news from national newspapers (e.g., *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *USA Today*), (e) get news from local newspapers (e.g., *Oregonian*, *Houston Chronicle*, *Miami Herald*), (f) get news from cable news (e.g., CNN, Fox News, MSNBC), (g) get news from radio news (e.g., NPR, talk shows), (h) use print for news, (i) use television for news, and (j) use radio for news. These items were averaged to create the final variable (Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$, $M = 5.00$, $SD = 1.73$).

Online News Use. Prior research has also linked online news use with persuasion (Feldman, 2011), and therefore it was also controlled. It was measured with four survey items using similar scales that asked respondents how often they (a) get news

from online news sites (e.g., Gawker, Politico, BuzzFeed), (b) use a computer Web browser (laptop or desktop) for news, (c) use a tablet app or browser (iPad, 7 inches or larger) for news, and (d) use a smartphone app or browser (handheld mobile device smaller than 7 inches) for news. These items were averaged (Cronbach's $\alpha = .67$, $M = 3.72$, $SD = 1.94$).

Political Talk Network Size. Characteristics of political discussion networks could influence media-related behavior (Eveland & Hivey, 2009), and political attitude ambivalence (Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004). Therefore, several dimensions of respondent's offline and online discussion networks were measured. To measure political talk network size, two survey items asked respondents (a) about how many people would you say have you talked to face-to-face or over the phone about politics or public affairs and (b) about how many people would you say you have talked to via the Internet, including e-mail, chat rooms, social networking sites, and micro-blogging sites. These items were added together in an index, and a log transformation was applied to reduce skew (Min = 0, Max = 6.31, $M = 1.22$, $SD = 1.23$).

Political Talk Frequency. Based on the recommendations of prior research (Eveland & Hivey, 2009), political talk frequency was measured by nine survey items that asked respondents how frequently (1 = *Never*, 10 = *Very Frequently*) they talk about politics or public affairs online and offline with (a) spouse or partner, (b) family relatives, (c) friends, (d) acquaintances, (e) strangers, (f) neighbors they know well, (g) neighbors they do not know well, (h) coworkers they know well, and (i) coworkers they do not know well. These items were averaged (Cronbach's $\alpha = .87$, $M = 3.28$, $SD = 1.74$).

Political Talk Heterogeneity. Also based on the recommendations of prior research (Mutz, 2006), analyses control for political talk heterogeneity. It was measured with four items on similar scales asking respondents how frequently they talk about politics or public affairs online and offline with (a) people who disagree with them, (b) people whose political views are different from theirs, (c) people from a different race or ethnicity, and (d) people from a different social class. These items, which form a reliable scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$), were averaged ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 2.46$).

Political Interest. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Shah et al., 2007a), the analyses control for political orientations. Political interest was measured with two items (1 = *Not at All*, 10 = *A Great Deal*) asking respondents (a) how interested they are in information about what's going on in politics or public affairs and (b) how closely they pay attention to information about what's going on in politics or public affairs (Spearman Brown coefficient = .96, $M = 6.67$, $SD = 2.70$).

Internal Political Efficacy. Political efficacy (Niemi et al., 1991) was measured with three items (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 10 = *Strongly Agree*) asking respondents the extent to which they agree with the following statements: (a) people like me can

influence government, (b) I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics, and (c) I have a good understanding of important political issues facing our country. These items were averaged (Cronbach's $\alpha = .78$, $M = 5.17$, $SD = 2.24$).

Ideological Extremity. Finally, ideological extremity (see, e.g., Garrett & Stroud, 2014) was measured with two items (1 = *Liberal*, 11 = *Conservative*) asking respondents to place themselves on the political spectrum on (a) social issues and (b) economic issues. These items were folded and then averaged (Spearman Brown coefficient = .86, $M = 3.23$, $SD = 1.72$).

Demographics. Analyses also control for demographic variables including age, gender, education, income, and race. The average respondent is 52.64 years old, has completed some college ($M = 3.61$, $SD = 1.43$), and makes between \$25,000 and \$50,000 per year ($M = 4.47$, $SD = 1.43$). About half (49.9%) of respondents identify as female, and 21.5% identify as a racial minority.

Results

The first hypothesis predicts that second screening will be positively related to political persuasion on social media. First, the cross-sectional relationship between these variables was assessed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and results are reported in Table 1. In the cross-sectional framework, second screening is positively related to self-reported persuasion ($\beta = .069$, $p < .05$), and the variable explains an additional .3% of the variance in the outcome on top of the influence of demographics, political orientations, communication antecedents, and other social media behaviors. Notably, social media use ($\beta = -.116$, $p < .001$), social media news use ($\beta = .353$, $p < .001$), and social media interaction ($\beta = .274$, $p < .001$) are significantly related to the outcome. In all, the cross-sectional model explains 42.8% of the variance in political persuasion on social media, and suggests that individuals who second screen are also more likely to be open to political persuasion in social media contexts.

Next, the over-time relationship was assessed with an autoregressive panel model that estimates the effect of second screening at Time 1 on self-reported political persuasion at Time 2 while controlling for self-reported political persuasion at Time 1. Results are reported in Table 2. Just as in the cross-sectional analysis, second screening at Time 1 is positively related to self-reported persuasion at Time 2 ($\beta = .060$, $p < .05$) and explains an additional .3% of the variance in the outcome—even when controlling for the aforementioned variables and the autoregressive term, which itself is strongly related to the outcome ($\beta = .474$, $p < .001$). Notably, social media news is also positively related to self-reported persuasion ($\beta = .162$, $p < .001$). The full model explains 48.1% of the variance in self-reported persuasion at Time 2 and suggests that individuals who second screen are more likely to be open to persuasion in social media contexts at a later point in time. Taken together, the

Table 1
The Cross-Sectional Relationship between Second Screening and Political Persuasion on Social Media

Variable	Political persuasion on social media				
	β				
Age	-.052 [#]	-.053 [#]	-.050 [#]	-.062*	-.054 [#]
Gender (1 = Female)	-.030	-.028	-.029	-.023	-.029
Education	.009	.012	.010	.018	.014
Income	-.029	-.024	-.027	-.021	-.026
Race (1 = Minority)	-.006	-.007	-.003	-.006	-.007
R^2 Change			4.7%		
Political interest	-.027	-.025	-.025	-.005	-.023
Internal political efficacy	.068*	-.037	.066*	.059 [#]	.066*
Strength of ideology	-.055*	-.056*	-.056*	-.055*	-.057*
R^2 Change			6.6%		
Political talk network size	-.011	-.010	-.007	.008	-.003
Political talk frequency	.191***	.172***	.179***	.014	.177***
Political talk heterogeneity	.055	.061	.057	.052	.050
Traditional news use	-.057 [#]	-.060*	-.061*	-.057 [#]	-.062*
Online news use	-.002	-.004	-.001	-.013	-.008
R^2 Change			13.7%		
Social media use	-.116**	-.114**	-.108**	-.108**	-.097*
Social media news use	.353***	.350***	.259***	.336***	.332***
Social media interaction	.274***	.270***	.281***	.267***	.158***
R^2 Change			17.5%		
Second screening	.069*	-.197**	-.023	-.211***	-.126*
R^2 Change			.3%		
Second screening by:					
Political efficacy	—	.293***	—	—	—
Social media news use	—	—	.170*	—	—
Political talk frequency	—	—	—	.449***	—
Social media interaction	—	—	—	—	.277***
R^2 Change	—	1.1%	.4%	2.0%	.9%
Total R^2	42.8%	43.9%	43.2%	44.8%	43.7%

Note. Cell entries are standardized beta coefficients (β) from a ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. [#] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

cross-sectional and autoregressive models strongly support H₁: Second screening is positively related to political persuasion on social media at a single time point and also over time.

Table 2
The Over-Time, Autoregressive Relationship between Second Screening and Political Persuasion on Social Media

Political persuasion on social media _{T2}					
Variable	β				
Age	-.043	-.044	-.042	-.044	-.044
Gender (1 = Female)	.011	.011	.011	.011	.011
Education	.005	.006	.006	.005	.007
Income	-.063*	-.061*	-.061*	-.062*	-.061*
Race (1 = Minority)	.058*	.057*	.060*	.058*	.057*
R^2 Change			4.5%		
Political interest _{T1}	-.027	-.026	-.024	-.025	-.025
Internal political efficacy _{T1}	.062 [#]	.021	.060 [#]	.062 [#]	.062 [#]
Strength of ideology _{T1}	.003	.002	.002	.003	.002
R^2 Change			6.8%		
Political talk network Size _{T1}	.098**	.098**	.102***	.100**	.101***
Political talk frequency _{T1}	-.016	-.021	-.028	-.028	-.021
Political talk heterogeneity _{T1}	.058	.060	.060	.057	.056
Traditional news use _{T1}	-.001	-.002	-.005	-.001	-.004
Online news use _{T1}	-.012	-.013	-.012	-.013	-.015
R^2 Change	10.6%				
Social media use _{T1}	-.043	-.043	-.036	-.043	-.035
Social media news use _{T1}	.162***	.164***	.067	.162***	.155***
Social media interaction _{T1}	.058	.058	.067 [#]	.058	.007
R^2 Change			12.7%		
Political persuasion on social media _{T1}	.474***	.467***	.467***	.472***	.466***
R^2 Change			13.2%		
Second screening _{T1}	.060*	-.046	-.035	.041	-.029
R^2 Change			.3%		
Second screening by:					
Political efficacy _{T1}	—	.117 [#]	—	—	—
Social media news use _{T1}	—	—	.176**	—	—
Political talk frequency _{T1}	—	—	—	.031	—
Social media interaction _{T1}	—	—	—	—	.128*
R^2 Change	—	.1%	.4%	.0%	.2%
Total R^2	48.1%	48.2%	48.5%	48.1%	48.3%

Note. Cell entries are standardized beta coefficients (β) from a ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. [#] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

The hypothesized moderated relationships were tested in both the cross-sectional (Table 1) and autoregressive (Table 2) frameworks. These moderated relationships are illustrated in Figures 1 (cross-sectional) and 2 (autoregressive), which plot the effect size for the relationship between second screening and self-reported persuasion at each level of the moderators using the Johnson-Neyman technique.

Figure 1
Cross-Sectional Conditional Effects of Second Screening on Political Persuasion on Social Media as a Function of Internal Political Efficacy (Top Left), Social Media News Use (Top Right), Political Talk Frequency (Bottom Left), and Social Media Interaction (Bottom Right)





Figure 2
Over-Time, Autoregressive Conditional Effects of Second Screening on Political Persuasion on Social Media as a Function of Internal Political Efficacy (Top Left), Social Media News Use (Top Right), Political Talk Frequency (Bottom Left), and Social Media Interaction (Bottom Right).



Among the four moderators, social media news use (cross-sectional $\beta = .170, p < .05$; autoregressive $\beta = .176, p < .01$) and social media interaction (cross-sectional $\beta = .277, p < .001$; autoregressive $\beta = .128, p < .05$) exert a significant influence on the relationship between second screening and self-reported persuasion in both analytic frameworks. Both at a single point in time and also over time, the relationship between second screening and self-reported persuasion is stronger among individuals who frequently use social media (a) for news or (b) to interact with others. These results strongly support H_3 (social media news use) and H_5 (social media interaction).

Results are mixed for the other two moderators, political efficacy and political talk frequency. Both interactions are significant in the cross-sectional analysis (for political efficacy, $\beta = .293, p < .001$; for political talk frequency, $\beta = .449, p < .001$), but neither reaches acceptable levels of significance in the autoregressive framework. Taken together, these results ultimately lead to a rejection of H_2 (political efficacy) and H_4 (political talk frequency).

Discussion

Participatory media technologies have altered the dynamics of influence between elite media organizations and ordinary citizens (Benkler, 2006), and some have argued that second screening practices making use of these technologies have contributed to this shift (Chadwick et al., 2016). As the adoption of mobile devices proliferates (Pew, 2015), the typical American's media experience has become increasing characterized by hybridity—they are not only exposed to information they see on television, but they can engage and interact with, even co-create, additional political content on social media (Doughty et al., 2011; Vacarri et al., 2015). These hybrid media practices provide more pathways for citizens to engage in public conversations about the events they see unfold in real time on television (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015). But in these hybrid media environments, the question arises whether second screening practices make it more likely that people will use social media content—news, user-generated content, and social opinion cues—to form or change their opinions about political events, actors, institutions, and issues.

This study provides evidence that they do. Results show a positive relationship between second screening and self-reported political persuasion on social media in both the cross-sectional and autoregressive frameworks. Theoretically, there are good reasons to believe that the hybrid media experience is even more influential than the traditional media environment in terms of making people open to political persuasion. First, social media content is typically the first information second screeners are exposed to outside of television programming because it enables real time engagement with public conversations (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015; Wohn & Na, 2011). People tend to favor these initial considerations more heavily when forming opinions or making decisions (Herriges & Shogren, 1996; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). Second, because second screening occurs primarily on social media (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011; Doughty et al., 2011; Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Giglietto & Selva,

2014; Pond, 2016), people are exposed to social opinion cues alongside news and public affairs content (Bode, 2015; Bond et al., 2012; Turcotte et al., 2015). These social cues provide direct evidence of the opinion climate within social networks (Schulz & Roessler, 2012; Spartz, Su, Griffin, Brossard, & Dunwoody, 2015; Thelwall, 2007), and people may rely on this evidence when forming their own opinions. This mix of news and social opinion therefore makes people more open to the influence of other people's opinions, news recommendations, or conversations that they encounter in social media environments (Messing & Westwood, 2012; Turcotte et al., 2015).

Results show that people who frequently use social media for news are more likely to be open to persuasion in social media contexts than those who do not. In general, people who habitually pay attention to news are more likely to respond to political cues embedded in media content (Zaller, 1992). But there are key differences when it comes to news on social media, where news content comes alongside social opinion cues—often in the form of content endorsements (Messing & Westwood, 2012). Because social media users self-construct these socially curated news networks, people may be more likely to pay attention to social opinion cues (Hermida et al., 2012; Messing & Westwood, 2012; Turcotte et al., 2015), making them more open to using these cues when interpreting or processing political or public affairs content.

Results also show that people who frequently interact with others in social media contexts are more open to political persuasion on social media while second screening. And while social influence has always been important when it comes to preference change (Druckman & Lupia, 2000; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987), social media afford people greater ability to monitor their social networks for opinion cues (Schultz & Roessler, 2012). The more people interact with others on social media, the more they are immersed in a socially opinionated environment, and this immersion arguably increases the likelihood that people will be socially influenced (Levitan & Verhulst, 2016).

Taken together, these results suggest that second screening may be a “weapon of the strong” (Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2010). In other words, the people who already pay attention to the news and interact with others in social media contexts are the most likely to use those opinion cues when forming their own opinions. Thus, while second screening can be seen as a new pathway to political engagement (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015), the effects of that engagement occur most acutely among those who are already highly involved or engaged with political content on social media to begin with. Therefore, it could be argued that second screening potentially increases the engagement gap between those who are highly involved and those who are not, as the highly involved have yet another way to stay up to date with public conversations about political events as they unfold.

These results have implications for broader scholarly conversations about the political autonomy of individuals and groups relative to elite social institutions, including media organizations, politicians, parties, and interest groups. Some have argued that participatory media, in general, make people more independent from

these institutions as sources of information and opinion (Benkler, 2006), while others have specifically suggested that second screening practices give audiences more power relative to media organizations (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011, 2015; Chadwick et al., 2016). The results of this study imply that, while second screening practices may give audience members the ability to shape public narratives about political events (Gillespie & O'Loughlin, 2015), often in critical fashion (D'heer & Verdegem, 2015; Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Pond, 2016), these practices also make people more dependent on other social media users when forming and/or changing political opinions. Therefore, while second screeners are not completely dependent on elite media organizations for information, the practice makes them more open to other sources of political influence, for good or for bad (Bode, 2015; Bond et al., 2012; Turcotte et al., 2015). Furthermore, elite news media organizations continue to play a major role in the persuasion process in social media environments because mainstream media content ostensibly provides the starting point for public conversations (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2012; Gil de Zuniga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). Thus, the evidence presented in this study points toward a "middle way": Second screening practices contribute to a complex interplay between media organizations and their audiences (Moe et al., 2016; Wilson, 2016), in which the people take an increasingly prominent role in shaping public narratives without necessarily diminishing the influence of elite news media.

Several limitations are important to consider when interpreting the results of the study. First, although the panel data used in this study establishes causal order between second screening and self-reported political persuasion, it cannot account for every potential alternative explanation for persuasion. In the future, experimental research is necessary to establish a causal relationship between second screening practices and persuasion. Second, this research studies adults of all ages, but young people may be especially likely to engage in second screening practices. Future research should focus on studying young adult populations. Third, this study has not measured opinion change, *per se*, but rather the openness to use social media content to form or change opinions. Future research should develop a method for directly observing political opinions and change over time. Another limitation relates to our measures of second screening. While our measures are based on previous research (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015), the measures represent general second-screening behaviors rather than specifically focusing on second screening for discussion versus information seeking. Future research should address this limitation by examining second screening for various reasons. Our second screening measures are also limited in that they did not measure political versus non-political second screening. Future research could focus on this distinction by developing items that specifically tap second screening for political versus entertainment purposes. The news use measures are also limited in important ways. While these measures were also based on previous research (Feldman, 2011), the news use measures capture both the frequency of using news as well as the breadth of media to which people are exposed. Therefore, we cannot tell if the relationships involving news use are driven by frequency of exposure or breadth of exposure. Future research should test the

difference between these important dimensions of news use. Finally, this study is unable to directly observe the content of second screening activities, and future research could focus on describing and characterizing it with a content analysis of the information and discussions people encounter when they second screen.

Despite these limitations, this study shows evidence that second screening makes people more likely to use social media content when forming or changing political opinions. The findings show that individuals who “double up” on media during a political news event are more open to persuasion on social media. Furthermore, findings show that this persuasion process is more likely to occur among those who already use social media for news or social interaction. These findings have broad implications for scholarly conversations about the nature of hybrid media experiences and the modern public sphere. Specifically, second screening practices may give individuals greater influence in shaping public narratives about important political issues, but in the process of doing so, they themselves become more open to political influence.

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